

United States Department of State 12.1

Reference: Keystone XL Project
Risk Analysis

Request:

DOS recently received a copy of a report that questions the validity of the risk analysis for the proposed Keystone XL Project that is summarized in the Section 3.13 of the supplemental draft EIS and included, in part, in Appendix P to the draft EIS. The undated report, *Analysis of Frequency, Magnitude and Consequence of Worst-Case Spills From the Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline*, was prepared by John Stansbury, Ph.D., P.E. DOS requests that Keystone provide a response to that report, indicating whether or not the author has accurately portrayed the Keystone risk analysis, whether or not the author has made valid assumptions regarding the analysis of risk included in the report, and any other responses that would assist DOS in comparing the information in the report to the risk analysis submitted by Keystone. Please include in your response any clarification to the existing risk assessment that may be required to adequately address valid concerns (if any) raised in the Stansbury report.

Response Part A:

An initial response to the Stansbury Report was previously provided to DOS. That response is repeated below. It is supplemented with the information in Response Part B.

The Stansbury/Friends of the Earth Report (Stansbury Report) attempts to build on a foundation of inaccurate assumptions that lead to greatly exaggerated estimates of releases of oil and consequences. This is simply the latest case of opportunistic fear-mongering, dressed up as an academic study.

The Keystone Pipeline system is subject to comprehensive pipeline safety regulation under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). As the recent State Department Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) recognizes, PHMSA is responsible for protecting the American public and the environment by ensuring the safe and secure movement of hazardous materials to industry and consumers by all transportation modes, including pipelines. To protect the public and environmental resources, Keystone is required to construct, operate, maintain, inspect, and monitor the pipeline in compliance with the PHMSA regulations at 49 CFR Part 195, as well as relevant industry standards and codes. These regulations specify pipeline material and qualification standards, minimum design requirements, required measures to protect the pipeline from internal, external corrosion, and many other aspects of safe operation.

Above and beyond the PHMSA regulations, Keystone has agreed to comply with 57 additional Special Conditions developed by PHMSA for the Keystone XL Project. Keystone has agreed to

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incorporate these conditions into its design and construction, and its manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies required by 49 CFR 195.402. These 57 Special Conditions are attached as Appendix C to the SDEIS.

PHMSA and the State Department took these 57 Special Conditions into account in the SDEIS. It is significant to note the finding in the SDEIS with respect to these conditions:

Incorporation of those conditions would result in a Project that would have a degree of safety over any other typically constructed domestic oil pipeline system under current code and a degree of safety along the entire length of the pipeline system similar to that which is required in High Consequence Areas (HCAs) as defined in 49 CFR 195.450. (SDEIS p. 2-9)

Based on an initial review, below are some of the major mistakes and misrepresentations in the Stansbury Report.

1. Stansbury Report Mistake: “River crossings are especially vulnerable,” going on to describe “the pipeline is more susceptible to corrosion because it is below ground and pressures are relatively high.”

The Facts: Keystone XL Pipeline is not vulnerable at river crossings; document referenced in report does not suggest it is.

Background: The Summary report states (p. 2) that that “River crossings are especially vulnerable,” going on to describe that here “the pipeline is more susceptible to corrosion because it is below ground and pressures are relatively high.”

In the corresponding section of Professor Stansbury’s full report, headed “Most Likely Spill Locations” (p. 6), the author states that adjacent to rivers, “the pipeline is susceptible to high rates of corrosion because it is below ground (DNV, 2006).” (Note that there is no reference in this section of the report to the additional claim in the Summary that at river crossings “pressures are relatively high.”)

Nowhere in the 2006 DNV document cited is there any suggestion that buried pipe at river crossings is more vulnerable to corrosion than any other portion of the buried pipeline. Nor is there any support for the statement in the summary about relative operating pressure at river crossings increasing susceptibility to corrosion.

The only statement in the DNV report remotely related to this unfounded assertion is this: “The Keystone Pipeline is being designed to consist entirely of below ground pipe except within Pump Station fence lines. Sections of the pipeline below ground were considered to be more likely to incur corrosion than above ground sections.”

Further, the statement in the DNV report was made within a section that highlights special measures Keystone will employ to eliminate risk of external corrosion. Keystone employs an approach to corrosion protection that has virtually eliminated failure due to external corrosion in the 30-plus years it has been in use. It includes fusion bond epoxy coating (FBE) coupled with active cathodic protection, which places a small current on the pipe preventing loss of metal due to corrosion. Keystone also will be inspected more frequently than standard regulations require, to ensure the effectiveness of this system.

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Relative to other failure modes at river crossings, such as flooding or increased river flows scouring the river bottom or banks and exposing the pipe and making it vulnerable to damage or breakage, Keystone will utilize the horizontal directional drill (HDD) crossing method that places the pipe 25 feet or more below the river bottom at locations where scour is considered a potential threat. Other measures at river crossings further reduce the likelihood of failure. For instance, each of the river crossings mentioned in the report (Yellowstone, Missouri, Platte) will be installed using the HDD method and will utilize heavy-walled pipe with sacrificial abrasion-resistant coating applied over the FBE to further ensure the protective capability of the coating. These measures make these locations among the **least likely for a release** on the entire pipeline.

2. Stansbury Report Mistake: The report incorrectly asserts that TransCanada ignored 23% of statistical pipeline failures (pp. 1, 4).

