BEFORE THE

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

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IN RE: NORTHWESTERN CORPORATION d/b/a NorthWestern Energy

Docket No. EL14-____

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF

ADRIEN M. MCKENZIE

On Behalf of NorthWestern Energy

December 19, 2014

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I. INTRODUCTION

1 01. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS. 2 A1. Adrien M. McKenzie, 3907 Red River, Austin, Texas, 78751. 3 **Q2**. **IN WHAT CAPACITY ARE YOU EMPLOYED?** 4 A2. I am a Vice President of FINCAP, Inc., a firm providing financial, economic, and 5 policy consulting services to business and government. **Q3**. 6 PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND 7 **PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE.** 8 A3. A description of my background and qualifications, including a resume containing 9 the details of my experience, is attached as Exhibit AMM-1. 10 **Q4**. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY? 11 A4. The purpose of my testimony is to present to the South Dakota Public Utilities 12 ("SDPUC" or the "Commission") my assessment of the fair rate of return on 13 common equity ("ROE") for the jurisdictional electric utility operations of 14 NorthWestern Energy ("NorthWestern" or "the Company"). In addition, I also evaluate the reasonableness of the 10.0% ROE requested by NorthWestern and 15 16 examine the reasonableness of the Company's requested capital structure, 17 considering both the specific risks faced by the Company and other industry 18 guidelines. 19 **Q5**. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE INFORMATION AND MATERIALS YOU **RELIED ON TO SUPPORT THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS** 20 21 **CONTAINED IN YOUR TESTIMONY.** 22 A5. I am familiar with the organization, finances, and operations of NorthWestern 23 from my firm's participation in prior proceedings before the SDPUC and the 1 Montana Public Service Commission. In connection with the present filing, I 2 considered and relied upon corporate disclosures, publicly available financial 3 reports and filings, and other published information relating to NorthWestern. I 4 also reviewed information relating generally to capital market conditions and 5 specifically to investor perceptions, requirements, and expectations for electric utilities. These sources, coupled with my experience in the fields of finance and 6 7 utility regulation, have given me a working knowledge of the issues relevant to 8 investors' required return for NorthWestern, and they form the basis of my 9 analyses and conclusions.

10

Q6. HOW IS YOUR TESTIMONY ORGANIZED?

11 A6. After first summarizing my conclusions and recommendations, I briefly reviewed 12 NorthWestern's operations and finances. I then examined current conditions in 13 the capital markets and their implications in evaluating a fair ROE for 14 NorthWestern. With this as a background, I conducted well-accepted quantitative 15 analyses to estimate the current cost of equity for a reference group of 16 comparable-risk electric utilities. I based my ROE recommendations on the 17 results of the discounted cash flow ("DCF") model, the empirical form of Capital 18 Asset Pricing Model ("ECAPM"), and an equity risk premium approach based on 19 allowed ROEs for electric utilities, which are all methods that are commonly 20 relied on in regulatory proceedings. Considering the cost of equity estimates 21 indicated by these primary analyses, a fair ROE for NorthWestern's electric utility 22 operations was evaluated taking into account the specific risks for NorthWestern's 23 jurisdictional electric utility operations in South Dakota, its requirements for 24 financial strength that provides benefits to customers, as well as flotation costs, 25 which are properly considered in setting a fair ROE.

In addition, I tested my conclusions against alternative checks of reasonableness, which included applications of the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"), reference to expected rates of return for utilities, and application of the DCF model to a select group of low risk non-utility firms. Finally, my testimony also presents an evaluation of the reasonableness of the 10.0% ROE requested by NorthWestern, as presented in the testimony of Mr. Brian Bird.

II. RETURN ON EQUITY FOR NORTHWESTERN ENERGY

8 Q7. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS SECTION?

9 A7. This section presents my conclusions regarding the fair ROE for NorthWestern.
10 This section also discusses the relationship between ROE and preservation of a
11 utility's financial integrity and the ability to attract capital.

A. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

12 Q8. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RESULTS OF THE QUANTITATIVE 13 ANALYSES ON WHICH YOUR CONCLUSIONS WERE BASED.

- 14 A8. My ROE recommendations are based on the results of three primary methods –
- 15 the DCF model, the ECAPM, and the risk premium approach. The cost of

16 common equity estimates produced by these three primary analyses are presented

17 on page 1 of Exhibit AMM-2, and summarized in Table 1, below:

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TABLE 1SUMMARY OF PRIMARY METHODS

DCF	<u>Average</u>	<u>Midpoint</u>
Value Line	9.5%	10.2%
IBES	9.9%	10.8%
Zacks	9.7%	10.7%
Reuters	10.0%	10.8%
Internal br + sv	9.2%	10.6%
Empirical CAPM - Historical Bond Yield		
Unadjusted	11.2%	11.4%
Size Adjusted	12.2%	12.2%
Empirical CAPM - Projected Bond Yield		
Unadjusted	11.5%	11.7%
Size Adjusted	12.4%	12.4%
<u>Utility Risk Premium</u>		
Historical Bond Yields	10.	1%
Projected Bond Yields	11.	3%
Cost of Equity Recommendation		
Cost of Equity Range	9.7% -	- 11.3%
Recommended Point Estimate	10.5	50%
Flotation Cost Adjustment		
Dividend Yield	3.0	5%
Flotation Cost Percentage	3.8	3%
Adjustment	0.1	4%
ROE Recommendation	10.0	64%

3 Q9. WHAT ARE YOUR FINDINGS REGARDING THE FAIR RATE OF 4 RETURN ON EQUITY FOR THE COMPANY?

A9. As shown on Table 1, based on the results of my primary analyses and
considering the economic requirements necessary to support continuous access to
capital, I recommend an ROE for NorthWestern of 10.64%. The bases for my
conclusion are summarized below and illustrated on page 1 of Exhibit AMM-2:

1 2

		Page 5 of 66
1		• In order to reflect the risks and prospects associated with NorthWestern's
2		jurisdictional utility operations, my analyses focused on a proxy group of
3		26 other utilities with comparable investment risks;
4		• Based on my evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the DCF,
5		ECAPM, and risk premium methods, I concluded that 10.64% represents a
6		fair ROE for the proxy group of utilities:
7		 After considering the relative merits of the alternative growth rates
8		and giving little weight to the internal, "br+sv" growth measures,
9		my evaluation of the DCF results implied a cost of equity in the
10		9.5% to 10.0% range.
11		 The forward-looking ECAPM estimates suggested an ROE in the
12		range of 11.2% to 12.4%;
13		 The utility risk premium approach implies an ROE estimate on the
14		order of 10.1% to 11.3%;
15		 Widespread expectations for higher interest rates emphasize the
16		implication of considering the impact of projected bond yields in
17		evaluating the results of the DCF, ECAPM, and risk premium
18		methods;
19		 Taken together, these results indicated that the "bare bones cost of
20		equity," that is, the cost of equity before flotation costs, falls within
21		a range of 9.7% to 11.3%, with a midpoint of 10.5%;
22		 Adding a flotation cost adjustment of 14 basis points to this bare
23		bones cost of equity resulted in an ROE of 10.64% for the proxy
24		group.
25		Apart from the expected upward trend in capital costs, a cost of equity of 10.64%
26		is consistent with the additional uncertainties associated with NorthWestern's
27		relatively small size and the need to support financial integrity and fund capital
28		investment even during times of adverse capital market conditions.
29	Q10.	DID YOU EVALUATE OTHER CHECKS OF REASONABLENESS?
30	A10.	Yes. I also performed alternative tests to confirm the results of my primary

30 A10. Yes. I also performed alternative tests to confirm the results of my primary 31 methods and my conclusions as to a fair and reasonable ROE for NorthWestern.

3	TABLE 2
2	are presented on page 2 of Exhibit AMM-2, and summarized in Table 2, below:
1	The results of these well-respected and commonly referenced ROE benchmarks

SUMMARY OF ROE CHECKS OF REASONABLENESS

4

	Average	<u>Midpoint</u>
CAPM - Historical Bond Yield		
Unadjusted	10.6%	10.9%
Size Adjusted	11.6%	11.7%
CAPM - Projected Bond Yield		
Unadjusted	11.0%	11.2%
Size Adjusted	11.9%	11.9%
Expected Earnings		
Industry	10.	.6%
Proxy Group	10.5%	11.1%
<u>Non-Utility DCF</u>		
Value Line	10.9%	10.9%
IBES	10.5%	10.4%
Zacks	10.4%	10.7%
Reuters	10.6%	11.1%

5	These ROE benchmarks are consistent with the results of my primary methods
6	and confirm my conclusion that an ROE of 10.64% for NorthWestern is
7	reasonable. As shown above:
8 9	• Applying the traditional CAPM approach implied a current cost of equity of 10.6% to 11.9%;
10 11	• Expected returns for electric utilities suggested an ROE on the order of at least 10.5%, excluding any adjustment for flotation costs; and
12 13 14	• Application of the DCF model to a select group of low-risk firms in the non-utility sector resulted in average ROE estimates ranging from 10.4% to 10.9%.
15 16	• Therefore, these benchmark tests of reasonableness confirm that a 10.64% ROE falls in the reasonable range to maintain NorthWestern's financial

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1		integrity, provide a return commensurate with investments of comparable
2		risk, and support the Company's ability to attract capital.
3	Q11.	WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION AS TO THE REASONABLENESS OF
4		THE COMPANY'S REQUESTED CAPITAL STRUCTURE?
5	A11.	Based on my evaluation, I concluded that a common equity ratio of 53.6%
6		represents a reasonable capitalization for NorthWestern. This conclusion was
7		based on the following findings:
8 9 10		• The common equity ratio implied by NorthWestern's capital structure falls within the range of capitalizations maintained by the proxy group of utilities based on data at year-end and near-term expectations;
11 12 13		• NorthWestern's proposed capital structure is consistent with industry benchmarks and reflects the Company's ongoing efforts to maintain its credit standing and support access to capital on reasonable terms.
14 15		• The additional uncertainties associated with NorthWestern's relatively small size warrant a more conservative financial posture.
		B. NorthWestern's Requested ROE is Conservative
16	Q12.	WHAT ROE IS NORTHWESTERN REQUESTING IN THIS CASE?
17	A12.	As discussed in the testimony of Mr. Bird, NorthWestern is requesting an ROE of
18		10.0%.
19	Q13.	BASED ON THE RESULTS OF YOUR EVALUATION, WHAT IS YOUR
20		CONCLUSION REGARDING THE COMPANY'S REQUESTED ROE?
21	A13.	Because the Company's requested ROE falls considerably below the 10.64%
22		midpoint of my recommended range, it represents a conservative basis on which
23		to establish rates in this proceeding. NorthWestern's requested ROE represents a
24		reasonable compromise between balancing the impact on customers and the need
25		to provide the Company with a return that is adequate to compensate investors.
26		The Company's requested 10.0% ROE falls in the lower end of the reasonable

range to maintain NorthWestern's financial integrity and ability to attract capital on reasonable terms.

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Q14. HOW DO THE COMMISSION'S ACTIONS IMPACT INVESTOR CONFIDENCE AND THEIR REQUIRED RATES OF RETURN?

A14. Regulatory signals are a major driver of investors' risk assessment for utilities.
Security analysts study commission orders and regulatory policy statements to
advise investors about where to put their money. If the Commission's actions
instill confidence that the regulatory environment is supportive, investors make
capital available to South Dakota utilities on more reasonable terms. When
investors are confident that a utility has reasonable and balanced regulation, they
will make funds available even in times of turmoil in the financial markets.

12 Q15. IS IT WIDELY ACCEPTED THAT A UTILITY'S ABILITY TO ATTRACT

13 CAPITAL MUST BE CONSIDERED IN ESTABLISHING A FAIR RATE 14 OF RETURN?

15 A15. Yes. This is a fundamental standard underlying the regulation of public utilities. 16 The Supreme Court's *Bluefield* and *Hope* decisions established that a regulated 17 utility's authorized returns on capital must be sufficient to assure investors' 18 confidence and that, if the utility is efficient and prudent on a prospective basis, it 19 will be able to maintain and support its credit and have the opportunity to raise 20 necessary capital.¹

¹ Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923) ("Bluefield"); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) ("Hope").

Q16. HOW DOES NORTHWESTERN'S REQUESTED ROE COMPARE TO AUTHORIZED RETURNS FOR THE UTILITIES IN THE PROXY GROUP USED TO ESTIMATE THE COST OF EQUITY?

A16. The current authorized rates of return for the electric utilities in the proxy group
reported by AUS Utility Reports ("AUS") are shown on Exhibit AMM-11. As
documented there, the firms in the proxy group of comparable risk utilities are
currently authorized an average ROE of 10.35%.

