1	THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
2	OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
3	
4	IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT ES11-006
5	BY OAK TREE ENERGY, LLC, AGAINST  NORTHWESTERN ENERGY FOR REFUSING  TO ENTER INTO A PURCHASE POWER
6	AGREEMENT
7	
8	Transcript of Proceedings ORIGINAL March 13, 2012
9	
10	BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION,
11	CHRIS NELSON, CHAIRMAN KRISTIE FIEGEN, COMMISSIONER
12	GARY HANSON, COMMISSIONER
13	COMMISSION STAFF John Smith
14	Rolayne Ailts Wiest Karen Cremer
15	Kara Semmler Ryan Soye
16	Greg Rislov Ross Pedersen
17	Brittany Mehlhaff Chris Daugaard
18	Brian Rounds Jon Thurber
19	Demaris Axthelm Deb Gregg
20	
21	APPEARANCES Sara Dannen, NorthWestern Energy
22	
23	
24	Reported By Cheri McComsey Wittler, RPR, CRR
25	

1	APPEARANCES BY TELEPHONE
2	Mike Uda, Oak Tree Yvette LaFrentz, Oak Tree
3	Al Brogan, NorthWestern
4	
5	
6	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the
7	above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State
8	Capitol Building, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre,
9	South Dakota, on the 13th day of March, 2012,
10	commencing at 2:20 p.m.
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CHAIRMAN NELSON: We will move on to the next docket, the next and the last docket. EL11-006, In the matter of the claim by Oak Tree Energy, LLC against NorthWestern Energy for refusing to enter into a purchase power agreement.

And let me just check and make sure we've got everybody still on the line.

Yvette LaFrentz.

MS. LAFRENTZ: Yes, I'm on the line.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mike Uda.

MS. LAFRENTZ: I will get him on the line.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. And Al Brogan.

MR. BROGAN: Mr. Chairman, yes, I am on the

line.

2.0

MR. UDA: Mr. Chairman, I had my phone on mute.

16 I am here.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Very good.

Just a reminder for everybody, we do have a court reporter, and if you could speak fairly slow so that we can get all of your comments taken, we appreciate that.

The way I want to do this we've obviously got a couple of different questions that we're going to wrestle with today. Since NorthWestern's Motion To Strike was filed first, we're going to take that one first.

Sara Dannen is here present in person to present that. We're going to deal with that one first. We will probably vote on that. And then we will go into Oak Tree's motions.

Before we get started, I probably better check, Commissioner Hanson, are you back with us?

COMMISSIONER HANSON: So kind of you to be concerned. Yes, I am.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Excellent. Well, kind of need that third vote in case we deadlock here. Thank you.

With that, Ms. Dannen.

MS. DANNEN: Thank you, Chairman Nelson.

Just as some preliminary matters on behalf of NorthWestern Energy, I would like to say that I will be arguing our Motion To Strike. I will also be arguing --

CHAIRMAN NELSON: I'm just going to interrupt for a moment. We've got some background, some almost wind-like noise coming across the telephone line so --

It just went away. Thank you.

MS. DANNEN: I will also be arguing against
Oak Tree's Motion To Strike, and Mr. Brogan will be
arguing on behalf of NorthWestern and Oak Tree's Omnibus
Motion.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. We're still getting some of that background noise. So if whoever's

on the lines if you could put your phones on mute, we'd sure appreciate that.

Go ahead.

MS. DANNEN: And then one more, I guess, preliminary matter. In NorthWestern's Prehearing Motion it's broken down into three different areas to strike. Would you like me to address them all at once or take them issue by issue?

CHAIRMAN NELSON: I think you can address all three of them at once. We'll probably vote on them separately, but go ahead and take them all three at once.

MS. DANNEN: Okay. Thank you, Chairman Nelson.

NorthWestern Energy is here today to argue its Prehearing Motion. You will note that our motion asks for three

May it please the Commission, Staff.

16 different requests.

The first is to strike portions of the rebuttal testimony of J. Richard Lauckhart related to dockets before the Montana Public Service Commission.

The second is to strike portions of relevant -of rebuttal testimony, excuse me, of Michael Makens
related to expenses of litigation and the litigation as a
last resort.

And, finally, our third issue in our Motion To Strike is striking the rebuttal testimony of

Mr. Thomas K. Anson in its entirety.

11.

NorthWestern Energy will first address striking certain portions of the rebuttal testimony of J. Richard Lauckhart. First and foremost, Mr. Lauckhart's rebuttal testimony as it relates to cases before the Montana Public Service Commission is inadmissible and irrelevant.

Oak Tree is trying to paint this picture before the Commission that NorthWestern's service territory across state lines is the same thing, and that is simply not the case.

NorthWestern Montana and NorthWestern

South Dakota are two different systems. For instance,

South Dakota -- our South Dakota system is in the eastern interconnect. Montana is in the western interconnect.

South Dakota is near a MISO market. Montana has access to other organized markets. South Dakota purchased our capacity separate in separate agreements. Montana has no defined capacity markets. Here in South Dakota we use WAPA as a balancing authority, and in Montana we balance our own load.

Here in South Dakota we operate most of our load with base load resources and purchase very little in the open market. It's kind of the reverse in Montana. In Montana we produce very little in base load and look to the markets for the rest of it.

A couple more points. South Dakota we're vertically integrated over here, and in Montana we're just starting that process of becoming more vertically integrated.

And, finally, here in South Dakota, as the Commission is well-aware, we have no mandatory renewable portfolio standards where we have those in Montana.

It would be unfair for Oak Tree to make

South Dakota customers pay Montana rates. NorthWestern

South Dakota's avoided cost rate is much different than

our Montana avoided cost rate. And it would be unfair to

make our rate payers pay that cost. And Oak Tree, I

think, is trying to argue that, you know, by way of lines

connecting through the system it can be inferred that

South Dakota customers should pay the Montana avoided

cost rate.

Moreover, Montana law regarding the establishment of an LEO is also irrelevant. And that is why, you know, based on this -- primarily on irrelevant and admissibility, NorthWestern is asking the Commission to strike those portions of Mr. Lauckhart's rebuttal testimony that are related to Montana Commission proceeding dockets.

Now I'd like to move on to -- well, I guess I will pause for questions at this point.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Questions from the Commission?

MS. DANNEN: Second, I'll move into striking the rebuttal testimony of Mr. Michael Makens. Mr. Makens in his rebuttal testimony provides inflammatory comments regarding the costs of litigation and that litigation was a last resort for the Oak Tree project.

Comments regarding the costs of litigation are irrelevant to the ultimate issue in this fact and should play -- have no weight placed on them in this proceeding. Mr. Makens is implying that NorthWestern has no costs in this docket. That is false. NorthWestern's time, energy, resources of its personnel -- it's had to hire experts. There are certainly costs associated with this docket that NorthWestern will feel at the end of the day.

I'd like to point the Commission to a South Dakota Supreme Court case, Smith v. Weber that says that damages actions in which compensatory damages are recoverable evidenced to show the wealth of either the plaintiff or the defendant is not admissible. This is not an action where compensatory damages are recoverable and, therefore, the wealth of either NorthWestern or Mr. Makens should not be laid part in this proceeding.

Mr. Makens' comments about bad faith negotiations are also irrelevant. While details

surrounding the negotiation process may play into the ultimate issue of whether an LEO was established, the accusations contained in Mr. Makens' rebuttal testimony regarding bad-faith negotiations by Northwestern have no bearing on that ultimate issue and should be stricken from the record.

Therefore, Northwestern respectfully asks the Commission to strike the rebuttal testimony of Mr. Makens as set forth in our motion.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Questions from the Commission?
You may proceed.

MS. DANNEN: Thank you. Last and finally, Northwestern asks the Commission to strike in its entirety the testimony of Mr. Thomas K. Anson.

First I'd like to point the Commission to a South Dakota Supreme Court Case <u>Papke v. Harbert</u>. In allowing previously undisclosed expert testimony there are three factors that the Commission should consider. One is time. Two is whether the testimony pertains to a crucial issue. And three is whether the expert's testimony differs substantially from what was disclosed in discovery.

Northwestern would argue that Mr. Anson's testimony is untimely. The issue of an LEO has been here in this proceeding since this proceeding's inception. It

was pled by Oak Tree in its initial -- or its initial start of this case. Given that, Oak Tree -- the time for Oak Tree to file Mr. Anson's testimony should have been when it filed its direct testimony.

Second, on the issue of whether this expert testimony pertains to a crucial issue in the case, there is an issue of an LEO in this case, but I don't believe it needs Mr. Anson's expert testimony to help the Commission answer that question.

Pointing further to South Dakota Statute
19-15-2, giving the Commission guidance on expert
testimony, it states if scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine the fact at
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion.

NorthWestern would like to note that Mr. Anson is not offering any expert opinion to assist the Commission in actually understanding any evidence in this matter. Or as a direct fact issue. Rather, Mr. Anson's testimony is merely interpreting relevant case law throughout the land on the issue of an LEO.

Finally, NorthWestern would also like to point the Commission to <u>State v. Guthrie</u>, which states that

experts are not allow to testify as to legal conclusions,
which again is the primary basis of Mr. Anson's
testimony.

NorthWestern does agree with Staff on this
issue. As noted in Mr. Rounds' testimony, he thought
that it may be appropriate to take the issue of an LEO up
separately in a rule-making authority -- in a rule-making

process and -- so NorthWestern, Oak Tree, and others can participate, and NorthWestern supports that position.

And, therefore, respectfully NorthWestern requests that the Commission strike Mr. Anson's rebuttal testimony in its entirety.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Questions from the Commission?

Seeing none, response from Oak Tree.

MR. UDA: Mr. Chairman, I was on mute just to be sure the whistling noise was not coming from me.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: You know, it might well have. Because it went away, but we can hear you loud and clear now.

MR. UDA: Okay. Let's first talk about
Mr. Lauckhart's testimony. Can you hear me clearly,
Mr. Chairman?

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Yes, sir.

MR. UDA: First of all, Mr. Lauckhart compared his rebuttal testimony taking into account the differences between the Montana system that NorthWestern owns and operates and the South Dakota system, and we believe that NorthWestern's representations regarding the two systems being different is inaccurate at best.

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And in particular we are not trying to claim the two systems are the same. We have taken into account in Mr. Lauckhart's testimony the distinctions between the two systems. That is specifically the information that was prepared and submitted and attached in extensive detail not only to Mr. Lauckhart's direct prefiled testimony but also his rebuttal testimony, including extensive documentation of his opinions.

