		1	
			3
		1	CHAIRMAN NELSON: I will call the meeting to
		2	order. Commissioner Fiegen and Commissioner Nelson are
	1 THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION	3	present in the committee room. Commissioner Hanson is
	2 OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA	4	with us on the line.
	3	5	Gary, just for your information, Yvette LaFrentz
	4 IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT EL11-006 BY OAK TREE ENERGY, LLC, AGAINST 5 NORTHWESTERN ENERGY FOR REFUSING	6	is also on the line. Everybody else is present here in
	TO ENTER INTO A PURCHASE POWER 6 AGREEMENT	7	the committee room.
	7	8	COMMISSIONER HANSON: Thank you.
	8 Transcript of Proceedings October 2, 2012	9	CHAIRMAN NELSON: I just want to go over the
	9	10	timelines that we've got. I think the last time we met
	10 BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, 11 CHRIS NELSON, CHAIRMAN	11	we thought we were maybe making some progress and several
	KRISTIE FIEGEN, VICE CHAIRMAN 12 GARY HANSON, COMMISSIONER (by telephone)	12	of you have had questions about that progress. So
	13 COMMISSION STAFF	13	hopefully we can get that resolved today.
	John Smith 14 Karen Cremer Greg Rislov	14	What we would like to do is in and just for
	15 Chris Daugaard Brian Rounds	15	the record in EL11-006, and we're dealing with Oak Tree's
	16 APPEARANCES 17 Michael Uda, Oak Tree	16	motion for partial reconsideration and NorthWestern's
	Al Brogan and Timothy Olson, NorthWestern Energy	17	application for reconsideration. We plan to give Oak
	19	18	
	20	19	Tree 30 minutes for your initial arguments. NorthWestern
	21 Reported By Cheri McComsey Wittler, RPR, CRR	_	30 minutes for your arguments. 20 minutes for Staff
	22 23	20	arguments.
	24	21	Then we'll come back to NorthWestern for 10
	25	22	minutes of rebuttal, go to Oak Tree for 15 minutes of
		23	rebuttal, and then allow 5 minutes for NorthWestern
		24	rebuttal limited to Oak Tree's rebuttal. And then after
		25	that we will go to Commissioner questions, discussion,
	2		4
1	2 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the	1	4 and/or action.
1 2	_	1 2	
	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the		and/or action.
2	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State	2	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today?
2	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue,	2 3	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions?
2 3 4	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 2nd day of October, 2012,	2 3 4	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions? Okay. If not, Mr. Uda, you may proceed.
2 3 4 5	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 2nd day of October, 2012,	2 3 4 5	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions? Okay. If not, Mr. Uda, you may proceed. MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the
2 3 4 5 6	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 2nd day of October, 2012,	2 3 4 5 6	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions? Okay. If not, Mr. Uda, you may proceed. MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission, Staff. First of all, I know it's been a long
2 3 4 5 6 7	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 2nd day of October, 2012,	2 3 4 5 6 7	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions? Okay. If not, Mr. Uda, you may proceed. MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission, Staff. First of all, I know it's been a long time since we were in front of you. And I wanted to sort
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 2nd day of October, 2012,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions? Okay. If not, Mr. Uda, you may proceed. MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission, Staff. First of all, I know it's been a long time since we were in front of you. And I wanted to sort of remind you a little bit about the nature of the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 2nd day of October, 2012,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions? Okay. If not, Mr. Uda, you may proceed. MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission, Staff. First of all, I know it's been a long time since we were in front of you. And I wanted to sort of remind you a little bit about the nature of the project. It's a 19 and a half megawatt project in Clark,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 2nd day of October, 2012,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions? Okay. If not, Mr. Uda, you may proceed. MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission, Staff. First of all, I know it's been a long time since we were in front of you. And I wanted to sort of remind you a little bit about the nature of the project. It's a 19 and a half megawatt project in Clark, South Dakota.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 2nd day of October, 2012,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions? Okay. If not, Mr. Uda, you may proceed. MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission, Staff. First of all, I know it's been a long time since we were in front of you. And I wanted to sort of remind you a little bit about the nature of the project. It's a 19 and a half megawatt project in Clark, South Dakota. I think this is a good project and would provide
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 2nd day of October, 2012,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions? Okay. If not, Mr. Uda, you may proceed. MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission, Staff. First of all, I know it's been a long time since we were in front of you. And I wanted to sort of remind you a little bit about the nature of the project. It's a 19 and a half megawatt project in Clark, South Dakota. I think this is a good project and would provide reliable energy and some capacity to NorthWestern's rate
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 2nd day of October, 2012,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions? Okay. If not, Mr. Uda, you may proceed. MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission, Staff. First of all, I know it's been a long time since we were in front of you. And I wanted to sort of remind you a little bit about the nature of the project. It's a 19 and a half megawatt project in Clark, South Dakota. I think this is a good project and would provide reliable energy and some capacity to NorthWestern's rate payers in South Dakota. But in addition to that, and I
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 2nd day of October, 2012,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions? Okay. If not, Mr. Uda, you may proceed. MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission, Staff. First of all, I know it's been a long time since we were in front of you. And I wanted to sort of remind you a little bit about the nature of the project. It's a 19 and a half megawatt project in Clark, South Dakota. I think this is a good project and would provide reliable energy and some capacity to NorthWestern's rate payers in South Dakota. But in addition to that, and I think even more important is I think that the Makenses
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 2nd day of October, 2012,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions? Okay. If not, Mr. Uda, you may proceed. MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission, Staff. First of all, I know it's been a long time since we were in front of you. And I wanted to sort of remind you a little bit about the nature of the project. It's a 19 and a half megawatt project in Clark, South Dakota. I think this is a good project and would provide reliable energy and some capacity to NorthWestern's rate payers in South Dakota. But in addition to that, and I think even more important is I think that the Makenses are good people and I dealt with some developers who are
