

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES
COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF
SOUTH DAKOTA

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF SCS CARBON TRANSPORT LLC FOR A PERMIT TO CONSTRUCT A CARBON DIOXIDE PIPELINE.	HP24-001
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TESTIMONY OF

BRYAN LOUQUE

ON BEHALF OF

SCS CARBON TRANSPORT, LLC

SCS EXHIBIT #

December 20, 2024

1 **Q. Please state your name, present position, and business address.**

2 A. My name is Bryan Louque, PE. I am employed by Audubon Field Solutions, LLC
3 (Audubon) as Vice President of Asset Integrity and Corrosion. My business address is 9920 E.
4 42nd Street, Tulsa, OK 74146. A copy of my CV is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

5 **Q. On whose behalf are you providing testimony in this proceeding?**

6 A. SCS Carbon Transport LLC (SCS).

7 **Q. How are you associated with SCS?**

8 A. My employer, Audubon, has been engaged by SCS to perform vapor dispersion modeling
9 and analysis for use in developing a high consequence (HCA) analysis, emergency flow
10 restriction device (EFRD) analysis, and other analyses in connection with meeting the Pipeline
11 and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) requirements for pipelines under 49
12 C.F.R. Part 195.

13 **Q. Please describe your educational and professional background.**

14 A. I earned a Bachelor of Science degree in chemical engineering from Louisiana State
15 University in 1992, and a Master of Arts in business from MidAmerica Nazarene University in
16 2001.

17 I have more than 30 years' experience in the pipeline industry, including experience in
18 design, construction, operations, and maintenance of pipeline systems with specific emphasis on
19 corrosion control, pipeline integrity, and regulatory compliance programs for natural gas (Part
20 192) and hazardous liquids (Part 195) pipeline systems. Prior to joining Audubon in 2017, I
21 worked for approximately 15 years with Black & Veatch, a global energy infrastructure
22 consulting and engineering firm. Prior to that, I worked for PHMSA from 2009 through 2012,
23 conducting, coordinating, and managing comprehensive root cause failure investigations

1 following pipeline release incidents.

2 I am a licensed professional engineer in the states of Kansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and
3 Texas, and I hold certifications from and have held various committee and board seats within the
4 National Association of Corrosion Engineers (NACE, now part of the Association for Materials
5 Protection and Performance, AMPP).

6 **Q. What is the purpose of your direct testimony?**

7 A. The purpose of my testimony is to provide information regarding vapor dispersion
8 modeling generally, the vapor dispersion analysis performed for SCS, and regulatory
9 requirements which are applicable to vapor dispersion modeling for transportation of dense
10 phase carbon dioxide (CO₂).

11 **Q. What is vapor dispersion modeling and what information does it provide?**

12 A. To anticipate the dynamics of a pipeline product release, specific processes and software
13 tools have been developed and applied in the pipeline industry. Specific tools are employed to
14 simulate liquid release from a pipeline, crude oil for example, and anticipate, among other things,
15 how the product would flow along the ground or in water. Other simulations are used to create
16 theoretical releases of gases or volatile liquids from pipelines carrying those products. These
17 models mimic, in virtual reality, how a vapor or gas cloud would act in the real world. The
18 model outputs are compared to mapping data to determine whether there could be an impact to
19 what PHMSA refers to as “high consequence areas” or “HCAs”.

20 **Q. What is a High Consequence Area?**

21 A. An HCA is an area defined by PHMSA regulations in 49 C.F.R. Part 195. Identification
22 of HCAs for hazardous liquid pipelines focuses on populated areas, drinking water sources, and
23 unusually sensitive ecological resources. Pipeline operators must determine which segments of

1 their pipeline could affect HCAs in the event of a release. This determination must be made
2 assuming that a release can occur at any point, even though the likelihood of a release at any
3 given point is very small. Hazardous liquid pipelines that pass through an HCA, or that pass
4 near enough that a release could reach the area by flowing over land or within a river, stream,
5 lake, or other means are assumed to have the potential to affect that area. When a pipeline
6 crosses an HCA, it must be included in the Operator's integrity management plan (IMP). In the
7 case of vapor dispersion analysis, theoretical vapor plumes that the modeling shows could cross
8 an HCA boundary are considered a "could-affect HCA" areas and must undergo further analyses
9 as well. Operators of pipelines with direct affect or could-affect HCAs must take additional
10 actions in the design, construction, and operation of those pipeline segments to further minimize
11 risks in those areas.