8 Q17. WHAT OTHER BENCHMARK INDICATES THAT NORTHWESTERN'S 9 10.0% ROE REQUEST IS CONSERVATIVE?

10 A17. Expected earned rates of return for other utilities provide another useful 11 benchmark to gauge the reasonableness of NorthWestern's requested 10.0% ROE. 12 As explained subsequently in my testimony, the expected earnings approach is 13 predicated on the comparable earnings test, which developed as a direct result of 14 the Supreme Court decisions in *Bluefield* and *Hope*. This test recognizes that 15 investors compare the allowed ROE with returns available from other alternatives 16 of comparable risk. As noted in New Regulatory Finance, "because the 17 investment base for ratemaking purposes is expressed in book value terms, a rate of return on book value, as is the case with Comparable Earnings, is highly 18 meaningful."² Similarly, FERC recently concluded that: 19

[T]he . . . expected earnings analysis, given its close relationship to
the comparable earnings standard that originated in *Hope*, and the
fact that it is used by investors to estimate the ROE that a utility will
earn in the future can be useful in validating our ROE
recommendation.³

² Roger A. Morin, NEW REGULATORY FINANCE, at 395 (Public Utilities Reports, Inc. 2006).

³ Martha Coakley et al., v. Bangor Hydro-Electric Company, et al., Opinion No. 531, 147 FERC ¶ 61,234 at P 147 (2014).

1	Q18.	WHAT ROE IS IMPLIED BY THE EXPECTED EARNINGS APPROACH
2		FOR THE PROXY GROUP OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES?

A18. The year-end returns on common equity projected by Value Line over its forecast
horizon for the firms in the electric utility proxy group are presented on Exhibit
AMM-9. As shown there, once adjusted to mid-year, reference to expected
earnings implied an annual average cost of equity for the Electric Group of
10.5%.

8 Q19. WOULD AN ROE BELOW THE 10.0% REQUESTED BY 9 NORTHWESTERN BE SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY REGULATORY 10 STANDARDS?

11 A19. No. The competition for capital is intense. While the details underlying a 12 determination of the cost of equity are significant to a rate of return analyst, there 13 is one fundamental requirement that any ROE must satisfy before it can be 14 considered reasonable. The ROE must grant NorthWestern the opportunity to 15 earn an ROE comparable to contemporaneous returns available from alternative 16 investments of comparable risk if it is to maintain its financial flexibility and 17 ability to attract capital.

Q20. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF SETTING AN ALLOWED ROE BELOW THE RETURNS AVAILABLE FROM OTHER INVESTMENTS OF COMPARABLE RISK?

A20. If the utility is unable to offer a return similar to the returns available from other
 opportunities of comparable risk, investors will become unwilling to supply
 capital to the utility on reasonable terms. For existing investors, denying the
 utility an opportunity to earn what is available from other similar risk alternatives

prevents them from earning their cost of capital. Both of these outcomes violate
 regulatory standards.

3 Q21. WHAT OTHER PITFALLS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH AN ROE BELOW

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THE RETURNS INVESTORS EXPECT FOR OTHER COMPARABLE COMPANIES?

- 6 A21. Adopting an ROE below the 10.0% requested by NorthWestern could lead 7 investors to view the Commission's regulatory framework as unsupportive, an outcome that would undermine investors' willingness to support future capital 8 availability for investment in South Dakota. Security analysts study regulatory 9 10 orders in order to advise investors where to invest their money. Moody's 11 Investors Service ("Moody's") noted that, "Fundamentally, the regulatory environment is the most important driver of our outlook."⁴ Similarly, Standard & 12 Poor's Corporation ("S&P") concluded: 13
- 14 The regulatory framework/regime's influence is of critical
- 15 importance when assessing regulated utilities' credit risk
- 16 because it defines the environment in which a utility
- 17 operates and has a significant bearing on a utility's financial
- 18 performance.⁵

19 Customers and the service area economy enjoy the benefits that come 20 from ensuring that the utility has the financial wherewithal to take whatever 21 actions are required to ensure reliable service. If the Commission's actions instill 22 confidence that the regulatory environment is supportive, investors will provide 23 the necessary capital even in times of turmoil in the financial markets. In

⁴ Moody's Investors Service, "Regulation Will Keep Cash Flow Stable As Major Tax Break Ends," *Industry Outlook* (Feb. 19, 2014).

⁵ Standard & Poor's Corporation, "Key Credit Factors For The Regulated Utilities Industry," *RatingsDirect* (Nov. 19, 2013).

evaluating NorthWestern's ROE in this case, the Commission has an opportunity
 to show that it recognizes the importance of a balanced regulatory regime.

III. FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSES

3 Q22. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS SECTION?

A22. As a predicate to subsequent quantitative analyses, this section briefly reviews the
operations and finances of NorthWestern. In addition, it examines conditions in
the capital markets and the general economy. An understanding of the
fundamental factors driving the risks and prospects of electric utilities is essential
in developing an informed opinion of investors' expectations and requirements
that are the basis of a fair ROE.

A. NorthWestern Energy

10 Q23. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE NORTHWESTERN AND ITS UTILITY 11 OPERATIONS.

12 A23. NorthWestern's corporate support office is located in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, 13 with additional corporate offices in Butte, Montana. NorthWestern is engaged in 14 providing regulated electric and natural gas utility service to approximately 15 678,000 customers in Montana, South Dakota, and Nebraska. The Company 16 engages in the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity, as well as 17 the purchase, transmission, distribution, and storage of natural gas. NorthWestern 18 serves 110 electric and 60 natural gas communities with approximately 62,100 19 electric customers and 44,900 natural gas customers in its South Dakota service 20 territory. NorthWestern provides electric services to 344,500 customers in 187 21 communities in Montana while its natural gas business serves 184,300 customers

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in 105 communities. It also provides natural gas service to approximately 41,900 customers in four communities in Nebraska.

3 NorthWestern's generating capacity requirements are met through a combination of 150 megawatts ("MW") of company-owned facilities and jointly 4 5 owned power plants, with the Company's share of total capacity amounting to approximately 210 MW. On September 26, 2013, NorthWestern entered into an 6 7 agreement with PPL Montana, LLC ("PPL Montana"), a wholly owned subsidiary 8 of PPL Corporation, to purchase eleven hydro-electric generating facilities and 9 associated assets located in Montana with a capacity of approximately 633 MW. 10 NorthWestern received the final required regulatory approvals and has closed on 11 the purchase of these facilities. During 2013, 93% of the electricity required to 12 serve electric customers in South Dakota came from coal, with 6% from 13 purchased power contracts and 1% attributable to natural gas and fuel oil. The 14 Company's transmission and distribution network in South Dakota includes 15 approximately 3,350 miles of overhead and underground transmission and 16 distribution lines.

At year-end 2013, NorthWestern had total, Company-wide assets of \$3.7
billion, with total revenues of approximately \$1.2 billion. NorthWestern's retail
electric and natural gas operations are subject to the jurisdiction of the SDPUC,
the Montana Public Service Commission, and the Nebraska Public Service
Commission.

Q24. DOES NORTHWESTERN ANTICIPATE THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL CAPITAL IN THE FUTURE?

A24. Yes. NorthWestern will require capital in order to fund new investment in electric
and natural gas utility facilities, including transmission, to meet customer growth,

1 provide for necessary maintenance and replace its utility infrastructure. 2 NorthWestern's capital spending is expected to be in excess of \$333 million 3 annually for the next three years. In connection with its purchase of PPL Montana's hydro-electric generating facilities, NorthWestern recently raised \$400 4 5 million through the issuance of new shares of common stock and \$450 million in 6 the form of first mortgage bonds.

7 Q25. WHAT CREDIT RATINGS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO 8 **NORTHWESTERN?**

9 NorthWestern has been assigned a corporate credit rating of "BBB" by Standard A25. 10 & Poor's Corporation ("S&P") and a senior unsecured debt credit rating of "A3" 11 from Moody's Investor Services, Inc. ("Moody's"). Meanwhile, Fitch Ratings 12 Ltd. ("Fitch") has assigned an issuer default rating of "BBB+" to NorthWestern.

B. **Outlook for Capital Costs**

13 Q26. **DO CURRENT** CAPITAL MARKET CONDITIONS PROVIDE A

14

REPRESENTATIVE BASIS ON WHICH TO EVALUATE A FAIR ROE?

15 A26. No. Current capital market conditions reflect the legacy of the Great Recession, 16 and are not representative of what investors expect in the future. Investors have 17 had to contend with a level of economic uncertainty and capital market volatility 18 that has been unprecedented in recent history. The ongoing potential for renewed 19 turmoil in the capital markets has been seen repeatedly, with common stock prices 20 exhibiting the dramatic volatility that is indicative of heightened sensitivity to 21 In response to heightened uncertainties in recent years, investors have risk. 22 repeatedly sought a safe haven in U.S. government bonds. As a result of this 23 "flight to safety," Treasury bond yields have been pushed significantly lower in 24 the face of political, economic, and capital market risks. In addition, the Federal

- 1 Reserve has implemented measures designed to push interest rates to historically 2 low levels in an effort to stimulate the economy and bolster employment and 3 investor confidence in the face of heightened economic risk.
- 4 Q27. HOW DO CURRENT YIELDS ON PUBLIC UTILITY BONDS COMPARE 5 WITH WHAT INVESTORS HAVE EXPERIENCED IN THE PAST?
- 6 A27. The yields on utility bonds remain near their lowest levels in modern history. 7 Figure 1, below, compares the October 2014 average yield on long-term, triple-B 8 rated utility bonds with those prevailing since 1968:
- 9
- 10

FIGURE 1 **BBB UTILITY BOND YIELDS – CURRENT VS. HISTORICAL**



11 As illustrated above, prevailing capital market conditions, as reflected in the 12 yields on triple-B utility bonds, are an anomaly when compared with historical 13 experience. Similarly, while 10-year Treasury bond yields may reflect a modest increase from all-time lows less than 2.0%,⁶ they are hardly comparable to

¹⁴

⁶ The average yield on 10-year Treasury bonds for the six-months ended October 2014 was 2.46%.

1		historical levels. ⁷ Federal Reserve President Charles Plosser recently observed
2		that U.S. interest rates are unprecedentedly low, and "outside historical norms." ⁸
3	Q28.	ARE THESE VERY LOW INTEREST RATES EXPECTED TO
4		CONTINUE?
5	A28.	No. Investors do not anticipate that these low interest rates will continue into the
6		future. It is widely anticipated that as the economy continues to stabilize and
7		resumes a more robust pattern of growth, long-term capital costs will increase
8		significantly from present levels. Figure 2 below compares current interest rates
9		on 30-year Treasury bonds, triple-A rated corporate bonds, and double-A rated
10		utility bonds with near-term projections from the Value Line Investment Survey
11		("Value Line"), IHS Global Insight, Blue Chip Financial Forecasts ("Blue Chip"),
12		and the Energy Information Administration ("EIA"):

⁷ Over the 1968-2014 period illustrated on Figure 2, 10-year Treasury bond yields averaged 6.76%.
⁸ Barnato, Katy, "Fed's Plosser: Low rates 'should make us nervous'," *CNBC* (Nov. 11, 2014).




FIGURE 2 INTEREST RATE TRENDS

Source:

Value Line Investment Survey, Forecast for the U.S. Economy (Aug. 22, 2014) IHS Global Insight, U.S. Economic Outlook at 79 (May 2014) Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2014 (May 7, 2014) Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, Vol. 33, No. 6 (Jun. 1, 2014)

These forecasting services are highly regarded and widely referenced, with FERC incorporating forecasts from IHS Global Insight and the EIA in its preferred DCF model for natural gas and oil pipelines, as well as for electric transmission utilities. As evidenced above, there is a clear consensus in the investment community that the cost of long-term capital will be significantly higher over 2015-2019 than it is currently.

9 Q29. DO RECENT ACTIONS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SUPPORT THE 10 CONTENTION THAT CURRENT LOW INTEREST RATES WILL 11 CONTINUE INDEFINITELY?