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 2nd day of October, 2012,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions? Okay. If not, Mr. Uda, you may proceed. MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission, Staff. First of all, I know it's been a long time since we were in front of you. And I wanted to sort of remind you a little bit about the nature of the project. It's a 19 and a half megawatt project in Clark, South Dakota. I think this is a good project and would provide reliable energy and some capacity to NorthWestern's rate payers in South Dakota. But in addition to that, and I think even more important is I think that the Makenses are good people and I dealt with some developers who are just in it for the money. And I think the Makenses are
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 2nd day of October, 2012,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions? Okay. If not, Mr. Uda, you may proceed. MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission, Staff. First of all, I know it's been a long time since we were in front of you. And I wanted to sort of remind you a little bit about the nature of the project. It's a 19 and a half megawatt project in Clark, South Dakota. I think this is a good project and would provide reliable energy and some capacity to NorthWestern's rate payers in South Dakota. But in addition to that, and I think even more important is I think that the Makenses are good people and I dealt with some developers who are just in it for the money. And I think that they will be
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 2nd day of October, 2012,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions? Okay. If not, Mr. Uda, you may proceed. MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission, Staff. First of all, I know it's been a long time since we were in front of you. And I wanted to sort of remind you a little bit about the nature of the project. It's a 19 and a half megawatt project in Clark, South Dakota. I think this is a good project and would provide reliable energy and some capacity to NorthWestern's rate payers in South Dakota. But in addition to that, and I think even more important is I think that the Makenses are good people and I dealt with some developers who are just in it for the money. And I think that they will be responsible developers. And I think that makes it an
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 2nd day of October, 2012,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions? Okay. If not, Mr. Uda, you may proceed. MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission, Staff. First of all, I know it's been a long time since we were in front of you. And I wanted to sort of remind you a little bit about the nature of the project. It's a 19 and a half megawatt project in Clark, South Dakota. I think this is a good project and would provide reliable energy and some capacity to NorthWestern's rate payers in South Dakota. But in addition to that, and I think even more important is I think that the Makenses are good people and I dealt with some developers who are just in it for the money. And I think that they will be responsible developers. And I think that makes it an important part of your consideration.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 2nd day of October, 2012,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions? Okay. If not, Mr. Uda, you may proceed. MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission, Staff. First of all, I know it's been a long time since we were in front of you. And I wanted to sort of remind you a little bit about the nature of the project. It's a 19 and a half megawatt project in Clark, South Dakota. I think this is a good project and would provide reliable energy and some capacity to NorthWestern's rate payers in South Dakota. But in addition to that, and I think even more important is I think that the Makenses are good people and I dealt with some developers who are just in it for the money. And I think that they will be responsible developers. And I think that makes it an important part of your consideration. With that, I'll turn to our motion for partial reconsideration.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 2nd day of October, 2012,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions? Okay. If not, Mr. Uda, you may proceed. MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission, Staff. First of all, I know it's been a long time since we were in front of you. And I wanted to sort of remind you a little bit about the nature of the project. It's a 19 and a half megawatt project in Clark, South Dakota. I think this is a good project and would provide reliable energy and some capacity to NorthWestern's rate payers in South Dakota. But in addition to that, and I think even more important is I think that the Makenses are good people and I dealt with some developers who are just in it for the money. And I think that they will be responsible developers. And I think that makes it an important part of your consideration. With that, I'll turn to our motion for partial reconsideration.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 2nd day of October, 2012,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions? Okay. If not, Mr. Uda, you may proceed. MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission, Staff. First of all, I know it's been a long time since we were in front of you. And I wanted to sort of remind you a little bit about the nature of the project. It's a 19 and a half megawatt project in Clark, South Dakota. I think this is a good project and would provide reliable energy and some capacity to NorthWestern's rate payers in South Dakota. But in addition to that, and I think even more important is I think that the Makenses are good people and I dealt with some developers who are just in it for the money. And I think that they will be responsible developers. And I think that makes it an important part of your consideration. With that, I'll turn to our motion for partial reconsideration. Could I have the first slide, please. Thank you, Sherry.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, Room 413, 500 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 2nd day of October, 2012,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	and/or action. Any questions on how we will proceed today? Any questions? Okay. If not, Mr. Uda, you may proceed. MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission, Staff. First of all, I know it's been a long time since we were in front of you. And I wanted to sort of remind you a little bit about the nature of the project. It's a 19 and a half megawatt project in Clark, South Dakota. I think this is a good project and would provide reliable energy and some capacity to NorthWestern's rate payers in South Dakota. But in addition to that, and I think even more important is I think that the Makenses are good people and I dealt with some developers who are just in it for the money. And I think that they will be responsible developers. And I think that makes it an important part of your consideration. With that, I'll turn to our motion for partial reconsideration.

		1	_
	5		7
1	demonstrative, and it's just kind of an example of how	1	power itself by acquiring a facility.
2	on the first half of the slide what we see here is two	2	So in this case you could use either one. You
3	hypothetical days of load generation capacity.	3	could use the incremental cost of operating
4	And as you can see, the red line is coal	4	NorthWestern's resources, including the peaking resources
5	operating at a steady state. The green line is coal plus	5	in the hours where NorthWestern needs resources instead
6	gas. And the blue line represents load. And what you	6	of resorting to the market. And then in those low cost
7	can see from this slide is that the incremental cost of	7	hours, in those hours where the utility has sufficient
8	operating coal and gas or the incremental generating	8	low cost coal to meet its load you could assign the value
9	capacity is in excess of NorthWestern's load if you add	9	of incremental cost to the coal plants.