It is beyond peradventure that the information is directly relevant because Mr. Lauckhart's conclusion after being faced with NorthWestern's direct and rebuttal prefiled testimony was to state the only explanation for why NorthWestern is saying one set of things to the Montana Public Service Commission and another set of things to the South Dakota Public Utilities Commission is because in the one case they wanted to build their own project and have the Montana Commission approve it and put it into rate base. And the other case they did not want to do a deal with Oak Tree.

How that information is not relevant under the lenient standards of the South Dakota Rules of Evidence 401 is beyond me. It is simply inconceivable that that information -- which goes directly not only to the substance of Mr. Lauckhart's testimony and the decision before the PUC on the question of the proper avoided cost calculation but also to the credibility of NorthWestern's witnesses. It is simply compelling evidence, not only relevant evidence.

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I don't want to belabor this point because obviously there are a number of things to get to today. And I don't want to take up too much of the Commission's time. But I do want to directly refute some of the things that Ms. Dannen has said.

Firstly, in the power industry both in the western interconnect and the eastern interconnect, which encompasses both Montana and South Dakota systems' natural gas fire generation is on the margin the very large portion of the time. So natural gas prices are prime drivers in market power prices in both interconnects.

The natural gas delivery system not separate between the western interconnect and the eastern interconnect. The gas delivery system interconnects all of North America. Gas can be moved across North America

which results in high correlations of gas prices for gas plans in the western interconnect and eastern interconnect. Therefore, market prices in the western interconnect region are highly correlated with market prices in the eastern interconnect.

1.6

The second point is that theories of avoided costs do not change between Montana and South Dakota. Fundamental theories of supply and demand are the same in Montana and South Dakota. Power can move between Montana and South Dakota. The cost of new resources are the same whether they are in Montana or South Dakota.

Although there is some input assumption details that need to be taken into account in assessing these differences --

CHAIRMAN NELSON: You might want to slow down just a bit, sir.

MR. UDA: I apologize, Mr. Chairman.

But Mr. Lauckhart has taken those differences into account in his calculations. However, and most importantly, avoided cost theories, the value of wind, and any fundamental analysis of the market are the same whether they are in Montana or South Dakota. It is appropriate for Oak Tree to point out how NorthWestern modified its avoided cost theories, value of wind theories, and fundamental analysis theories between its

testimony in Montana and its testimony before the South Dakota Commission.

1.0

I think the other point that needs to be made in response to Ms. Dannen's presentation is that the -- there is no unfairness in Mr. Lauckhart's testimony. Mr. Lauckhart simply is responding to the testimony of NorthWestern's purported experts, Mr. LaFave and Mr. Lewis, and responding to same. And he was pointing out that sometimes the same witnesses said different things in different proceedings.

For example, before the Montana Commission

NorthWestern said, well, a prudent regulator would take into account the risk of some sort of program by the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate greenhouse gases. In South Dakota they're not saying that. Now how that changes between the Montana and South Dakota systems based on a federal policy is a mystery to me.

I think the other point that I would make is that with respect to this issue about whether or not the South Dakota and Montana statutes governing the acquisition or need to acquire renewable resources — there is no question that the two statutes are different. But the underlying premise of both is the same, which is the cost of the resource — the alternative to a renewable resource is higher.

In that circumstance in neither South Dakota nor Montana is the utility required to purchase a renewable if it is more expensive than the alternatives. So in the fundamental sense it is exactly the same.

Now I understand that the South Dakota program is -- doesn't contain any penalties. But the fact is the reason that NorthWestern made the presentations to the Montana Commission that it did was in order to show that this renewable energy that it was going to purchase from its own project, a 40 megawatt project in Montana, was less than the alternatives.

And when Mr. Lauckhart looked at what they did in Montana and what they did in South Dakota, noted that in the one instance they used a different witness and a different methodology than they're using in this proceeding. And that's why his testimony on these issues is relevant. It's something that is important, indeed critical, for the South Dakota Commission to consider.

Now the last issue she raises I'm confused by because I don't believe Mr. Lauckhart ever offered any opinion on the state of the law in Montana with respect to legally enforceable obligations.

He did make some statements about whether he believed -- I believe it was in his direct prefiled testimony whether or not he believed Oak Tree had

preferred an LEO but he was -- was Mr. Anson simply referring to FERC policy. Which is something I would presume the Commission would be interested in considering that it is charged by PURPA with implementing that FERC policy.

Let's turn -- unless you want to ask me any questions, I'll just turn to Mr. Makens.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Any questions from the Commission?

You may continue.

MR. UDA: Okay. With respect to Mr. Makens and inflammatory comments, I think NorthWestern misapprehends the purpose and intent of Mr. Makens' testimony.

One of the key issues in this case, as the Commission knows -- I believe it's issue 2 -- is whether or not Oak Tree incurred a legally enforceable obligation. I mean, we obviously believe it did as of February 25, 2011, by committing to sell its output to NorthWestern.

However, one of the things which has come up and we found disturbing and the purpose for Mr. Makens' testimony is an attempt on the part of Northwestern to blame us for the failure of negotiations. And what Mr. Makens' testimony goes to is the fact that we had every incentive to negotiate with them.

NorthWestern's position simply makes no sense on that score. Their position is, well, you know, you should have said something about just the course of negotiations did not explain the motivations of the party. It's directly relevant to why negotiations never took place.

Oak Tree, by every reason and position in logic, had every incentive to try to avoid the expense of litigation.

Now with respect to the idea that NorthWestern Energy incurs cost as part of a proceeding, I would agree that NorthWestern has certain obligations it has to fulfill. And, for example, its Staff spends time and so on on these proceedings and, indeed, has hired an outside expert for this proceeding.

However, unless NorthWestern is conceding that it's not going to seek rate recovery for the expenses in this proceeding, the fact remains that Oak Tree who bears all of its expenses is not in the same position as NorthWestern Energy.

It has no incentive based on this not to negotiate and, therefore, casts into doubt the credibility of the statements made by Mr. LaFave that somehow Oak Tree never even tried to engage NorthWestern in negotiations.

With respect to <u>Smith v. Weber</u> and the damages case, again, I think this case is not really applicable to the situation here. The reason you're typically not allowed to mention the relative wealth of the two parties is because you don't want a jury in a fact-finding situation to draw the conclusion that the parties -- the richer party has, you know, every ability to pay and you don't want to put that into the minds of the jury because you don't want them making a decision based on an irrelevant consideration.

2.2

That's not, as I stated previously, why we introduced this testimony. We introduced this testimony to show the negotiation process, what took place, why Oak Tree had every incentive to negotiate, and the imbalance and bargaining position between the parties.

This imbalance and bargaining position is something that FERC has been acutely aware of over time. Which is in 1980 in FERC Order 69 implementing these regulations it created the whole legally enforceable obligation in the first place, which was, it said very clearly, that if you are in a situation where the qualifying facility, which has a right to a contract, comes to the utility and says, hey, we'd really like to sell you our output and the utility stonewalls them and refuses to sign the agreement, a legally enforceable

obligation is created. So when NorthWestern raises the specter that somehow we were responsible, we need to rebut that in order to make our case. And so I think this question of motivation is directly relevant.

2.3

Now with respect to Mr. Anson, unless the Commission at this time has any questions, which I would take.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Seeing none, go ahead.

MR. UDA: Okay. NorthWestern takes the position that Mr. Anson's testimony was previously undisclosed and is improper because it was, I presume, filed too late in the process.

However, first of all, NorthWestern never asked for any expert disclosures; who are you going to have testify as an expert witness. That question was never asked. If we had failed to comply with some sort of Rule 26 disclosure under the Rules of Civil Procedure, I might actually agree with NorthWestern.

However, they never asked that question.

Mr. Anson's testimony became important and, indeed,
pivotal to Oak Tree after reviewing the testimony of

Mr. LaFave, who offers, in our opinion, a considerable
number of legal opinions about what PURPA requires.

So Mr. Anson's testimony simply rebuts the notion that PURPA and FERC policy require anything of the

sort. And we cited in our papers, and I don't have it in front of you but you can refer to it if you like, a case that says, specifically, with respect to expert testimony on terms in the utility industry, the electric industry, what they mean and how they're applied elsewhere, this is an exception to the rule, that typically you don't allow experts to testify on such policy and legal issues.

I agree that the LEO is a crucial issue in this case. And this Commission is -- is being offered a chance to establish policy. And it needs to know what that FERC policy is.

Mr. Anson is an expert in this field. He's been practicing both in front of FERC and in state and federal courts on the issue of creation and formation of an LEO pursuant to FERC policy for a long time.

And I think if you look at Mr. Anson's qualifications, I think you will agree that he is imminently qualified to offer the opinions that he's offered.

Now Ms. Dannen also cites 19-15-2 with respect to whether this will assist the trier of fact. One of the determinations in this case is what facts matter with respect to creation of a legally enforceable obligation. That's a crucial issue.

And that's why, for example, Mr. Makens has

offered the testimony that he's offered. In this case Mr. Anson's defining what facts matter to FERC. The question is what does a QF have to do in order to create a legally enforceable obligation under FERC policy. And the answer to that question is they have to commit themselves to sell their output to the utility and nothing more. So Mr. Anson's testimony goes directly to summation of that FERC policy.

2.2

Now the last issue I want to address is this whole issue of the Staff's recommendation with respect to having a rule making on a legally enforceable obligation. And, you know, I agree that that's probably maybe a good idea. But we have a case that's pending in front of this Commission, and we believe that it's very clear that we've incurred a legally enforceable obligation.

Now we think it's consistent with FERC policy, and we think for the Commission to defer deciding that issue places us in an untenable position. So although we agree as a matter of a policy that the Commission might want to take on this LEO issue in a broader proceeding where a rule making is established and get input from all the interested stakeholders, we think the Commission has no choice but to reach this issue in this proceeding.

And that's all I have, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you.

Staff.

MR. SOYE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is

Ryan Soye. I am part of Staff. I will just address the issues in the same order the parties did.

The first issue, whether or not to strike the rebuttal testimony of Mr. J. Richard Lauckhart related to the Montana PUC, NorthWestern has stated it is irrelevant because of the different systems, interconnections, market access, et cetera, are different. And Oak Tree has said these differences have been taken into consideration by their expert.

Staff doesn't know if that's been made completely clear in the analysis they offered during their testimony that they offered. However, Staff feels the testimony should not be stricken for two reasons.