12 A29. No. While the Federal Reserve continues to express support for maintaining a 13 highly accommodative monetary policy and an exceptionally low target range for 14 the federal funds rate, it has also acted to steadily pare back its monthly bond-15 buying program. Citing improvement in the outlook for the labor market and

1		increasing strength in the broader economy, the Federal Reserve elected to
2		discontinue further purchases under its bond-buying program at its October 2014
3		meeting. Elimination of the Federal Reserve's bond buying program should
4		ultimately exert upward pressure on long-term interest rates, with The Wall Street
5		Journal observing that:
6 7 8 9 10		The Fed's decision to begin trimming its \$85 billion monthly bond- buying program is widely expected to result in higher medium-term and long-term market interest rates. That means many borrowers, from home buyers to businesses, will be paying higher rates in the near future. ⁹
11		While the Federal Reserve's tapering announcements and subsequent
12		conclusion of its asset purchases have moderated uncertainties over just when,
13		and to what degree, the stimulus program would be altered, investors continue to
14		face ongoing uncertainties over future modifications that could ultimately affect
15		how quickly and how much interest rates are affected.
16	Q30.	DOES THE CESSATION OF FURTHER ASSET PURCHASES MARK A
17		RETURN TO "NORMAL" IN CAPITAL MARKETS?
18	A30.	No. The Federal Reserve continues to exert considerable influence over capital
19		market conditions through its massive holdings of Treasuries and mortgage-
20		backed securities. Prior to the initiation of the stimulus program in 2009, the
21		Federal Reserve's holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds and notes amounted to
22		approximately \$400 - \$500 billion. With the implementation of its asset purchase
23		program, balances of Treasury securities and mortgage backed instruments
24		climbed steadily, and their effect on capital market conditions became more

⁹ Hilsenrath, Jon, "Fed Dials Back Bond Buying, Keeps a Wary Eye on Growth," *The Wall Street Journal* at A1 (Dec. 19, 2013).

pronounced. Table 1 below charts the course of the Federal Reserve's asset

2 purchase program:

TABLE 1 FEDERAL RESERVE BALANCES OF TREASURY BONDS AND MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES

	(Billion \$)
2008	\$ 410
2009	\$ 1,618
2010	\$ 1,939
2011	\$ 2,423
2012	\$ 2,512
2013	\$ 3,597
2014	\$ 4,065

As illustrated above, far from representing a return to normal, the Federal
Reserve's holdings of Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities now
amount to more than \$4 trillion, ¹⁰ which is an all-time high.
For now, the Federal Reserve is maintaining its policy of reinvesting
principal payments from these securities - about \$16 billion a month - and rolling
over maturing Treasuries at auction. As the Federal Reserve recently noted:
The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction. This policy, by keeping the Committee's holdings of longer-term securities at sizable levels, should help maintain accommodative financial conditions. ¹¹

¹⁰ *Federal Reserve Statistical Release*, "Factors Affecting Reserve Balances of Depository Institutions and Condition Statement of Federal Reserve Banks," H.4.1, (Oct. 30, 2014).

¹¹ Federal Open Market Committee, *Press Release* (Oct. 29, 2014).

1 This continued investment maintains the downward pressure on interest rates that 2 is the hallmark of the stimulus program and the anomalous conditions currently 3 characterizing capital markets.

Of course, the corollary to these observations is that changes to this policy 4 of reinvestment would further reduce stimulus measures and could place 5 6 significant upward pressure on bond yields, especially considering the 7 unprecedented magnitude of the Federal Reserve's holdings of Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities. The International Monetary Fund noted, "A lack 8 9 of Fed clarity could cause a major spike in borrowing costs that could cause 10 severe damage to the U.S. recovery and send destructive shockwaves around the 11 global economy," adding that, "[a] smooth and gradual upward shift in the yield curve might be difficult to engineer, and there could be periods of higher volatility 12 when longer yields jump sharply—as recent events suggest."¹² Similarly, The 13 Wall Street Journal noted investors' "hypersensitivity to Fed interest rate 14 15 decisions," and expectations that higher interest rates "may come a bit sooner and be a touch more aggressive than expected."¹³ As a Financial Analysts Journal 16 17 article noted:

18Because no precedent exists for the massive monetary easing that19has been practiced over the past five years in the United States and20Europe, the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of central bank21policy is so vast. . . . Total assets on the balance sheets of most22developed nations' central banks have grown massively since 2008,

¹² Talley, Ian, "IMF Urges 'Improved' U.S. Fed Policy Transparency as It Mulls Easy Money Exit," *The Wall Street Journal* (July 26, 2013).

¹³ Jon Hilsenrath and Victoria McGrane, "Yellen Debut Rattles Markets," Wall Street Journal (Mar. 19, 2014).

Page 21 of 66 and the timing of when the banks will unwind those positions is uncertain.¹⁴

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3 These developments highlight continued concerns for investors and 4 support expectations for higher interest rates as the economy and labor markets 5 continue to recover. With the Federal Reserve curtailing the expansion of its enormous portfolio of Treasuries and mortgage bonds, ongoing concerns over 6 7 political stalemate in Washington, the threat of renewed recession in the 8 Eurozone, and political and economic unrest in Ukraine, the Middle East, and 9 emerging markets, the potential for significant volatility and higher capital costs is 10 clearly evident to investors.

Q31. WHAT DO THESE EVENTS IMPLY WITH RESPECT TO THE ROE FOR NORTHWESTERN MORE GENERALLY?

A31. Current capital market conditions continue to reflect the impact of unprecedented
 policy measures taken in response to recent dislocations in the economy and
 financial markets and ongoing economic and political risks. As a result, current
 capital costs are not representative of what is likely to prevail over the near-term
 future. As FERC recently concluded:

- 18 [W]e also understand that any DCF analysis may be affected by
- 19 potentially unrepresentative financial inputs to the DCF formula,
- 20 including those produced by historically anomalous capital market
- 21 conditions. Therefore, while the DCF model remains the
- 22 Commission's preferred approach to determining allowed rate of
- return, the Commission may consider the extent to which economic
- anomalies may have affected the reliability of DCF analyses ...¹⁵

¹⁴ Poole, William, "Prospects for and Ramifications of the Great Central Banking Unwind," *Financial Analysts Journal* (November/December 2013).

⁵ Opinion No. 531, 147 FERC ¶ 61,234 at P 41 (2014).

1 This conclusion is supported by comparisons of current conditions to the 2 historical record and independent forecasts. As demonstrated earlier, recognized 3 economic forecasting services project that long-term capital costs will increase 4 from present levels.

5 Given investors' expectations for rising interest rates and capital costs, the 6 Commission should consider near-term forecasts for public utility bond yields in 7 assessing the reasonableness of individual cost of equity estimates and in 8 evaluating a fair ROE for NorthWestern from within the range of reasonableness. 9 The use of these near-term forecasts for public utility bond yields is supported 10 below by economic studies that show that equity risk premiums are higher when 11 interest rates are at very low levels.

IV. COMPARABLE RISK PROXY GROUP

12 Q32. HOW DID YOU IMPLEMENT QUANTITATIVE METHODS TO 13 ESTIMATE THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY FOR THE COMPANIES?

14 A32. Application of quantitative methods to estimate the cost of common equity 15 requires observable capital market data, such as stock prices. Moreover, even for 16 a firm with publicly traded stock, the cost of common equity can only be 17 estimated. As a result, applying quantitative models using observable market data 18 only produces an estimate that inherently includes some degree of observation 19 error. Thus, the accepted approach to increase confidence in the results is to apply 20 quantitative methods such as the DCF and ECAPM to a proxy group of publicly 21 traded companies that investors regard as risk-comparable.

Q33. WHAT SPECIFIC PROXY GROUP OF UTILITIES DID YOU RELY ON FOR YOUR ANALYSIS?

- A33. In order to reflect the risks and prospects associated with NorthWestern's
 jurisdictional electric utility operations, my analyses focused on a reference group
 of other utilities composed of those companies included in Value Line's electric
 utility industry groups with:
- Corporate credit ratings from S&P of "BBB", "BBB+", or "A-";
 Long-term issuer ratings from Moody's of "Baa2", "Baa1", or "A3";
 Value Line Safety Rank of "2" or "3";
 No ongoing involvement in a major merger or acquisition; and,
- 11 5. No cuts in dividend payments during the past six months.
- These criteria resulted in a proxy group composed of 26 companies, which I refer
 to as the "Electric Group."

14 Q34. HOW DID YOU EVALUATE THE RISKS OF THE ELECTRIC GROUP 15 RELATIVE TO NORTHWESTERN?

16 A34. My evaluation of relative risk considered four objective, published benchmarks 17 that are widely relied on in the investment community. Credit ratings are assigned 18 by independent rating agencies for the purpose of providing investors with a broad assessment of the creditworthiness of a firm. Ratings generally extend 19 from triple-A (the highest) to D (in default). Other symbols (e.g., "+" or "-") are 20 21 used to show relative standing within a category. Because the rating agencies' 22 evaluation includes virtually all of the factors normally considered important in 23 assessing a firm's relative credit standing, corporate credit ratings provide a 24 broad, objective measure of overall investment risk that is readily available to 25 investors. Widely cited in the investment community and referenced by investors,

credit ratings are also frequently used as a primary risk indicator in establishing proxy groups to estimate the cost of common equity.

3 While credit ratings provide the most widely referenced benchmark for investment risks, other quality rankings published by investment advisory services 4 5 also provide relative assessments of risks that are considered by investors in forming their expectations for common stocks. Value Line's primary risk 6 7 indicator is its Safety Rank, which ranges from "1" (Safest) to "5" (Riskiest). 8 This overall risk measure is intended to capture the total risk of a stock, and 9 incorporates elements of stock price stability and financial strength. Given that 10 Value Line is perhaps the most widely available source of investment advisory 11 information, its Safety Rank provides useful guidance regarding the risk 12 perceptions of investors.

The Financial Strength Rating is designed as a guide to overall financial strength and creditworthiness, with the key inputs including financial leverage, business volatility measures, and company size. Value Line's Financial Strength Ratings range from "A++" (strongest) down to "C" (weakest) in nine steps. These objective, published indicators incorporate consideration of a broad spectrum of risks, including financial and business position, relative size, and exposure to firm-specific factors.

Finally, beta measures a utility's stock price volatility relative to the market as a whole, and reflects the tendency of a stock's price to follow changes in the market. A stock that tends to respond less to market movements has a beta less than 1.00, while stocks that tend to move more than the market have betas greater than 1.00. Beta is the only relevant measure of investment risk under modern capital market theory, and is widely cited in academics and in the

1	investment industry as a guide to investors' risk perceptions. Moreover, in my
2	experience Value Line is the most widely referenced source for beta in regulatory

3 proceedings. As noted in New Regulatory Finance:

4 Value Line is the largest and most widely circulated independent investment advisory service, and influences the expectations of a 5 large number of institutional and individual investors. ... Value Line 6 betas are computed on a theoretically sound basis using a broadly 7 based market index, and they are adjusted for the regression 8 tendency of betas to converge to 1.00.¹⁶ 9

10 **Q35. HOW DO THE OVERALL RISKS OF YOUR PROXY GROUP COMPARE**

11

TO THE COMPANY?

12 A35. Table 2 compares the Electric Group with NorthWestern across the four key 13 indicia of investment risk discussed above:

14 TABLE 2 **COMPARISON OF RISK INDICATORS** 15

				Value Line	
Proxy Group	S&P	Moody's	Safety Rank	Financial Strength	Beta
Electric Group	BBB+	Baa1	2	B++	0.75
NorthWestern	BBB	A3	3	B+	0.70

16 **O36.** WHAT DOES THIS COMPARISON INDICATE REGARDING **INVESTORS' ASSESSMENT OF THE RELATIVE RISKS ASSOCIATED** 17 18 WITH YOUR ELECTRIC GROUP?

19 A36. As shown above, NorthWestern's S&P credit rating falls one notch below the 20 average for the Electric Group, while its Moody's issuer rating is one notch higher 21 than the proxy group average. Meanwhile, the Company's higher Safety Rank and lower Financial Strength Rating suggests greater risk, while its lower beta 22

¹⁶ Morin, Roger A., "New Regulatory Finance," *Public Utilities Reports* at 71 (2006).

suggests somewhat less risk. Considered together, this comparison of objective
measures, which incorporate a broad spectrum of risks, including financial and
business position and exposure to company specific factors, indicates that
investors would likely conclude that the overall investment risks for
NorthWestern are comparable to those of the firms in the Electric Group.

6

7

Q37. IS AN EVALUATION OF THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE MAINTAINED BY A UTILITY RELEVANT IN ASSESSING ITS RETURN ON EQUITY?

8 A37. Yes. Other things equal, a higher debt ratio, or lower common equity ratio, 9 translates into increased financial risk for all investors. A greater amount of debt 10 means more investors have a senior claim on available cash flow, thereby 11 reducing the certainty that each will receive his contractual payments. This 12 increases the risks to which lenders are exposed, and they require correspondingly 13 higher rates of interest. From common shareholders' standpoint, a higher debt 14 ratio means that there are proportionately more investors ahead of them, thereby 15 increasing the uncertainty as to the amount of cash flow, if any, that will remain.

16 Q38. WHAT COMMON EQUITY RATIO IS USED IN NORTHWESTERN'S 17 CAPITAL STRUCTURE?

A38. As supported in the testimony of Mr. Brian Bird, NorthWestern is proposing a
common equity ratio of 53.6%.

20 Q39. HOW DOES THIS COMPARE TO THE AVERAGE CAPITALIZATION 21 MAINTAINED BY THE ELECTRIC GROUP?

A39. As shown on Exhibit AMM-3, common equity ratios for the individual firms in
the Electric Group ranged from a low of 30.9% to a high of 57.8% at year-end
2013, and averaged 47.5%. Meanwhile, Value Line's three-to-five year forecast

- 1 2
- indicates an average common equity ratio of 49.4% for the Electric Group, with the individual equity ratios ranging from 37.0% to 58.0%.
- 3

Q40. WHAT OTHER FACTORS DO INVESTORS CONSIDER IN THEIR ASSESSMENT OF A COMPANY'S CAPITAL STRUCTURE?