10	those resources together. And, again, this is for	10	Or alternatively you could assign the market
11	demonstrative purposes only.	11	across all hours. That's what Mr. Lauckhart did. He
12	The second half of the slide on the bottom is	12	used Black & Veatch's analysis, he used their power curve
13	the associated incremental cost and market prices. And	13	and calculated a number. And it's very simple and it's
14	this is where Oak Tree has a problem with the hybrid	14	very straightforward. And I can just tell you from my
15	methodology. As you can see, the blue line represents	15	experience most qualifying facilities don't like getting
16	the cost, and the of the incremental cost of	16	the market rate because it's typically lower than the
17	NorthWestern's resources, again, for illustrative	17	alternative.
18	purposes only, and the red line represents market.	18	What you've done here with the hybrid
19	And the problem Oak Tree has with the hybrid	19	methodology is essentially you're playing a heads we win,
20	method is as follows: In the hours where NorthWestern	20	tails you lose game.
21	has represented on the right side has insufficient coal	21	Now I want to address briefly the objections
22	to serve its own load, it relies on the market. And	22	that I've heard to this, the argument I've just made.
23	that's a prudent decision, and that's something that it	23	And the argument is Oak Tree is indifferent if you used
24	should do. It does not use its peaking resources because	24	incremental cost of NorthWestern's resources or the
25	presumably they're more expensive than the market	25	market. We just don't want to have a situation where
	6		8
1	alternative.	1	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of
2	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours	2	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation.
2 3	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve	2 3	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is
2 3 4	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market	2 3 4	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this
2 3 4 5	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market is higher than the incremental cost of operating	2 3 4 5	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this represents more accurately what NorthWestern does. And
2 3 4 5 6	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market is higher than the incremental cost of operating NorthWestern's own coal resources. And what NorthWestern	2 3 4 5 6	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this represents more accurately what NorthWestern does. And that's not the case. NorthWestern isn't backing down its
2 3 4 5 6 7	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market is higher than the incremental cost of operating NorthWestern's own coal resources. And what NorthWestern does in those hours is it sells into the market.	2 3 4 5 6 7	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this represents more accurately what NorthWestern does. And that's not the case. NorthWestern isn't backing down its coal plants. It's selling that power in the market when
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market is higher than the incremental cost of operating NorthWestern's own coal resources. And what NorthWestern does in those hours is it sells into the market. And, again, that's a prudent thing for the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this represents more accurately what NorthWestern does. And that's not the case. NorthWestern isn't backing down its coal plants. It's selling that power in the market when it has sufficient capacity to do so. As I said, that's a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market is higher than the incremental cost of operating NorthWestern's own coal resources. And what NorthWestern does in those hours is it sells into the market. And, again, that's a prudent thing for the utility to do. It's maximizing the value of those	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this represents more accurately what NorthWestern does. And that's not the case. NorthWestern isn't backing down its coal plants. It's selling that power in the market when it has sufficient capacity to do so. As I said, that's a prudent decision.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market is higher than the incremental cost of operating NorthWestern's own coal resources. And what NorthWestern does in those hours is it sells into the market. And, again, that's a prudent thing for the utility to do. It's maximizing the value of those resources.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this represents more accurately what NorthWestern does. And that's not the case. NorthWestern isn't backing down its coal plants. It's selling that power in the market when it has sufficient capacity to do so. As I said, that's a prudent decision. So there's not a mythological world or even real
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market is higher than the incremental cost of operating NorthWestern's own coal resources. And what NorthWestern does in those hours is it sells into the market. And, again, that's a prudent thing for the utility to do. It's maximizing the value of those resources. The problem comes in that when you really look	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this represents more accurately what NorthWestern does. And that's not the case. NorthWestern isn't backing down its coal plants. It's selling that power in the market when it has sufficient capacity to do so. As I said, that's a prudent decision. So there's not a mythological world or even real world example of where what NorthWestern is doing is
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market is higher than the incremental cost of operating NorthWestern's own coal resources. And what NorthWestern does in those hours is it sells into the market. And, again, that's a prudent thing for the utility to do. It's maximizing the value of those resources. The problem comes in that when you really look at this what happens is that anytime market would help us	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this represents more accurately what NorthWestern does. And that's not the case. NorthWestern isn't backing down its coal plants. It's selling that power in the market when it has sufficient capacity to do so. As I said, that's a prudent decision. So there's not a mythological world or even real world example of where what NorthWestern is doing is backing down its generation when it has sufficient coal
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market is higher than the incremental cost of operating NorthWestern's own coal resources. And what NorthWestern does in those hours is it sells into the market. And, again, that's a prudent thing for the utility to do. It's maximizing the value of those resources. The problem comes in that when you really look at this what happens is that anytime market would help us specifically in the hours where there is sufficient low	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this represents more accurately what NorthWestern does. And that's not the case. NorthWestern isn't backing down its coal plants. It's selling that power in the market when it has sufficient capacity to do so. As I said, that's a prudent decision. So there's not a mythological world or even real world example of where what NorthWestern is doing is backing down its generation when it has sufficient coal resources to meet its load. It's doing the prudent thing
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market is higher than the incremental cost of operating NorthWestern's own coal resources. And what NorthWestern does in those hours is it sells into the market. And, again, that's a prudent thing for the utility to do. It's maximizing the value of those resources. The problem comes in that when you really look at this what happens is that anytime market would help us specifically in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to meet NorthWestern's resources we get the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this represents more accurately what NorthWestern does. And that's not the case. NorthWestern isn't backing down its coal plants. It's selling that power in the market when it has sufficient capacity to do so. As I said, that's a prudent decision. So there's not a mythological world or even real world example of where what NorthWestern is doing is backing down its generation when it has sufficient coal resources to meet its load. It's doing the prudent thing and selling it into the market. So it doesn't represent