The Facts: TransCanada’s analysis accurately represents historical data and does not overlook 23% of incidents as claimed

Background: The report incorrectly asserts that TransCanada ignored 23% of statistical pipeline failures (pp. 1, 4). In part because the PHMSA data does not identify the cause for 23% of pipeline incidents, TransCanada used a more detailed assessment of causes of historical pipeline incidents, evaluating Keystone against each of these threats to establish an accurate risk profile. The applicable threats to the pipeline were determined using established pipeline industry standards ASME B31.8S and API 1160. This fact was noted within the DNV report itself:

“It should be noted that the factors are similar but not identical to the U.S. Department of Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) categories of failure (e.g., third party harm).” (DNV 2006, p. 3)

3. Stansbury Report Mistake: TransCanada “arbitrarily assigned a drain-down factor” for the pipeline

The Facts: TransCanada estimates of volume released – arbitrarily adjusted in the Stansbury Report – use results of a detailed study prepared by the California Fire Marshal

In calculating how much oil might be released from a pipeline after it is secured and isolated, the author claims TransCanada “arbitrarily assigned a drain-down factor” for the pipeline (p. 9). Not noted, however, is that TransCanada’s methodology reflects not TransCanada’s judgment but rather the results of an independent assessment by the California Fire Marshal in its role as a regulator in California. The report is well known and respected among pipeline regulators and risk assessors. After labeling use of the California Fire Marshal figure for retained volume “arbitrary,” it is ironic that the author goes on to say the factor “is likely too high” and cuts it in half with no further justification.

4. Stansbury Report Mistake: TransCanada’s adjustment to risk factors are arbitrary and improper

The Facts: TransCanada adjustments to risk factors are consistent with industry experience

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Background: The Summary report states that “TransCanada arbitrarily and improperly adjusted spill factors” (p. 1). The full report written by Professor Stansbury is less strident, suggesting the adjustments are “probably not appropriate” (p. 4).

The majority of pipeline infrastructure in North America was constructed many decades ago at a time when the materials, coating systems, and ongoing inspection capabilities that will be used for Keystone XL were not available. Studies show the benefits of these technologies in reducing pipeline incidents. For instance (as described in para. #1 above), the corrosion protection Keystone uses has virtually eliminated external corrosion as a cause of failure. Approximately two thirds of the pipelines in the US were constructed prior to 1970. It is therefore entirely appropriate to use an incident frequency for Keystone XL that is derived from pipelines of its class. To do otherwise would be like trying to estimate the gas mileage of a 2011 model car by using the average gas mileage of all cars built since the 1920s.

This is corroborated by observations included in the SDEIS, including:

“It is likely that both incident frequency analyses tend to overestimate the likely spill frequency of the proposed Project since both analyses rely on data that include incidents on older pipelines that would not be operated under the Project-specific Special Conditions developed by PHMSA and incorporated into the design, construction, operations, and maintenance plans for the proposed Project.” (SDEIS, p. 3-98)

Examples of measures taken by TransCanada to reduce risk on Keystone include:

- External corrosion – Keystone employs an approach to corrosion protection that has virtually eliminated failure due to external corrosion in the 30-plus years it has been in use. It includes fusion bond epoxy coating and active cathodic protection, which places a small current on the pipe preventing loss of metal due to corrosion. Keystone has agreed to a special regulatory condition requiring the pipeline to be internally inspected with an instrumented device that monitors the pipe wall for anomalies. Any wall degradation due to corrosion would be detected and addressed prior to failure. (These requirements are covered by several PHMSA Special Conditions, including #9, 10, 11, 33, 35-39, 42, 53.)
- External impact – Keystone will be buried at a deeper depth to minimize risk of external impact. In addition, pipe walls will exhibit greater puncture resistance and fracture control properties. Keystone will take additional steps to minimize risk of accidental excavation damage. (Required by PHMSA Special Conditions #7, 19, 40, 41, 48, 53, 54).
- Internal corrosion – Limit sediment and water content of oil shipped to 0.5%. Run cleaning tools twice per year in the first year and as necessary based on integrity analysis. Implement a crude oil monitoring and sampling program to ensure products transported meet specifications. Perform internal inspections at increased frequency. (Required by PHMSA Special Conditions #33, 34, 42, 53)
- Mechanical defect – enhanced material requirements and QA/QC program as described in PHMSA Special Conditions #1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 22.

5. Stansbury Report Mistake: The report erroneously relies on disproven assumptions on corrosivity of oil to be shipped.

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The Facts: Independent analysis of oil sands derived crude oils has conclusively demonstrated that, below 450 degrees Fahrenheit, these oils are not corrosive to steel.

Background: The Stansbury Report states Keystone is subject to higher failure rates due to corrosivity of oil to be shipped (p. 5). Independent analysis of oil sands derived crude oils has conclusively demonstrated that, below 450 degrees Fahrenheit, these oils are not corrosive to steel. The maximum operating temperature anywhere in the pipeline is 150 degrees. (Supplemental Draft EIS, Keystone XL, p. 3-112.) A recent independent assessment of crude oil quality by the firm Crude Quality Inc., including corrosion potential, has been completed and provided to the U.S. Department of State supporting these findings.

Keystone XL will ship a wide variety of crude oil types including conventional oil, shale oil, partially upgraded synthetic oil and oil sands derived bitumen blends. None of these crude types create a risk of destroying the pipeline from within and causing leaks. Furthermore these products have shipped and are currently being shipped across to the US via other cross-border pipelines from Canada. It would be an uneconomic business proposition to spend \$13 billion dollars constructing a pipeline system that would be destroyed by the product it transported.

6. Stansbury Report Mistake: The erroneously states that abrasive sediment in the crude oil will cause higher failure rates

The Facts: The oil that will be shipped on Keystone XL “shall have no physical or chemical characteristics” that would damage or harm the pipeline.

Background: Report states Keystone is subject to higher failure rates due to abrasive sediment (p. 5). However, as clarified in the SDEIS, oil transported by Keystone must meet strict limits for sediment and water. (SDEIS, p. 3-116)

Special Condition 34 (see Appendix C of this SDEIS) addresses the sediment and water content of the crude oil that would be transported by the proposed Project and states the following:

“Internal Corrosion: Keystone shall limit basic sediment and water (BS&W) to 0.5% by volume and report BS&W testing results to PHMSA in the annual report.”

The FERC-approved tariff for transport of oil on the Keystone Pipeline system also requires that all oil to be shipped:

“shall have no physical or chemical characteristics that may render such Petroleum not readily transportable by Carrier or that may materially affect the quality of other Petroleum transported by Carrier or that may otherwise cause disadvantage or harm to Carrier or the Pipeline System, or otherwise impair Carrier’s ability to provide service on the Pipeline System.” (SDEIS, Pp. 3-116.)