First, much of the testimony Staff understands
Oak Tree is making efforts to explore prior inconsistent
statements made by NorthWestern regarding wind projects.
This is a common practice in contested cases and Staff
feels, therefore, is relevant.

Second, although there are going to be many differences between NorthWestern Energy's Montana systems and South Dakota systems, we don't feel that that will necessarily make the information inapplicable.

The differences that can be explained or

distinguished about what was done in Montana and what needs to be done in South Dakota. Staff doesn't believe these differences make the information irrelevant, especially until we've had the opportunity to explore more why these differences would make it irrelevant.

2.1

If nothing more, Staff feels the Commission needs the chance to explore these issues more in depth and determine for themselves what are the differences?

Why does it make it relevant? And then decide from there. As of now, the information we've been provided in the briefs I don't think makes that clear.

With respect to striking the rebuttal testimony of Mr. Makens, relating to the litigation costs and litigation as a last resort, with respect to comments of NorthWestern's expense of litigation, Staff must agree with NorthWestern.

Mr. Makens is testifying as a lay witness. He has no personal knowledge of whether or not NorthWest Energy will bear its own legal costs or how those will be recovered and simply stating that, for instance, if NorthWestern Energy filed a rate case, there is a possibility that those litigation expenses could be denied for some reason.

So it's also speculative. We just don't know how those rates are going to be -- or those legal

expenses are going to be recovered or where they're going to come from.

1.4

With respect to the expense as a last resort,

Staff feels we must agree with Oak Tree in that this does
go to a -- the issue of a legally enforceable agreement
and does go to the issue of process of negotiations that
occurred between Oak Tree and NorthWestern prior to the
Complaint being filed.

Next with the testimony on allegations of bad-faith negotiations, again there's been a fair amount of testimony by NorthWestern and Oak Tree concerning the negotiation process that occurred prior to this Complaint being filed, and those negotiation processes are very relevant to whether or not a legally enforceable obligation was established. So, therefore, we would say -- we would -- Staff would recommend not to strike the comments on bad-faith negotiations.

Finally, the Motion To Strike Rebuttal Testimony Of Thomas Anson In Its Entirety, with respect to whether Mr. Anson's testimony is undisclosed expert testimony and is untimely, Staff feels that both parties have made comments on the legally enforceable obligation.

Although it certainly was not fully explored until recently, it seems that this -- through rebuttal testimony, responsive testimony of each party, it's

developed into this full-blown issue now.

So Staff doesn't feel necessarily that it's untimely expert testimony but just late in the game for developing these full issues on the legally enforceable agreement and sees this as proper rebuttal testimony in response to Mr. Bleau LaFave.

Next, NorthWest Energy argued that the testimony be stricken as it consists of legal conclusions. It's not being offered as an expert opinion, and these arguments are properly part of a legal argument to be set forth in briefing. Staff does agree that a significant majority of Mr. Anson's testimony appears to be argumentative and such agreements are better left for the posthearing briefing stage.

However, Staff feels Mr. Anson's testimony carries the same tone and substance as that offered by Mr. Bleau LaFave in his prefiled and rebuttal testimony filed February 13, 2012. Simply as an example, one question of Mr. Anson page 3, line 1, "What are the qualifying facility's options under PURPA relevant to an LEO?"

And I'll compare that to the questions asked of Mr. Bleau LaFave at page 4, line 15, "What are the requirements of a utility concerning a qualifying facility requesting to provide energy and capacity under

PURPA?"

Both questions are going to interpretation and presentation to the Commission of the framework and processes of the PURPA requirements.

Energy may have slightly opened the door to this type of rebuttal testimony from Mr. Anson through the testimony offered by Mr. Bleau LaFave. As such, Staff believes the rebuttal testimony of Mr. Anson, as it carries the same tone and purpose of Mr. LaFave's testimony, should not be stricken.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you.

Brief rebuttal, Ms. Dannen. If any.

MS. DANNEN: I was going to say, I guess multiple comments by multiple parties. NorthWestern would ask the Commission to, you know -- it relies on its brief and its part of the submissions that, you know, the Motions To Strike Mr. Lauckhart -- Mr. Lauckhart's testimony are primarily in substance due to inadmissibility and irrelevance.

Mr. Makens' testimony, his testimony should be stricken because of the fact that he is giving opinions, expert opinions, as to our cost, and he is not an expert on our costs and that his accusations of bad-faith negotiations should be stricken. And, finally,

Mr. Anson's testimony should be stricken for the reasons set forth before. Because it was untimely. It can be properly addressed in posthearing briefs, and he's offering legal conclusions which are not proper expert testimony.

Thank you.

2.0

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. Questions from the Commission.

I have one for Mr. Uda. In your -- for Mr. Uda, in your responsibilities to NorthWestern Energy's Prehearing Motions on page 20 the last paragraph you make a statement "The PUC is not a jury but rather a policy making body."

Is that your opinion that in this matter we are simply a policy making body?

MR. UDA: Mr. Chairman, this is a complicated issue. And I -- excuse me? I'm sorry. I thought I heard somebody say something.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: You're okay.

MR. UDA: Okay. So it's a complicated issue.

And, you know, I looked into this in some detail. And,
typically speaking, when administrative bodies such as
the Commission are delegated rate setting authority
that's typically thought to be sort of legislative policy
making.

But there's also the aspect that the Commission is sitting as a quasi-judicial policy maker. And in this case I think particularly that's a fact because what you have in front of you is a policy question. What does it take in the State of South Dakota to create the legally enforceable obligation? And that is a policy question.

1.5

And I think with respect to Mr. Anson's testimony in particular, I think that that's the role the Commission is playing here.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. I appreciate that.

Any other questions from the Commission?

Seeing none, are there motions?

COMMISSIONER HANSON: Mr. Chairman, I do have a question of Staff. The information that was just presented by Staff, I'm trying to find that anywhere on the internet here. Is that something that has not been provided to us, or do I have an e-mail on that somewhere?

MR. SOYE: Mr. Commissioner, this is Ryan Soye.

I'm part of Staff. The comments of Staff on these
motions was not put into a formal letter to the

Commission.

Staff felt that we would need to wait to hear all information that was presented by the parties in their oral arguments prior to making any final

decisions.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: Thank you. Ryan, I found a lot of your comments quite helpful, and I was looking for -- do you have that in e-mail form that you could send to me?

There's actually more questions there than what I had anticipated and prepared for myself here. So I'm not -- I guess I'll follow the Chair's direction as to what questions he wishes to take. But if that's something you can send me, I'd appreciate it.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you.

Commissioner Hanson, perhaps if I go ahead and make a motion and then we can play off of that. Does that sound fair?

COMMISSIONER HANSON: That's fair. Although there's quite a bit of information here that I wanted to digest. But I recognize there's a time frame as well.

So please go ahead, and thank you for the leeway here. Go ahead.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: I would move that the

Commission deny NorthWestern Energy's Motion To Strike

The Testimony Of Mr. Lauckhart. I would -- and that the

Commission deny NorthWestern's Motion To Strike The

Rebuttal Testimony Of Mr. Makens with the sole exception

of Mr. Soye's recommendation that we strike or allow the

striking of the testimony regarding who's paying. 1 that we grant NorthWestern Energy's Motion To Strike The 2 Rebuttal Testimony Of Mr. Anson. 3 Discussion on the motion. 4 COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Question of Chairman 5 Nelson. 6 CHAIRMAN NELSON: Go ahead. 7 COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: So I know you have more 8 motions. If we're striking Mr. Anson's, will you be also 9 striking -- will you have another Motion To Strike --10 CHAIRMAN NELSON: I have no prejudgment on any 11 12 other issues at this point. COMMISSIONER HANSON: Mr. Chairman. 13 14 CHAIRMAN NELSON: Commissioner Hanson. COMMISSIONER HANSON: Commissioner Fiegen, if I 15 may, and tell me if I'm interrupting you, I think 16 you're -- Commissioner Fiegen, I think you're going the 17 same direction I am, 18 I wish to treat the parties the same way here. 19 20 And if we're including one, we include the other. we're excluding one, we exclude the other. At least 21 that's my feeling. 2.2 COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: And I would agree, 23 Commissioner Hanson. 24

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Further discussion?

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Seeing none, all those in favor will vote ave. 1 Commissioner Hanson. 2 Still struggling a little COMMISSIONER HANSON: 3 bit with would we still allow briefs to be filed by these 4 folks? 5 CHAIRMAN NELSON: Turning to Mr. Smith. 6 MR. SMITH: I don't think so. I mean, 7 they've -- this has been briefed to death, you know. 8 we have a mountain of briefs and argument on this. 9 think Staff indicated it just had decided it would just 1.0 present its comments orally. 1.1 So I don't think so. And we're up against the 12 wall here in terms of time and -- we've got to know the 13 14 answers to these things. I know. COMMISSIONER HANSON: But we get into 15 situations where we require additional information after 16 we get to a point, and I just don't want to get to a 17 point where we are not placing ourselves in a position 18 where we can't obtain information in the future. 19 But thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the leeway on 20 that question during the voting. And I will vote aye. 21 CHAIRMAN NELSON: Commissioner Fiegen. 22 Fiegen votes aye. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: 23 24 CHAIRMAN NELSON: Nelson votes aye.

Motion carries.

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MR. SMITH: Chairman Hanson. Or Commissioner
Hanson. You're not the chairman anymore.

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I think I just understood your question. I think I did. Is what you're asking whether or not there will be additional briefs in this case following hearing?

COMMISSIONER HANSON: That's correct.

MR. SMITH: I would assume there would be.

Absolutely. Once the hearing is over and we've heard it and we have the final record, absolutely, I would expect additional briefing at that point.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: Okay. And we would not be excluding anyone from providing --

MR. SMITH: No. In fact, in terms of excluding, you just voted to exclude Mr. Anson's testimony. That will not exclude him from participating as an attorney in the case if he wants to participate in the -- you know, he would have to get pro hac vice status. But other than that, he's able to practice here if he does that.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you, Mr. Smith. I appreciate that clarification.

We will now move on to the motions from

Oak Tree. And if I understand correctly, we've got two
in particular, one dealing with the 20-year avoided cost
forecast, the second with determining whether or not as a

matter of law Oak Tree properly created an LEO, and then also some motions to strike.

So with that, Oak Tree.

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MR. UDA: Mr. Chairman, would it be your preference that I handle the two separate -- the Omnibus Motions separate from the Motion To Exclude?

