1	BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
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3	CE06-002 In the Matter of the Complaint filed by Sioux Valley Southwestern Electric Cooperative
Inc., d/b/a Sioux V	Inc., d/b/a Sioux Valley Energy against Northern States Power Company, d/b/a/ Xcel Energy,
5	Regarding Provision of Electric Service to Myrl and Roy's Paving,
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8	2205 Career Place/USDSU Building Sioux Falls, South Dakota June 13, 2006
10	2:30 p.m.
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12	MEETING
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14	Chairman Bob Sahr Commissioner Gary Hanson
15	Commissioner Dustin Johnson
16	STAFF ATTORNEYS:
17	Mr. John Smith Mr. Greg Rislov
18	Mr. Greg Rislov Ms. Sara Greff
19	Mr. David A. Gerdes May, Adam, Gerdes & Thompson
20	P.O. Box 160 Pierre, South Dakota 57501-0160
21	for Xcel Energy;
22	Mr. Alan F. Glover
23	Glover & Helsper, P.C. SOUTH DAKOTA DEGLE
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With that we will 1 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: proceed with the main event. Under consumer 2 3 complaints, CE06-002, in the matter of the complaint filed by Sioux Valley Southwestern 4 Electric Cooperative doing business as Sioux 5 Valley Energy against Northern States Power 6 7 Company, doing business as Xcel Energy, 8 Regarding Provision of Electric Service to Myrl 9 and Roy's Paving. The question for the commission today is shall the commission grant 10 the motion to dismiss, and I believe the motion 11 to dismiss is made by Xcel. As the moving 12 13 party Xcel has the floor. Members of the commission. MR. GERDES: 14 15 name is Dave Gerdes. I'm a lawyer from Pierre and I represent Xcel Energy in this matter. 16 it agreeable to the commission if I speak from 17 here as opposed to coming closer? 18 19 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: That would be fine. MR. GERDES: Xcel has made a motion to dismiss 20 the complaint on the basis that it fails to 21 22 state a claim upon which relief can be granted as a matter of law; that is, we're saying that 23 the law simply does not contemplate the relief 24 25 which Sioux Valley is asking for in its

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

complaint.

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When this first came up, just by way of background, when I opened my file I entitled it "Myrl and Roy Revisited" because of course it all stems from the Myrl and Roy case, which is a 1992 case, decided by this commission which went up to the South Dakota Supreme Court, and which this commission's decision was affirmed And the question was -- it was kind of a unique situation but -- and I won't bore the commission because I'm sure you're familiar with the facts. But there's a quarry that is in both service territories, Sioux Valley's and Xcel's. Xcel's is the northern half of a quarter section and -- excuse me, Xcel's is the northern half of a quarter section and Sioux Valley's is the southern half of the quarter section.

This commission ruled that in 1992 -- or before the 1992 Supreme Court decision that Sioux Valley could not deliver electricity into then NSP, now Xcel's territory through a private line that was constructed by Myrl and Roy. And they ruled that under the majority load test that in fact the load that was coming

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

in was that of Xcel's, and that Xcel should provide service to that location.

I want to talk about the word location, and I want to talk about the concept of retained right. Those are both concepts that have come up in cases of the South Dakota Supreme Court since the first Myrl and Roy case.

You'll note that in the Myrl and Roy case the South Dakota Supreme Court says this: "We feel constrained to point out that what we have not held. This decision does not hold that the majority load test" -- the MLT test they call it -- "is required in every contested territorial case. PUC may conclude under a different set of facts that a different test such as point of use test or point of delivery test is more appropriate for consideration and application in a subsequent case."

Now, they're not talking about a retrial of the Myrl and Roy case. They're talking about other cases under similar circumstances in that quote. And the point I want to make is that the Supreme Court has in subsequent cases, and specifically in what I call the Hub City

case, it's the Northwestern Public Service case involving the old Hub City Iron property in Aberdeen where the REC was granted the right to serve that location under the majority load -excuse me, under the large load statutes in our code. And the customer and Northwestern at a later time concluded that there had been a change in circumstances and that we had to go back, and they had a retained right to go back and ask that that be revisited, and that because of the change in circumstances reassign it to Northwestern Public Service rather than NEC, which was the rural electric carrier. the South Dakota Supreme Court said very specifically that there is no such thing as a retained right under South Dakota law.

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Once a service territory is assigned it's assigned. That's it. And the only way it can be changed is pursuant to a statute passed by the legislature. And the legislature did not contemplate a situation where there had been a change in circumstances.

In other words, once assigned the territory is assigned. And it can't change except for some very limited circumstances that

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

applied neither to the Hub City case nor that apply to this case.

And the major reason that the courts have assigned for this rule is what they have talked about as being the fundamental reason that the Territorial Integrity Act was passed, and, that is, that the South Dakota Territorial Integrity Act exists to eliminate duplication and wasteful spending in all segments of the electric utility industry. The court has said that many times, especially in its more recent decisions.

Now, if we -- if this commission wants to go back and revisit Myrl and Roy, what's going to happen is that Sioux Valley is going to have to construct a whole new system of poles and wires and transformers, and the rest, to deliver the same load that Northwestern -- or that Xcel is now delivering, plus some because of course there's a proposed expansion involved here. And that is why the legislature in its wisdom in 1975 passed an act that said once the service area is assigned it's assigned and that's it. And the Supreme Court in the Hub City case -- in the Northwestern Public Service

case said there is no statutory means to change the law by virtue of a retained right to go back and revisit the decision that was made previously. That is the same thing that Sioux Valley is to trying to do in this -- in this complaint here because back in the original Myrl and Roy case the commission used the majority load test to determine which utility should serve that situation.

Now, Sioux Valley will tell you, no, this isn't a retained right. We think it was -we're going back because of the majority load test and we think we have a right to recalculate the majority load. Well, isn't that retained right except using another name? I would submit that it is. And that's the whole point of the position that Xcel is taking in this case, and, that is, the Supreme Court clearly said in the Hub City case that there is no basis in statute to make the change that they want to do in the Hub City case. We would contend there's no basis in statute to make the change to revisit the assignment of the territory that was made in the original Myrl and Roy case. And the only way that that can

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Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

occur is for the legislature to go back and amend the law, and that has not occurred.