7. Stansbury Report Mistake: The report erroneously states bitumen will sink, therefore “posing significant threat” to water resources.

The Facts: The gravity of crude oils that Keystone XL would transport are less than the specific gravity of water.

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Background: The report states bitumen will sink “posing significant threat” (p. 19). This issue was addressed in the SDEIS, which includes the following summary statement: “the specific gravity of the crude oils that would be transported on the proposed pipeline ranges from about 0.85 to about 0.93, less than the specific gravity of water. These crude oils, therefore, tend to float on water...” (SDEIS, p. 3-104)

8. Stansbury Report Mistake: The report suggests that TransCanada will cut back on monitoring and maintenance activities, causing increased risk in out years (p. 5).

The Facts: Contrary to a suggestion in the Stansbury Report, monitoring and maintenance activities are a required condition of operation.

Background: The report suggests that TransCanada will cut back on monitoring and maintenance activities, causing increased risk in out years (p. 5). However, the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations requires many of these monitoring and maintenance activities as a condition of operation. TransCanada has voluntarily committed to 57 additional safety conditions that include other enhanced monitoring and maintenance activities as additional conditions of continued operation. For instance, in order to continue to operate the pipeline, TransCanada must perform in-line inspection with a smart pig, conduct corrosion surveys, and perform valve inspections at specified frequencies – these are not discretionary. Additionally, TransCanada must meet requirements to patrol the pipeline every two weeks.

In addition to regulatory requirements, continuing to invest in the safety of the pipeline makes sense from a business perspective. Paying for increased maintenance is built into TransCanada’s contracts with its shippers such that variable integrity spending costs are flowed through to the shippers. Additionally, the FERC rate allows the uncommitted toll to rise at a greater than inflation rate which allows for recovery of maintenance costs. There is therefore no financial incentive for TransCanada to cut back on monitoring and maintenance and a substantial financial penalty associated with leaks in the form of fines, cleanup costs, lawsuits and reputational damage. It is therefore not reasonable to suggest that TransCanada or another owner would increase their liability in order to reduce an expense that is flowed through to the customers.

9. Stansbury Report Mistake: The report tries to suggest that because shutdown on another pipeline took longer, that increased time should be the new assumption on shutdown time (pp. 7-8).

The Facts: Keystone time to shutdown has been accurately reflected in the risk analysis and is consistent with Keystone’s record.

Background: The Stansbury Report tries to suggest that because shutdown on another pipeline took longer, that increased time should be the new assumption on shutdown time (pp. 7-8). However, the author does not address the differences in system design and operating characteristics (including single phase flow in Keystone) that make it unlikely that Keystone operators would experience difficulty detecting a leak. Nor does he address industry information sharing nor the workings of the regulatory regime, both of which serve to make it unlikely that operational errors are repeated.

Additionally, Keystone has established its own operating record that demonstrates prompt reaction time to any indication of an operational abnormality. These response records align with the shut down times conveyed in Keystone's risk assessment report.

10. Stansbury Report Mistake: Report suggests that enough oil to fill a dozen Olympic-sized swimming pools would go unnoticed in Nebraska (pp. 8-9).

The Facts: The report's calculation of spill volume for "small" leak not credible because it ignores leak detection methodologies designed to detect low rate or seepage releases.

Background: In assessing worst-case "small" leak, the Stansbury Report suggests that enough oil to fill a dozen Olympic-sized swimming pools would go unnoticed in Nebraska (pp. 8-9). The estimate ignores leak detection methodologies designed to detect low rate or seepage releases.

As described below, Keystone will utilize a state-of-the-art integrated leak detection system. Real-time computerized systems can detect spills as low as 1.5 percent of throughput. In addition to surveillance and public reporting, Keystone will implement a non-real time mass balance procedure that can detect spills below 1.5 percent of throughput.

Data from actual pipeline spills demonstrate that substantial leaks do not go undetected for long periods of time. Further, those spills that are not detected within the first 48 hours are typically relatively small. PHMSA records (2001 through 2009) indicate that the majority of spills are 3 barrels or less, regardless of detection time. These data also indicate that the majority of spills are detected within 2 hours, with 99 percent of spills detected within 7 days. Of those spills not detected within the first 48 hours, the majority of spills were 15 barrels or less. In summary, large spills do not remain undetected for substantial periods of time.

The pipeline will be monitored 24 hours a day, 365 days a year from the Operations Control Center (OCC) using a sophisticated Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. Keystone will utilize multiple leak detection methods and systems that are overlapping in nature and progress through a series of leak detection thresholds. The leak detection methods are as follows:

- Remote monitoring performed by the OCC Operator 24/7, which consists of monitoring pressure and flow data received from pump stations and valve sites fed back to the OCC by the Keystone SCADA system. Remote monitoring is typically able to detect leaks down to approximately 25 to 30 percent of the pipeline flow rate.
- Software-based volume balance systems that monitor receipt and delivery volumes. These systems are typically able to detect leaks down to approximately 5 percent of the pipeline flow rate.
- Computational Pipeline Monitoring or model-based leak detection systems that break the pipeline into smaller segments and monitor each of these segments on a mass balance basis. These systems are typically capable of detecting leaks down to a level of approximately 1.5 to 2 percent of pipeline flow rate.
- Computer-based, non-real time accumulated gain/(loss) volume trending to assist in identifying low rate or seepage releases below the 1.5 to 2 percent by volume detection thresholds.

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- Direct observation methods, which include aerial patrols, ground patrols, and public and landowner awareness programs that are designed to encourage and facilitate the reporting of suspected leaks and events that may suggest a threat to the integrity of the pipeline.

The leak detection system will be configured in a manner capable of sending an alarm to the OCC operators through the SCADA system and also will provide the OCC operators with a comprehensive assortment of display screens for incident analysis and investigation. In addition, there will be a redundant, stand-by OCC to be used in case of emergency.