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market is higher than the incremental cost of operating NorthWestern's own coal resources. And what NorthWestern does in those hours is it sells into the market. And, again, that's a prudent thing for the utility to do. It's maximizing the value of those resources. The problem comes in that when you really look at this what happens is that anytime market would help us specifically in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to meet NorthWestern's resources we get the cost of the coal.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this represents more accurately what NorthWestern does. And that's not the case. NorthWestern isn't backing down its coal plants. It's selling that power in the market when it has sufficient capacity to do so. As I said, that's a prudent decision. So there's not a mythological world or even real world example of where what NorthWestern is doing is backing down its generation when it has sufficient coal resources to meet its load. It's doing the prudent thing and selling it into the market. So it doesn't represent reality.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market is higher than the incremental cost of operating NorthWestern's own coal resources. And what NorthWestern does in those hours is it sells into the market. And, again, that's a prudent thing for the utility to do. It's maximizing the value of those resources. The problem comes in that when you really look at this what happens is that anytime market would help us specifically in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to meet NorthWestern's resources we get the cost of the coal. In the hours where there's insufficient	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this represents more accurately what NorthWestern does. And that's not the case. NorthWestern isn't backing down its coal plants. It's selling that power in the market when it has sufficient capacity to do so. As I said, that's a prudent decision. So there's not a mythological world or even real world example of where what NorthWestern is doing is backing down its generation when it has sufficient coal resources to meet its load. It's doing the prudent thing and selling it into the market. So it doesn't represent reality. The second argument I've heard is, well, the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market is higher than the incremental cost of operating NorthWestern's own coal resources. And what NorthWestern does in those hours is it sells into the market. And, again, that's a prudent thing for the utility to do. It's maximizing the value of those resources. The problem comes in that when you really look at this what happens is that anytime market would help us specifically in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to meet NorthWestern's resources we get the cost of the coal. In the hours where there's insufficient resources we get the market. So to us what happens is	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this represents more accurately what NorthWestern does. And that's not the case. NorthWestern isn't backing down its coal plants. It's selling that power in the market when it has sufficient capacity to do so. As I said, that's a prudent decision. So there's not a mythological world or even real world example of where what NorthWestern is doing is backing down its generation when it has sufficient coal resources to meet its load. It's doing the prudent thing and selling it into the market. So it doesn't represent reality. The second argument I've heard is, well, the definition of avoided cost is, well, what it costs. But
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market is higher than the incremental cost of operating NorthWestern's own coal resources. And what NorthWestern does in those hours is it sells into the market. And, again, that's a prudent thing for the utility to do. It's maximizing the value of those resources. The problem comes in that when you really look at this what happens is that anytime market would help us specifically in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to meet NorthWestern's resources we get the cost of the coal. In the hours where there's insufficient resources we get the market. So to us what happens is anytime market could help us on either side of the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this represents more accurately what NorthWestern does. And that's not the case. NorthWestern isn't backing down its coal plants. It's selling that power in the market when it has sufficient capacity to do so. As I said, that's a prudent decision. So there's not a mythological world or even real world example of where what NorthWestern is doing is backing down its generation when it has sufficient coal resources to meet its load. It's doing the prudent thing and selling it into the market. So it doesn't represent reality. The second argument I've heard is, well, the definition of avoided cost is, well, what it costs. But if you look at what NorthWestern actually does, the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market is higher than the incremental cost of operating NorthWestern's own coal resources. And what NorthWestern does in those hours is it sells into the market. And, again, that's a prudent thing for the utility to do. It's maximizing the value of those resources. The problem comes in that when you really look at this what happens is that anytime market would help us specifically in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to meet NorthWestern's resources we get the cost of the coal. In the hours where there's insufficient resources we get the market. So to us what happens is anytime market could help us on either side of the equation, either in the hours where NorthWestern has	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this represents more accurately what NorthWestern does. And that's not the case. NorthWestern isn't backing down its coal plants. It's selling that power in the market when it has sufficient capacity to do so. As I said, that's a prudent decision. So there's not a mythological world or even real world example of where what NorthWestern is doing is backing down its generation when it has sufficient coal resources to meet its load. It's doing the prudent thing and selling it into the market. So it doesn't represent reality. The second argument I've heard is, well, the definition of avoided cost is, well, what it costs. But if you look at what NorthWestern actually does, the incremental activity, and this is really if you look at
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market is higher than the incremental cost of operating NorthWestern's own coal resources. And what NorthWestern does in those hours is it sells into the market. And, again, that's a prudent thing for the utility to do. It's maximizing the value of those resources. The problem comes in that when you really look at this what happens is that anytime market would help us specifically in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to meet NorthWestern's resources we get the cost of the coal. In the hours where there's insufficient resources we get the market. So to us what happens is anytime market could help us on either side of the equation, either in the hours where NorthWestern has insufficient coal or in the hours where NorthWestern has	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this represents more accurately what NorthWestern does. And that's not the case. NorthWestern isn't backing down its coal plants. It's selling that power in the market when it has sufficient capacity to do so. As I said, that's a prudent decision. So there's not a mythological world or even real world example of where what NorthWestern is doing is backing down its generation when it has sufficient coal resources to meet its load. It's doing the prudent thing and selling it into the market. So it doesn't represent reality. The second argument I've heard is, well, the definition of avoided cost is, well, what it costs. But if you look at what NorthWestern actually does, the incremental activity, and this is really if you look at it what they're really doing is using the market. And if