5 A40. Utilities are facing significant capital investment plans, uncertainties over 6 accommodating future environmental mandates, and ongoing regulatory risks. 7 Coupled with the potential for turmoil in capital markets, these considerations 8 warrant a stronger balance sheet to deal with an increasingly uncertain 9 environment. A more conservative financial profile, in the form of a higher 10 common equity ratio, is consistent with increasing uncertainties and the need to 11 maintain the continuous access to capital that is required to fund operations and 12 necessary system investment, even during times of adverse capital market 13 conditions.

14 In addition, depending on their specific attributes, contractual agreements 15 or other obligations that require the utility to make specified payments may be 16 treated as debt in evaluating the Company's financial risk. For example, PPAs 17 and leases typically obligate the utility to make specified minimum contractual 18 payments. Because investors consider the debt impact of such fixed obligations 19 in assessing a utility's financial position, they imply greater risk and reduced 20 financial flexibility. Unless the utility takes action to offset this additional 21 financial risk by maintaining a higher equity ratio, the resulting leverage will 22 weaken its creditworthiness and imply greater risk.

Q41. WHAT DOES THIS EVIDENCE SUGGEST WITH RESPECT TO THE COMPANIES' PROPOSED CAPITAL STRUCTURE?

3 A41. The 53.6% common equity ratio requested by NorthWestern is consistent with the 4 range of capital structures maintained by the utilities in the Electric Group at year-5 end 2013, and based on Value Line's expectations for these utilities over the near-6 term. While industry averages provide one benchmark for comparison, each firm 7 must select its capitalization based on the risks and prospects it faces, as well as 8 its specific needs to access the capital markets. A public utility with an obligation 9 to serve must maintain ready access to capital so that it can meet the service 10 requirements of its customers, even during unfavorable capital market conditions.

11 NorthWestern's proposed capital structure is consistent with the range of 12 industry benchmarks and reflects the Company's ongoing efforts to maintain its 13 credit standing and support access to capital on reasonable terms. The 14 reasonableness of the Company's requested capital structure is reinforced by the 15 need to accommodate the additional risks associated with the Company's 16 relatively small size. Based on my evaluation, I conclude that NorthWestern's 17 requested capital structure represents a reasonable mix of capital sources from 18 which to calculate the overall rate of return.

V. CAPITAL MARKET ESTIMATES

19 Q42. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS SECTION?

A42. This section presents capital market estimates of the cost of equity. First, I
 address the concept of the cost of common equity, along with the risk-return
 tradeoff principle fundamental to capital markets. Next, I describe DCF, ECAPM,
 and risk premium analyses conducted to estimate the cost of common equity for

the proxy group of comparable risk firms. Finally, I examine flotation costs, which are properly considered in evaluating a fair rate of return on equity.

A. Economic Standards

3 Q43. WHAT ROLE DOES THE RATE OF RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY 4 PLAY IN A UTILITY'S RATES?

5 A43. The ROE compensates common equity investors for the use of their capital to finance the plant and equipment necessary to provide utility service. 6 This investment is necessary to finance the asset base needed to provide utility service. 7 Investors will commit money to a particular investment only if they expect it to 8 9 produce a return commensurate with those from other investments with 10 comparable risks. To be consistent with sound regulatory economics and the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in the Bluefield¹⁷ and Hope¹⁸ cases, a 11 utility's allowed ROE should be sufficient to: (1) fairly compensate investors for 12 13 capital invested in the utility, (2) enable the utility to offer a return adequate to 14 attract new capital on reasonable terms, and (3) maintain the utility's financial 15 integrity. Meeting these objectives allows the utility to fulfill its obligation to 16 provide reliable service while meeting the needs of customers through necessary system expansion. 17

18 Q44. WHAT FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC PRINCIPLE UNDERLIES THE 19 COST OF EQUITY CONCEPT?

A44. The fundamental economic principle underlying the cost of equity concept is the
 notion that investors are risk averse. In capital markets where relatively risk-free

¹⁷ Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923).

¹⁸ Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).

1		assets are available (e.g., U.S. Treasury securities), investors can be induced to
2		hold riskier assets only if they are offered a premium, or additional return, above
3		the rate of return on a risk-free asset. Because all assets compete with each other
4		for investor funds, riskier assets must yield a higher expected rate of return than
5		safer assets to induce investors to invest and hold them.
6		Given this risk-return tradeoff, the required rate of return (k) from an asset
7		(i) can generally be expressed as:
8		$k_{\rm i} = R_{\rm f} + RP_{\rm i}$
9 10		where: $R_{\rm f}$ = Risk-free rate of return, and $RP_{\rm i}$ = Risk premium required to hold riskier asset i.
11		Thus, the required rate of return for a particular asset at any time is a function of:
12		(1) the yield on risk-free assets, and (2) the asset's relative risk, with investors
13		demanding correspondingly larger risk premiums for bearing greater risk.
14	Q45.	IS THERE EVIDENCE THAT THE RISK-RETURN TRADEOFF
15		PRINCIPLE ACTUALLY OPERATES IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS?
16	A45.	Yes. The risk-return tradeoff can be readily documented in segments of the
17		capital markets where required rates of return can be directly inferred from market
18		data and where generally accepted measures of risk exist. Bond yields, for
19		example, reflect investors' expected rates of return, and bond ratings measure the
20		risk of individual bond issues. Comparing the observed yields on government
21		securities, which are considered free of default risk, to the yields on bonds of
22		various rating categories demonstrates that the risk-return tradeoff does, in fact,
23		exist.

Q46. DOES THE RISK-RETURN TRADEOFF OBSERVED WITH FIXED INCOME SECURITIES EXTEND TO COMMON STOCKS AND OTHER ASSETS?

4 It is widely accepted that the risk-return tradeoff evidenced with long-term debt A46. 5 extends to all assets. Documenting the risk-return tradeoff for assets other than 6 fixed income securities, however, is complicated by two factors. First, there is no 7 standard measure of risk applicable to all assets. Second, for most assets -8 including common stock – required rates of return cannot be directly observed. 9 Yet there is every reason to believe that investors exhibit risk aversion in deciding 10 whether or not to hold common stocks and other assets, just as when choosing 11 among fixed-income securities.

12 Q47. IS THIS RISK-RETURN TRADEOFF LIMITED TO DIFFERENCES 13 BETWEEN FIRMS?

14 A47. No. The risk-return tradeoff principle applies not only to investments in different 15 firms, but also to different securities issued by the same firm. The securities 16 issued by a utility vary considerably in risk because they have different 17 characteristics and priorities. As noted earlier, long-term debt is senior among all 18 capital in its claim on a utility's net revenues and is, therefore, the least risky. The 19 last investors in line are common shareholders. They receive only the net 20 revenues, if any, remaining after all other claimants have been paid. As a result, 21 the rate of return that investors require from a utility's common stock, the most 22 junior and riskiest of its securities, must be considerably higher than the yield 23 offered by the utility's senior, long-term debt.

Q48. WHAT DOES THE ABOVE DISCUSSION IMPLY WITH RESPECT TO ESTIMATING THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY FOR A UTILITY?

3 A48. Although the cost of common equity cannot be observed directly, it is a function 4 of the returns available from other investment alternatives and the risks to which 5 the equity capital is exposed. Because it is not readily observable, the cost of 6 common equity for a particular utility must be estimated by analyzing information 7 about capital market conditions generally, assessing the relative risks of the 8 company specifically, and employing various quantitative methods that focus on 9 investors' required rates of return. These various quantitative methods typically 10 attempt to infer investors' required rates of return from stock prices, interest rates, 11 or other capital market data.

B. Discounted Cash Flow Analyses

12 Q49. HOW IS THE DCF MODEL USED TO ESTIMATE THE COST OF 13 COMMON EQUITY?

14 A49. DCF models attempt to replicate the market valuation process that sets the price 15 investors are willing to pay for a share of a company's stock. The model rests on the assumption that investors evaluate the risks and expected rates of return from 16 17 all securities in the capital markets. Given these expectations, the price of each 18 stock is adjusted by the market until investors are adequately compensated for the 19 risks they bear. Therefore, we can look to the market to determine what investors 20 believe a share of common stock is worth. By estimating the cash flows investors 21 expect to receive from the stock in the way of future dividends and capital gains, 22 we can calculate their required rate of return. That is, the cost of equity is the 23 discount rate that equates the current price of a share of stock with the present

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of the DCF model is as follows:

$$P_0 = \frac{D_1}{(1+k_e)^1} + \frac{D_2}{(1+k_e)^2} + \dots + \frac{D_t}{(1+k_e)^t} + \frac{P_t}{(1+k_e)^t}$$

value of all expected cash flows from the stock. The formula for the general form

4	where:	$P_0 = Current price per share;$
5		P_t = Expected future price per share in period t;
6		D_t = Expected dividend per share in period t;
7		$k_e = Cost of common equity.$

8 Q50. WHAT FORM OF THE DCF MODEL IS CUSTOMARILY USED TO

9 ESTIMATE THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY IN RATE CASES?

- 10 A50. Rather than developing annual estimates of cash flows into perpetuity, the DCF
- 11 model can be simplified to a "constant growth" form:¹⁹

$$P_0 = \frac{D_1}{k_e - g}$$

13 where: g = Investors' long-term growth expectations.

14 The cost of common equity (k_e) can be isolated by rearranging terms within the 15 equation:

$$k_e = \frac{D_1}{P_0} + g$$

16

¹⁹ The constant growth DCF model is dependent on a number of strict assumptions, which in practice are never met. These include a constant growth rate for both dividends and earnings; a stable dividend payout ratio; the discount rate exceeds the growth rate; a constant growth rate for book value and price; a constant earned rate of return on book value; no sales of stock at a price above or below book value; a constant price-earnings ratio; a constant discount rate (*i.e.*, no changes in risk or interest rate levels and a flat yield curve); and all of the above extend to infinity.

This constant growth form of the DCF model recognizes that the rate of return to
 stockholders consists of two parts: 1) dividend yield (D₁/P₀); and, 2) growth (g).
 In other words, investors expect to receive a portion of their total return in the
 form of current dividends and the remainder through price appreciation.

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Q51. WHAT FORM OF THE DCF MODEL DID YOU USE?

A51. I applied the constant growth DCF model to estimate the cost of common equity
for NorthWestern, which is the form of the model most commonly relied on to
establish the cost of common equity for traditional regulated utilities and the
method most often referenced by regulators.

10 Q52. HOW IS THE CONSTANT GROWTH FORM OF THE DCF MODEL

11 TYPICALLY USED TO ESTIMATE THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY?

The first step in implementing the constant growth DCF model is to determine the 12 A52. 13 expected dividend yield (D_1/P_0) for the firm in question. This is usually 14 calculated based on an estimate of dividends to be paid in the coming year divided 15 by the current price of the stock. The second, and more controversial, step is to 16 estimate investors' long-term growth expectations (g) for the firm. The final step 17 is to sum the firm's dividend yield and estimated growth rate to arrive at an 18 estimate of its cost of common equity.

19 Q53. HOW DID YOU DETERMINE THE DIVIDEND YIELD FOR THE 20 ELECTRIC GROUP?

A53. Estimates of dividends to be paid by each of these utilities over the next twelve
months, obtained from Value Line, served as D₁. This annual dividend was then
divided by the corresponding stock price for each utility to arrive at the expected
dividend yield. The expected dividends, stock prices, and resulting dividend
yields for the firms in the Electric Group are presented on page 1 of Exhibit

AMM-4. As shown there, dividend yields for the firms in the Electric Group
 ranged from 1.8% to 4.3%.

3 Q54. WHAT IS THE NEXT STEP IN APPLYING THE CONSTANT GROWTH

4

DCF MODEL?

5 A54. The next step is to evaluate long-term growth expectations, or "g", for the firm in 6 question. In constant growth DCF theory, earnings, dividends, book value, and 7 market price are all assumed to grow in lockstep, and the growth horizon of the 8 DCF model is infinite. But implementation of the DCF model is more than just a 9 theoretical exercise; it is an attempt to replicate the mechanism investors used to 10 arrive at observable stock prices. A wide variety of techniques can be used to 11 derive growth rates, but the only "g" that matters in applying the DCF model is the value that investors expect. 12

13 Q55. WHAT ARE INVESTORS MOST LIKELY TO CONSIDER IN 14 DEVELOPING THEIR LONG-TERM GROWTH EXPECTATIONS?

15 Given that the DCF model is solely concerned with replicating the forward-A55. 16 looking evaluation of real-world investors, in the case of utilities, dividend growth 17 rates are not likely to provide a meaningful guide to investors' current growth 18 expectations. This is because utilities have significantly altered their dividend 19 policies in response to more accentuated business risks in the industry, with the 20 payout ratios falling significantly. As a result of this trend towards a more 21 conservative payout ratio, dividend growth in the utility industry has remained 22 largely stagnant as utilities conserve financial resources to provide a hedge against 23 heightened uncertainties.