Keystone also will have an Emergency Response Program (ERP) in place to respond to incidents. The ERP contains comprehensive manuals, detailed training plans, equipment requirements, resources plans, auditing, change management and continuous improvement processes. The Integrity Management Program (IMP) (49 CFR Part 195) and ERP will ensure Keystone will operate the pipeline in an environmentally responsible manner.

11. Stansbury Report Mistake: The report relies on old claims that the emergency response plan for the Keystone pipeline is “woefully inadequate”

The Facts: Contrary to assumptions in the Stansbury Report, the Emergency Response capability for Keystone XL will meet or exceed requirements.

Background: The Stansbury Report relies on old claims that the emergency response plan for the Keystone pipeline is “woefully inadequate” (p. 3). This accusation was one of the items reviewed in detail in the SDEIS.

“DOS and PHMSA have reviewed these hypothetical spill response scenarios prepared by Keystone and would also review a final ERP to be prepared by Keystone prior to startup of the proposed pipeline...Based on its review of the hypothetical spill response scenarios, *DOS considers Keystone’s response planning appropriate and consistent with accepted industry practice.*” (SDEIS, p. 3-122)

12. Stansbury Report Mistake: The report includes exaggerated descriptions of the physical extent of benzene.

The Facts: The exaggerated claims in the report do not match any oil-spill experience; furthermore, benzene concentration in heavy oils Keystone will ship will be comparable to other heavy oils shipped in the U.S. and will generally be lower than benzene concentrations in lighter crudes and in refined products such as gasoline.

Background: Benzene concentration in heavy oils Keystone will ship will be comparable to other heavy oils shipped in the U.S. and will generally be lower than benzene concentrations in lighter crudes and in refined products such as gasoline.

Exaggerated descriptions of the physical extent of benzene in the Stansbury Report do not match any oil-spill experience. The report does not account for emergency response containment and cleanup. Examination of field data collected from large spills into rivers typically finds that concentrations of petroleum products become undetectable in a relatively short distance. For example, following a 10,000 barrel release in 2007 from the Coffeerville Refinery in Kansas into

the Verdigris River, the EPA found no detectable concentrations of petroleum products 20 miles downstream at the closest municipal water intake.

13. Stansbury Report Mistake: The report claims TransCanada cut risk factors in half.

The Facts: TransCanada reflected the results of industry studies regarding failure rates of pipe-related equipment, reducing by half the anticipated number of failures caused by material defect.

Background: TransCanada assumed that its pipeline would be constructed so well that it would have only half as many spills as the other pipelines in service. Not true. Rather, TransCanada reflected the results of industry studies regarding failure rates of pipe-related equipment, reducing by half the anticipated number of failures caused by material defect. As discussed in item #4 above, measures that help achieve this performance are among the Special Conditions to which TransCanada has committed.

Here is the statement from the TransCanada report: “A 50% reduction in the DOT leak frequency was applied to the entire pipeline because the U.S. portion of Keystone will consist of entirely new materials and be constructed to meet current standards and requirements.” [DNV section 4.1.13, page 13] The statement occurs in a section of the DNV report describing risk of mechanical defect. Other risk factors are adjusted differently for above-ground and below-ground pipe for instance.

14. Stansbury Report Mistake: The report suggests that releases at pump station sites means Keystone is using less reliable pipe.

The Facts: None of the pump stations releases involved pipeline.

Background: As of June 1, 2011 the Keystone pipeline has experienced fourteen (14) unplanned releases within pump/valve station facility sites, averaging 5-10 barrels each. None of these incidents have involved the pipeline itself. In two cases, nearby adjacent property was affected by spray. Otherwise, the incidents were contained within our pump station facility. Equipment has been replaced or repaired. In all cases, Keystone’s operation personnel immediately isolate all releases and clean up and remediation efforts are employed to mitigate any effects to the environment.

TransCanada meets or exceeds all notification and reporting requirements to all state and federal agencies. In many of these cases, reporting to regulatory agencies was not required due to the very small volume of these spills. TransCanada has taken a transparent approach to proactively report all spills to federal and state regulatory agencies regardless of volume. Pipelines are the safest method of transporting the oil that must be moved throughout North America everyday.

Response Part B:

Mr. Stansbury's document referenced above (the "Stansbury document") does not accurately portray the Keystone XL risk analysis nor has the author made valid assumptions regarding the analysis of the risk included in the report. The discussion below responds to a number of the points in the Stansbury document.

1. The expected frequency of spills from the Keystone XL pipeline reported by TransCanada (DNV, 2006) was evaluated. (Stansbury document at p. 1)

The DNV 2006 report is irrelevant to Keystone XL Pipeline Project. The Keystone XL pipeline project risk assessment is based on the Keystone XL Pipeline Project Risk and Consequence Analysis, April 2009 and Appendix A, Analysis of Incident Frequencies and Spill Volumes For Environmental Consequence Estimation for the Keystone XL Project, July 2009.

2. The worst-case spill volume at the Hardisty Pumping Station was understated. (Stansbury document at pp. 1-2).

The Hardisty Pump Station in Alberta Canada is irrelevant to the risk assessment for the US segments of the Keystone XL pipeline Project. Moreover, Stansbury's worst case spill estimates are based on incorrect assumptions, as discussed below.

3. The primary difference between Stansbury's worst-case spill estimate and TransCanada's estimate is that TransCanada used 19 minutes as the expected time to shut down pumps and close valves (TransCanada states that it expects the time to be 11.5 minutes for the Keystone XL pipeline). Since a very similar pipeline recently experienced a spill (the Enbridge spill), and the time to finally shut down the pipeline was approximately 12 hours, and during those 12 hours the pipeline pumps were operated for at least 2 hours, the assumption of 19 minutes or 11.5 minutes is not appropriate for the shut-down time for the worst-case spill analysis. Therefore, worst-case spill volumes are likely to be significantly larger than those estimated by TransCanada. (Stansbury document at p. 2).