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market is higher than the incremental cost of operating NorthWestern's own coal resources. And what NorthWestern does in those hours is it sells into the market. And, again, that's a prudent thing for the utility to do. It's maximizing the value of those resources. The problem comes in that when you really look at this what happens is that anytime market would help us specifically in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to meet NorthWestern's resources we get the cost of the coal. In the hours where there's insufficient resources we get the market. So to us what happens is anytime market could help us on either side of the equation, either in the hours where NorthWestern has insufficient coal or in the hours where NorthWestern has sufficient coal, we get the lower of the two	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this represents more accurately what NorthWestern does. And that's not the case. NorthWestern isn't backing down its coal plants. It's selling that power in the market when it has sufficient capacity to do so. As I said, that's a prudent decision. So there's not a mythological world or even real world example of where what NorthWestern is doing is backing down its generation when it has sufficient coal resources to meet its load. It's doing the prudent thing and selling it into the market. So it doesn't represent reality. The second argument I've heard is, well, the definition of avoided cost is, well, what it costs. But if you look at what NorthWestern actually does, the incremental activity, and this is really if you look at it what they're really doing is using the market. And if you've got a market you have to consider in that activity
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market is higher than the incremental cost of operating NorthWestern's own coal resources. And what NorthWestern does in those hours is it sells into the market. And, again, that's a prudent thing for the utility to do. It's maximizing the value of those resources. The problem comes in that when you really look at this what happens is that anytime market would help us specifically in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to meet NorthWestern's resources we get the cost of the coal. In the hours where there's insufficient resources we get the market. So to us what happens is anytime market could help us on either side of the equation, either in the hours where NorthWestern has insufficient coal or in the hours where NorthWestern has sufficient coal, we get the lower of the two alternatives.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this represents more accurately what NorthWestern does. And that's not the case. NorthWestern isn't backing down its coal plants. It's selling that power in the market when it has sufficient capacity to do so. As I said, that's a prudent decision. So there's not a mythological world or even real world example of where what NorthWestern is doing is backing down its generation when it has sufficient coal resources to meet its load. It's doing the prudent thing and selling it into the market. So it doesn't represent reality. The second argument I've heard is, well, the definition of avoided cost is, well, what it costs. But if you look at what NorthWestern actually does, the incremental activity, and this is really if you look at it what they're really doing is using the market. And if you've got a market you have to consider in that activity that's where the incremental activity is taking place.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market is higher than the incremental cost of operating NorthWestern's own coal resources. And what NorthWestern does in those hours is it sells into the market. And, again, that's a prudent thing for the utility to do. It's maximizing the value of those resources. The problem comes in that when you really look at this what happens is that anytime market would help us specifically in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to meet NorthWestern's resources we get the cost of the coal. In the hours where there's insufficient resources we get the market. So to us what happens is anytime market could help us on either side of the equation, either in the hours where NorthWestern has insufficient coal or in the hours where NorthWestern has insufficient coal, we get the lower of the two alternatives. Now the definition of avoided cost is	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this represents more accurately what NorthWestern does. And that's not the case. NorthWestern isn't backing down its coal plants. It's selling that power in the market when it has sufficient capacity to do so. As I said, that's a prudent decision. So there's not a mythological world or even real world example of where what NorthWestern is doing is backing down its generation when it has sufficient coal resources to meet its load. It's doing the prudent thing and selling it into the market. So it doesn't represent reality. The second argument I've heard is, well, the definition of avoided cost is, well, what it costs. But if you look at what NorthWestern actually does, the incremental activity, and this is really if you look at it what they're really doing is using the market. And if you've got a market you have to consider in that activity that's where the incremental activity is taking place. And when NorthWestern makes the decision to sell into
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	alternative. The problem for Oak Tree comes in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to serve NorthWestern's load. Because in those hours the market is higher than the incremental cost of operating NorthWestern's own coal resources. And what NorthWestern does in those hours is it sells into the market. And, again, that's a prudent thing for the utility to do. It's maximizing the value of those resources. The problem comes in that when you really look at this what happens is that anytime market would help us specifically in the hours where there is sufficient low cost coal to meet NorthWestern's resources we get the cost of the coal. In the hours where there's insufficient resources we get the market. So to us what happens is anytime market could help us on either side of the equation, either in the hours where NorthWestern has insufficient coal or in the hours where NorthWestern has sufficient coal, we get the lower of the two alternatives.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	we're getting the worst of both worlds on either side of the equation. And the response we've heard to this is essentially two arguments. The first one is, well, this represents more accurately what NorthWestern does. And that's not the case. NorthWestern isn't backing down its coal plants. It's selling that power in the market when it has sufficient capacity to do so. As I said, that's a prudent decision. So there's not a mythological world or even real world example of where what NorthWestern is doing is backing down its generation when it has sufficient coal resources to meet its load. It's doing the prudent thing and selling it into the market. So it doesn't represent reality. The second argument I've heard is, well, the definition of avoided cost is, well, what it costs. But if you look at what NorthWestern actually does, the incremental activity, and this is really if you look at it what they're really doing is using the market. And if you've got a market you have to consider in that activity that's where the incremental activity is taking place.

-		T	
	9		11
1	another unit of generation. This has to take place from	1	the blue line in the middle is actually at the low to
2	a load resource vantage point. And that value is being	2	low mid range of those estimates.