Now, I also want to point out, because there's another reason — these are both new cases new to the Myrl and Roy case. The one I just talked about, the Hub City case, is new, more recent. And then there's the most recent one, and that's the West River Electric case out in Rapid City. And, again, the Supreme Court said that a location, is a location, is a location.

Once a location is served you can't change the utility that provides service to that location. What do we have here? We have a quarry. We had a quarry back in 1992 and we've got a quarry right now. Who is serving it?

Xcel. You cannot change the service provider on — the Supreme Court said in the West River Electric case you can't change the provider simply because of a change in load, either reduction or increase in the load. Whoever is providing that service will continue to provide that service.

Another thing that's kind of interesting, and I'm about ready to get to the end, and I

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and I'm about ready to get to

apologize for waxing so eloquently here, at least I think it's eloquent, some may not. But the other thing that's interesting is that way back in the Myrl and Roy case, Myrl and Roy won. They talk about the fact that it is — the point of connection is viewed by the industry to be the place where the service is established.

They said, well, the record indicates that it is an industry practice to treat the point of connection as the point of delivery of service. And that's true today. That's the way the industry views it. Well, where is the point of connection in the Myrl and Roy case? It's in Xcel's territory. And so for at least three reasons, not the least of which is that there's no retained right to go back and recalculate all this. We submit that the motion to dismiss should be granted.

And I want to say one last thing, and,
that is that the SDREA filed a brief that I got
about -- fortunately I was at the office at
5:46 last night because that's when it came -but SDREA says, well, there are fact issues.
There isn't a fact issue that affects what I've

talked about. We have admitted every allegation in the complaint that's relevant to what I just got done saying. They're saying, well, there's a fact issue as to where the majority load is. We're saying there is no issue about the majority load because the location has already been assigned. We don't have to worry about the majority load.

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Commissioners, you can consider the majority load to be in Sioux Valley's territory for all I care because we say it's not relevant. And the same is true under the West River Electric case. Whether the load goes up and down or where it is in the location, it doesn't make any difference because whoever is serving the location is entitled to continue the location. So whether you view it under the Myrl and Roy case, under the Hub City case, or under the West River Electric case we would submit that the petition should be dismissed. Thank you. And I apologize for going along so long. And I'll be happy to answer any questions when the time comes. COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Gerdes. Now from my count there were three parties

Now from my count there were three partie

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filing briefs in opposition to the motion to 1 2 dismiss. Is there a particular order that was agreed upon? Mr. Glover and Ms. Moore? 3 Sioux Valley should go first. MS. GREFF: 4 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: We'll go with Sioux 5 Valley first. 6 Thank you. 7 MR. GLOVER: COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Followed by Myrl and 8 Roy, followed by SDREA, followed by staff, if 9 10 that's amenable to everyone. Thank you. I'm Al Glover, 11 MR. GLOVER: attorney from Brookings, South Dakota. 12 represent Sioux Valley Energy. And, by the 13 14 way, I've represented Sioux Valley Energy when we were up here on the first Myrl and Roy's 15 And so I'm quite familiar with it. And 16 case. 17 I think it's interesting to draw some distinctions though. 18 As a matter of fact, I had quite a finger 19 in the development of the territorial law in 20 the first instance. I was one of the original 21 drafters. Not that that gives me any greater 22 eloquence when I'm speaking to it, as opposing 23 counsel would say, but I think that I am 24

familiar with it. And I think that the two

instances, of course, that were cited as the major cases by Mr. Gerdes in this case, he referred to one as the Black Hills or the West River case. That was a case where that customer was assigned by virtue of the law as it was drafted. It was part of the original assignment of customers. And it was -- you know, the old thing where he was an existing customer but it was in the West River's territory. And so what we are arguing about is as that customer's load and his development expanded, what ultimately it did is it just kept going more and more and more into that territory, and that's where we got into the issue of location. And basically it was ruled that once that was assigned under the Territorial Act that we weren't going to change And it gave a very broad definition to location.

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The one in Aberdeen is an example of the exact same -- of a different exception. It was in our law. And that's the large load exception. And basically that -- once our courts have said, yes. Once that exception is made and the customer's awarded, that we're not

made and the customer's awarded, that we're n

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

going to permit any changes. So if there's any, the Public Utilities Commission has no authority or no power to make that correction.

Now, I would submit that there may come a time where some development -- I'm not even going to go there, but I will talk about the distinction in this case.

In this particular case that territorial line was drawn and agreed to by both parties.

NSP got that -- got the north half of that quarter and Sioux Valley got the south half.

It's split right through the quarry. At the time, of course, it wasn't Myrl and Roy's. It was some other company that was doing that.

And they were providing their own electricity for the projects.

Ultimately Sioux Valley was provided -providing electricity to their trailer until
the point in time when Myrl and Roy's decided
that they wanted some three-phase power at that
site. And I think it's interesting that
counsel would argue that we had -- the point of
connection was a criteria in the initial Myrl
and Roy's case because they ignored that,
because the point of connection in the initial

Myrl and Roy's case was in Sioux Valley's territory. That's where we connected to the load.

We were arguing, of course, that Myrl and Roy chose to take it from that point in connection, and he was running his own wires over to run some of his equipment was in -- which was in their territory. But we lost on that point. The point of connection technically did not rule.

So we had a situation in the first Myrl and Roy's where we had a customer that was straddling the line. They were serving -- operating in both Sioux Valley's territory. Their location, so to speak, was in Sioux Valley's territory and in NSP's territory.

And PUC -- there's no law -- that

territory law did not deal with that situation.

It was only the Public Utilities Commission

that dealt with that situation. They took it

upon themselves to say we've got some inherent

powers here to resolve these issues based upon

a number of standards and so we're resolving

it. We're adopting the load -- the majority

load test and we're going to do it.

And when they did that I thought their comments were interesting. They said we don't -- because I argued that. I said, What's going to happen if that load grows into Sioux Valley's territory? They said, Well, we think that that's a real possibility. It didn't happen as quickly as we projected it might, but they said at the time if that's the case we're not going to deal with that now. That's not before us. We'll deal with it if and when that comes up.