Keystone has calculated the worst case discharge for the Keystone XL pipeline in accordance with 49 CFR §194.105. The Stansbury document suggests that, because shutdown on another pipeline took longer, that increased time should be used as the shut down time assumption for the Keystone XL Pipeline. Enbridge's pipeline was constructed in 1969, while Keystone XL Pipeline would be constructed in 2013 and would meet or exceed current regulatory standards. Stansbury does not take into account that the Keystone XL pipeline is instrumented at every mainline valve and has new, state-of-the-art leak detection and operator training systems that make it unlikely that Keystone operators would experience difficulty detecting a leak. Nor does he address industry information sharing or the workings of the regulatory regime, both of which serve to make it unlikely that alleged operational errors on one system are repeated on another system.

In addition, Stansbury does not take into account the fact that worst case discharge is determined using a large leak that would be instantaneously detected by the leak detection system resulting

in immediate initiation of shut down procedures. Nonetheless, in determining its worst case discharge, Keystone conservatively assumed a 10 minute leak confirmation period, plus nine minutes for pump shut down, plus a 3 minute valve closure time, for a total of 22 minutes. While detection of a smaller leak may require additional confirmation time, the small volumes released would not approach worst case discharge amounts. For example, Keystone has experienced small leaks at pumping stations on the Keystone system which resulted in releases that were a fraction of the estimated worst case discharge volumes. Despite being small, these leaks were identified by the sophisticated leak detection system employed on the pipeline and appropriate shut down and isolation measures were initiated. It is incorrect to assume that there could be a small leak that remained undetected for an extended period of time, as suggested by the Stansbury document (see item 15).

- 4. The worst-case spill volumes from the Keystone XL pipeline for the Missouri, Yellowstone, and Platte River crossings were estimated by Stansbury to be 122,867 Bbl, 165,416 Bbl, and 140,950 Bbl, respectively. In addition, this analysis estimated the worst-case spill for a subsurface release to groundwater in the Sandhills region of Nebraska to be 189,000 Bbl (7.9 million gallons). (Stansbury document at p. 2)**

The results of the risk assessment for the Keystone XL pipeline are conservative as the largest spill on record from PHMSA records January 1986-May 2011 for large diameter hazardous liquid pipelines is 40,500 bbl of which 39,800 bbl was recovered. This occurred in 1991 on a 1967 vintage pipeline. Spills greater than 10,000 barrels are uncommon, occurring in less than 0.5 percent of all pipeline spills. Moreover, these estimates are based on incorrect assumptions regarding shut down times as outlined in response #3.

- 5. The benzene released by the worst-case spill to groundwater in the Sandhills region of Nebraska would be sufficient to contaminate 4.9 billion gallons of water at concentrations exceeding the safe drinking water levels. This water could form a plume 40 feet thick by 500 feet wide by 15 miles long. (Stansbury document at p. 2).**

This claim is unsupported and disproven by field studies throughout the US. The groundwater study (Newell and Connor 1998) summarized the results of four nationwide studies looking at groundwater plumes from petroleum hydrocarbon contamination. The results show that movement of petroleum hydrocarbons is very limited, moving 312 feet or less in 90 percent of the cases. The longest plume was approximately 3,000 feet in length. Therefore, if groundwater became contaminated, any plume would be expected to result in highly localized effects. Importantly, these limits tend to be independent of the rate of groundwater flow. In contrast, chemicals used in some industries and in agriculture, such as commercial solvents, such as PCE and TCE (tetrachloroethylene and trichloroethylene) and pesticides, have much greater mobility and environmental persistence when compared to oil and its constituents.

- 6. Among numerous toxic chemicals that would be released in a spill, the benzene (a human carcinogen) released from the worst-case spill into a major river (e.g., Missouri River) could contaminate enough water to form a plume that could extend more than 450 miles. (Stansbury document at p. 2).**

This claim is unsubstantiated and unsupported by actual field data nor does it account for containment and cleanup efforts by the operator that limit downstream movement. For example, reference is made to a 2007 spill in Coffeerville, Kansas that released 10,000 barrels of crude oil that entered the flooded Verdigris River. EPA samples reported concentration of petroleum hydrocarbons to be below threshold limits at the first sampling point, located 12 downstream miles of the spill. In 2010, an Enbridge 30-inch pipeline ruptured, spilling 19,500 barrels of oil into the Kalamazoo River system. EPA reports that contamination has been documented in localized areas within 30 miles of the spill's origin. These case studies demonstrate that actual contamination is much less than implied by the Stansbury document.

7. In estimating spill frequency, TransCanada ignored historical data for spills from “other causes,” which represents 23 percent of historical pipeline spills (Stansbury document at pp. 1, 4).

In its failure frequency analysis, Keystone determined the threats that are actually applicable to the Keystone XL Pipeline by using the combination of variables in the Time Dependant, Stable and Time Independent categories listed in API 1160¹ Section 8.7 and ASME B31.8S². Keystone then used the PHMSA data for the categories of incidents that are associated with these applicable threats. The data for “other causes” was not used because it consists of offshore pipeline, offshore platform, tankage, tankage piping and terminal incidents data that are not applicable to the Keystone XL Pipeline. Keystone did however consider spills at pumping and metering facilities in its analysis of the PHMSA data.