CHAIRMAN NELSON: You know, I think I'm okay with you presenting everything in one shot, and then we'll probably break up the votes at the end.

Ms. Dannen may weigh in on that.

MS. DANNEN: Well, just from NorthWestern's perspective, obviously, we'll handle it any way the Chairman wishes, but NorthWestern will be splitting up the arguments on separate motions, and I will be arguing NorthWestern's arguments on the Motion To Strike and Mr. Brogan will be handling NorthWestern's arguments on the Omnibus Motion, if that helps at all.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: You know, maybe let's -- let's split them into two parts then. And whichever you want to take first, Mr. Uda, do that, and we'll work through that one first.

MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to do the Omnibus Motion first, and I suspect it may take longer than the Motion To Exclude, but you never know about these things.

Mr. Chairman, at the outset I want to thank the Commission for this opportunity. We are here before the Commission, we believe, because NorthWestern has not complied with your 1982 order that required utilities to negotiate with QFs.

Under that policy if the utility doesn't negotiate or cooperate, the PUC is supposed to resolve the issues between the QF and the utility.

Here our opinion is we had a recalcitrant utility and were forced to file the Complaint. Although NorthWestern is blaming Oak Tree for the failure of these negotiations, we don't believe NorthWestern's position is credible, and we hope to prove it at the hearing.

Just a little background. Oak Tree is not a large project. It's a 19 and a half megawatt wind project located in Clark County. It needs a power purchase agreement in order to fully construct its plant and be eligible for production tax credits by the end of 2012. We need a decision from the PUC as soon as possible to preserve those benefits both for the project and for NorthWestern's rate payers.

With that in mind, we are requesting a summary disposition pursuant to SDCL 1-26-8. This provision states that summary disposition of certain cases, opportunities shall be afforded to all parties to respond

and present evidence on issues of fact and argument on issues of law or policy. However, each agency upon the motion of any party may dispose of any defense or claim if the pleadings, depositions, Answers to Interrogatories and admissions on file together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

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We submit with the two issues that we are -included in our Omnibus Motion, that they are ripe for
summary disposition. The first is whether Oak Tree has
the right to a full 20-year avoided cost forecast on
which to base the rate for its project. And, number two,
whether Oak Tree incurred a legally enforceable
obligation on February 25, 2011, when it committed to
sell its output to NorthWestern.

On the issue of the rights to a long-term power purchase agreement, in our papers we cited the Federal Regulation 18 CFR 192.304 and two cases which cite the 292.304(d) as giving to us the right to specify the terms of the PPA.

The rule itself states "Purchase as available or pursuant to a legally enforceable obligation. Each qualifying facility shall have the option either to provide energy or capacity pursuant to a legally enforceable obligation for the delivery of energy or

capacity over a specified term."

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Now the term "a specified term" means that once a QF makes a commitment to sell its output to a utility, it gets to determine how long that agreement is going to be. Otherwise, it wouldn't make any sense if the utility got to set a different term because they could substantially interfere with the ability of a project to obtain financing. And I'll discuss that a little bit more in a minute.

NorthWestern basically tried to distinguish the cases because they say, well, this is just dicta. So there's another case that we'd like to offer, Smith Cogeneration Management v. Oklahoma Corporation

Commission, 863 P.2d 1227, 1240 (1993) in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated in deciding a series of regulatory opt-out cases that an Oklahoma rule reopening a QF power purchase agreement every five years was preempted by PURPA.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated "FERC regulations also grant cogenerators the right to negotiate a long-term purchase contract with the price of power to be purchased based on the avoided costs of the utility calculated at the time of delivery or at the time the obligation is incurred. Should a cogenerators choose the latter method of calculation, it has the right to

receive the benefits of the contract even if due to changed circumstances the contract price for power at the time of the delivery is unfavorable to the utility."

In another regulatory opt-out case the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Agrilectric Power Partners

v. Entergy Gulf States, 207 F.3d 301, 304 n.5(2000)

characterized the Smith Cogeneration case this way:

"Likewise, in <u>Smith Cogeneration</u>, <u>Inc. v.</u>

<u>Oklahoma Corporation Commission</u>, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma invalidated a requirement by state regulators to require regulatory opt-out price adjustment clauses in all such wholesale power contracts. Significantly, the court found the state's requirements of these clauses conflicted with the party's federally guaranteed right to fully negotiate long-term fixed rate wholesale power contracts."

NorthWestern has offered no contrary authority for the proposition that QFs have no such rights. The plain language of the regulation, along with every authority that Oak Tree has been able to find, supports this proposition.

NorthWestern Energy has cited no contrary authority or even a plausible counter-interpretation of 18 CFR 292.304(d). Another important point is that PURPA also prohibits discrimination against QFs. Is

NorthWestern Energy financing its own projects on a short-term basis?

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At least in Montana NorthWestern gained approval for a 25-year PPA for its own project. This is because long-term contracts are needed to encourage the development of any projects, including QFs, and FERC knew this well.

NorthWest Energy next argues that Oak Tree offers no authority for the proposition that a QF may calculate its own avoided costs. However, this is a matter of logic. If the utility refuses to produce a long-term avoided cost forecast over a 20-year period, as here, and a State Commission does not require the utility to produce one, as here, the only option for the QF is to calculate its own rate. It is not a matter of law. It is a matter of logic.

NorthWest Energy next agrees that Oak Tree has a right to be paid full avoided costs. But NorthWestern by its own admission has not prepared a full avoided cost forecast. Oak Tree agrees with NorthWestern that NorthWestern Energy has not done so.

NorthWestern at this point now has the burden of proof to show what Oak Tree's long-term avoided costs would be over a 20-year period, and it cannot carry its case. But NorthWestern is continually trying to argue

that -- sort of having it both ways. It has an electric incremental price forecast. But NorthWestern can't have it both ways.

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There's simply no basis for assuming that a long-term incremental price forecast is any more or less reliable than an avoided cost forecast. And NorthWestern presents a forecast based on methodology that was not approved by the Montana Commission in Final Order 7108e in Docket D2010.7.77.

NorthWestern then states that its deeply flawed electric price forecast sets an upper limit on how much Oak Tree can be paid. How can this be? Oak Tree has a right to full avoided cost, which NorthWestern has not prepared over the length of the contract. Although NorthWestern has prepared an electric price forecast, it has utilized a natural gas price forecast methodology that Montana has not approved.

It is not a coincidence to Oak Tree that in Montana when NorthWestern wanted to cost justify -(Discussion off the record)

It is not a coincidence that in Montana where NorthWestern Energy wanted to cost justify to Spion Kop that the rate was twice what NorthWestern Energy's electric price forecast is when NorthWest Energy, as here, does not want to buy output from a qualifying

1 | facility.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: If I might just interject, you were inserting a proper name in there; correct?

MR. UDA: Yes.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: And would you like to spell that for our court reporter.

MR. UDA: I sure would. It's S-P-I-O-N K-O-P.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you.

MR. UDA: You bet. From the outset of this case NorthWestern has refused to cooperate in any respect with Oak Tree. During negotiations we asked them for avoided cost information. Even the information that was already required to be produced pursuant to 18 CFR 292.302. As the Commission may recall, we had to file a Motion To Compel just to get that information.

The position that NorthWestern took before the Commission on the Motion To Compel with respect to a 20-year avoided cost forecast was that it was too unreliable. And now we're being asked to sort of argue about an electric price forecast that NorthWestern admits is not an avoided cost forecast. And we think we have a right under federal law to that long-term 20-year avoided cost forecast.

The next argument NorthWestern has is that it's asserted the claims that Black & Veatch is a national

expert on avoided costs because individuals and not firms
are experts. This is true in so far as it goes.

Mr. Lauckhart -- so the Commission knows this is part of his testimony -- relied on electric price forecasts in preparing his long-term 20-year avoided cost forecast.

There is nothing inaccurate or wrong with Mr. Lauckhart's 20-year forecast based on the information he had available to him prior to February 25, 2011 when Oak Tree incurred its legally enforceable obligation.

In closing on this particular argument, I think the logic is inexorable. Oak Tree has the right to a full avoided cost over a 20-year term. There is no other avoided cost forecast in this proceeding. And since Oak Tree has the right to a 20-year full avoided cost, the only evidence in this proceeding regarding the full avoided cost for 20 years is the one prepared by Mr. Lauckhart. There need not be a hearing on this issue.

Northwestern cannot claim both it has an avoided cost forecast and does not have one. I think this 20-year forecast that they've come up with is incomplete, does not include all the elements of an avoided cost forecast, and is too unreliable to counter Mr. Lauckhart's expert testimony.

I would submit that this issue is a issue that

is ripe for summary disposition.

Do you wish me to proceed on to the LEO issue, Mr. Chairman?

CHAIRMAN NELSON: I do. Thank you.

MR. UDA: Oak Tree believes FERC policy on the legally enforceable obligation is now extraordinarily clear in light of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's recent announcements in the Cedar Creek case.

As I'm sure the Commission knows, utilities have an obligation to buy output from qualifying facilities under PURPA. And PURPA adopted the LEO requirements specifically to prevent what has happened here and having a recalcitrant utility refuse to purchased from a QF.

In FERC Order 69 adopted in 1980 implementing 18 CFR 292.304(d)(2), FERC stated "Paragraph (d)(2) permits a qualifying facility to enter into a contract or other legally enforceable obligation to provide energy or capacity over a specified term. Use of the term 'legally enforceable obligation' is intended to prevent the utility from circumventing the requirement that provides capacity credit for an eligible qualifying facility merely by refusing to enter into a contract with the qualifying facility."

Under the recent holdings by FERC in JD Wind and

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Cedar Creek Wind, if a QF makes a commitment to sell its output to a utility, a legally enforceable obligation has been created. FERC has made it very clear that State Commissions may not impose additional requirements beyond those in FERC's regulation.

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This is made very clear in Cedar Creek Wind, which stated "The PUC," referring to the Idaho PUC, "has limited discretion to determine the LEO issue. Idaho PUC and other protesters interpret West Penn's discussion to give broad discretion to the states as to what constitutes a legally enforceable obligation and when such obligation is incurred. We disagree. West Penn stands to the notion that the Commission gives deference to the states to determine the dates on which a legally enforceable obligation is incurred, such deference is subject to the terms of the Commission's West Penn does not, as Idaho PUC argues, regulation. give states the unlimited discretion to limit the way a legally enforceable obligation is incurred." And the cite there is to paragraph 35 of page 14 and 15.