Well, it's happened. It's happened now.

But they had no statutory authority to make

that decision. That was their inherent power.

And that is different than either of the

cases -- of the two cases cited. And our

Supreme Court has gone on and said where there

is, and I cited that in my brief, it says,

Where there is no statutory authority we have

to rely upon the inherent power and knowledge

of the PUC to deal with these topics.

In this particular case when they adopted the majority load test, I think that has since been the only one that we've ever seen where that's come up. But to say that that can never

be modified based upon the load growth I think is presumptuous and I don't think that the other cases hold that under these unique circumstances. Because under these unique circumstances we've got a customer that was awarded by a decision of the PUC that was not statutory-backed, so to speak, and now we have this customer who has -- in fact, the PUC said one of the exceptions where a customer can choose. That was one of the big issues because Myrl and Roy wanted to choose. And they said the only way that a customer can choose is by moving his load into another customer's territory.

Basically it's one of the ways a customer gets to choose who's going to be his provider.

Well, Myrl and Roy -- what if Myrl and Roy moved all of their load into our territory now?

And that's a possibility that could happen. As they're developing that quarry everything is developing to the south. And as they continue to develop it we could very well have one hundred percent of the load in Sioux Valley's territory.

Now, we then would have the unique

circumstances where we are absolutely -- which I say would be in violation of the law because we would have another utility serving a customer who is located in our territory entirely.

So why would you not be able to go back and say under the majority load test, at least evaluate to see what would be the good reasons for doing that. I think it's presumptuous to argue at this point in time that because we don't really know what the facts and circumstances are as to whether or not it would be wasteful. I know there would be some duplication. But that's a subjective matter determination that can be determined by way of hearing as to how much — how much duplication or waste might take place.

The fact is is that -- that's only one standard. The other standard that you've got to consider is who's going -- somebody's going to be serving a customer that's located in our territory now, and what standard are you going to adopt? Are you going to now eliminate and say we're no longer going to apply the majority load test once we've decided it? You're all

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1 That's what you're being asked to do. And I think that that's -- I don't think that 2 3 that's what was ever intended by our legislature. 4 Thank you. 5 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Mr. Glover, thank you. Ms. Moore? 6 7 Thank you, Commissioner Johnson. 8 Meredith Moore appearing on behalf of Myrl and We would obviously rely upon our brief 9 10 for the majority of our issues, but for 11 purposes of elucidating some of the arguments 12 that have already been expressed I would concur 13 in Mr. Glover's statement that to rely upon the 14 1997 Hub City case as well as the 2004 West 15 River Electric Cooperative case would make bad 16 law, frankly, because the decisions of those 17 cases are constrained to their facts. And the 18 1992 case which involved Myrl and Roy's is also 19 premised upon a very unique set of facts, and a 20 set of facts which since 1992 has never been 21 addressed again by the South Dakota Supreme 22 Court. And I think that it's very well pointed 23 out in the South Dakota Supreme Court's 24 decision, specifically at footnote six, which

is effectively a recitation of the PUC's ruling

at the time which specifically said, "Under the record as established in this case the majority of Myrl and Roy's electric power is currently consumed in NSP's assigned service area, and, therefore, NSP has the exclusive right to serve the entire load."

At no point was there necessarily a distinction granted that it would be exclusive territory or a redefinition of territory for the future. Therefore, it was essentially contemplated by the South Dakota Supreme Court that this issue could in fact be revisited if the facts justified such a revisitation. And they do in this particular instance. And we're not simply talking about the point of connection or being able to move that from one particular side of the dividing line to the other, but we're also talking about a customer.

Myrl and Roy's contemplating a very significant increase in the electric load which it will require almost doubling in size, and because of that there are numerous factual issues which I appreciate under the standard of review for a motion to dismiss cannot necessarily be reviewed by this commission at

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

that time, but which are certainly relevant to a determination of what the law in fact is.

And because of that a motion to dismiss is premature.

Perhaps a motion for summary judgment in the future following discovery or following essentially an opportunity to further develop the facts of this case might be appropriate, but a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is simply not appropriate under the facts. And when referencing some of the territorial concerns that were effectively dealt with by the Territorial Act of 1975 as well as the subsequent case law and decisions of this commission, there was concern about unnecessary duplication of facilities. The customers being required to absorb revenue shortfalls, those sorts of things.

It's my basic understanding that in this case there would likely be construction required by either Xcel or by Sioux Valley in order to properly serve the entirety of the increased load anticipated by Myrl and Roy's. And because of that you're not dealing with those same types of territorial concerns.

You're dealing with two companies which would likely both have to engage in some sort of construction, both engage in some sort of up front capital expenditure which certainly would not be imposed upon a customer base by any means. Nor are we talking about the duplication of services, because, again, it doesn't appear at least at this point in time that either one of the companies would necessarily be in the perfect position to continue to provide power.

And so, again, I think that the facts of this case as applied to the law of the 1992 case would require that the motion to dismiss at this time be denied, and we would request that the commission deny that motion. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Thank you, Ms. Moore.

Ms. Rogers, I presume you're representing

SDREA?

MS. ROGERS: Did you ask for my comments?

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Yes. Sorry. I didn't have the mike on. I was speaking in a mute as well. Ms. Rogers, I presume you're representing SDREA?

MS. ROGERS: Yes. That's correct. Thank you.

I feel a little bit like a new kid on the block
because I was not involved in any of the past
litigation concerning this case, and I'm also
the last one to intervene so I'm probably not
as well-versed in all of the cases that have
been cited so far.

I believe that SDREA's position is consistent with Sioux Valley's and also with Myrl and Roy's, and, that is, and what we tried to point out in our brief, this motion to dismiss is premature. As Mr. Gerdes stated, the law does not contemplate the relief requested by Sioux Valley. And I'm not convinced at this stage that that is necessarily a true statement. In fact, I think it's not a true statement.