A measure that plays a pivotal role in determining investors' long-term growth expectations are future trends in earnings per share ("EPS"), which provide the source for future dividends and ultimately support share prices. The
importance of earnings in evaluating investors' expectations and requirements is
well accepted in the investment community, and surveys of analytical techniques
relied on by professional analysts indicate that growth in earnings is far more
influential than trends in dividends per share ("DPS").

The availability of projected EPS growth rates also is key to investors 6 7 relying on this measure as compared to future trends in DPS. Apart from Value 8 Line, investment advisory services do not generally publish comprehensive DPS 9 growth projections, and this scarcity of dividend growth rates relative to the 10 abundance of earnings forecasts attests to their relative influence. The fact that 11 securities analysts focus on EPS growth, and that DPS growth rates are not 12 routinely published, indicates that projected EPS growth rates are likely to 13 provide a superior indicator of the future long-term growth expected by investors.

14 Q56. DO THE GROWTH RATE PROJECTIONS OF SECURITY ANALYSTS

15 CONSIDER HISTORICAL TRENDS?

A56. Yes. Professional security analysts study historical trends extensively in
 developing their projections of future earnings. Hence, to the extent there is any
 useful information in historical patterns, that information is incorporated into
 analysts' growth forecasts.

Q57. DID PROFESSOR MYRON J. GORDON, WHO ORIGINATED THE DCF APPROACH, RECOGNIZE THE PIVOTAL ROLE THAT EARNINGS PLAY IN FORMING INVESTORS' EXPECTATIONS?

A57. Yes. Dr. Gordon specifically recognized that "it is the growth that investors
expect that should be used" in applying the DCF model and he concluded:

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A number of considerations suggest that investors may, in fact, use earnings growth as a measure of expected future growth."²⁰

3 Q58. ARE ANALYSTS' ASSESSMENTS OF GROWTH RATES APPROPRIATE 4 FOR ESTIMATING INVESTORS' REQUIRED RETURN USING THE 5 DCF MODEL?

A58. Yes. In applying the DCF model to estimate the cost of common equity, the only
relevant growth rate is the forward-looking expectations of investors that are
captured in current stock prices. Investors, just like securities analysts and others
in the investment community, do not know how the future will actually turn out.
They can only make investment decisions based on their best estimate of what the
future holds in the way of long-term growth for a particular stock, and securities
prices are constantly adjusting to reflect their assessment of available information.

13 Any claims that analysts' estimates are not relied upon by investors are 14 illogical given the reality of a competitive market for investment advice. If 15 financial analysts' forecasts do not add value to investors' decision making, then 16 it is irrational for investors to pay for these estimates. Similarly, those financial analysts who fail to provide reliable forecasts will lose out in competitive markets 17 18 relative to those analysts whose forecasts investors find more credible. The 19 reality that analyst estimates are routinely referenced in the financial media and in 20 investment advisory publications, as well as the continued success of services 21 such as Thomson Reuters and Value Line, implies that investors use them as a 22 basis for their expectations.

23 24 While the projections of securities analysts may be proven optimistic or pessimistic in hindsight, this is irrelevant in assessing the expected growth that

²⁰ Gordon, Myron J., "The Cost of Capital to a Public Utility," *MSU Public Utilities Studies* at 89 (1974).

1		investors have incorporated into current stock prices, and any bias in analysts'
2		forecasts - whether pessimistic or optimistic - is irrelevant if investors share
3		analysts' views. Earnings growth projections of security analysts provide the
4		most frequently referenced guide to investors' views and are widely accepted in
5		applying the DCF model. As explained in New Regulatory Finance:
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13		Because of the dominance of institutional investors and their influence on individual investors, analysts' forecasts of long-run growth rates provide a sound basis for estimating required returns. Financial analysts exert a strong influence on the expectations of many investors who do not possess the resources to make their own forecasts, that is, they are a cause of g [growth]. The accuracy of these forecasts in the sense of whether they turn out to be correct is not an issue here, as long as they reflect widely held expectations. ²¹
1.4	0.50	WHAT ARE SECURITY ANALYSTS CURRENTLY PROJECTING IN
14	Q59.	WHAT ARE SECURITI ANALISIS CURRENILI PROJECTING IN
14 15	Q59.	THE WAY OF GROWTH FOR THE FIRMS IN THE UTILITY PROXY
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15	Q59. A59.	THE WAY OF GROWTH FOR THE FIRMS IN THE UTILITY PROXY
15 16	-	THE WAY OF GROWTH FOR THE FIRMS IN THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP?
15 16 17	-	THE WAY OF GROWTH FOR THE FIRMS IN THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP? The earnings growth projections for each of the firms in the Electric Group
15 16 17 18	-	THE WAY OF GROWTH FOR THE FIRMS IN THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP? The earnings growth projections for each of the firms in the Electric Group reported by Value Line, Thomson Reuters ("IBES"), Zacks Investment Research
15 16 17 18 19	A59.	THE WAY OF GROWTH FOR THE FIRMS IN THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP? The earnings growth projections for each of the firms in the Electric Group reported by Value Line, Thomson Reuters ("IBES"), Zacks Investment Research ("Zacks"), and Reuters are displayed on page 2 of Exhibit AMM-4. ²²
15 16 17 18 19 20	A59.	THE WAY OF GROWTH FOR THE FIRMS IN THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP? The earnings growth projections for each of the firms in the Electric Group reported by Value Line, Thomson Reuters ("IBES"), Zacks Investment Research ("Zacks"), and Reuters are displayed on page 2 of Exhibit AMM-4. ²² HOW ELSE ARE INVESTORS' EXPECTATIONS OF FUTURE LONG-
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	A59.	THE WAY OF GROWTH FOR THE FIRMS IN THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP? The earnings growth projections for each of the firms in the Electric Group reported by Value Line, Thomson Reuters ("IBES"), Zacks Investment Research ("Zacks"), and Reuters are displayed on page 2 of Exhibit AMM-4. ²² HOW ELSE ARE INVESTORS' EXPECTATIONS OF FUTURE LONG- TERM GROWTH PROSPECTS OFTEN ESTIMATED WHEN APPLYING
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	A59. Q60.	THE WAY OF GROWTH FOR THE FIRMS IN THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP? The earnings growth projections for each of the firms in the Electric Group reported by Value Line, Thomson Reuters ("IBES"), Zacks Investment Research ("Zacks"), and Reuters are displayed on page 2 of Exhibit AMM-4. ²² HOW ELSE ARE INVESTORS' EXPECTATIONS OF FUTURE LONG- TERM GROWTH PROSPECTS OFTEN ESTIMATED WHEN APPLYING THE CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL?

²¹ Morin, Roger A., "New Regulatory Finance," *Public Utilities Reports, Inc.* at 298 (2006) (emphasis added). ²² Formerly I/B/E/S International, Inc., IBES growth rates are now compiled and published by Thomson

Reuters.

payout ratio are constant over time, growth in earnings and dividends will be
equal to growth in book value. Despite the fact that these conditions are never
met in practice, this "sustainable growth" approach may provide a rough guide for
evaluating a firm's growth prospects and is frequently proposed in regulatory
proceedings.

The sustainable growth rate is calculated by the formula, g = br+sv, where 6 "b" is the expected retention ratio, "r" is the expected earned return on equity, "s" 7 is the percent of common equity expected to be issued annually as new common 8 stock, and "v" is the equity accretion rate. Under DCF theory, the "sv" factor is a 9 10 component of the growth rate designed to capture the impact of issuing new 11 common stock at a price above, or below, book value. The sustainable, "br+sv" 12 growth rates for each firm in the Electric Group are summarized on page 2 of 13 Exhibit AMM-5, with the underlying details being presented on Exhibit AMM-6.²³ 14

15 Q61. ARE THERE SIGNIFICANT SHORTCOMINGS ASSOCIATED WITH 16 THE "BR+SV" GROWTH RATE?

A61. Yes. First, in order to calculate the sustainable growth rate, it is necessary to develop estimates of investors' expectations for four separate variables; namely, "b", "r", "s", and "v." Given the inherent difficulty in forecasting each parameter and the difficulty of estimating the expectations of investors, the potential for measurement error is significantly increased when using four variables, as opposed to referencing a direct projection for EPS growth. Second, empirical research in the finance literature indicates that sustainable growth rates are not as

²³ Because Value Line reports end-of-year book values, an adjustment factor was incorporated to compute an average rate of return over the year, which is consistent with the theory underlying this approach.

significantly correlated to measures of value, such as share prices, as are analysts'
 EPS growth forecasts.²⁴

The "sustainable growth" approach was included for completeness, but evidence indicates that analysts' forecasts provide a superior and more direct guide to investors' growth expectations. Accordingly, I give less weight to cost of equity estimates based on br+sv growth rates in evaluating the results of the DCF model.

Q62. WHAT COST OF COMMON EQUITY ESTIMATES WERE IMPLIED

8

9

- FOR THE ELECTRIC GROUP USING THE DCF MODEL?
- A62. After combining the dividend yields and respective growth projections for each
 utility, the resulting cost of common equity estimates are shown on page 3 of
 Exhibit AMM-4.
- 13Q63. IN EVALUATING THE RESULTS OF THE CONSTANT GROWTH DCF14MODEL, IS IT APPROPRIATE TO ELIMINATE ESTIMATES THAT ARE
- 15 **EXTREME LOW OR HIGH OUTLIERS?**
- A63. Yes. In applying quantitative methods to estimate the cost of equity, it is essential
 that the resulting values pass fundamental tests of reasonableness and economic
 logic. Accordingly, DCF estimates that are implausibly low or high should be
 eliminated when evaluating the results of this method.

20 Q64. HOW DID YOU EVALUATE DCF ESTIMATES AT THE LOW END OF 21 THE RANGE?

A64. I based my evaluation of DCF estimates at the low end of the range on the
fundamental risk-return tradeoff, which holds that investors will only take on
more risk if they expect to earn a higher rate of return to compensate them for the

²⁴ Morin, Roger A., "New Regulatory Finance," *Public Utilities Reports, Inc.*, at 307 (2006).

1		greater uncertainly. Because common stocks lack the protections associated with
2		an investment in long-term bonds, a utility's common stock imposes far greater
3		risks on investors. As a result, the rate of return that investors require from a
4		utility's common stock is considerably higher than the yield offered by senior,
5		long-term debt. Consistent with this principle, DCF results that are not
6		sufficiently higher than the yield available on less risky utility bonds must be
7		eliminated.
8	Q65.	HAVE SIMILAR TESTS BEEN APPLIED BY REGULATORS?
9	A65.	Yes. FERC has noted that adjustments are justified where applications of the
10		DCF approach produce illogical results. FERC evaluates DCF results against
11		observable yields on long-term public utility debt and has recognized that it is
12		appropriate to eliminate estimates that do not sufficiently exceed this threshold. ²⁵
13		FERC recently affirmed that:
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22		The purpose of the low-end outlier test is to exclude from the proxy group those companies whose ROE estimates are below the average bond yield or are above the average bond yield but are sufficiently low that an investor would consider the stock to yield essentially the same return as debt. In public utility ROE cases, the Commission has used 100 basis points above the cost of debt as an approximation of this threshold, but has also considered the distribution of proxy group companies to inform its decision on which companies are outliers. As the Presiding Judge explained, this is a flexible test. ²⁶
23	Q66.	WHAT INTEREST RATE BENCHMARK DID YOU CONSIDER IN
24		EVALUATING THE DCF RESULTS FOR NORTHWESTERN?
25	A66.	As noted earlier, the average S&P and Moody's ratings for the Electric Group is
26		BBB+ and Baa1, respectively, which fall in the triple-B rating category.

²⁵ See, e.g., Southern California Edison Co., 131 FERC ¶ 61,020 at P 55 (2010) ("SoCal Edison").
²⁶ Martha Coakley et al., v. Bangor Hydro-Electric Company, et al., Opinion No. 531, 147 FERC ¶ 61,234 at P 122 (2014).

Accordingly, I referenced average yields on triple-B utilities bonds as one
 benchmark in evaluating low-end DCF results. Monthly yields on triple-B bonds
 reported by Moody's averaged approximately 4.7% over the six months ended
 October 2014.²⁷

5 Q67. WHAT ELSE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN EVALUATING DCF 6 ESTIMATES AT THE LOW END OF THE RANGE?

A67. As indicated earlier, while corporate bond yields have declined substantially as
the worst of the financial crisis has abated, it is generally expected that long-term
interest rates will rise as the economy returns to a more normal pattern of growth.
As shown in Table 3 below, forecasts of IHS Global Insight and the EIA imply an
average triple-B bond yield of approximately 6.8% over the period 2015-2019:

TABLE 3 IMPLIED BBB BOND YIELD

12

13

	2015-19
Projected AA Utility Yield	
IHS Global Insight (a)	6.32%
EIA (b)	6.08%
Average	6.20%
Current BBB - AA Yield Spread (c)	0.57%
Implied Triple-B Utility Yield	6.77%

(a) IHS Global Insight, U.S. Economic Outlook at 79 (May 2014)

(b) Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2014 (May 7, 2014)

(c) Based on monthly average bond yields from Moody's Investors Service for the six-month period May 2014 - Oct. 2014

²⁷ Moody's Investors Service, http://credittrends.moodys.com/chartroom.asp?c=3.