3	transferred to NorthWestern in return for backing down.	3	And this is something that we've talked about
4	So that resource in the market is being displaced and	4	extensively in our briefs, and I would commend you to
5	that's the fundamental principle of avoided cost.	5	those. But one of the points that we've made about this
6	You can either assume there's a market or you	6	whole issue of calculation of carbon costs is
7	can assume there's no market. What we're asking you to	7	NorthWestern both in 2009 and 2011 when it did its
8	do is just be consistent in that determination. We're	8	procurement plan in Montana used a very different
9	not telling you what the outcome of that determination	9	calculation.
10	needs to be but we're saying that this methodology is	10	Their proposal in this proceeding is 0. The 5,
11	inconsistent with avoided cost because of this heads we	11	10, 15 was adopted by the Commission. But if you read
12	win, tails you lose scenario.	12	what they've said in their procurement plan, they assume
13	I want to turn next to well, before I	13	now as the 2011 procurement plan delayed implementation
14	proceed, one point I want to get to is NorthWestern cites	14	of Waxman-Markey until 2019, and some of those costs are
15	in response to our motion for reconsideration two cases	15	very high in the outer years but it averages out
16	for the proposition that a hybrid methodology is	16	levelized to about between 23 and \$25 per ton, not 5, 10,
17	appropriate. The first cited is the Arkansas Entergy	17	and 15. And that's assuming delayed implementation of
18	decision. But that case did not deal with long-term	18	Waxman-Markey.
19	avoided costs for prospective QFs. It dealt with	19	And that's essentially what Black & Veatch did
20	calculating an avoided cost for existing QFs that did not	20	too is they delayed the implementation of Waxman-Markey
21	need to build a resource.	21	because it had stalled at that point and was not at that
22	The second decision they cite is from Virginia.	22	point a viable legislation.
23	The Virginia decision did not use the market at all when	23	The basis for NorthWestern's calculation is the
24	it determined avoided costs for Virginia Electric Power.	24	NorthWestern Power & Conservation Council's sixth plan
25	The reason is is that using the PROMOD model and it did	25	where they do an estimate of carbon costs. And I commend
	10		10
	10		12
1	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it	1	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of
1 2		1 2	
	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it		that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of
2	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the	2	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect.
2 3	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the utility's incremental cost of its own resources. Now I want to quickly move to carbon costs. And okay. The carbon cost figure that was used by the PUC	2 3	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect. The game changer, of course, is the recent I
2 3 4	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the utility's incremental cost of its own resources. Now I want to quickly move to carbon costs. And	2 3 4	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect. The game changer, of course, is the recent I believe it was June of 2012 decision in Coalition For
2 3 4 5	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the utility's incremental cost of its own resources. Now I want to quickly move to carbon costs. And okay. The carbon cost figure that was used by the PUC here is \$10 by 2015, I believe, \$15 by 2020, and \$20 by 2025. And this figure is simply out of the range of	2 3 4 5	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect. The game changer, of course, is the recent I believe it was June of 2012 decision in Coalition For Responsible Regulation versus EPA 684 F.3d 102 in 2012, as I said. The reason that decision is so important is
2 3 4 5 6	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the utility's incremental cost of its own resources. Now I want to quickly move to carbon costs. And okay. The carbon cost figure that was used by the PUC here is \$10 by 2015, I believe, \$15 by 2020, and \$20 by 2025. And this figure is simply out of the range of normal expectation for what carbon costs will be. And if	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect. The game changer, of course, is the recent I believe it was June of 2012 decision in Coalition For Responsible Regulation versus EPA 684 F.3d 102 in 2012, as I said. The reason that decision is so important is because in 2008 a number of states, coastal states not
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the utility's incremental cost of its own resources. Now I want to quickly move to carbon costs. And okay. The carbon cost figure that was used by the PUC here is \$10 by 2015, I believe, \$15 by 2020, and \$20 by 2025. And this figure is simply out of the range of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect. The game changer, of course, is the recent I believe it was June of 2012 decision in Coalition For Responsible Regulation versus EPA 684 F.3d 102 in 2012, as I said. The reason that decision is so important is because in 2008 a number of states, coastal states not surprisingly, sued EPA because EPA had yet to make a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the utility's incremental cost of its own resources. Now I want to quickly move to carbon costs. And okay. The carbon cost figure that was used by the PUC here is \$10 by 2015, I believe, \$15 by 2020, and \$20 by 2025. And this figure is simply out of the range of normal expectation for what carbon costs will be. And if I could Sherry, if I could have that second slide real quick.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect. The game changer, of course, is the recent I believe it was June of 2012 decision in Coalition For Responsible Regulation versus EPA 684 F.3d 102 in 2012, as I said. The reason that decision is so important is because in 2008 a number of states, coastal states not surprisingly, sued EPA because EPA had yet to make a determination as to whether greenhouse gases were a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the utility's incremental cost of its own resources. Now I want to quickly move to carbon costs. And okay. The carbon cost figure that was used by the PUC here is \$10 by 2015, I believe, \$15 by 2020, and \$20 by 2025. And this figure is simply out of the range of normal expectation for what carbon costs will be. And if I could Sherry, if I could have that second slide real quick. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Do we need to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect. The game changer, of course, is the recent I believe it was June of 2012 decision in Coalition For Responsible Regulation versus EPA 684 F.3d 102 in 2012, as I said. The reason that decision is so important is because in 2008 a number of states, coastal states not surprisingly, sued EPA because EPA had yet to make a determination as to whether greenhouse gases were a threat to human health and safety under the Clean Air