What I did when I looked at these cases and reviewed the West River case and the Hub City case, I kind of went back and diagramed the territorial issues in each one. So, for example, in the West River case you have West River Electric's territory and you had the Black Hills territory. And because of SDCL 49-34(a)-42, Black Hills was allowed to

continue to provide service to a customer that it had already served that was located then in the West River area. And so that was a factual situation. And the basis of granting West — or Black Hills' authority continued to serve that customer was strictly in statute. And, in fact, the Supreme Court in West River said, "A resolution of this case requires statutory construction."

So then when the case came back in front of the Supreme Court when that load expanded, the Supreme Court said because the initial service and right to serve that customer was based on the statute, that's where you have to look at if you're going to revisit the issue, and they said there is no statute that authorizes changing what was established in the initial statutory 49-34(a)-42, which is the Territorial Act.

The same way in Hub City. You had two separate territories, and you have a foundry then that was established in Northwestern Public Service area, but that through customer choice and SDCL 49-34(a)-56, which is the large load statute. So it's a statutory right to

have an electric service provider outside the Northwestern service area territory provide service to that customer.

And so, again, when the customer -- the foundry closed, there was a change in circumstances, the customer wanted to go back to Northwestern Public Service, the court once again looked at the statute.

The basis for assigning that customer to that particular area in the first case was the statute -- you had to look to the statute to change it.

The current case appears to me to be different. What you have is you have two service areas, and you have the business in the middle so it's basically split between two areas.

So this commission in the prior litigation looked at the statute, could find no guidance in the statute as to who should be allowed to serve that customer because in fact there isn't any.

So then the commission exercised its discretion as a commission and said we're going to adopt the majority load. That's not a

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Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

statutory basis for assigning a service. discretionary with this commission.

And so now we come to the situation where the facts that governed discretion exercised by the commission at that time may have changed. And, in fact, I think that the commission -this commission even contemplated that in the first -- when it exercised its position -- or its discretion in applying the majority load test. And the footnote alluded to by Ms. Moore, the commission went on to say, "The commission will not speculate as to how Myrl and Roy's load will change in the future and when a majority of the load will be in Sioux Valley's assigned area."

So clearly I think that this commission has the same discretion as they had to assign it in the first place. They utilized their discretion because there was no statutory quideline. Likewise now if it can be shown that facts and circumstances have changed I think that this commission retains that discretion to make whatever changes or not make changes that the commission deems appropriate after you have once again reviewed the facts.

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Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

And I think that's what the Supreme Court upheld in the prior Myrl and Roy's cases -- Roy cases, and that is your discretion to act and to revisit it. That's why I am -- in our brief we tried to point out that this petition -- or this motion to dismiss is premature. believe that you need to look at the facts, and apparently from the petition to intervene there may be some dispute in the facts that are out there, but I think that you as a commission initially need to look at those facts and then make a determination is there a different discretionary -- discretionary measure that you want to employ now that would be more appropriate to what you see factually in front of you at this point.

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I think you deserve that right, and that's clear in the Supreme Court cases, and so that's why we are urging you to deny the motion to dismiss. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Thank you, Ms. Rogers.

My plan for -- the game plan would be to ask

staff, Mr. Gerdes some rebuttal and then open

up to commissioner and advisor questions.

Unless there are any concerns with that,

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

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Ms. Greff?

MS. GREFF: Thank you, Commissioner Johnson. Staff would first like to rely on their comments in their brief as to their position in this matter and echo the eloquent sentiments of Kind of taking these arguments to the extreme by Sioux Valley Energy, and Myrl and Roy's, and SDREA, if the commission were to revisit the majority load test, in essence they would be allowing Myrl and Roy's to jump back and forth between providers whenever they wanted to. They could simply move their load across this dividing line in between Xcel and Sioux Valley's territory. And I really don't think that that is what the founders of the 1975 act would have, I guess, allowed or liked to happen. The act is clear that it does not want -- or wants to prevent the duplication of services -- or services to territories, and that's why they came down with what they came down with.

Since then, since the 1992 case the
Supreme Court has provided us guidance as to
how to handle this matter. They have came down
with the Hub City case and the West River case,

giving us definitions as to this retained right that Mr. Gerdes referred to and the definition of location. And that's why it's important to look at those precedence that have been handed down and apply them to the facts of this case today. Xcel had been given the retained right to serve Myrl and Roy's as it exists at that location. That right should exist with Xcel and should continue to exist with Xcel, and that is why staff feels that the motion to dismiss should be granted and allow Xcel to continue.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Thank you, Ms. Greff. Mr. Gerdes, did you want an opportunity to rebut?

MR. GERDES: Very briefly, Mr. Chairman. I, too, was around with Mr. Glover when this was written although I was in the back room working on the draft. My partner, Warren May, was on the front line with the bill.

So in any event, I couldn't say it any better than Ms. Greff said it. Back in -- this quote is in most cases on this subject. And this is the Wilrod case back in 1979 when the Supreme Court said, "An individual has no

organic, economic or political right to service

by a particular utility merely because he deems

it advantageous to himself." The purpose of

the Territorial Act is to assign service

territories, and if I'm in Sioux Valley's

Once the territory is assigned, it's assigned. And there's no way to change it except there are a few statutory ways to change it that are not here relevant.

service territory that's where the service is.

Ms. Greff hit the nail right on the head.

If we were to adopt the position that's being advocated by our loyal opposition, Myrl and Roy could flip-flop every five years and try to negotiate with the other provider. Well, we'll move our load over here now so you give me a better deal. Well, we're move our load over here now so you give me a better deal. That is not what is contemplated by the Territorial Act.

What I'm saying, and have been saying is this: That Myrl and Roy -- the first Myrl and Roy case has been overruled by implication by the Supreme Court of South Dakota in these latter two cases that we've been talking about.

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And that's what -- that's what the Supreme

Court was talking about in the first Myrl and

Roy case when they said we're not going to

speculate about what's going to happen if the

load shifts. They've pronounced the answer,

and the answer is we don't go back and revisit

the majority load test. The service territory

is assigned.

I mean -- and, lastly, Mr. Glover talked about the West River case and how this was different somehow because it was a stranded location. The Supreme Court doesn't say one word about it ever having been a stranded location. They say we're talking about a location, and they use that term expansively.

When location is established it's established unless there's some statutory way to change it, and there's no statutory method of changing it that's relevant to this proceeding.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Gerdes.