1 The increase in debt yields anticipated by IHS Global Insight and EIA is also 2 supported by the widely referenced Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, which projects 3 that yields on corporate bonds will climb on the order of 200 basis points through 2019.28 4

Q68. WHAT DOES THIS TEST OF LOGIC IMPLY WITH RESPECT TO THE 5 6 **DCF RESULTS FOR THE ELECTRIC GROUP?**

7 A68. Adding FERC's 100 basis-point premium to the historical and projected average 8 utility bond yields implies a low-end threshold on the order of 5.7% to 7.8%. As 9 highlighted on page 3 of Exhibit AMM-4, after considering this test and the 10 distribution of the individual estimates, I eliminated low-end DCF estimates 11 ranging from 4.8% to 7.4%. Based on my professional experience and the risk-12 return principle that is fundamental to finance, it is inconceivable that investors 13 are not requiring a substantially higher rate of return for holding common stock. 14 As a result, consistent with the threshold established by historical and projected 15 utility bond yields, these values provide little guidance as to the returns investors 16 require from utility common stocks and should be excluded.

IS THERE A BASIS TO ELIMINATE HIGH-END DCF VALUES FOR THE 17 **O69**.

18

ELECTRIC GROUP?

19 Yes. It is just as important to eliminate high-end outliers as low-end outliers. A69. 20 This is also consistent with the precedent adopted by FERC, which has 21 established that estimates found to be "extreme outliers" should be disregarded in interpreting the results of the DCF model.²⁹ As shown on page 3 of Exhibit 22

²⁸ Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, Vol. 33, No. 6 (Jun. 1, 2014).

²⁹ See, e.g., ISO New England, Inc., 109 FERC ¶ 61,147 at P 205 (2004). Under FERC's test, cost of equity estimates of 17.7% or greater are considered extreme outliers, as are estimates based on growth rates of 13.3% or higher.

1 AMM-4, the upper end of the DCF cost of common equity range produced for the 2 Electric Group was set by cost of equity estimates of 19.8% and 17.3%. When 3 compared with the balance of the remaining estimates, these values are outliers 4 and should be excluded in evaluating the results of the DCF model.

5 Q70. WHAT COST OF COMMON EQUITY ESTIMATES ARE IMPLIED BY 6 YOUR DCF RESULTS FOR THE ELECTRIC GROUP?

A70. As shown on page 3 of Exhibit AMM-4 and summarized in Table 4, below, after
eliminating illogical values, application of the constant growth DCF model
resulted in the following average cost of common equity estimates:

10TABLE 411DCF RESULTS - ELECTRIC GROUP

	<u>Cost of Equity</u>		
Growth Rate	Average	<u>Midpoint</u>	
Value Line	9.5%	10.2%	
IBES	9.9%	10.8%	
Zacks	9.7%	10.7%	
Reuters	10.0%	10.8%	
br + sv	9.2%	10.6%	

~ **—**

C. Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model

12 Q71. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE ECAPM.

13 A71. The ECAPM is a variant of the traditional CAPM, which is a theory of market 14 equilibrium that measures risk using the beta coefficient. Assuming investors are 15 fully diversified, the relevant risk of an individual asset (*e.g.*, common stock) is its 16 volatility relative to the market as a whole, with beta reflecting the tendency of a 17 stock's price to follow changes in the market. A stock that tends to respond less to 18 market movements has a beta less than 1.00, while stocks that tend to move more

1		than the market have betas greater than 1.00. The CAPM is mathematically				
2		expressed as:				
3		$\mathbf{R}_{j} = \mathbf{R}_{f} + \beta_{j}(\mathbf{R}_{m} - \mathbf{R}_{f})$				
4 5 6 7		Where: $R_j = Required rate of return for stock j;$ $R_f = risk$ -free rate; $R_m = expected return on the market portfolio; and,$ $\beta_j = beta, or systematic risk, for stock j.$				
8		Like the DCF model, the ECAPM is an <i>ex-ante</i> , or forward-looking model				
9		based on expectations of the future. As a result, in order to produce a meaningful				
10		estimate of investors' required rate of return, the ECAPM must be applied using				
11		estimates that reflect the expectations of actual investors in the market, not with				
12		backward-looking, historical data.				
13	Q72.	WHY IS THE ECAPM APPROACH AN APPROPRIATE COMPONENT IN				
14		EVALUATING THE COST OF EQUITY FOR THE COMPANY?				
15	A72.	The CAPM approach, which forms the foundation of the ECAPM, generally is				
16		considered to be the most widely referenced method for estimating the cost of				
17		equity among academicians and professional practitioners, with the pioneering				
18		researchers of this method receiving the Nobel Prize in 1990. Because this is the				
19		dominant model for estimating the cost of equity outside the regulatory sphere, ³⁰				
20		the ECAPM provides important insight into investors' required rate of return for				
21		utility stocks, including NorthWestern.				

³⁰ See, e.g., Bruner, R.F., Eades, K.M., Harris, R.S., and Higgins, R.C., "Best Practices in Estimating Cost of Capital: Survey and Synthesis," *Financial Practice and Education* (1998).

1

073. HOW DOES THE ECAPM APPROACH DIFFER FROM TRADITIONAL 2 **APPLICATIONS OF THE CAPM?**

3 A73. Myriad empirical tests of the CAPM have shown that low-beta securities earn 4 returns somewhat higher than the CAPM would predict, and high-beta securities 5 earn less than predicted. In other words, the CAPM tends to overstate the 6 actual sensitivity of the cost of capital to beta, with low-beta stocks tending to 7 have higher returns and high-beta stocks tending to have lower risk returns than predicted by the CAPM. This empirical finding is widely reported in the 8 9 finance literature, as summarized in New Regulatory Finance:

10 As discussed in the previous section, several finance scholars have developed refined and expanded versions of the standard CAPM by 11 12 relaxing the constraints imposed on the CAPM, such as dividend 13 yield, size, and skewness effects. These enhanced CAPMs typically produce a risk-return relationship that is flatter than the CAPM 14 15 prediction in keeping with the actual observed risk-return 16 relationship. The ECAPM makes use of these empirical relationships.³¹ 17

18 As discussed in New Regulatory Finance, based on a review of the 19 empirical evidence, the expected return on a security is related to its risk by the 20 ECAPM, which is represented by the following formula:

21
$$R_i = R_f + 0.25(R_m - R_f) + 0.75[\beta_i(R_m - R_f)]$$

22 This ECAPM equation, and the associated weighting factors, recognize the 23 observed relationship between standard CAPM estimates and the cost of capital 24 documented in the financial research, and correct for the understated returns that 25 would otherwise be produced for low beta stocks.

³¹ Morin, Roger A., "New Regulatory Finance," *Public Utilities Reports* at 189 (2006).

Q74. HOW DID YOU APPLY THE ECAPM TO ESTIMATE THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY?

A74. Application of the ECAPM to the Electric Group based on a forward-looking
estimate for investors' required rate of return from common stocks is presented on
Exhibit AMM-6. In order to capture the expectations of today's investors in
current capital markets, the expected market rate of return was estimated by
conducting a DCF analysis on the 408 dividend paying firms in the S&P 500.

8 The dividend yield for each firm was obtained from Value Line, and the 9 growth rate was equal to the average of the EPS growth projections for each firm 10 published by IBES, with each firm's dividend yield and growth rate being 11 weighted by its proportionate share of total market value. Based on the weighted 12 average of the projections for the 408 individual firms, current estimates imply an 13 average growth rate over the next five years of 10.8%. Combining this average 14 growth rate with a year-ahead dividend yield of 2.3% results in a current cost of 15 common equity estimate for the market as a whole (R_m) of approximately 13.1%. 16 Subtracting a 3.3% risk-free rate based on the average yield on 30-year Treasury 17 bonds for October 2014 produced a market equity risk premium of 9.8%.

18 Q75. WHAT WAS THE SOURCE OF THE BETA VALUES YOU USED TO

19

APPLY THE ECAPM?

A75. As indicated earlier, I relied on the beta values reported by Value Line, which in
 my experience is the most widely referenced source for beta in regulatory
 proceedings.

23 Q76. WHAT ELSE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN APPLYING THE ECAPM?

24 A76. As explained by Morningstar:

25 One of the most remarkable discoveries of modern finance is that of 26 a relationship between firm size and return. The relationship cuts

Page across the entire size spectrum but is most evident among smaller

Page 48 of 66

1

2

3

4

5

Because financial research indicates that the ECAPM does not fully account for observed differences in rates of return attributable to firm size, a modification is required to account for this size effect.

companies, which have higher returns on average than larger ones.³²

According to the ECAPM, the expected return on a security should consist 6 7 of the riskless rate, plus a premium to compensate for the systematic risk of the 8 particular security. The degree of systematic risk is represented by the beta 9 coefficient. The need for the size adjustment arises because differences in 10 investors' required rates of return that are related to firm size are not fully 11 captured by beta. To account for this, Morningstar has developed size premiums 12 that need to be added to the theoretical ECAPM cost of equity estimates to 13 account for the level of a firm's market capitalization in determining the ECAPM cost of equity.³³ These premiums correspond to the size deciles of publicly traded 14 15 common stocks, and range from a premium of approximately 6.0% for a company 16 in the first decile (market capitalization less than \$338.8 million), to a reduction of 33 basis points for firms in the tenth decile (market capitalization between 17 \$21.8 billion and \$428.7 billion). Accordingly, my ECAPM analyses also 18 19 incorporated an adjustment to recognize the impact of size distinctions, as 20 measured by the average market capitalization for the Electric Group.

Q77. WHAT COST OF EQUITY IS IMPLIED FOR THE ELECTRIC GROUP USING THE ECAPM APPROACH?

A77. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit AMM-6, a forward-looking application of the
 ECAPM approach resulted in an average unadjusted ROE estimate of 11.2%.

³² Morningstar, "Ibbotson SBBI 2013 Valuation Yearbook," at p. 85.

 $^{^{33}}$ *Id.* at Table C-1.

1 After adjusting for the impact of firm size, the ECAPM approach implied an average cost of equity of 12.2% for the Electric Group.³⁴ 2

3 **O78.** DID YOU ALSO APPLY THE ECAPM USING FORECASTED BOND **YIELDS?**

4

5 A78. Yes. As discussed earlier, there is widespread consensus that interest rates will 6 increase materially as the economy continues to strengthen. Accordingly, in 7 addition to the use of current bond yields, I also applied the ECAPM based on the forecasted long-term Treasury bond yields developed based on projections 8 9 published by Value Line, IHS Global Insight and Blue Chip. As shown on page 2 10 of Exhibit AMM-6, incorporating a forecasted Treasury bond yield for 2015-2019 11 implied a cost of equity of approximately 11.5% for the Electric Group, or 12.4% 12 after adjusting for the impact of relative size. The midpoints of the unadjusted 13 and size adjusted cost of equity ranges were 11.7% and 12.4%, respectively.

Utility Risk Premium D.

BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE RISK PREMIUM METHOD. 14 079.

15 A79. The risk premium method extends the risk-return tradeoff observed with bonds to 16 estimate investors' required rate of return on common stocks. The cost of equity 17 is estimated by first determining the additional return investors require to forgo 18 the relative safety of bonds and to bear the greater risks associated with common 19 stock, and by then adding this equity risk premium to the current yield on bonds. 20 Like the DCF model, the risk premium method is capital market oriented. 21 However, unlike DCF models, which indirectly impute the cost of equity, risk

³⁴ The midpoints of the unadjusted and size adjusted ECAPM ranges were 11.4% and 12.2%, respectively.

- premium methods directly estimate investors' required rate of return by adding an
 equity risk premium to observable bond yields.
- 3 Q80. IS THE RISK PREMIUM APPROACH A WIDELY ACCEPTED METHOD
- 4

FOR ESTIMATING THE COST OF EQUITY?

5 A80. Yes. The risk premium approach is based on the fundamental risk-return principle 6 that is central to finance, which holds that investors will require a premium in the 7 form of a higher return in order to assume additional risk. This method is 8 routinely referenced by the investment community and in academia and 9 regulatory proceedings, and provides an important tool in estimating a fair ROE 10 for NorthWestern.

11 Q81. HOW DID YOU IMPLEMENT THE RISK PREMIUM METHOD?

12 Estimates of equity risk premiums for utilities were based on surveys of A81. 13 previously authorized ROEs. Authorized ROEs presumably reflect regulatory 14 commissions' best estimates of the cost of equity, however determined, at the time 15 they issued their final order. Such ROEs should represent a balanced and 16 impartial outcome that considers the need to maintain a utility's financial integrity 17 and ability to attract capital. Moreover, allowed returns are an important 18 consideration for investors and have the potential to influence other observable 19 investment parameters, including credit ratings and borrowing costs. Thus, these 20 data provide a logical and frequently referenced basis for estimating equity risk 21 premiums for regulated utilities.