More specifically, FERC stated "Like the Public Utilities Commission of Texas, Texas PUC in JD Wind 1, the Idaho PUC has imposed requirements on QFs seeking to enter into agreements to sell electricity that are in addition to those contained in the Commission's

regulations. In JD Wind 1 the Texas PUC refused to find that a legally enforceable obligation existed because in its view the QF was unable to provide 'firm' power. The Commission disagreed with the Texas PUC and explained the Commission's PURPA regulations do not contain any reference to firm power. And when Texas PUC's reliance on certain language in the regulatory text was incorrect, similarly Idaho PUC requires that a legally enforceable obligation can result only from a fully executed contract. Like the requirement that a QF must provide firm power, the requirement of a fully executed contract is absent from the Commission's regulation."

The purpose of the LEO requirement is to prevent just what NorthWest Energy did here. There is no real dispute as to the facts. You can look at the letters, the correspondence. There was no offer to negotiate. There was just simply boiler plate language that was offered in response to various Oak Tree inquiries starting in June of 2010 and really terminating just prior to the time that Oak Tree filed its Complaint.

The logic of the situation compels the conclusions that Oak Tree had every incentive to negotiate and cooperate in negotiations with NorthWestern Energy. I think that you can compare what NorthWestern's witnesses said in Montana with what they said in

South Dakota and see that the distinction there is that NorthWestern simply does not want to enter into a contract, and that has been their attitude from the very beginning.

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NorthWestern has quibbled with the citation to both Cedar Creek Wind and JD Wind because they did not order the State Commissions to do anything and FERC has never overruled its earlier statement that State Commissions are responsible for determining an LEO.

First, FERC has the discretion under the federal statute to decide whether to initiate the enforcement action on its own, but it typically leaves that to the parties to go to court. And, in fact, that's what happened in both cases.

That does not mean that FERC did not provide policy guidance to the State Commissions in those decisions. They told both the States of Idaho and the State of Texas their interpretation of the LEO was wrong and that these states were not free to adopt an LEO determination that added terms other than those that are contained in the FERC regulation.

NorthWest Energy also argues that Oak Tree never committed to sell its output to NorthWest Energy. Oak Tree has made that commitment since February 25 of 2011. This makes sense, if you think about it. NorthWestern is

really the only viable alternative for Oak Tree given transaction costs associated with trying to sell its output to another utility.

You are not required to weigh testimony that makes no logical sense. You can read the proposed testimony and exhibits and decide if Northwest Energy's position makes logical, rational sense to you. I submit that it does not for all the reasons I have mentioned.

I would also add that NorthWestern's Response

Brief to our motion on our LEO issue makes a startling

admission. On the bottom of page 8 and continuing on to

page 9 of that Brief Northwestern Energy states "Oak Tree

has never committed to delivering anything to

NorthWestern. It has only committed to providing power

at a price far above NorthWestern's incremental cost if

Oak Tree actually builds the plant."

NorthWestern obviously misunderstands the LEO issue. The issue is not that the utility gets to decide what the avoided cost is. The issue is not whether or not the plant is ultimately going to be built. The issue is whether or not under the federal regulations Oak Tree said we're going to sell all of our output to you. And, in fact, followed up with a letter saying, hey, we really don't want to file a Complaint with the PUC but we need something from you other than just getting another letter

from you that repeats the same position over and over again.

The utility does not have the right to dictate the price. The utility does not have the right to say your plant must be complete before we negotiate with you. Under the FERC regulations Oak Tree incurred a legally enforceable obligation when it told NorthWestern, hey, here's our data. This is what we think we can sell to you. We think it's below your avoided costs. We're committing to sell all of our output to you over a specified term of 20 years, and we think that's all we're obligated to do.

At any rate, I think what -- the policy question, and it's really more of a policy question, is what is FERC's policy with respect to legally enforceable obligations. And I would submit to you that Cedar Creek Wind is direct evidence that FERC's policy is not changed since FERC Order 69 that implemented these regulations in the first place and that all it would take is for a qualifying facility to come to the utility and say, hey, we're -- we're sending you a contract, this is what we want to do, and in response the utility does nothing, which is exactly what happened here.

And with that I have nothing more on these two motions.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. 1 NorthWestern. 2 MR. BROGAN: Good afternoon, Chairman. 3 Thank you. We can hear you 4 CHAIRMAN NELSON: loud and clear. 5 MR. BROGAN: I'm going to start on this, the 6 7 speaker phone, but if I get to the point, Chairman Nelson, where neither you nor the court reporter can hear 8 me, please let me know, and I will pick up the handset. 9 So far so good. 10 CHAIRMAN NELSON: 11 MR. BROGAN: The first issue that Mr. Uda has argued is that Oak Tree is entitled to use its 20-year 12 avoided forecast -- avoided cost forecast as the basis 13 for rates for the Oak Tree wind project. 14 NorthWestern asserts that it has a right to an 15 estimated 20-year avoided cost rate and that it has the 16 right to specify the length of its commitment. And Oak 17 Tree cites to --18 CHAIRMAN NELSON: I think we're cutting in and 19 out now. Maybe we need to go back to the handset. 2.0 21 MR. BROGAN: Okay. I will do that. Oak Tree cites to the FERC regulation --22 23 I would note, Chairman Nelson, that I'm getting a lot of echo on my handset. Is there some way that that 24

can be adjusted?

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CHAIRMAN NELSON: Our tech person is going to work on that.

MR. BROGAN: Thank you very much.

First off, neither of the cases that were cited in Oak Tree's initial brief nor the two cases which Mr. Uda just cited as new -- the Smith Cogen. case and the Fifth Circuit -- I believe it was Fifth Circuit case, 207 F.3d 301 deal with allowing a QF to set the term of a commitment. Both of those involve contracts.

And I guess I want to point out throughout his advocacy Mr. Uda seems to conflate the concept of a -- an agreed upon contract between a utility and a QF and a forced purchase, forced by both federal law and a QF.

Parties can agree to things that they can't necessarily be forced to do, and I think we need to keep that in mind.

I would point out that none of those cases establish any kind of precedent that the Commission cannot determine the length of the commitment or the length of a contract.

One of the cases that Oak Tree cited in its initial motion, Omnibus Motion, was New York State

Electric & Gas Corporation v. Saranac Power Partners, LP.

I would quote from that case at 219 where the court described the history and said "The" -- and I insert here

New York -- "PFC then ordered NYSEG to enter into a 15-year contract with Lockport's predecessor and interest, Empire Energy Niagara Limited Partnership."

Clearly in that case and in all of the cases either the parties agreed or the State Commission determined the length of the contract.

Next, Oak Tree in Mr. Uda's exposition stated that the fact that a QF can generate the avoided forecast over the specified term itself is not a matter of law but a matter of logic. NorthWestern would assert that it's not factually reasonable to allow a QF to generate an avoided cost forecast because of the impact of utility's specific resources, utility specific operations, and utility specific resource acquisition plans.

It's important to note that avoided cost is not synonymous with market price. Except for those utilities that are purchasing spot power in every hour of the year.

Finally, Oak Tree asserts that

Mr. Lauckhart's -- Mr. Lauckhart's testimony provides the only evidence of Northwestern's avoided costs over a 20-year period. NorthWestern specifically disagrees.

There is substantial other evidence in this docket from which the Commission will be able to determine a 20-year avoided cost rate. First, Richard

Green's Exhibit RGG 022 shows NWE's avoided costs through 2016. And his testimony explains the necessity of considering hourly load, estimated market prices, and the marginal cost of NorthWestern's most expensive base load generator, Big Stone, to calculate NWE's avoided cost.

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Steven Lewis provides a 20-year estimate of electric market prices for NorthWestern to use in estimating its incremental costs. Bleau LaFave's testimony provides NorthWestern's estimate of its 20-year incremental cost, factoring in load growth, available resources, the marginal cost of operating Big Stone, and estimated market prices. Importantly, this incremental cost is the maximum that NWE could avoid by purchasing from Oak Tree.

In addition to NorthWestern's witnesses, the Commission's Staff witness, Mr. Rounds, has filed testimony in which he compared and contrasted Mr. Lauckhart's forecast and NorthWestern's calculations and stated I think NorthWestern's model is the most accurate.

In addition to the evidence in the record,
NorthWestern believes that cross-examination of
Mr. Lauckhart and Mr. Makens will demonstrate the
inaccuracies and unreliability of Mr. Lauckhart's
forecast and that NorthWestern's South Dakota consumers

should not be required to pay for power far in excess of what NorthWestern can acquire power elsewhere.

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So given the overall legal issues, the conflicting prefiled testimony, and the issues regarding the validity of Oak Tree's estimate, NorthWestern requests that the Commission deny this part of Oak Tree's Omnibus Motion.

The second issue, as described in the agenda, is has Oak Tree incurred an LEO? First Oak Tree asserts that the individual states under PURPA have been left to grapple with the question of when and whether an LEO was incurred. But then Oak Tree asserts that FERC's recent decisions in JD Wind 1, LLC and Cedar Creek Wind, LLC have somehow eliminated a state's discretion to determine what it takes to establish an LEO.

As NorthWestern stated in its response brief, it disagrees with Oak Tree's overly broad interpretation of both JD Wind and Cedar Creek. Mr. Uda correctly pointed out that in neither case was FERC willing to initiate an enforcement action.

He did, I believe, leave out a couple of very important points with respect to states' discretion. I JD Wind 1, FERC let stand the Texas restrictive requirements to create an LEO. Mr. Uda said a utility does not have a right to say a plant must be complete

before it can establish an LEO.

In Texas it was the Texas Commission, not the utilities, that created that requirement. In Texas there's an Administrative Rule that to create an LEO a QF must demonstrate that it is able to deliver power within 90 days.

FERC did not strike down that requirement in JD Wind 1. It only said that the Commission's interpretations that did not allow a constructed, ready to generate wind plant to create an LEO was impermissible.

Cedar Creek, likewise, in NorthWestern's opinion is substantially narrower. Cedar Creek only stands for the proposition that a State Commission may not make a utility's execution of a power purchase agreement a condition precedent to an LEO.

Next Oak Tree asserts that by committing to sell its output to NorthWestern it has created an LEO. First, NorthWestern asserts an illusory commitment which, is all Oak Tree has made, is not really a commitment. Oak Tree is not committed to anything because it's not committed to actually building a project. At most at this point it is committed to selling output from a -- from a project that may or may not be built.