I'd look quickly to the other parties to see if
they have anything quickly before moving to
commissioner and advisor questions.

MR. GLOVER: I would only state that there's

1 been a lot of discussion on the customer not 2 choosing, and I would cite briefly that one 3 paragraph, one sentence from the initial decision that was cited by the Supreme Court in 4 5 Myrl and Roy's when they first talked about the 6 customer not having a right to choose. 7 then they said -- this is the quote -- "A 8 customer with a mobile load may as a practical 9 matter choose its electrical provider if it 10 relocates its equipment to the company's 11 territory of its choice." 12 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Ms. Moore, Ms. Greff, Ms. Rogers, anything further? 13 I would add one additional brief 14 MS. MOORE: 15 comment. Mr. Commissioner, it's certainly not 16 the desire of Myrl and Roy's in this case to 17 jump back and forth between providers. 18 believe that to be a very extreme extension of 19 the argument that has been advanced. 20 However, under the circumstances of this 21 case, with the type of increase in power that 22

However, under the circumstances of this case, with the type of increase in power that would be required in order to properly accommodate the needs of the quarry expansion, we do take on some of the same concerns that are expressed in the large load statute.

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1 Obviously, we do not fall within the definition of new customer or new location 2 3 under the terms of those statutes. However, 4 equitably we believe that there are concerns 5 which can and need to be addressed in order to 6 insure that Myrl and Roy's receives power in a 7 timely manner, in the most effective manner, and to insure that either carrier can 8 9 effectively provide the necessary power. 10 given that there is construction anticipated by 1.1 both parties, again, it would appear to be premature to dismiss this matter as a matter of 12 13 law. Thank you. 14 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Ms. Greff, Ms. Rogers, 15 anything further? 16 MS. ROGERS: Nothing further. Thank you. 17 MS. GREFF: I guess I would just briefly touch 18 on Ms. Moore's comments as to her concerns 19 under the factors of the large load customers. 20 There do exist other remedies for Myrl and 21 Roy's do they find that -- if they find that 22 Xcel cannot or has not been providing them or 23 in the future will not be able to provide them adequate service. The commission is equipped 24 25 with adequacy of service statute that Myrl and

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

1 Roy's would be able to come back to at a later 2 date if they find that their service is not 3 adequate and then request switching of providers. 4 Thank you, Ms. Greff. 5 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: At this point we would move to commissioner and 6 7 advisor questions. I have one for Mr. Glover. Mr. Glover, on page 6 of your brief you do note 8 that under Xcel's theory of this case if Myrl 9 10 and Roy's moved their entire load into Sioux 11 Valley's territory, Xcel would still be 12 entitled to continue servicing them. understand some concerns about that. 13 14 have any response to the concerns raised by 15 staff and by Xcel about what I envision as the teeter-totter ability of a customer to move 16 their load in order to choose their provider on 17 18 more than one occasion? 19 MR. GLOVER: Well, I actually can expand that a 20 The thing that concerns me is little bit more. 21 we're not looking at a large load factor here. 22 Let's say you got another customer that wants to build right on a boundary line. He has the 23 ability at that time if he wants -- if he wants 24 to do it he can set -- if he wants to set up 25

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

the majority load test again he can effectively put the majority of his load on that, very little load, but make it the majority on that side of the customer he wants. If he's under the belief that once it's done, once I've done it, nobody ever can change it again. So he can effectively do that by picking it up, moving it right on his line, putting a little bit more than 52 percent on this side, 48 on this side, and then go on with it.

I think that this commission should retain the jurisdiction to rule on that. I don't think that that's going to be a problem with somebody -- with somebody jockeying back and forth as long as -- and if it does you certainly have got the inherent power to make exceptions to that.

In other words, if you say no, we're -we're not going to let you just -- five years
they come back, Myrl and Roy comes back and
says now we're moving all of our stuff back
over to the east side because we got a lot
better deal. That might be a point in time
where you can say this is enough of this. This
is enough of this. We're not going to

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

entertain this. We're not going to permit you 1 2 to do that back and forth, but you have to weigh that against the criteria that's 3 happening if you followed the argument of 4 5 In this particular case they've counsel. essentially got -- we have territory that is 6 not our territory. Basically it's -- and it 7 was assigned to us. And it could be that he'll 8 9 have 100 percent of his customer in our territory. That's fine if we'd agreed to that, 10 11 but we never agreed to it. 12 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Mr. Glover, your 13 comments seem to place quite a bit of importance on customer preference. And I may 14 15 be wrong on that, please correct me, but the 16 statute allows so few exceptions for customer 17 preference. MR. GLOVER: I agree with that. And I have 18 19 heard that. If I'm leaving that impression 20 with you I don't want to because I fully understand that the purpose of our territorial 21 22 law and the rulings of this commission and our 23 Supreme Court over the years have essentially said customer preference has no place in our 24 territorial law. And I agree with you. 25

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

think that is a broad and accurate statement, and I don't think we want to kind of get into the position where we're permitting a customer to choose.

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COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Thank you. Mr. Glover, you note in your brief on page 4, the court -and you quote from the court ruling -- "The customer with a mobile load may as a practical matter choose its electric provider as it relocates its equipment to the company's territory of its choice." And you've mentioned that a couple of times today to support the idea of the majority load, that if the circumstances change, that if the customer moves their load into somebody else's service territory that they can in effect -- that the commission in effect can select a different provider. But my reading of this, I presume the court was very clearly talking about a customer moving their load to a new location. Do you think I'm reading that portion of the ruling incorrectly? MR. GLOVER: If you were to take out the word

MR. GLOVER: If you were to take out the word mobile load that might be true. But I think if you get any meaning to the word a customer with

1	a mobile load, I think then you're talking
2	about a situation where they're talking about a
3	customer that's got a load that he can move.
4	Essentially a mobile load is not a structure,
5	so to speak. That's what I'm referring to in
6	that case. And it's very unique circumstances
7	in this case. So it's not the general rule.
8	It's one exception.
9	COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Glover.
10	Other commissioner or advisor questions?
11	COMMISSIONER HANSON: I have some.
12	COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Yeah. Commissioner
13	Hanson.
14	COMMISSIONER HANSON: Thank you. Mr. Gerdes,
15	just a couple of curiosity points. You used a
16	date on the stated that the legislature
17	passed a law stating that once a territory is
18	assigned it remains assigned. Was that 1975?
19	MR. GERDES: Yes. That was the year that the
20	Territorial Act was adopted.
21	COMMISSIONER HANSON: And I have another
22	question for you. And forgive me, I'm not
23	going to be able to articulate very well
24	because I was listening to other things as I
25	was jotting just a couple of words to remind

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

myself of it, and while you're looking for it I may ask some other questions.