8. In estimating spill frequency, TransCanada assumed that its pipeline would be constructed so well that it would have only half as many spills as the other pipelines in service. The modification of historical pipeline incident data to account for modern pipeline materials and methods is “probably” overstated for this pipeline. (Stansbury document at pp. 1, 46)

The modification for modern materials and methods is fully appropriate. Based on the PHMSA incident database January 1, 1986 through May 31, 2011, there are two (2) reported pipeline incidents on crude oil pipelines manufactured with high strength steel (grade X70 or higher) due to pipeline material and methods. This first incident was due to external corrosion and occurred in 1998 on a 1985 vintage pipeline. The second pipeline incident occurred on small diameter (24inch or less). This incident was due to electric flash resistance (ERW) pipe seam failure and occurred in 2007 on a 1998 vintage pipeline. As Keystone is a large diameter pipeline, its method of joining is double submerged arc welding (DSAW) and not ERW. Furthermore,

¹ Section 8.7. In any risk assessment method, the likelihood is estimated using a combination of variables in categories such as the following: external corrosion, internal corrosion, third party damage, ground movement, design and materials, system operations

² ASME B31.8 S “*Managing System Integrity of Gas Pipelines*” classifies threats to pipelines in terms of “Time Dependant”, “Stable” and “Time Independent” categories. Time Dependant Threats include: External Corrosion; Internal Corrosion; and, Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC); Stable Threats include: Manufacturing Defects; Welding / Fabrication Related; and, Equipment Failure; and, Time Independent Threats include: Third Party / Mechanical Damage; Incorrect Operations, and Weather and Outside Force (Geotechnical)

Keystone will protect the pipeline from external corrosion using fusion bond epoxy (FBE) and a cathodic protection (CP) system. The combination of FBE and CP has proven effective over TransCanada's 30+ years of operation. Keystone implements 24 hour surveillance during pipe manufacturing and coating. Lastly, Keystone has implemented nine (9) specific material related conditions and will implement thirteen (13) construction method related conditions set forth in the PHMSA Special Condition Appendix C, over and above current regulations, which would ensure that Keystone is the safest pipeline built in North America, thereby minimizing any potential for spills resulting from materials and construction methods.

In order to establish the particular incident threats that would apply to the Keystone XL pipeline during its operational life, three key points were considered:

- Keystone XL is a new construction project, developed with the benefit of TransCanada's more than 50 years of pipeline construction and operating experience;
- The pipeline will be constructed and operated in accordance with comprehensive regulatory guidelines (49 CFR Part 195) and pipeline design standards (ASME B31.4), and;
- At the time the risk assessment was prepared, Keystone had applied to PHMSA for a Special Permit to allow it to design, construct and operate the pipeline up to 80% of the steel pipeline's specified minimum yield strength (SMYS). The Special Permit application provided that Keystone would comply with a number of pipeline integrity conditions over and above the applicable PHMSA regulations and industry standards. This included the 51 conditions from the Special Permit 2006-26617 issued by PHMSA to TransCanada for the Keystone Pipeline Project in April 2007. Keystone included these conditions in the base design of the Keystone XL Project and recognized their impact in modifying historic failure frequency data in preparing the Risk Assessment. Subsequent to the completion and submittal of the Keystone XL Project Pipeline Risk Assessment and Environmental Consequence Analysis in April 2009, Keystone withdrew the Special Permit Application. Nonetheless, PHMSA ultimately developed and recommend that Keystone adopt 57 conditions over and above the applicable regulations and industry standards and in some cases exceeding the requirements of the 51 conditions listed in the Keystone Special Permit 2006-26617. Keystone agreed to adopt these conditions, which are set forth in Appendix C of the Supplemental Draft EIS. Accordingly, the design assumptions underlying the failure frequency modifications remain conservative.

Taking these factors into consideration, the applicable threats were determined using both the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) B31.8S Managing System Integrity of Gas Pipelines and American Petroleum Institute (API) 1160 Managing System Integrity of Hazardous Liquid Pipelines as guidance. These standards outline processes for pipeline operators which can be used to assess risks and make decisions about risks in operating pipelines in order to reduce both the number of incidents and the adverse effects of errors and incidents. Moreover, in view of Keystone's adoption of additional conditions beyond those taken into account during preparation of the Risk Assessment, the modifications to historic failure frequency data reflected in the 2009 Risk Assessment are actually even more conservative.

9. **Keystone will operate the pipeline at higher temperatures and pressures and the crude oil that will be transported through the Keystone XL pipeline will be more corrosive than the conventional crude oil transported in existing pipelines, which tends to increase failure frequency. The diluted bitumen to be transported through the Keystone XL Pipeline will be significantly more corrosive and abrasive than conventional crude oil. (Stansbury document at pp.1, 4-5).**

Keystone has withdrawn its application to operate up to 80% SMYS thereby reducing its throughput and operating pressure. PHMSA Special Condition 15 provides that “under no circumstances may the pump station discharge temperatures exceed 150° Fahrenheit (°F) without sufficient justification that Keystone’s long-term operating tests show that the pipe coating will withstand the higher operating temperature for long term operations, and approval from the appropriate PHMSA region(s).”

The potential for internal corrosion (IC) to develop during transportation of oil sands derived crude oils due to sediment and solids is considered low. The following factors support the conclusion that the risk of corrosion from sediments and solids is low:

- Keystone’s tariff specifications group sediments/solids with water content. The tariff contains a restriction of 0.5% solids and water by volume.
- “Solids and water” is comprised mostly of water, with solids typically at 5% of the solids/water content (reference www.crudemonitor.ca)
- Keystone will utilize a number of operating measures that will minimize solids in the pipeline:
 - periodic cleaning
 - turbulent flow operating regime
 - sediments are benign at the pipeline’s proposed operating temperature (not to exceed 150°F per PHMSA Special Condition 15)

PHMSA Special Condition 34 requires Keystone to limit basic sediment and water (BS&W) to 0.5% by volume and report BS&W testing results to PHMSA annually. Keystone must run cleaning pigs twice in the first year and as necessary in succeeding years based on the analysis of oil constituents, liquid test results, and weight loss coupons in corrosion threat areas. At a minimum, in years after the first year, Keystone must run cleaning pigs once per year, at intervals not to exceed 15 months. Liquids collected during the pig runs, including BS&W, must be sampled, collected, and analyzed and internal corrosion plans must be developed, based on lab test results. This mitigation plan will be incorporated in the Keystone XL Integrity Management Plan and must be reviewed at least quarterly based upon crude oil quality. Keystone will also monitor and implement adjustments for the presence of deleterious crude oil stream constituents as per the PHMSA Special Conditions.