12 **Q. Is vapor dispersion analysis necessary to comply with PHMSA regulations?**

13 A. Yes. Conducting a vapor dispersion analysis is a key part of compliance with PHMSA
14 regulations. Audubon has used dispersion modeling on a wide variety of products covered by
15 PHMSA regulations to determine the theoretic potential to reach HCAs along the pipeline. This
16 modeling is used to comply with the requirement to identify whether the pipeline could affect an
17 HCA, pursuant to 195.452(f)(1), and given the factors set out in Part 195 Appendix C, including
18 vapor cloud behavior and terrain effects. SCS has also used and will continue to use the
19 modeling to inform other areas of its IMP, including the risk analysis required by 195.452(e),
20 195.452(g), and 195.452(i). Beyond integrity management, SCS will also use relevant parts of
21 the modeling results to conduct security vulnerability analyses and to inform development of its
22 PHMSA required public awareness program under 195.440 and its emergency response program
23 under 195.402, 195.403, and 195.408(b)(4).

1 **Q. What vapor dispersion tools did Audubon utilize for the vapor dispersion analysis**
2 **performed for SCS?**

3 A. Audubon utilized CANARY, by Quest Consultants, a vapor dispersion analysis tool
4 commonly used in the pipeline industry. There are a limited number of vapor dispersion tools
5 available commercially for use in pipeline modeling and regulatory compliance. When an
6 operator chooses a modeling solution, they must take into consideration the nature of the release
7 to be modeled. A supercritical (dense phase) CO₂ release is a high-velocity jet release, so the
8 modeling solution must have the ability to model high-velocity jet releases. The solution must
9 also handle the mixing and turbulence aspects of the release. These three aspects, among others,
10 were considered when choosing CANARY as a vapor dispersion model.

11 **Q. What key factors typically determine the extent of vapor dispersion after a release**
12 **of CO₂?**

13 A. While not exhaustive, primary factors include weather, topography, product composition,
14 product temperature and pressure, pipeline size and length, full flow duration, and valve spacing.

15 **Q. Did Audubon take these and other factors into account in performing vapor**
16 **dispersion modeling for SCS?**

17 A. Yes. The dispersion modeling performed for SCS accounts for a range of possible
18 weather conditions, including atmospheric temperatures and pressures. This information was
19 sourced from open-source geospatial data from the National Weather Service and the National
20 Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) specific to the areas along the pipeline route.

21 Modeling input data relative to pipeline product and properties used in the modeling was
22 sourced from SCS. This allowed for greater granularity and accuracy in the results for the areas
23 being evaluated. In addition, the vapor dispersion modeling was further evaluated using a digital

1 terrain map as discussed more fully below.

2 **Q. Has SCS prepared a dispersion analysis to be entered into evidence and open to the**
3 **public?**

4 A. Yes. SCS's public dispersion analysis report, "*Dispersion Analysis – Report to the South*
5 *Dakota Public Utilities Commission*" is attached to my testimony as Appendix 1.

6 **Q. What is the purpose of this report?**

7 A. To provide the Commission and public with credible information and important context
8 around potential pipeline failures and associated potential impacts, as well as a discussion of the
9 regulatory requirements regarding modeling – both vapor dispersion modeling and terrain-aided
10 dispersion modeling. The dispersion models discussed within the report highlight two types of
11 potential pipeline releases – mechanical damage punctures and full-bore ruptures, both
12 considering average atmospheric conditions (rather than “worst case” conditions utilized in
13 certain planning activities) in South Dakota. Although a pipeline rupture is the least common
14 type of historical failure for CO₂ pipelines, Appendix 1 focuses on these types of failures as they
15 have the largest potential impact. The reality is that the vast majority of CO₂ pipeline incidents
16 are very minor in consequence, for example valve or flange leaks, and rarely extend beyond
17 operator-owned property or the pipeline right-of-way. The atmospheric and overland flow vapor
18 dispersion associated with incidents seldom approach the modeled dispersion distances.