You stated that in the South Dakota

Territorial Integrity Act that the Supreme

Court had made a statement pertaining to the

inability, the sanctity, I guess I will say, of

that act. And do you recall -- it was towards

the beginning of your remarks. Do you recall

what you had said on that? While you're

looking for that I'm going to ask a couple of

other questions. I hope that they don't cause

you consternation as you're trying to look for

that.

Ms. Moore, just a point of clarification for me. As I understand it these properties are all contiguous. Is that correct?

MS. NOHR: Yes. We haven't added onto any property. It's all property we've already had.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Could you state your name for the record?

MS. NOHR: Sure. My name is Patty Nohr, and I'm with Myrl and Roy's Paving. We've not added on any more property. It's all still the same property we had. We have new equipment that's going further south.

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

1 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Okay. The name one more 2 time? 3 MS. NOHR: Patty Nohr, N-O-H-R. 4 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Thank you, Patty. 5 Appreciate it. 6 MS. MOORE: Excuse me. I wanted to defer to 7 Ms. Nohr as a representative to ensure I didn't 8 make a factual misstatement. 9 COMMISSIONER HANSON: That's great. 10 appreciate that. Thank you. One other 11 question for you. Is this in any way a mobile 12 load? 13 MS. MOORE: To a certain extent, yes. 14 this is a multi-million dollar expansion and 15 requires significant amounts of new materials 16 which is in and of itself extremely expensive and which will be placed in the appropriate 17 18 place once the final plans are drawn up. 19 it is my understanding based on speaking with 20 Ms. Nohr as well as other representatives of 21 Myrl and Roy's because of some of delays in 22 construction at this point that it has not yet 23 been determined exactly where all of this 24 equipment is going to go in order to best serve 25 the area of the quarry in which they're

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

currently working. So it is to a certain 1 extent a mobile load. However, because it is 2 3 that multi-million dollar expansion it certainly doesn't make any economic sense for 4 5 Myrl and Roy's to constantly juggle the location of this type of very burdensome, 6 7 heavy, expensive equipment. COMMISSIONER HANSON: So for the most part once 8 9 it's placed it's likely to remain at that 10 location with the exception, I'm going to 11 quess, that as the quarry expands or changes 12 there may be a relocation of that equipment? I believe that would be a fair 13 MS. MOORE: 14 statement, yes. 15 COMMISSIONER HANSON: In the future when there 16 is a relocation of that equipment is there a 17 potential for it to end up back into Sioux 18 Valley's territory? 19 MS. MOORE: Quite frankly I would defer to 20 Ms. Nohr on that because again she would better 21 be able to describe the nature of the quarrying 22 endeavors they undertake. Some of the new equipment is going 23 MS. NOHR: to the south on the property, and there's going 24 25 to be new equipment on the north side, too.

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

1 it's still quite -- hasn't been determined yet. 2 Not everything is, you know, is moving out of 3 Xcel's property, but not -- so there's still 4 going to be some straddling across that line, I 5 guess, and it's not really been determined how 6 much is going to be where. 7 COMMISSIONER HANSON: Thank you. And just for 8 the record, as I recalled, you're president of 9 the company. Is that correct? What is your 10 position? 11 I'm one of the owners, and my sister MS. NOHR: 12 is the president. 13 COMMISSIONER HANSON: Okay. Thank you. 14 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Mr. Gerdes, would you 15 like to respond to Commissioner Hanson's 16 question? 17 MR. GERDES: Yes. What I was referring to, 18 Commissioner Hanson, was the South Dakota 19 Supreme Court has on numerous occasions when 20 it's been deciding territorial issues has a 21 quote, and that is, "That the purpose of the 22 South Dakota Territorial Integrity Act was to 23 eliminate duplication and wasteful spending in 24 all segments of the electric utility industry," 25 and the cases pretty much support the

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

1	proposition that that is the guiding light that
2	should be used in interpreting these statutes.
3	In other words, the purpose of assigning
4	service territories was to eliminate
5	duplication of services by competing utilities
6	on both sides of the dividing line, so to
7	speak. And that's the point we were trying to
8	make here is that you could end up with a
9	flip-flop situation where both companies are
10	duplicating services or excuse me,
11	equipment, and that's not what's contemplated
12	by the act. And that was our point.
13	COMMISSIONER HANSON: I appreciate that. And I
14	thought I had seen it in a brief. I wasn't
15	certain whether I had or not. I think it was
16	in your brief.
17	MR. GERDES: I wouldn't be surprised if it's in
18	my brief.
19	COMMISSIONER HANSON: It seems to explain, at
20	least it's surprisingly the Supreme Court
21	can say things better than I can, but I was
22	struggling with this. And as I struggle with
23	it I really truly wanted to maintain the
24	integrity of territories as much as possible.
25	And at the same time we have this situation

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

where at one time it was on one side of the fence and now it's on the other side of the fence, and there's discussion about it going back to the other side of the fence. It's a struggle for me because I wished to maintain it as much as possible, and I don't want to get into a conclusive statement here, but I think that helped me with the best that I could articulate my thoughts.

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And there is some concern, Mr. Gerdes, what if -- by myself -- what if 100 percent of the load eventually migrated over to the Sioux Valley service territory? MR. GERDES: If 100 percent of the load migrated over to Sioux Valley service territory Xcel would still be able to serve that load under the West River case because the West River case talks about a location. And once a location is established -- and that's a perfect That is -- the West River case example. involves a sewage treatment plant that is totally in West River's service area, but Black Hills Power serves it. And it's because of the fact that it was originally served. mean, they are all kinds of exceptions.