Furthermore, an independent analysis performed by Crude Quality Inc of oil sands derived crude oils has conclusively demonstrated that, below 450 degrees Fahrenheit, the oil sand crude oils are not corrosive to steel.³

In addition, the Energy Resources Conservation Board of Alberta issued a statement on February

³ CAPP Response to US DOS re Keystone XL

16, 2011 stating “the ERCB can identify only three spills resulting from internal corrosion between 1990 and 2005 (and only eight from 1975 to 2010) [for Alberta pipelines]. The resulting average failure frequency for the grouping of crude oil pipelines from 1990 to 2005 is thus 0.03 per 1000 km per year. This is significantly lower than the U.S. rate quoted in [a recent Natural Resources Defense Council] study of 0.08 per 1000 km per year.”⁴ The ERCB stated further that:

Analysis of pipeline failure statistics in Alberta has not identified any significant differences in failure frequency between pipelines handling conventional crude versus pipelines carrying crude bitumen, crude oil or synthetic crude oil. Diluent by nature is a lower viscosity, higher-vapour pressure solvent. It could then be considered to be more “volatile” in its natural state, as it consists of lighter end hydrocarbons. However, when blended with bitumen, the resulting blend is a “new” product consisting of thinned bitumen that more closely resembles conventional crude products. Once mixed with diluent, DilBit should behave in much the same manner as other crude oils of similar characteristics. In conventional oils sands processing, sulphur is removed during processing, as well as water (which is a primary concern in regards to corrosivity). The tariff specification for the Keystone XL project, for example, is virtually the same in regards to water content and solids contents as that specified for other heavy oil pipelines, thus there is no reason to expect this product to behave in any substantially different way than other oil pipelines. It should also be noted that pipelines in Alberta have never been safer. In 2009, Alberta posted a record-low pipeline failure rate of 1.7 pipeline failures per 1,000 km of pipeline (considering all substances), bettering the previous record-low of 2.1 set in both 2008 and 2007.”⁵

- 10. Although pipeline technology has improved, new pipelines are subject to proportionately higher stress as companies use this improved technology to maximize pumping rates through increases in operational temperatures and pressures, rather than to increase safety margins. (Stansbury document at p.5)**

Keystone XL pipeline is design in accordance with 49 CFR §195.106 and ASME B31.4. The federal regulation limits the pipeline’s operating stress to no more than 72% of the pipeline steel material’s specified minimum yield strength. Operating temperature is addressed in Item 9 above.

- 11. TransCanada relies on “soft” technological improvements which require an on-going commitment to monitoring and maintenance resources and which should not be assumed to be constant over the projected service life of the pipeline, and are**

⁴ ERCB ADDRESSES STATEMENTS IN NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL PIPELINE SAFETY REPORT February 16, 2011

⁵ ERCB ADDRESSES STATEMENTS IN NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL PIPELINE SAFETY REPORT February 16, 2011

subject to an ongoing risk of error in judgment during operations. (Stansbury document at p.5).

The PHMSA regulations at 49 CFR Part 195 require many of these monitoring and maintenance activities as a condition of operation. Keystone has voluntarily committed to 57 additional safety conditions that include other enhanced monitoring and maintenance activities as additional conditions of continued operation. For instance, in order to continue to operate the pipeline, Keystone must perform in-line inspections, conduct corrosion and depth of cover surveys, and perform valve inspections at specified frequencies – these are not discretionary. Additionally, Keystone must patrol the pipeline 26 times per year, at intervals not to exceed three weeks.

In addition to regulatory requirements, continuing to invest in the safety of the pipeline makes sense from a business perspective. Paying for increased maintenance is built into Keystone's contracts with its shippers such that variable integrity spending costs are flowed through to the shippers. Additionally, the FERC rate allows the uncommitted toll to rise at a greater than inflation rate which allows for recovery of maintenance costs. There is therefore no financial incentive for Keystone to cut back on monitoring and maintenance and a substantial financial penalty associated with leaks in the form of fines, cleanup costs, lawsuits and reputational damage. It is therefore not reasonable to suggest that Keystone or another owner would increase their liability in order to reduce an expense that is flowed through to the shippers.

12. The TransCanada spill frequency estimation consistently stated the frequency of spills in terms of spills per year per mile. This is a misleading way to state the risk or frequency of pipeline spills. Spill frequency estimates averaged per mile can be useful; e.g., for extrapolating frequency data across varying pipeline lengths. However, stating the spill frequency averaged per mile obfuscates the proper value to consider; i.e., the frequency of a spill somewhere along the length of the pipeline. (Stansbury document at p. 5).

Keystone was transparent in its use of statistics, including where and how they were derived, how they were applied, and by expressing the potential risk in a variety of ways to promote greater understanding and clarity to a broad audience. Spill frequencies are expressed several ways throughout the document to facilitate comparison with other pipelines and modes of transport, and to promote project-specific understanding. As suggested, spill frequencies expressed as an average per mile facilitates comparison with pipelines of various lengths and to national averages, which are also expressed in this normalized expression of risk. Within the same sentence of expressing the average risk value in terms of incidents/per mile*year (page 3-2), risk was immediately expressed in terms of risk for the whole pipeline over a 10-year period and as an occurrence interval for any single mile of pipe. This provides decision-makers multiple opportunities to understand spill risk and how it applies to the project as a whole as well as to an individual's piece of property. The risk assessment addresses risk specifically to the project as a whole and by pipeline segment (Table 3-1), providing an estimate of the number of spills that could occur over a ten-year period. The risk assessment also uses the spill frequency and historical spill volume data to estimate the potential frequency of different sizes of spills (Table 3-2). In Section 4 of the risk assessment, these same statistics are used to generate estimates of spill frequency and spill volumes in high consequence areas.