Q82. IS IT CIRCULAR TO CONSIDER RISK PREMIUMS BASED ON AUTHORIZED RETURNS IN ASSESSING A FAIR ROE FOR THE COMPANIES?

A82. No. In establishing authorized ROEs, regulators typically consider the results of
alternative market-based approaches, including the DCF model. Because allowed
risk premiums consider objective market data (*e.g.*, stock prices dividends, beta,
and interest rates), and are not based strictly on past actions of other regulators,
this mitigates concerns over any potential for circularity.

9 Q83. HOW DID YOU CALCULATE THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUMS BASED 10 ON ALLOWED ROES?

11 A83. The ROEs authorized for electric utilities by regulatory commissions across the 12 U.S. are compiled by Regulatory Research Associates and published in its 13 Regulatory Focus report. In Exhibit AMM-7, the average yield on public utility bonds is subtracted from the average allowed ROE for electric utilities to 14 calculate equity risk premiums for each year between 1974 and 2013.³⁵ As shown 15 16 on page 3 of Exhibit AMM-7, over this period, these equity risk premiums for electric utilities averaged 3.53%, and the yield on public utility bonds averaged 17 18 8.69%.

19 Q84. IS THERE ANY CAPITAL MARKET RELATIONSHIP THAT MUST BE 20 CONSIDERED WHEN IMPLEMENTING THE RISK PREMIUM 21 METHOD?

A84. Yes. There is considerable evidence that the magnitude of equity risk premiums is
 not constant and that equity risk premiums tend to move inversely with interest

³⁵ My analysis encompasses the entire period for which published data is available.

rates.³⁶ In other words, when interest rate levels are relatively high, equity risk 1 2 premiums narrow, and when interest rates are relatively low, equity risk premiums 3 widen. The implication of this inverse relationship is that the cost of equity does not move as much as, or in lockstep with, interest rates. Accordingly, for a 1% 4 increase or decrease in interest rates, the cost of equity may only rise or fall, say, 5 6 50 basis points. Therefore, when implementing the risk premium method, 7 adjustments may be required to incorporate this inverse relationship if current interest rate levels have diverged from the average interest rate level represented 8 9 in the data set.

10 Q85. HAS THIS INVERSE RELATIONSHIP BEEN DOCUMENTED IN THE 11 FINANCIAL RESEARCH?

12 A85. Yes. There is considerable empirical evidence that when interest rates are 13 relatively high, equity risk premiums narrow, and when interest rates are 14 relatively low, equity risk premiums are greater.³⁷ This inverse relationship 15 between equity risk premiums and interest rates has been widely reported in the 16 financial literature. For example, *New Regulatory Finance* documented this 17 inverse relationship:

18Published studies by Brigham, Shome, and Vinson (1985), Harris19(1986), Harris and Marston (1992, 1993), Carelton, Chambers, and20Lakonishok (1983), Morin (2005), and McShane (2005), and others21demonstrate that, beginning in 1980, risk premiums varied inversely22with the level of interest rates – rising when rates fell and declining23when rates rose.

³⁶ See, e.g., Brigham, E.F., Shome, D.K., and Vinson, S.R., "The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility's Cost of Equity," *Financial Management* (Spring 1985); Harris, R.S., and Marston, F.C., "Estimating Shareholder Risk Premia Using Analysts' Growth Forecasts," *Financial Management* (Summer 1992).

 $[\]int Id.$

³⁸ Morin, Roger A., "New Regulatory Finance," Public Utilities Reports, at 128 (2006).

- 1 Other regulators have also recognized that the cost of equity does not move in 2 tandem with interest rates.³⁹
- 3
- Q86. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RELATIONSHIP UNDER CURRENT CAPITAL MARKET CONDITIONS?
- 4
- A86. As noted earlier, bond yields are at unprecedented lows. Given that equity risk
 premiums move inversely with interest rates, these uncharacteristically low bond
 yields also imply a sharp increase in the equity risk premium that investors
 require to accept the higher uncertainties associated with an investment in utility
 common stocks versus bonds. In other words, higher required equity risk
 premiums offset the impact of declining interest rates on the ROE.

11 Q87. WHAT COST OF EQUITY IS IMPLIED BY THE RISK PREMIUM 12 METHOD USING SURVEYS OF ALLOWED ROES?

13 A87. Based on the regression output between the interest rates and equity risk 14 premiums displayed on page 4 of Exhibit AMM-7, the equity risk premium for 15 electric utilities increased approximately 42 basis points for each percentage point 16 drop in the yield on average public utility bonds. As illustrated on page 1 of Exhibit AMM-7, with an average yield on public utility bonds for the six-months 17 18 ending October 2014 of 4.34%, this implied a current equity risk premium of 19 5.38% for electric utilities. Adding this equity risk premium to the average yield on triple-B utility bonds of 4.70% implies a current cost of equity of 10.08%. 20

³⁹ See, e.g., California Public Utilities Commission, Decision 08-05-035 (May 29, 2008); Entergy Mississippi Formula Rate Plan FRP-5, http://www.entergy-mississippi.com/content/price/tariffs/emi_frp.pdf; *Martha Coakley et al.*, 147 FERC ¶ 61,234 at P 147 (2014).

1 **O88**. WHAT RISK PREMIUM COST OF EQUITY ESTIMATE WAS 2 PRODUCED AFTER INCORPORATING FORECASTED BOND YIELDS? 3 A88. As shown on page 2 of Exhibit AMM-7, incorporating a forecasted yield for 4 2015-2019 and adjusting for changes in interest rates since the study period implied an equity risk premium of 4.50% for electric utilities. Adding this equity 5 6 risk premium to the implied average yield on triple-B public utility bonds for 7 2015-2019 of 6.77% resulted in an implied cost of equity of 11.27%.

E. Flotation Costs

8 Q89. WHAT OTHER CONSIDERATIONS ARE RELEVANT IN SETTING THE 9 RETURN ON EQUITY FOR A UTILITY?

10 A89. The common equity used to finance the investment in utility assets is provided 11 from either the sale of stock in the capital markets or from retained earnings not 12 paid out as dividends. When equity is raised through the sale of common stock, 13 there are costs associated with "floating" the new equity securities. These 14 flotation costs include services such as legal, accounting, and printing, as well as 15 the fees and discounts paid to compensate brokers for selling the stock to the public. Also, some argue that the "market pressure" from the additional supply of 16 17 common stock and other market factors may further reduce the amount of funds a 18 utility nets when it issues common equity.

19 Q90. IS THERE AN ESTABLISHED MECHANISM FOR A UTILITY TO 20 RECOGNIZE EQUITY ISSUANCE COSTS?

A90. No. While debt flotation costs are recorded on the books of the utility, amortized
over the life of the issue, and thus increase the effective cost of debt capital, there
is no similar accounting treatment to ensure that equity flotation costs are
recorded and ultimately recognized. No rate of return is authorized on flotation

1 costs necessarily incurred to obtain a portion of the equity capital used to finance 2 plant. In other words, equity flotation costs are not included in a utility's rate base 3 because neither that portion of the gross proceeds from the sale of common stock used to pay flotation costs is available to invest in plant and equipment, nor are 4 5 flotation costs capitalized as an intangible asset. Unless some provision is made to 6 recognize these issuance costs, a utility's revenue requirements will not fully reflect 7 all of the costs incurred for the use of investors' funds. Because there is no 8 accounting convention to accumulate the flotation costs associated with equity 9 issues, they must be accounted for indirectly, with an upward adjustment to the 10 cost of equity being the most appropriate mechanism.

11 Q91. IS THERE A THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL BASIS TO INCLUDE A 12 FLOTATION COST ADJUSTMENT IN THIS CASE?

13 A91. Yes. First, an adjustment for flotation costs associated with past equity issues is 14 appropriate, even when the utility is not contemplating any new sales of common 15 stock. The need for a flotation cost adjustment to compensate for past equity 16 issues has been recognized in the financial literature. In a Public Utilities 17 Fortnightly article, for example, Brigham, Aberwald, and Gapenski demonstrated 18 that even if no further stock issues are contemplated, a flotation cost adjustment in 19 all future years is required to keep shareholders whole, and that the flotation cost adjustment must consider total equity, including retained earnings.⁴⁰ Similarly, 20 21 New Regulatory Finance contains the following discussion:

Another controversy is whether the flotation cost allowance should still be applied when the utility is not contemplating an imminent common stock issue. Some argue that flotation costs are real and

⁴⁰ Brigham, E.F., Aberwald, D.A., and Gapenski, L.C., "Common Equity Flotation Costs and Rate Making," *Public Utilities Fortnightly*, May, 2, 1985.

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1 should be recognized in calculating the fair rate of return on equity, 2 but only at the time when the expenses are incurred. In other words, 3 the flotation cost allowance should not continue indefinitely, but 4 should be made in the year in which the sale of securities occurs, 5 with no need for continuing compensation in future years. This 6 argument implies that the company has already been compensated 7 for these costs and/or the initial contributed capital was obtained 8 freely, devoid of any flotation costs, which is an unlikely 9 assumption, and certainly not applicable to most utilities. ... The 10 flotation cost adjustment cannot be strictly forward-looking unless all past flotation costs associated with past issues have been 11 recovered.⁴¹ 12 13 WHAT IS THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ADJUSTMENT TO THE "BARE **Q92.** 14 BONES" COST OF EQUITY TO ACCOUNT FOR ISSUANCE COSTS? 15 A92. There are a number of ways in which a flotation cost adjustment can be 16 calculated, but the most common methods used to account for flotation costs in 17 regulatory proceedings is to apply an average flotation-cost percentage to a utility's dividend yield. Based on a review of the finance literature, *Regulatory* 18 19 Finance: Utilities' Cost of Capital concluded: 20 The flotation cost allowance requires an estimated adjustment to the return on equity of approximately 5% to 10%, depending on the size 21 and risk of the issue.⁴ 22 23 Alternatively, a study of data from Morgan Stanley regarding issuance 24 costs associated with utility common stock issuances suggests an average flotation cost percentage of 3.6%,⁴³ with NorthWestern incurring issuance costs equal to 25 approximately 3.8% of the gross proceeds from its recent public offering of 26

⁴¹ Morin, Roger A., "New Regulatory Finance," *Public Utilities Reports, Inc.* (2006) at 335.

⁴² Roger A. Morin, "Regulatory Finance: Utilities' Cost of Capital," Public Utilities Reports, Inc. at 166 (1994).

⁴³ Application of Yankee Gas Services Company for a Rate Increase, DPUC Docket No. 04-06-01, Direct Testimony of George J. Eckenroth (Jul. 2, 2004) at Exhibit GJE-11.1. Updating the results presented by Mr. Eckenroth through April 2005 also resulted in an average flotation cost percentage of 3.6%.

common stock.⁴⁴ Applying this 3.8% expense percentage for NorthWestern to a
 representative dividend yield of 3.6% implies a minimum flotation cost
 adjustment on the order of 14 basis points.

VI. OTHER ROE BENCHMARKS

4 Q93. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS SECTION OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

A93. This section presents alternative tests to demonstrate that the end-results of the
ROE analyses discussed earlier are reasonable and do not exceed a fair ROE
given the facts and circumstances of NorthWestern. The first test is based on
applications of the traditional CAPM analysis using current and projected interest
rates. The second test is based on expected earned returns for electric utilities.
Finally, I present a DCF analysis for a select, low risk group of non-utility firms,
with which NorthWestern must compete for investors' money.

A. Capital Asset Pricing Model

12 Q94. WHAT COST OF EQUITY ESTIMATES WERE INDICATED BY THE

13 TRADITIONAL CAPM?

14 A94. My application of the traditional CAPM was based on the same forward-looking 15 market rate of return, risk-free rates, and beta values discussed earlier in 16 connections with the ECAPM. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit AMM-8, applying 17 the forward-looking CAPM approach to the firms in the Electric Group results in 18 an average theoretical cost of equity estimate of 10.6%, or 11.6% after 19 incorporating the size adjustment corresponding to the market capitalization of the 20 individual utilities.

⁴⁴ NorthWestern Corporation, *Prospectus Supplement (To Prospectus dated February 17, 2014)* (Nov. 4, 2014).

1 As shown on page 2 of Exhibit AMM-8, incorporating a forecasted 2 Treasury bond yield for 2015-2019 implied a cost of equity of approximately 3 11.07% for the Electric Group, or 11.9% after adjusting for the impact of relative 4 size.