Second, NorthWestern asserts that it's you, the

South Dakota Commission, that has the authority to establish what is necessary to create an LEO in South Dakota and that after you have done so the parties can argue as to whether or not Oak Tree has done what is necessary.

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Third, NorthWestern asserts that this legal issue is not appropriate for decision without legal argument and that that could not fully have been developed at a time between March 5 when Oak Tree filed its Omnibus Motion and March 8, the deadline for NorthWestern to file its response.

Fourth, NorthWestern would point out that the majority of states that have examined the LEO issue require a potential QF to show that it is a viable project before it can create an LEO, that there must be something that actually involves a potential QF having committed itself so that it can't walk away scot-free.

Oak Tree has not made any showing that it is viable if it is paying NorthWestern's true incremental costs or the lesser avoided cost.

As an addition, I would point out that the Texas requirement that a -- essential requirement that a QF be built before it can establish an LEO, in other words a 90-day rule, has been upheld by the federal courts. And I would direct the Commission's attention to the case of

Public Resource Group, Inc. v, The Public Utility

Commission of Texas at 422 F.3d 231, which was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 2005.

Given the legal uncertainties and the factual disputes, NorthWestern requests that the Commission deny Oak Tree's determination -- or, excuse me, Oak Tree's motion for a determination that it incurred a legally enforceable obligation on February 25, 2011.

With that, I would respond to any questions that the Commissioners or Staff might have.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. I think we'll go to Staff, and then we'll come back to questions.

Staff.

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MS. SEMMLER: Thank you. This is Kara Semmler on behalf of Staff. You know, both of these issues are big deal issues. They're issues of first impression that this Commission is absolutely going to have to decide at some point. Staff recommends, however, that you not make the decision now. Rather, that you wait and hold a posthearing briefing and argument process to fully debate and discuss these legal issues.

You know, several months ago, the first part of January, Staff anticipated these two questions would be before you. And we actually had a conversation with both

parties about a prehearing process months ago to eliminate these issues, to have a cleaner hearing.

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And the parties for various reasons didn't want to do that. At that time NorthWestern believed the issues were so intertwined with the actual issues at the hearing itself it didn't want to proceed. And the procedural schedule being what it was, NorthWestern had not submitted testimony at that time so Oak Tree didn't know NorthWestern's position and they didn't want to proceed at that time.

On top of it, Staff was told that the legally enforceable obligation issue wouldn't ultimately have a massive impact on the dollars, the avoided cost dollars. Hence, our recommendation. Hence, Brian Rounds's testimony that we can wait. Maybe we can issue a rule making.

In addition we then relied on NorthWestern's 20-year numbers it presented in its testimony. Now we've corrected our reliance on those numbers was maybe a misplaced -- they've been corrected in the rebuttal testimony.

But in summary I guess I want to let the Commission know after hearing from the parties on these issues the first part of January we didn't feel the need to proceed months ago. And now we're stuck with the very

problem that Staff anticipated might happen. If Oak Tree would prevail, we're left with a record that may be lacking a bit. We're lacking rebuttal data.

So, frankly, we're a bit frustrated, but with that said we do believe the best we can do at this point is proceed to hearing. We need to hear the facts. We need to hear the evidence that applies to these questions to the extent they're not purely legal questions. And Staff recommends you then hold a posthearing process to fully brief and argue the issues.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you.

Mr. Uda, very brief rebuttal, please, if needed. Mr. Uda, are you there?

MR. UDA: Yes, I am. I'm sorry. I had my phone on mute, just in case Mr. Brogan couldn't be heard because of anything on my end.

So I just want to briefly state, you know, with respect to this whole issue of the right to a QF to specify the term, you'll note that Mr. Brogan's argument he did not provide any contrary authority. Nor did he provide a plausible explanation of the plain meaning of the regulation that the QF gets to specify the term of its commitment.

And I disagree with Mr. Brogan with respect to the import of those cases. Those cases state very

clearly that a QF has the right to a long-term contract.

And even though he cites <u>Saranac</u> as saying there's a

15-year agreement, NorthWestern hasn't agreed to a

15-year term either. Mr. Brogan's position is, is the utility gets to decide it.

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If that were the case, the utility could circumvent its legally enforceable obligation simply by saying we're only going to give you a five-year contract. That cannot be the law.

Secondly, the cases I cite are very clear that the reason that the court was discussing these issues both in Smith Cogeneration and in the Fifth Circuit decision was because they were trying to explain that if you chop up a QF's right to receive revenue under its contract, you're interfering with their ability to enter into a long-term contract. And this is a fact that Mr. Brogan fails to bring to your attention.

I think with respect to the issue on the 20-year avoided cost forecast, NorthWestern is again trying to have it both ways. The only party in this proceeding who's developed the 20-year forecast is Oak Tree. The reason Oak Tree did that is because it had to do that. Because NorthWestern continues to say we sort of have an avoided cost forecast. We don't have an avoided cost forecast. And, indeed, many of the elements in an

avoided cost forecast are missing from all of the testimony that Mr. Brogan cited.

So at this point if we have a right to full avoided cost over a 20-year term, there's really no dispute. The evidence in this record is overwhelmingly clear. And I don't understand how a hearing is going to cure that problem. Because the fact is there is no other avoided cost forecast for a 20-year period before the Commission.

Now with respect to the legally enforceable obligation issue, I think all the distinctions that Mr. Brogan wants to bring up with respect to the recent FERC decisions are irrelevant. Texas does not say you have to have a built facility. And, indeed, in the Commission decision in Montana the Commission itself when Mr. Brogan was the Staff attorney there pointed out that Texas took an extreme position.

But the recent FERC decisions are very clear that you can't impose additional requirements beyond those that are in the regulations. You can't require the project to be built. You're asking for a QF to make an irretrievable commitment of resources without access to a market. For example, an organized market such as MISO or the California ISO. And you're saying, well, you have to completely invest all of your money.

Now I don't understand how NorthWestern plans to make its case on hearing on this either, considering there isn't any evidence in this record about the state of readiness of Oak Tree.

I suppose they can ask on cross-examination, but I submit to you that the case as it stands right now raises none of those issues about the readiness and commitment of Oak Tree. We have said from the beginning we're willing to sell our output. We think that's what FERC policy requires. And we think that the Commission should approve both motions because we're in the same situation that NorthWestern was itself with respect to Spion Kop. It told the Montana Commission we need immediate action on this because we're in danger of losing our ability to get production tax credits.

We're trying to shorten this hearing and not spend additional valuable resources on this proceeding when there really isn't an issue with respect to whether Oak Tree did what it was required to do to create an LEO or whether it has a right to a 20-year avoided cost rate for its facility. Those are the two issues, and I think they're very simple.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. Questions from the Commission?

I have two, and they both relate to the

establishment of the LEO issue, the second issue.

Mr. Brogan, you mentioned a number of different -- that FERC allows, you know, states to establish various requirements in their rules, and you mentioned some of those. But we haven't done that here. We haven't established any of those additional requirements. And so why as a matter of law has this LEO not been created, given our existing lack of rules?

Mr. Brogan, we can't hear you.

MR. BROGAN: Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry. I picked up the handset, but didn't turn off the speaker phone. Can you hear me now?

CHAIRMAN NELSON: We can hear you now.

MR. BROGAN: Mr. Chairman, State Commissions may implement PURPA in three ways. One, they may adopt rules. Two, they may issue orders in contested cases that establish what is and isn't necessary in their state. How they're going to do it. They can actually do it as part of contested cases which establish precedent within the state. Or, three, they can do a combination of the two.

In South Dakota right now we don't have either rules or precedent from the Commission. And until we have one or the other, neither NorthWestern nor any other utility in the State of South Dakota nor any potential QF

in the State of South Dakota know for certain what it takes in South Dakota to create an LEO.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. I appreciate that response.

My second question for Mr. Uda, you've taken the very firm position that you've created an LEO as of February 25, 2011, and with that is your obligation to deliver power. If we in this proceeding find that the avoided cost is actually something -- and I'm just going to pull a number, 35 bucks. 40 bucks. Do you still take the position that you've created an LEO?

MR. UDA: Mr. Chairman, I think in my mind those are two separate issues. Because the creation of an LEO is basically the determination that the utility has the right to buy the output. Now if it turns out that the rate won't support financing, I'm not sure that there is anything that can be done about that.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: So if I might interrupt, so do you or don't you have an LEO at that point?

MR. UDA: I believe we have a legally enforceable obligation at that point, yes.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: I have no further questions.

Other questions from the Commission?

COMMISSIONER HANSON: Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Commissioner Hanson.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: I have a question of Oak Tree. Curious what their opinion is, how long it should have taken NorthWestern to prepare a 20-year forecast.

MR. UDA: Commissioner Hanson, you know, I don't want to put any undue burden on NorthWestern's resources. But I think that if they had devoted -- they obviously know how, based on Mr. LaFave's testimony, to prepare an avoided cost forecast. And based on our review of what was done in the Spion Kop proceeding in Montana, they certainly know how to prepare an avoided cost forecast. I don't think it would have taken them months and months and months to do that.

I think the reason it took them as long as it did was because they were even resisting providing information with respect to the creation of this avoided cost forecast. And then they basically said it's too unreliable; we won't produce it. And now they're saying, well, we kind of have something similar to it, and it's not an avoided cost forecast, and they can't claim it is.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: So how long do you think it would take?

MR. UDA: I think Mr. Lauckhart prepared his in about a month.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: So it's your opinion that

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you think they could prepare one in a month. 1 2 MR. UDA: I think they could do it much more quickly than that because Mr. Lauckhart is a single 3 person just working on his own. COMMISSIONER HANSON: All right. Thank you. 5 I have a question of Staff then as well. 6 Kara -- excuse me. Ms. Semmler, do you have -- either 7 you or another Staff member, do you have opinions on the 8 criteria that would be necessary for Oak Tree to have 9 incurred an LEO? And do those match with FERC 10 requirements? 11 12 MS. SEMMLER: We do have an opinion. obviously Staff chose not to share its opinions on the 13 14 substantive questions today and are sticking to our recommendation that this be fully briefed and argued 15 posthearing. However, I can certainly go there if you 16 want me to. 17 COMMISSIONER HANSON: No. Actually it was a yes 18 or no question, and I wanted to know the answer just 19 20

so -- you answered it perfectly. As you always do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. Further questions from the Commission?

> Seeing none, are there any motions? COMMISSIONER HANSON: Mr. Chairman, if I may.