13. Likely failure points include welds, valve connections, and pumping stations. A vulnerable location of special interest along the pipeline system is near the side of a major stream where the pipeline is underground but at a relatively shallow depth. (Stansbury document at p. 6)

Keystone is required to conduct non-destructive examination of 100% of the pipeline and pump station welds, in addition to a hydrostatic pressure test. (PHMSA Special Conditions 5, 8, 20, 22). Furthermore, below-ground mainline valve connections are welded, hydrostatically tested and capable of inspection by an in-line inspection tool. Pump station infrastructure undergoes regular maintenance and inspection, piping and equipment is contained within property boundaries which are contained by berms.

The Keystone XL pipeline is designed with a minimum depth of cover of 5 feet below the bottom of waterbodies including rivers, creeks, streams, ditches and drains for a depth normally maintained over a distance of 15 feet on each side of the waterbody measured from the top of the defined stream channel. The depth of cover may be modified by Keystone based on site specific conditions and in accordance with PHMSA Special Condition 19. The Project's depth of cover meets or exceeds the federal requirements noted in 49 CFR 195.248 of 48 inches for inland bodies of water with a width of at least 100 feet from high water mark to high water mark (for normal excavation, 18 inches for rock excavation) and PHMSA Special Condition 19 on depth of cover. Furthermore, major rivers will be crossed employing the horizontal directional drill (HDD) method, whereby the pipe is installed at a minimum of 25 feet below the river bottom there by eliminating the potential for scour to affect the pipeline's integrity. HDD crossings also utilize pipe with a wall thickness of 0.748 inch and abrasion resistant coating applied over top of the FBE coating.

14. An independent assessment of TransCanada's emergency response plans for the previously built Keystone pipeline was done by Plains Justice (Blackburn, 2010). This document clearly shows that the emergency response plan for the Keystone pipeline is woefully inadequate. Considering that the proposed Keystone XL pipeline will cross much more remote areas (e.g., central Montana, Sandhills region of Nebraska) than was crossed by the Keystone pipeline, there is little reason to believe that the emergency response plan for Keystone XL will be adequate. (Stansbury document at p. 3).

Keystone is required to submit its emergency response plan for the Keystone XL Pipeline to PHMSA prior to commencing operations for review and approval. As contrasted with Mr. Blackburn, a lawyer, PHMSA has the professional and technical expertise necessary to perform an independent and competent evaluation of the adequacy of the emergency response plan. Significantly, as part of the State Department's review of the project, Keystone was required to present its approach to oil spill response under specific hypothetical spill scenarios to DOS and PHMSA. Based on review of Keystone's response to those scenarios, the SDEIS found that Keystone's spill response planning "is appropriate and consistent with accepted industry practice" (SDEIS p. 3-122). Moreover, PHMSA has already approved the emergency response plan for the Keystone Pipeline, which will serve as the model for the Keystone XL plan.

- 15. Slow leaks could go undetected for long periods of time (e.g., up to 90 days). (Stansbury document at p.7).**

While it is theoretically possible for a very small leak to go undetected for 90 days, data from actual pipeline spills demonstrate that substantial leaks do not go undetected for long periods of time. Further, those spills that are not detected within the first 48 hours are typically relatively small. PHMSA records (2001 through 2009) indicate that the majority of spills are detected within 2 hours, with 99 percent of spills detected within 7 days. Additionally given that leak occurrence is effectively random in time, if a patrol interval is fixed and equal to 14 days, then the time between leak occurrence and leak detection by patrol will range between zero days and 14 days, and it can be shown through modelling that the average time between occurrence and detection will be equal to one-half of the patrol interval (i.e., 7 days). Furthermore, in the context of a risk assessment, where the consequences are weighted by probability of occurrence, the average time is the most appropriate value.

- 16. Stansbury assumes a shut-down time of 2 hours for the worst case spill for a large leak (Stansbury document at p. 8).**

See response to Item number 3.

- 17. Given the difficulty for operators to distinguish between an actual leak and other pressure fluctuations, the shut-down time for the worst case volume calculation should not be considered to be less than 30 minutes for a leak greater than 50 percent of the pumping rate. This would allow for 4 alarms (5 minutes apart) to be evaluated by operators and a 5th alarm to cause the decision to shut down. In addition, the time to shut down the systems (pumps and valves) would require another 5 minutes. The assumption that the decision to shut the pipeline down can be made after a single alarm, as is suggested by TransCanada (ERP, 2009) is unreasonable considering the difficulty in distinguishing between a leak and a pressure anomaly. (Stansbury report at p. 8).**

As noted in Item 3, Keystone allows for a 10 minute trouble shoot period to confirm if the alarm is a pressure fluctuation or an actual leak. This time period was incorporated into Keystone XL's worst case discharge calculation in addition to the pump shut down time and valve closure time. Keystone's OCC procedures require immediate shut down of the pipeline upon expiry of the trouble shoot period. Stansbury's assumption of four alarms, five minutes apart, bears no relationship to Keystone operating policies and procedures.

- 18. TransCanada arbitrarily assigned a drain-down factor of 0.6 for the Keystone XL pipeline. Stansbury report at p. 9).**

Keystone's methodology incorporates the results of an independent assessment by the California Fire Marshal in its role as a regulator in California. The report is well known and respected among pipeline industry, regulators and risk assessors.

- 19. Stansbury assumes a discovery and shut-down time of 14 days, which corresponds to the time between pipeline inspections. Stansbury document at p. 20).**

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See response to Item number 15.

20. Stansbury states his estimated worst case releases for major river crossings (i) Missouri R.; (ii) Yellowstone R.; (ii) Platte R. (Stansbury document at pp.10-13).

Stansbury's estimates for these major river crossings are grossly overstated. Based on actual elevation profile, spill calculation inputs and hydraulic engineering data the worst case discharges for these three rivers is less than 20 percent of the volumes stated by Stansbury.

21. "Impacts to Air, Terrestrial Resources, Surface Water, Groundwater Resources (Stansbury document at pp. 14 – 23)

Please refer to the Keystone XL Project Pipeline Risk Assessment and Environmental Consequence Analysis in April 2009.