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

to eliminate them, but there are all kinds of exceptions. As an example I know there's a school building in the southern part of Sioux Falls where just one corner of it is in Xcel's territory and the rest of it's in one of the local cooperative's territories, but Xcel has the service because it's got the point of connection.

So there's all kinds of examples of that.

But there has to be some consistency, and
that's why we're saying once the location is
established -- and that's why we're saying
that's what West River said -- once the
location is established it is a location. And
unfortunately our legislature in its wisdom did
not provide a statutory mechanism for changing
that.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: Thank you. And I don't know that Commissioner Johnson needs me to be running to his defense in any fashion whatsoever. He's quite capable by himself. But knowing Myrl and Roy's as long as I have, and having done business with them even years, many, many, many years ago, I recognize fully well, Ms. Moore, that they would not play the

game of jumping back and forth just to try and 1 2 game the system. At the same time I think that Commissioner Johnson's statements were more 3 towards the precedent that this would set as 4 5 opposed to meaning to imply in any fashion that Myrl and Roy's would do that. 6 7 And I appreciate your comments in MS. MOORE: that regard, Commissioner. 8 9 COMMISSIONER HANSON: Thank you, Commissioner. 10 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Mr. Chairman, sir, any questions coming from you? 11 12 COMMISSIONER SAHR: I have no questions or 13 comments at this point. 14 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Advisors? 15 MR. SMITH: I have one, and maybe you can all 16 address this. I regret to say I picked up the 17 wrong Northern State's Power case as I was scrambling to get ready. I've got one that has 18 19 no relevance to this in my folder here. 20 recall, though, in doing the brief in the West River case a statement in the opinion to the 21 22 effect of nothing in the act giving a customer 23 the right to be served by two utilities. MR. GERDES: That's correct. 24 25 MR. SMITH: Maybe, could you guys maybe address

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

whether -- I couldn't quite discern the logic of that really when I read the original case, but maybe address that and how that might relate to the issue of stranding if we were to do what the complainants are requesting us to

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do.

MR. GERDES: The quote is on page 5 of the version of the act that I have, and it's under subheading two called -- it's subheading two, Exclusive Service. It's paragraph 8 in the numbered opinion. And it says, "There is no statutory provision which would allow both NSP and Sioux Valley to service the company. PUC applied the majority load test to determine whether NSP or Sioux Valley should serve the company's electrical needs. Sioux Valley argues PUC has no statutory authority which would allow it to adopt the majority load test." At that time the commission adopted the majority load test as a way of assigning the territory. And they assigned the territory and now it's assigned. And that's the way I read There's nothing in this decision or any other decision that says you can go back and rework the majority load test every time a load

moves around. And I guess that's the point I'm 1 2 trying to make. Well, and what about service by two 3 utilities? 4 It says there is no statutory 5 MR. GERDES: provision which would permit both service. 6 Let me ask you this: 7 MR. SMITH: It says there's no statutory provision which would 8 9 require that. It says allow. 10 MR. GERDES: 11 MR. SMITH: Allow. Okay. MR. GERDES: And there isn't. There isn't any 12 statutory provision that permits two companies 13 14 to serve the same location that I'm aware of in 15 the Territorial Act. MR. SMITH: I believe I understand the 16 implication, you know, with the discussion on 17 the duplication of services and all of that, 18 but is it then the position of Xcel that if the 19 commission were, because of the load, majority 20 of the load passing to the south end of the 21 property, would assign it now to Sioux Valley, 22 that there would be a stranding or that we 23 would result in a wasting and then duplication 24

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

of investment out there.

Well, yes. Because what you would 1 MR. GERDES: 2 end up doing was any service that -- any improvements that NSP or Xcel has would have to 3 4 be abandoned. They would be useless. 5 course then Sioux Valley would have to build new equipment to serve the load, and so that's 6 7 exactly what the territorial law is talking 8 about avoiding. And, I mean, there's no 9 stranding in the sense of stranding a company, 10 because, again, that's answered in the West 11 River case which talks about a location, and 12 once a location is established it's always a 13 location. 14 Will your facilities be stranded if MR. SMITH: 15 Myrl and Roy is to be served by Sioux Valley? MR. GERDES: 16 Yes. 17 Okay. I'm not arguing that this is MR. SMITH: 18 a grandfathering, you know, issue here. 19 what I'm asking is if -- I'm asking, I guess, 20 if this is a genuine issue, if this is a 21 genuine case where that phrase duplication of 22 facilities and waste is at issue. 23 MR. GERDES: We would say yes. 24 MR. SMITH: And I think it is. And the reason 25 is because your facilities out there then would

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

1 be stranded? MR. GERDES: Yes, they would become useless. 2 3 MR. SMITH: Is that an issue of fact in this case or is it absolute? 4 I don't think it's an issue of 5 MR. GERDES: 6 fact as it relates to the law. And I think 7 that's why we brought the motion to dismiss 8 because the facts are irrelevant whether or not 9 it's stranded or not because of the operation 10 of the two cases, the Hub City case and the 11 West River case. I mean, the law says that once a location is established it's a location. 12 And that location was established in the first 13 Myrl and Roy case. And that's the point we're 14 15 making. There's no point to going any further. 16 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Other questions from 17 commission advisors? Mr. Glover, did you want 18 to respond? 19 MR. GLOVER: Just one point. I think that the 20 point is well made. John makes it. Is that 21 the commissioners have already asked some 22 issues about factual issues that may very well 23 be relevant were this to go further. But if we 24 restrict this, strictly given the assumptions, 25 the only issue we're talking about here is what

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

issue he's raising in his motion, and that is 1 2 simply do you have the power to change the 3 customer under any circumstances, inherent power to do? We know two of them you don't, 4 5 that one location in the Rapid City case and 6 the other one in the Hub City case, but we've 7 argued, and I think it's there, that you do 8 When you argue the stranded -- or not 9 the stranded, but the duplication of services, 10 I only wanted to remind you that one -- if the 11 companies couldn't agree under the statute --12 if the companies could not agree upon the 13 territory back in 1975, then it was up to the 14 Public Utilities Commission to assign the 15 territory in a contested case situation. 16 Duplication of facilities was only one of the 17 criteria, statutory criteria that they had when 18 they make that decision. It was one of them --19 of I think there was five or six criteria that 20 the commission could use in deciding who should 21 get a customer, and duplication of service was only one of them. It is not the only criteria 22 23 to be considered by the commission. 24 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Glover. 25 Other commission, advisor questions,