19 **Q. Did Audubon take heavy vapor overland flow and terrain into account in**
20 **performing SCS's vapor dispersion analysis?**

21 A. Yes. A typical vapor dispersion model produces results in two dimensions. At SCS's
22 request, Audubon went a step further and modeled the supercritical (dense) phase CO₂ release as
23 a pooling spill component to consider the effects of terrain on a potential release. Audubon

1 utilized the pipeline centerlines and a digital elevation model to identify critical valleys (a
2 “critical valley” has been defined as any terrain that could transport heavy vapor CO₂ to a highly
3 populated area (“HPA”) or other populated area (“OPA”)) along the pipeline right-of-way. This
4 elevation analysis was performed as a surface study in three dimensions.

5 At each critical valley site, a heavy vapor CO₂ overland spread was modeled. The heavy
6 vapor CO₂ component was then modeled with FLO-2D (a program discussed in more detail
7 below) to create overland spread polygons of the release in reference to the digital elevation
8 model. These overland spread polygons were then overlaid on the mapping to see if any of them
9 intersected with HPAs or OPAs.

10 **Q. In conducting its vapor dispersion analysis, has SCS considered past CO₂ releases
11 and PHMSA investigations?**

12 A. Yes. The modeling is informed by historical releases and the resulting PHMSA
13 investigations and reports. For example, in February of 2020, a pipeline transporting CO₂,
14 hydrogen sulfide (H₂S), and other compounds experienced a catastrophic guillotine (full bore)
15 failure, and the released gases formed a vapor cloud that migrated downhill to the Village of
16 Satartia, Mississippi. PHMSA’s Failure Investigation Report following the incident indicates
17 that the operator’s CO₂ dispersion model underestimated the potential area that could be
18 impacted by a release. This underestimation caused the pipeline segment at issue to not be
19 identified as a “could affect” HCA by the operator, which resulted in the operator not including it
20 in the operator’s public awareness plan or emergency response planning efforts. To avoid a
21 similar situation, SCS has had a more robust vapor dispersion analysis performed, modeling
22 overland spread of CO₂ in critical valleys that could assist in the transport of a CO₂ release to
23 HCAs.

1 **Q. Is the dispersion analysis periodically updated both prior to construction and after**
2 **operations begin?**

3 A. Yes. As the design of the pipeline evolves and route adjustments are made, the vapor
4 dispersion analysis is updated. In addition, after operations begin, updates to all aspects of an
5 IMP (including dispersion modeling) are required on at least an annual basis or as conditions
6 change along the pipeline. This evaluation also includes the risk factors for evaluating whether a
7 pipeline could affect a HCA, pursuant to 195.452(j)(2). As part of its IMP, SCS plans to update
8 its dispersion modeling whenever either conditions along the pipeline or pipeline operational
9 changes occur such that the dispersion modeling would be affected.

10 **Q. What other modeling tool is SCS using?**

11 A. As noted above, SCS has used and continues to use FLO-2D to perform the overland flow
12 / terrain-aided vapor dispersion analysis.

13 **Q. What is FLO-2D?**

14 A. FLO-2D uses an overland spread flow model to determine the terrain-aided dispersion
15 distance and whether or not a heavy vapor might impact a HCA.

16 **Q. Why did SCS decide to use the FLO-2D tool as well as CANARY?**

17 A. Modeling done with tools like CANARY can benefit from supplementation by additional
18 modeling that can account better for terrain and topographic features. This is because elevation
19 and topography changes may cause the modeled plume to change from what is predicted by
20 using only the atmospheric vapor dispersion model. SCS has applied the CANARY modeling
21 across the entire pipeline length and applied the FLO-2D overland spread / terrain-aided analysis
22 where terrain and topography could cause the plume to impact an HCA. SCS's CO₂ vapor
23 dispersion modeling approach is widely considered appropriate and is consistent with best

1 practices and applicable regulations and guidance.