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the utility's incremental cost of its own resources. Now I want to quickly move to carbon costs. And okay. The carbon cost figure that was used by the PUC here is \$10 by 2015, I believe, \$15 by 2020, and \$20 by 2025. And this figure is simply out of the range of normal expectation for what carbon costs will be. And if I could Sherry, if I could have that second slide real quick. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Do we need to everybody in the room, you're comfortable with this?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect. The game changer, of course, is the recent I believe it was June of 2012 decision in Coalition For Responsible Regulation versus EPA 684 F.3d 102 in 2012, as I said. The reason that decision is so important is because in 2008 a number of states, coastal states not surprisingly, sued EPA because EPA had yet to make a determination as to whether greenhouse gases were a threat to human health and safety under the Clean Air Act.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the utility's incremental cost of its own resources. Now I want to quickly move to carbon costs. And okay. The carbon cost figure that was used by the PUC here is \$10 by 2015, I believe, \$15 by 2020, and \$20 by 2025. And this figure is simply out of the range of normal expectation for what carbon costs will be. And if I could Sherry, if I could have that second slide real quick. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Do we need to everybody in the room, you're comfortable with this? MR. UDA: I'm fine.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect. The game changer, of course, is the recent I believe it was June of 2012 decision in Coalition For Responsible Regulation versus EPA 684 F.3d 102 in 2012, as I said. The reason that decision is so important is because in 2008 a number of states, coastal states not surprisingly, sued EPA because EPA had yet to make a determination as to whether greenhouse gases were a threat to human health and safety under the Clean Air Act. The United States Supreme Court said that not
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the utility's incremental cost of its own resources. Now I want to quickly move to carbon costs. And okay. The carbon cost figure that was used by the PUC here is \$10 by 2015, I believe, \$15 by 2020, and \$20 by 2025. And this figure is simply out of the range of normal expectation for what carbon costs will be. And if I could Sherry, if I could have that second slide real quick. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Do we need to everybody in the room, you're comfortable with this? MR. UDA: I'm fine. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. And so far as your	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect. The game changer, of course, is the recent I believe it was June of 2012 decision in Coalition For Responsible Regulation versus EPA 684 F.3d 102 in 2012, as I said. The reason that decision is so important is because in 2008 a number of states, coastal states not surprisingly, sued EPA because EPA had yet to make a determination as to whether greenhouse gases were a threat to human health and safety under the Clean Air Act. The United States Supreme Court said that not only does the EPA have the authority, the jurisdiction to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the utility's incremental cost of its own resources. Now I want to quickly move to carbon costs. And okay. The carbon cost figure that was used by the PUC here is \$10 by 2015, I believe, \$15 by 2020, and \$20 by 2025. And this figure is simply out of the range of normal expectation for what carbon costs will be. And if I could Sherry, if I could have that second slide real quick. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Do we need to everybody in the room, you're comfortable with this? MR. UDA: I'm fine. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. And so far as your verbalization of this, do we need to go off the record?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect. The game changer, of course, is the recent I believe it was June of 2012 decision in Coalition For Responsible Regulation versus EPA 684 F.3d 102 in 2012, as I said. The reason that decision is so important is because in 2008 a number of states, coastal states not surprisingly, sued EPA because EPA had yet to make a determination as to whether greenhouse gases were a threat to human health and safety under the Clean Air Act. The United States Supreme Court said that not only does the EPA have the authority, the jurisdiction to consider that issue, it had the obligation to do so. So
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the utility's incremental cost of its own resources. Now I want to quickly move to carbon costs. And okay. The carbon cost figure that was used by the PUC here is \$10 by 2015, I believe, \$15 by 2020, and \$20 by 2025. And this figure is simply out of the range of normal expectation for what carbon costs will be. And if I could Sherry, if I could have that second slide real quick. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Do we need to everybody in the room, you're comfortable with this? MR. UDA: I'm fine. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. And so far as your verbalization of this, do we need to go off the record? MR. UDA: I don't think so. Because I'm going	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect. The game changer, of course, is the recent I believe it was June of 2012 decision in Coalition For Responsible Regulation versus EPA 684 F.3d 102 in 2012, as I said. The reason that decision is so important is because in 2008 a number of states, coastal states not surprisingly, sued EPA because EPA had yet to make a determination as to whether greenhouse gases were a threat to human health and safety under the Clean Air Act. The United States Supreme Court said that not only does the EPA have the authority, the jurisdiction to consider that issue, it had the obligation to do so. So EPA went back and it made an endangerment finding. And
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the utility's incremental cost of its own resources. Now I want to quickly move to carbon costs. And okay. The carbon cost figure that was used by the PUC here is \$10 by 2015, I believe, \$15 by 2020, and \$20 by 2025. And this figure is simply out of the range of normal expectation for what carbon costs will be. And if I could Sherry, if I could have that second slide real quick. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Do we need to everybody in the room, you're comfortable with this? MR. UDA: I'm fine. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. And so far as your verbalization of this, do we need to go off the record? MR. UDA: I don't think so. Because I'm going to describe it pretty generally.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect. The game changer, of course, is the recent I believe it was June of 2012 decision in Coalition For Responsible Regulation versus EPA 684 F.3d 102 in 2012, as I said. The reason that decision is so important is because in 2008 a number of states, coastal states not surprisingly, sued EPA because EPA had yet to make a determination as to whether greenhouse gases were a threat to human health and safety under the Clean Air Act. The United States Supreme Court said that not only does the EPA have the authority, the jurisdiction to consider that issue, it had the obligation to do so. So EPA went back and it made an endangerment finding. And not only did it make an endangerment finding, it proposed