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

1 commissioner questions? 2 I might have one. MR. SMITH: COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: 3 Mr. Smith, go ahead. 4 MR. SMITH: One more. And, again, Meredith, I regret to say I couldn't find your petition to 5 6 intervene here, and I think it's probably stuck 7 in one of my other files frankly. But are you 8 in -- I can't remember whether you did or 9 didn't and whether that's relevant here. Is 10 Myrl & Roy's alleging that Xcel either is not 11 now or cannot or will not in the future provide 12 adequate service? 13 MS. MOORE: I don't believe that allegation has 14 been made. The primary justification advanced 15 in the petition to intervene was based on 16 insuring that service would be provided in a 17 timely manner, and that either party would essentially be able to accommodate the 18 increased load that is anticipated will be 19 20 required to service the quarry expansion. 21 in that regard it wasn't certainly the desire 22 of Myrl & Roy's to become the object of desire, 23 so to speak, between two companies, but to insure that in that fight it would be allowed 24

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

the opportunity to advancing facts or any

circumstances which it believed needed to be 1 addressed in order to best flesh out the 2 3 arguments and in order to insure that it was able to obtain the power it needs. 4 MR. SMITH: 5 I have one other question, if I 6 may. It may be relevant in the wake of the 7 West River case, probably is, but are the 8 facilities here discrete loads or are they all 9 an integrated load that would be serviced 10 through one transformer and one set of 11 facilities, or do you know that? Has that 12 design level been done? 13 MS. MOORE: I don't believe I know the answer 14 to that question at this point. 15 MR. GLOVER: And I don't. John, I might also 16 mention only you talked about stranded load. 17 go back to the original Myrl and Roy's. 18 was stranded load back then, too. 19 Valley's load -- once Xcel was permitted to 20 connect, all of our load to that site was 21 stranded. 22 MR. GERDES: We're not aware of the nature of the load. 23 We have one transformer and one 24 feeder and we don't know how it's broken down. 25 MR. SMITH: Thank you. That's all I have.

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Question for Ms. Greff and staff, and Mr. Gerdes may want to chime in as well. Mr. Glover and I have had some discussions about what the court meant when it talked about a customer with a mobile load being able to choose its electric provider. Do you have any comment on the way I view that as opposed to the way Mr. Glover has laid out his case?

MS. GREFF: If I remember correctly that was in the original Myrl and Roy's case in 1992 where they talked about the mobile load and it being able to be switched back and forth. Since then, since 1992 we have gotten two other cases come down. The Hub City case and the Black Hills case that have further given us direction as to how to view this mobile load. One is in the retained right case in the Hub City case where the retained right exists with the current provider, and also the word location. Once a location is established, and that was in the Black Hills case, once a location is established that location is its location is its location. It can't be switched back and So, yes, there was this mobile load forth.

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

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back in 1992 in the first Myrl and Roy's case, 1 2 but since then the court has directed us that once this is established and once a customer is 3 4 being served by a utility a customer cannot. 5 There is no mechanism for a customer to jump 6 back and forth between providers. That's how 7 staff would feel about it. 8 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Thank you, Ms. Greff. 9 Mr. Gerdes? 10 MR. GERDES: And I would add, I read in context 11 I read this quote as saying this was the 12 problem that the PUC and the court were trying 13 to solve. They're not saying you can do this. They're saying this is the situation that we 14 15 were faced with. 16 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I see. All right. Ιf 17 there are -- unless there are any other 18 commissioner or advisor questions it seems as 19 though there are three options for the 20 commission to take at this point. One would be 21 to rule at this point from the bench. 22 would be to take a short recess for the 23 purposes of deliberating and returning today to 24 make a ruling, and the third would be to take this information under advisement and take no 25

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

1	action today. I'll look to Commissioner Hanson
2	and Chairman Sahr as to your preferences. I'm
3	prepared to do any of the three.
4	COMMISSIONER HANSON: I'm prepared to make a
5	ruling today. If you feel the need to have a
6	short conference that's fine, too.
7	COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Mr. Chairman, we could
8	certainly patch you in via phone in a private
9	conference if you're so inclined.
10	COMMISSIONER SAHR: Well, I'm certainly
11	prepared to act as well today, so certainly I
12	can do so with or without the conference so
13	whatever my fellow commissioners would like to
14	do I would be more than happy to accommodate
15	that.
16	COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I haven't heard any need
17	for a recess and deliberation, unless I'm
18	reading either of you wrong. If no one wants a
19	deliberation then I think a commission action
20	is in order. Does anyone have a motion?
21	COMMISSIONER HANSON: I will move that the
22	commission grant the motion to dismiss.
23	COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And I would second that.
24	COMMISSIONER SAHR: And I dissent.
25	COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: The motion by a two-one

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

vote, the motion to dismiss has been granted. I believe that concludes the commission's actions today, although there are a few announcements. (End of Proceeding.) 

Pat L. Beck, Court Reporter (605) 332-1272

1	STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA )
2	:SS CERTIFICATE
3	COUNTY OF MINNEHAHA )
4	
5	I, Pat L. Beck, Registered Merit Reporter and
6	Notary Public within and for the State of South Dakota:
7	DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I took the proceedings of
8	the foregoing Public Utilities Commission Meeting, and the
9	foregoing pages 1-57, inclusive, are a true and correct
10	transcript of my stenotype notes.
11	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not an attorney for,
12	nor related to the parties this action, and that I am in no
13	way interested in the outcome of this action.
14	In testimony whereof, I have hereto set my hand
15	and official seal this 28th day of June, 2006.
16	
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20	- Gat & Beck
21	Pat L. Beck, Notary Public
22	Expiration Date: June 11, 2011
23	Iowa CSR Number: 1185
24	
25	