1 CHAIRMAN NELSON: You may. COMMISSIONER HANSON: I fully concur with what 2 This is a precedent setting 3 Staff has presented. 4 hearing. It's extremely important that we get it right. 5 Of course, with any docket it's important that we get it 6 right. 7 However, this is -- in this type of a hearing where it's -- we are plowing new ground. And from that 8 standpoint, I'm comfortable with proceeding without going 9 through the process that Staff has recommended. 10 that's my comment without a motion at this point. 11 CHAIRMAN NELSON: Is there a motion? 12 I will move that we deny both of these questions 13 at this time without making any prejudgment as to how we 14 15 will ultimately rule on these two questions. Further discussion? 16 Seeing none, all those in favor will vote aye. 17 Commissioner Hanson, 18 19 COMMISSIONER HANSON: Aye. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Commissioner Fiegen. 20 21 COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Fiegen votes aye. 22 CHAIRMAN NELSON: Nelson votes aye. 23 carries.

That brings us to the last issues of the day,

and that is Oak Tree's Motions To Exclude Certain

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Testimony.

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Go ahead, Oak Tree.

MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The first -there are three of these -- or two of these. Excuse me.
So I don't know -- I'm just going to go ahead and go
through them all in the interest of time, if that's okay.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Certainly.

MR. UDA: Under the South Dakota rules, and we heard some of this before from NorthWestern with respect to -- with respect to Oak Tree's witnesses, before a witness can testify as an expert the witness must be qualified.

And under the United States Supreme Court's decision in <u>Daubert</u> the proponent who's offering expert testimony must show that the expert's theory or method qualifies as scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge as required under Rule 702. Before admitting the expert testimony a court must first determine whether such qualified testimony is relevant and based on a reliable foundation. The burden of demonstrating the testimony as competent, relevant, reliable, rests with the proponent of the testimony. The proponent of the expert testimony must prove its admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence. And this is citing to Burley v. Kytec Innovative Sports Equipment, Inc.,

2007 SD 82, Paragraph 13, 737 N.W.2d 397, 402-403.

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Therefore, in order for expert testimony to be accepted by the PUC it must determine it is relevant by a qualified expert based upon sufficient data, the product of reliable principles or methods and, five, applied reliably to the facts of the case.

Furthermore, the burden of proving that the testimony meets these requirements lies on the party who's offering the witness and the testimony. This is citing State v. Lemler, 2009 SD 86, 774 N.W.2d 272, among other cases. In this case NorthWestern has not met its burden as it applies to Mr. Steven E. Lewis.

At the outset I would like to note we have no doubt that Mr. Lewis has considerable experience in the electric industry. But the fact that one is qualified to testify in one area as an expert does not mean that they are qualified to testify in another.

For example, in <u>Tosh v. Schwab</u>, 743 N.W.2d 422, 2007 SD 132, the court excluded Plaintiff's expert testimony, finding that although the testimony was relevant, Plaintiff's expert was not an expert in police surveillance or interrogation. Instead his experience was in the area of criminal corrections and treatment.

<u>Daubert</u> makes it very clear. There is a quideline for assessing reliability. For example,

testing, peer review, error rate, and general acceptance. Although these factors can't be applied in all settings and sometimes reliability must focus on knowledge and experience, a fundamental baseline for liability is that experts are limited to offering opinions within their expertise.

In this case we have tried extensively to determine the foundation for Mr. Lewis's opinions and qualifications. To date we have no evidence that Mr. Lewis has ever been qualified as an expert to testify on natural gas price forecasting, electric price forecasting, or avoided cost.

In fact, we have not been able to determine that any utility anywhere has ever utilized any of Mr. Lewis's forecasts that have actually gone into determining natural gas price, electric or avoided cost anywhere other than NorthWestern.

There's no evidence of peer review or acceptance of Mr. Lewis's methodology in any proceeding. As Mr. Lauckhart points out, there are significant flaws in Mr. Lewis's methodology. This Commission only required Mr. Lewis to produce information regarding the forecast he prepared for NorthWest Energy, and that does not establish that Mr. Lewis is anything other than a consultant providing input to NorthWest Energy's actual

experts in the Montana proceeding.

Despite ample opportunity to identify and detail Mr. Lewis's experience in this particular area,

NorthWestern has not provided any. Mr. Lewis, based on the record before the South Dakota Commission, is plainly not qualified.

As I said previously, Oak Tree has no doubt that Mr. Lewis may be an expert in general in various fields in the electric industry, but there is no basis to conclude that he has the expertise to perform long-term electric price forecasts in any sort of way that would qualify him as a expert.

The second test under the <u>Daubert</u> is whether the opinions of the expert -- the opinions are valid.

Oak Tree requested information regarding any other instance when Mr. Lewis's forecast may have been used to calculate avoided costs. As I mentioned previously, none have been provided. While it's not necessary the method be the preferred method within the industry, there must be evidence it has been subjected to some typed of peer review.

NorthWest Energy has not provided any instances where Mr. Lewis's method has been utilized. And, in fact, one instance Mr. Lewis's method was not approved by the Montana Public Service Commission.

Furthermore, NorthWest Energy does not rely on Mr. Lewis's forecast in proposing its own wind project in Montana. It would like the PUC to accept Mr. Lewis's forecast for Oak Tree's wind project.

As we stated in Mr. Lauckhart's prefiled rebuttal testimony --

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(Discussion off the record)

MR. UDA: While it is not necessary that the method be the preferred method within the industry, there must be some evidence it's been subject to some kind of peer review. And as stated previously, NorthWestern hasn't provided any instances where Mr. Lewis's method has been approved by any Commission or utilized within the industry or analyzed by any peer group.

And as I stated, Mr. Lewis's method was not approved by the Montana Public Service Commission in Docket E2010.7.77. Also as I pointed out, NorthWest Energy used a different expert and a different forecast in proposing its own wind project in Montana, and yet it would like the PUC to accept Mr. Lewis's forecast for Oak Tree's wind project. Which we can debate what the reason for that is, but to our mind that's because they produced different results and avoided costs.

I think based on this that I think Mr. Lewis's testimony with respect to his electric price forecast is

shown that he's not an expert on electric price forecasting and nor is his method reliable and, specifically, was rejected in one proceeding when it was incorporated in another expert's testimony. And here they're asking you to accept something that is very different than what they did in Montana.

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So with that, I think that there is no basis for concluding that Mr. Lewis is qualified to offer the opinions he's offering before this Commission.

Now with respect to Mr. LaFave, our original motion said, well, Mr. LaFave is not a legal expert, and he can't offer opinions on the law. NorthWestern's position is now that Mr. LaFave isn't an expert but merely a lay witness offering observations on PURPA.

Based on this admission, all of Mr. LaFave's testimony regarding PURPA must be excluded. This is because lay witnesses are offered only a limited ability to testify regarding opinions. When Mr. LaFave starts offering opinions regarding what PURPA requires and whether an LEO exists in this case he is offering legal testimony. He is telling you what the law requires. It is plain that no lay witness may offer such opinions.

Under SDCL 19-15-1, Rule 701, if the witness who is not testifying as an expert his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or

inferences which are, one, rationally based on the perception of the witness and, two, helpful to a clear understanding of its testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Generally the tool has been construed to allow two types of lay opinions: Collective fact opinions and skilled lay observer opinions.

A collective fact opinion is the expression of an inference lay people commonly draw. Unable to articulate all the century data supporting a logical inference, the rule allows opinions on subjects such as height, distance, speed, color, and identity. Lay witnesses must have personal knowledge of the data supporting their opinions.

In the second category, which is not applicable here, courts allowed skilled lay observer opinions about a voice, handwriting, or sanity. Clearly Mr. LaFave's opinions do not fall within either of these categories as can be seen from his direct rebuttal testimony.

For example, on page 6 starting at line 21.

"Question: Which is a legally enforceable obligation?

Where does that fit into FERC regulations?

"As described in the FERC rules I cited earlier, FERC created the concept of an LEO to protect QFs from a utility's refusal to sign a contract."

And it goes on like that. With respect to the

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next page he talks about Mr. Lauckhart's testimony that Oak Tree has created an LEO and about what he believes that PURPA requires with respect to the creation of an LEO.

So what Mr. LaFave is telling you here is his opinion about what PURPA requires, his interpretation. And this is the stuff of legal opinion, and Mr. LaFave cannot testify in this fashion as a lay expert. His opinions must be limited to his experiences under South Dakota Law.

Mr. LaFave's statements offered in both prefiled direct and rebuttal testimony that PURPA only requires five years of avoided costs is also legally incorrect. This statement is contradicted by FERC Regulations 18 CFR 292.302 as well as every scrap of legal authority that Oak Tree can find.

There is also no evidence that Mr. LaFave has been involved in PURPA. It is certainly not in his CV. He has only been in his present position since 2011. There are no PURPA contracts in South Dakota, at least to my knowledge, and I have never seen Mr. LaFave testify in any proceedings before the Montana PFC in cases regarding PURPA.

So I think with that there isn't really any question of what Mr. LaFave is doing is offering expert

legal testimony. He's not qualified to provide that testimony. And, in addition to that, it violates the South Dakota rules which limit lay witnesses to testimony regarding their own personal experiences.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. Rebuttal from NorthWestern.

MS. DANNEN: Thank you, Commissioner Nelson. On Oak Tree's Motion To Exclude Mr. Lewis's Testimony we would point the Commission to State v. Fischer and SDCL -- as previously mentioned by Oak Tree, SDCL 19-15-2, areas in which the witness has superior knowledge, skill, or experience or education with the subject matter is what governs expert testimony. I will not -- in the interest of time I will not belabor everything in Mr. Lewis's curriculum vitae, but it is extensive.

Specifically, Mr. Lewis has experience working in power purchase agreements, which is going to include some analysis of price forecasting.

One, they claim that Mr. Lewis is testifying as to NorthWestern's avoided cost. Mr. Lewis is not testifying to NorthWestern's avoided cost. The primary purpose of his testimony was to provide information related to price forecasts in South Dakota wholesale market.

Oak Tree's also made baseless statements about the reliability of Mr. Lewis's testimony and his methods. Those baseless statements should have no effect on whether this Commission rules he is qualified to testify as an expert. Ultimately, that can go to the -- what weight the Commission puts on his testimony at hearing but to base statements as to the credibility of his methods should play no -- should play no factor in your decision today. Rather, you should look at his education, his experience, and his qualifications.