B. Expected Earnings Approach

5 Q95. WHAT OTHER ANALYSES DID YOU CONDUCT TO ESTIMATE THE 6 COST OF COMMON EQUITY?

7 A95. As noted earlier, I also evaluated the cost of common equity using the expected 8 earnings method. Reference to rates of return available from alternative 9 investments of comparable risk can provide an important benchmark in assessing 10 the return necessary to assure confidence in the financial integrity of a firm and its 11 ability to attract capital. This expected earnings approach is consistent with the 12 economic underpinnings for a fair rate of return established by the U.S. Supreme 13 Court in *Bluefield* and *Hope*. Moreover, it avoids the complexities and limitations of capital market methods and instead focuses on the returns earned on book 14 15 equity, which are readily available to investors.

16 Q96. WHAT ECONOMIC PREMISE UNDERLIES THE EXPECTED 17 EARNINGS APPROACH?

18 A96. The simple, but powerful concept underlying the expected earnings approach is 19 that investors compare each investment alternative with the next best opportunity. 20 If the utility is unable to offer a return similar to that available from other 21 opportunities of comparable risk, investors will become unwilling to supply the 22 capital on reasonable terms. For existing investors, denying the utility an 23 opportunity to earn what is available from other similar risk alternatives prevents 24 them from earning their opportunity cost of capital. In this situation the 1 government is effectively taking the value of investors' capital without adequate 2 compensation. The expected earnings approach is consistent with the economic 3 rationale underpinning established regulatory standards, which specifies a 4 methodology to determine an ROE benchmark based on earned rates of return for 5 a peer group of other regional utilities.

6 Q97. HOW IS THE EXPECTED EARNINGS APPROACH TYPICALLY 7 IMPLEMENTED?

8 A97. The traditional comparable earnings test identifies a group of companies that are 9 believed to be comparable in risk to the utility. The actual earnings of those 10 companies on the book value of their investment are then compared to the 11 allowed return of the utility. While the traditional comparable earnings test is 12 implemented using historical data taken from the accounting records, it is also 13 common to use projections of returns on book investment, such as those published 14 by recognized investment advisory publications (e.g., Value Line). Because these 15 returns on book value equity are analogous to the allowed return on a utility's rate 16 base, this measure of opportunity costs results in a direct, "apples to apples" 17 comparison.

18 Moreover, regulators do not set the returns that investors earn in the 19 capital markets, which are a function of dividend payments and fluctuations in 20 common stock prices - both of which are outside their control. Regulators can 21 only establish the allowed ROE, which is applied to the book value of a utility's 22 investment in rate base, as determined from its accounting records. This is 23 directly analogous to the expected earnings approach, which measures the return 24 that investors expect the utility to earn on book value. As a result, the expected 25 earnings approach provides a meaningful guide to ensure that the allowed ROE is 1 similar to what other utilities of comparable risk will earn on invested capital. 2 This expected earnings test does not require theoretical models to indirectly infer 3 investors' perceptions from stock prices or other market data. As long as the proxy companies are similar in risk, their expected earned returns on invested 4 capital provide a direct benchmark for investors' opportunity costs that is 5 6 independent of fluctuating stock prices, market-to-book ratios, debates over DCF 7 growth rates, or the limitations inherent in any theoretical model of investor 8 behavior.

9 Q98. WHAT RATES OF RETURN ON EQUITY ARE INDICATED FOR 10 UTILITIES BASED ON THE EXPECTED EARNINGS APPROACH?

11 A98. Value Line's projections imply an average rate of return on common equity for the electric utility industry of 10.6% over its forecast horizon.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, for the 12 13 firms in the Electric Group specifically, the year-end returns on common equity 14 projected by Value Line over its forecast horizon are shown on Exhibit AMM-9. Consistent with the rationale underlying the development of the br+sv growth 15 16 rates, these year-end values were converted to average returns using the same 17 adjustment factor discussed earlier and developed on Exhibit AMM-5. As shown 18 on Exhibit AMM-9, Value Line's projections for the Electric Group suggest an 19 average ROE of approximately 10.5%.

⁴⁵ The Value Line Investment Survey (Aug. 22, Sep. 19, & Oct. 31, 2014). Value Line reports return on year-end equity so the equivalent return on average equity would be higher.

C. Low Risk Non-Utility DCF

Q99. WHAT OTHER PROXY GROUP DID YOU CONSIDER IN EVALUATING A FAIR ROE FOR THE COMPANIES?

A99. Consistent with underlying economic and regulatory standards, I also applied the
DCF model to a reference group of low-risk companies in the non-utility sectors
of the economy. I refer to this group as the "Non-Utility Group".

6 Q100. DO UTILITIES HAVE TO COMPETE WITH NON-REGULATED FIRMS 7 FOR CAPITAL?

8 A100. Yes. The cost of capital is an opportunity cost based on the returns that investors 9 could realize by putting their money in other alternatives. Clearly, the total 10 capital invested in utility stocks is only the tip of the iceberg of total common 11 stock investment, and there are a plethora of other enterprises available to 12 investors beyond those in the utility industry. Utilities must compete for capital, 13 not just against firms in their own industry, but with other investment 14 opportunities of comparable risk. Indeed, modern portfolio theory is built on the assumption that rational investors will hold a diverse portfolio of stocks, not just 15 16 companies in a single industry.

17 Q101. IS IT CONSISTENT WITH THE BLUEFIELD AND HOPE CASES TO

18 CONSIDER INVESTORS' REQUIRED ROE FOR NON-UTILITY 19 COMPANIES?

A101. Yes. The cost of equity capital in the competitive sector of the economy form the
 very underpinning for utility ROEs because regulation purports to serve as a
 substitute for the actions of competitive markets. The Supreme Court has
 recognized that it is the degree of risk, not the nature of the business, which is
 relevant in evaluating an allowed ROE for a utility. The *Bluefield* case refers to

1		"business undertakings attended with comparable risks and uncertainties." It does
2		not restrict consideration to other utilities. Similarly, the Hope case states:
3 4 5		By that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. ⁴⁶
6		As in the <i>Bluefield</i> decision, there is nothing to restrict "other enterprises" solely
7		to the utility industry.
8	Q102.	DOES CONSIDERATION OF THE RESULTS FOR THE NON-UTILITY
9		GROUP MAKE THE ESTIMATION OF THE COST OF EQUITY USING
10		THE DCF MODEL MORE RELIABLE?
11	A102.	Yes. The estimates of growth from the DCF model depend on analysts' forecasts.
12		It is possible for utility growth rates to be distorted by short-term trends in the
13		industry, or by the industry falling into favor or disfavor by analysts. The result of
14		such distortions would be to bias the DCF estimates for utilities. Because the
15		Non-Utility Group includes low risk companies from many industries, it
16		diversifies away any distortion that may be caused by the ebb and flow of
17		enthusiasm for a particular sector.
18	Q103.	WHAT CRITERIA DID YOU APPLY TO DEVELOP THE NON-UTILITY
19		GROUP?
20	A103.	The comparable risk proxy group was composed of those United States
21		companies followed by Value Line that:
22		1) pay common dividends;
23		2) have a Safety Rank of "1";
24		3) have a Financial Strength Rating of "B++" or greater;
25		4) have a beta of 0.70 or less; and

⁴⁶ Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 320 U.S. 391, (1944).

5) have investment grade credit ratings from S&P and Moody's.⁴⁷ Q104. HOW DO THE OVERALL RISKS OF THIS NON-UTILITY GROUP COMPARE WITH THE ELECTRIC GROUP?

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4 A104. Table 5 compares the Non-Utility Group with the Electric Group and
5 NorthWestern across the risk measures discussed earlier:

6 7

1

2

3

TABLE 5COMPARISON OF RISK INDICATORS

			Value Line		
Proxy Group	S&P	Moody's	Safety Rank	Financial Strength	Beta
Non-Utility	А	A2	1	A+	0.66
Electric	BBB+	Baa1	2	B++	0.75
NorthWestern	BBB	A3	3	B+	0.70

As shown above, the average credit ratings, Safety Rank, Financial 8 9 Strength Rating, and beta for the Non-Utility Group suggest less risk than for 10 NorthWestern and the proxy group of electric utilities. When considered 11 together, a comparison of these objective measures, which consider a broad 12 spectrum of risks, including financial and business position, relative size, and exposure to company-specific factors, indicates that investors would likely 13 14 conclude that the overall investment risks for the Electric Group and 15 NorthWestern are greater than those of the firms in the Non-Utility Group.

16 The sixteen companies that make up the Non-Utility Group are 17 representative of the pinnacle of corporate America. These firms, which include

⁴⁷ Credit rating firms, such as S&P, use designations consisting of upper- and lower-case letters 'A' and 'B' to identify a bond's credit quality rating. 'AAA', 'AA', 'A', and 'BBB' ratings are considered investment grade. Credit ratings for bonds below these designations ('BB', 'B', 'CCC', etc.) are considered speculative grade, and are commonly referred to as "junk bonds". The term "investment grade" refers to bonds with ratings in the 'BBB' category and above.

1 household names such as Colgate-Palmolive, McDonalds, Proctor & Gamble, and 2 Wal-Mart, have long corporate histories, well-established track records, and exceedingly conservative risk profiles. Many of these companies pay dividends 3 on a par with utilities, with the average dividend yield for the group approaching 4 Moreover, because of their significance and name recognition, these 5 3%. 6 companies receive intense scrutiny by the investment community, which increases 7 confidence that published growth estimates are representative of the consensus 8 expectations reflected in common stock prices.

9 Q105. WHAT WERE THE RESULTS OF YOUR DCF ANALYSIS FOR THE 10 NON-UTILITY GROUP?

A105. I applied the DCF model to the Non-Utility Group using the same analysts' EPS
 growth projections described earlier for the Electric Group, with the results being
 presented in Exhibit AMM-10. As summarized in Table 6, below, application of
 the constant growth DCF model resulted in the following cost of equity estimates:

TABLE 6DCF RESULTS – NON-UTILITY GROUP

	<u>Cost of Equity</u>		
Growth Rate	Average	<u>Midpoint</u>	
Value Line	10.9%	10.9%	
IBES	10.5%	10.4%	
Zacks	10.4%	10.7%	
Reuters	10.6%	11.1%	

As discussed earlier, reference to the Non-Utility Group is consistent with established regulatory principles. Required returns for utilities should be in line with those of non-utility firms of comparable risk operating under the constraints of free competition.

Q106. HOW CAN YOU RECONCILE THESE DCF RESULTS FOR THE NON UTILITY GROUP AGAINST THE LOWER ESTIMATES PRODUCED FOR YOUR GROUP OF UTILITIES?

4 A106. First, it is important to be clear that the higher DCF results for the Non-Utility 5 Group cannot be attributed to risk differences. As documented earlier, the risks that investors associate with the group of non-utility firms - as measured by 6 7 S&P's credit ratings, Value Line's Safety Rank, Financial Strength, and beta – are lower than the risks investors associate with the Electric Group and 8 9 NorthWestern. The objective evidence provided by these observable risk 10 measures rules out a conclusion that the higher non-utility DCF estimates are 11 associated with higher investment risk.

Rather, the divergence between the DCF results for these groups of utility 12 13 and non-utility firms can be attributed to the fact that DCF estimates invariably 14 depart from the returns that investors actually require because their expectations 15 may not be captured by the inputs to the model, particularly the assumed growth 16 Because the actual cost of equity is unobservable, and DCF results rate. 17 inherently incorporate a degree of error, cost of equity estimates for the Non-18 Utility Group provide an important benchmark in evaluating a fair ROE for 19 NorthWestern. There is no basis to conclude that DCF results for a group of 20 utilities would be inherently more reliable than those for firms in the competitive 21 sector, and the divergence between the DCF estimates for the group of utilities 22 and the Non-Utility Group suggests that both should be considered to ensure a 23 balanced end-result. The DCF results for the Non-Utility Group suggest that a 24 10.64% ROE for NorthWestern is a conservative estimate of a fair return.

Q107. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RESULTS OF YOUR ROE CHECKS OF REASONABLENESS.

A 107. The cost of common equity estimates produced by the various tests of
reasonableness discussed above are shown on page 2 of Exhibit AMM-2, and
summarized in Table 2, which is reproduced below:

6 7

TABLE 2 SUMMARY OF ROE CHECKS OF REASONABLENESS

	Average	<u>Midpoint</u>
<u> CAPM - Historical Bond Yield</u>		
Unadjusted	10.6%	10.9%
Size Adjusted	11.6%	11.7%
CAPM - Projected Bond Yield		
Unadjusted	11.0%	11.2%
Size Adjusted	11.9%	11.9%
Expected Earnings		
Industry	10.	.6%
Proxy Group	10.5%	11.1%
Non-Utility DCF		
Value Line	10.9%	10.9%
IBES	10.5%	10.4%
Zacks	10.4%	10.7%
Reuters	10.6%	11.1%

8 The results of these checks of reasonableness confirm my conclusion that an ROE

9 of 10.64% for NorthWestern' electric utility operations is reasonable.

10 Q108. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR PRE-FILED DIRECT TESTIMONY?

11 A108. Yes.