2 **Q. When developing atmospheric vapor dispersion models, has SCS identified worst-**
3 **case climate and other data inputs to produce the most conservative (largest) atmospheric**
4 **vapor dispersion concentration plumes?**

5 A. Audubon empirically determined which combination of the atmospheric inputs produced
6 the maximum distance from centerline for a specified CO₂ concentration (ppm) at ground level
7 due to a pipeline release. In other words, Audubon employed the variables that would produce
8 the “worst case” scenario. For example, Audubon performed a sensitivity analysis to determine
9 what wind speed to use for worst-case dispersion. That analysis resulted in a 4.47 mile per hour
10 input; below that level, the plume remained stationary and, above that level, the turbulence and
11 mixing effect reduced the distance the plume would travel at a specified concentration at grade.

12 It is also worth noting that Audubon likewise developed and employed worst-case data
13 inputs for non-climatic inputs – for example, a full-bore break at ground level at an orientation
14 (*i.e.*, angle) to produce the largest vapor dispersion for the modeling. The result is a credible,
15 albeit overly conservative, presentation of the “worst-case” vapor dispersion model. This
16 “worst-case” model was the basis for developing the could-affect pipeline segments which are
17 illustrated in Application Appendix 10 – High Consequence Area Mainline Valves.

18 **Q. Does this “worst-case” model differ from the models presented in Appendix 1?**

19 A. Yes. SCS created Appendix 1 for the purposes of permitting the pipeline and providing a
20 public-facing document that could be used by regulators and the public to understand the
21 potential impacts of a CO₂ release from the project. Additional models, such as the more
22 conservative “worst-case” model, are completed to comply with PHMSA regulations. The
23 “worst-case” model was not presented within Appendix 1 as it tends to overstate the risk from a

1 potential pipeline release. The “worst-case” model stacks a number of extremely conservative
2 assumptions into a scenario that is so unlikely that it does not, in my view, provide a particularly
3 credible or useful tool from the standpoint of informing and educating the public. For example,
4 the “worst-case” scenario utilizes a product pressure that matches the pipeline maximum
5 operating pressure, thus the “worst-case” model returns a conservative result. Another example
6 is that the pipeline is modeled at ground level, allowing for an unrestricted release onto the
7 ground. In reality, the pipeline is buried and during a large rupture, a crater would form due to
8 the release force, and the crater would act to propel the released product upwards into the air,
9 aiding in the dispersion of CO₂. Finally, the “worst-case” model also assumes the release
10 occurred at the “worst-case” wind speed, humidity, temperature, wind stability class, terrain,
11 release angle, and other required inputs to run the model. It is the summation of all of these
12 “worst-case” inputs that creates a model that is not likely to occur. The models within Appendix
13 1 were chosen to educate and inform the public and regulators on potential impacts from a very
14 rare pipeline rupture, but under more realistic atmospheric and operating conditions.

15 **Q. Wouldn't it be prudent to require computational fluid dynamics (“CFD”) modeling**
16 **over the entire pipeline length?**

17 A. No. There is little benefit to be achieved from deploying CFD modeling across the entire
18 pipeline length. The combination of modeling that SCS is doing is a more prudent decision.
19 Moreover, the amount of computational power required to run CFD modeling results in timelines
20 and resource consumption that is not commensurate with any resulting benefits from a risk and
21 safety perspective when compared to the results of the combination of modeling employed by
22 SCS. Moreover, as I noted above, the FLO-2D modeling approach that SCS has used for terrain-
23 aided dispersion around HCAs provides a number of the benefits that CFD could provide,

1 without the impracticality imposed by running CFD across the entire pipeline length.

2 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

3 A. Yes.

4

5 Dated this 20th day of December, 2024.

6

7 /s/ Bryan Louque

8 Bryan Louque