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On to the testimony of Mr. LaFave. Oak Tree I guess kind of stole our thunder a little bit by taking you to 19-15-1, the opinions of lay persons. We are not offering Mr. LaFave's review of PURPA as merely anything more than that. A review of PURPA that is rationally based on his lay opinion. Mr. LaFave as evidenced in his testimony has negotiated other wind contracts and has had to review and review PURPA.

So to that extent the Commission can put the credibility and the weight -- the same as they can in Mr. Lewis's testimony -- to Mr. LaFave's testimony as his layperson's opinion regarding PURPA and their requirements.

And for those reasons NorthWestern respectfully requests the Commission to deny both of Oak Tree's

1 motions.

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And I'd like to add one more thing before the Commission rules too, that I think the main distinction in remembering -- in ruling and excluding Mr. Anson's testimony, his testimony was given as an expert. Mr. -- in differentiating, Mr. LaFave's testimony is not being offered for anything more than his opinion as to his experience based on his past negotiations and dealing in wind contracts as to the existence of PURPA.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you.

Staff.

MR. SOYE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is Ryan Soye. I'm part of Staff.

I'll begin with Staff's opinion on striking
Mr. Lewis's testimony in its entirety for lack of expert
qualifications. Here Staff agrees with NorthWestern
Energy on this matter. Under the SDCL 19-15-2 an expert
can be qualified by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education.

Staff feels Mr. Lewis is properly qualified upon at least one if not several of these expert qualifications. Oak Tree points to the fact that the Montana PSC has rejected Mr. Lewis's methodology in at least one instance for disqualifying him as an expert.

However, like the Montana PSC, this Commission is capable to assess the credibility and qualifications of an expert and whether the expert's opinions are justified by sound analysis and sufficient data inputs have been provided to convince this Commission of his methodology.

Next, in the alternative Oak Tree asks for a Motion To Strike in the -- of Mr. Lewis's testimony based on the avoided cost. Although there's been some back and forth about what testimony has been provided by Mr. Lewis and what he's providing through that testimony, it appears NorthWestern Energy is adamant in the fact that Mr. Lewis is not providing avoided cost energy. Instead he's only testifying on future wholesale market price forecast. It appears he has done this before for NorthWestern Energy and in front of other commissions such as the Montana Commission.

Staff believes this testimony is relevant to judge the appropriateness of an avoided cost forecast. We do not believe it substitutes an avoided cost forecast but is certainly relevant, and we believe that Mr. Lewis is capable of doing so.

Finally, the Motion To Strike Bleau LaFave's testimony on technical matters of PURPA. Although this Commission has determined that it's going to exclude the testimony of Mr. Anson on the same subject, Staff doesn't

1 necessarily believe this requires excluding Mr. LaFave's
2 testimony.

As NorthWestern Energy stated, he is testifying as a lay witness, and Staff feels this may be relevant to the issue of a -- whether or not a legally enforceable obligation was established, as Mr. Bleau LaFave was the NorthWestern Energy representative dealing with Oak Tree Energy. It goes to his actions, why he did what he did, why he -- I'm sorry. Excuse me. What he thought he was required to do under the PURPA regulations and maybe relevant to the negotiation process leading up to this dispute.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you.

Mr. Uda, very brief rebuttal, if needed.

MR. UDA: Okay. Mr. Chairman, I will do my very best.

I think based on what Staff has said, I still believe that although Mr. Lewis may be qualified in a number of different areas, it does not mean he's qualified to offer the opinions he's offered here. And I'll leave it at that.

With respect to Mr. LaFave, I adamantly disagree that it makes Mr. LaFave's testimony more acceptable because he's testifying as a lay witness. A lay witness under the rules is not allowed to offer testimony

concerning what the law requires. That is absolutely 100 percent clear. And if the Commission were to rule otherwise, I think it would be making a serious error.

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Mr. LaFave can testify all he wants about what actually happened in the transactions. He can actually testify about what was said to whom and why and everything else, but what he may not do as a fact witness is testify about what PURPA requires. That is, as I said, the stuff of legal opinion. And he is plainly not qualified to offer that opinion.

And so if you're going to strike Mr. Anson's testimony, I think it is quid pro quo to strike Mr. LaFave's testimony on that same subject matter.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you.

Questions from the Commission.

I have one for Mr. Uda. And this comes from your Motion To Exclude Testimony, page 8. The first paragraph where you're talking about specific line items, and you have a sentence "Also Mr. LaFave's responsive testimony from page 2, line 24 through page 3, line 1."

That's not making sense to me. Are those accurate?

MR. UDA: It may not have been, Mr. Chairman. I think in general we're just objecting to any testimony where Mr. LaFave purports to offer legal opinion. And if

that is an inaccurate citation, we can certainly get the right one to you.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Well, now would be a pretty good time if you want it.

MR. UDA: Okay. Hold on. I will get right to it, Mr. Chairman. I need to pull it up.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Smith may have a suggestion for you.

MR. SMITH: In just looking at it, Mr. Uda, it appears to me that perhaps an appropriate substitution would be for line 24 substitute line 36?

MR. UDA: That would be fine, Mr. Smith. I would take your recommendation.

MR. SMITH: I think up until then he's not really opining on PURPA in that area. Maybe take a quick look at it, but I think that's correct.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Uda, please take a look at that and make sure that's what you're after.

MR. UDA: Okay. I will do that right now,
Mr. Chairman. I had all of this stuff up, and then my
computer crashed. I apologize for the inconvenience. I
certainly know that it's late there in South Dakota, and
I'm not trying to make anybody stay there any longer than
they have to.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Any other Commission questions

while his computer is coming back? 1 2 Commissioner Fiegen. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: I'd like to ask a quick 3 question of Staff on Mr. LaFave's testimony. I mean, he 4 can argue that in front of us during the hearing; is that 5 6 correct? No? MR. SMITH: Not if you exclude it. But his 7 I think if you strike the testimony and if 8 lawyer can. you rule testimony with similar nature is not admissible, 9 the answer is no. But he has two competent legal counsel 10 who can make the arguments about if it's legal -- if 11 we're excluding it on the grounds that it's offering 12 legal opinions, they can do that in oral argument and 13 brief. And they're perfectly able to do that. 14 MR. UDA: Mr. Chairman, my computer is back up. 15 I have confirmed that Mr. Smith is right. 16 So you're looking at line 36 CHAIRMAN NELSON: 17 and then the first two lines on the next page; correct? 18 That's correct, Mr. Chairman. MR. UDA: 19 CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. 2.0 Further Commission questions? 21 COMMISSIONER HANSON: Chairman, this is 22 Gary Hanson. I appreciate Commissioner Fiegen just now 23 because it seems that the admonition and warnings and

such that we just received are certainly ones would take

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place during a hearing and they have the ability to argue at that juncture and we have the ability to determine what should or should not be included.

Earlier in the meeting I said the quid pro quo if one is out, then the other's out; if one's in, the other's in.

However, after listening to Staff's presentation, they make some valid arguments that I had not considered at that time and they -- and Mr. Soye has swayed me on that position.

That's all the comment I have. Thank.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Other questions?

Are there any motions?

COMMISSIONER HANSON: Mr. Chairman, I don't have -- I've been having challenges with my computer as well, and I don't have the last question in front of me that you were proposing here.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Well, as I understand it, we have two questions. One is to exclude the testimony of Steven Lewis in full. And the second question is to exclude portions of Bleau LaFave's testimony.

COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, on the first question, move that the Commission deny Oak Tree's request to strike Steven Lewis's testimony in its entirety.

CHAIRMAN NELSON: Discussion on that motion? 1 2 Seeing none, all those in favor will vote aye. Commissioner Hanson. 3 COMMISSIONER HANSON: 4 CHAIRMAN NELSON: Fiegen. 5 COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Votes aye. 6 CHAIRMAN NELSON: Nelson votes aye. 7 carries. 8 Is there a further motion? 9 Commissioner Fiegen. 10 COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: John, if you can help me 11 with this motion, I do -- I would like to move that the 12 Commission strike part of LaFave's motion. Do I have to 13 go through all of these lines? 14 MR. SMITH: I don't think so. I think just 15 state in accordance with Oak Tree's Motion To Strike, 16 except that with respect to page 2 of his -- is it called 17 rebuttal or responsive testimony? 18 CHAIRMAN NELSON: Responsive. 19 MR. SMITH: That that reference to line 24 be 20 amended to line 36. 21 COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: So so moved. 22 CHAIRMAN NELSON: Discussion on that motion? 23 Seeing none, all those in favor will vote aye. 24 Commissioner Hanson. 25

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1.	COMMISSIONER HANSON: Aye.
2	CHAIRMAN NELSON: Commissioner Fiegen.
3	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Fiegen votes aye.
4	CHAIRMAN NELSON: Nelson votes aye. Motion
5	carries.
6	(Proceedings concluded at 5:50 p.m.)
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1	STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA)
2	:SS CERTIFICATE
3	COUNTY OF SULLY )
4	
5	I, CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered
6	Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and
7	Notary Public in and for the State of South Dakota:
8	DO HEREBY CERTIFY that as the duly-appointed
9	shorthand reporter, I took in shorthand the proceedings
10	had in the above-entitled matter on the 13th day of
11	March, 2012, and that the attached is a true and correct
12	transcription of the proceedings so taken.
13	Dated at Onida, South Dakota this 25th day
14	of March, 2012.
15	
16	
17	Co. M. Com . Star
18	Cheri McComsey Wittler, Notary Public and
19	Registered Professional Reporter Certified Realtime Reporter
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	56:9, 63:7, 74:19		actions (2) - 8:18,	26:13, 44:24, 75:18
'firm' [1] - 45:3	1	<b>701</b> [1] - 72:23	79:8	agrees [3] - 39:17,
'legally (1) - 43:19	<b>2012</b> [6] - 1:8, 2:9, 26:18, 35:19, 86:11,	<b>702</b> [1] - 67:17	actual [2] - 57:5, 69:25	39:20, 77:17
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0	86:14	737 [1] - 68:1	acutely [1] - 19:17	ahead [9] - 5:3, 5:11,
0	2016 [1] - 52:2	,	adamant [1] - 78:11	1
	207 [2] - 38:6, 50:8	743 [1] - 68:18	adamantly [1] - 79:22	20:8, 30:12, 30:18,
022 [1] - 52:1	<b>21</b> [1] - 73:19	<b>774</b> [1] - 68:10	add [2] - 47:9, 77:2	30:19, 31:7, 67:2,
<b>DEC</b> [1] <b>DE</b> . 1	<b>219</b> [1] - 50:24		added [1] - 46:20	67:5
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