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the utility's incremental cost of its own resources. Now I want to quickly move to carbon costs. And okay. The carbon cost figure that was used by the PUC here is \$10 by 2015, I believe, \$15 by 2020, and \$20 by 2025. And this figure is simply out of the range of normal expectation for what carbon costs will be. And if I could Sherry, if I could have that second slide real quick. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Do we need to everybody in the room, you're comfortable with this? MR. UDA: I'm fine. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. And so far as your verbalization of this, do we need to go off the record? MR. UDA: I don't think so. Because I'm going to describe it pretty generally. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect. The game changer, of course, is the recent I believe it was June of 2012 decision in Coalition For Responsible Regulation versus EPA 684 F.3d 102 in 2012, as I said. The reason that decision is so important is because in 2008 a number of states, coastal states not surprisingly, sued EPA because EPA had yet to make a determination as to whether greenhouse gases were a threat to human health and safety under the Clean Air Act. The United States Supreme Court said that not only does the EPA have the authority, the jurisdiction to consider that issue, it had the obligation to do so. So EPA went back and it made an endangerment finding. And not only did it make an endangerment finding, it proposed regulations for stationary sources as well as for mobile
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the utility's incremental cost of its own resources. Now I want to quickly move to carbon costs. And okay. The carbon cost figure that was used by the PUC here is \$10 by 2015, I believe, \$15 by 2020, and \$20 by 2025. And this figure is simply out of the range of normal expectation for what carbon costs will be. And if I could Sherry, if I could have that second slide real quick. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Do we need to everybody in the room, you're comfortable with this? MR. UDA: I'm fine. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. And so far as your verbalization of this, do we need to go off the record? MR. UDA: I don't think so. Because I'm going to describe it pretty generally. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. MR. UDA: This is from the Black & Veatch Fall	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect. The game changer, of course, is the recent I believe it was June of 2012 decision in Coalition For Responsible Regulation versus EPA 684 F.3d 102 in 2012, as I said. The reason that decision is so important is because in 2008 a number of states, coastal states not surprisingly, sued EPA because EPA had yet to make a determination as to whether greenhouse gases were a threat to human health and safety under the Clean Air Act. The United States Supreme Court said that not only does the EPA have the authority, the jurisdiction to consider that issue, it had the obligation to do so. So EPA went back and it made an endangerment finding. And not only did it make an endangerment finding, it proposed regulations for stationary sources as well as for mobile sources.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the utility's incremental cost of its own resources. Now I want to quickly move to carbon costs. And okay. The carbon cost figure that was used by the PUC here is \$10 by 2015, I believe, \$15 by 2020, and \$20 by 2025. And this figure is simply out of the range of normal expectation for what carbon costs will be. And if I could Sherry, if I could have that second slide real quick. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Do we need to everybody in the room, you're comfortable with this? MR. UDA: I'm fine. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. And so far as your verbalization of this, do we need to go off the record? MR. UDA: I don't think so. Because I'm going to describe it pretty generally. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. MR. UDA: This is from the Black & Veatch Fall 2010 Energy Market Perspective. And they did a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect. The game changer, of course, is the recent I believe it was June of 2012 decision in Coalition For Responsible Regulation versus EPA 684 F.3d 102 in 2012, as I said. The reason that decision is so important is because in 2008 a number of states, coastal states not surprisingly, sued EPA because EPA had yet to make a determination as to whether greenhouse gases were a threat to human health and safety under the Clean Air Act. The United States Supreme Court said that not only does the EPA have the authority, the jurisdiction to consider that issue, it had the obligation to do so. So EPA went back and it made an endangerment finding. And not only did it make an endangerment finding, it proposed regulations for stationary sources as well as for mobile sources. The D.C. circuit reviewed that decision and said
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the utility's incremental cost of its own resources. Now I want to quickly move to carbon costs. And okay. The carbon cost figure that was used by the PUC here is \$10 by 2015, I believe, \$15 by 2020, and \$20 by 2025. And this figure is simply out of the range of normal expectation for what carbon costs will be. And if I could Sherry, if I could have that second slide real quick. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Do we need to everybody in the room, you're comfortable with this? MR. UDA: I'm fine. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. And so far as your verbalization of this, do we need to go off the record? MR. UDA: I don't think so. Because I'm going to describe it pretty generally. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. MR. UDA: This is from the Black & Veatch Fall 2010 Energy Market Perspective. And they did a calculation of various different scenarios. And they	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect. The game changer, of course, is the recent I believe it was June of 2012 decision in Coalition For Responsible Regulation versus EPA 684 F.3d 102 in 2012, as I said. The reason that decision is so important is because in 2008 a number of states, coastal states not surprisingly, sued EPA because EPA had yet to make a determination as to whether greenhouse gases were a threat to human health and safety under the Clean Air Act. The United States Supreme Court said that not only does the EPA have the authority, the jurisdiction to consider that issue, it had the obligation to do so. So EPA went back and it made an endangerment finding. And not only did it make an endangerment finding, it proposed sources. The D.C. circuit reviewed that decision and said that it did not find that it was in error. And so we
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the utility's incremental cost of its own resources. Now I want to quickly move to carbon costs. And okay. The carbon cost figure that was used by the PUC here is \$10 by 2015, I believe, \$15 by 2020, and \$20 by 2025. And this figure is simply out of the range of normal expectation for what carbon costs will be. And if I could Sherry, if I could have that second slide real quick. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Do we need to everybody in the room, you're comfortable with this? MR. UDA: I'm fine. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. And so far as your verbalization of this, do we need to go off the record? MR. UDA: I don't think so. Because I'm going to describe it pretty generally. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. MR. UDA: This is from the Black & Veatch Fall 2010 Energy Market Perspective. And they did a calculation of various different scenarios. And they included EIA carbon cost scenarios in it.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect. The game changer, of course, is the recent I believe it was June of 2012 decision in Coalition For Responsible Regulation versus EPA 684 F.3d 102 in 2012, as I said. The reason that decision is so important is because in 2008 a number of states, coastal states not surprisingly, sued EPA because EPA had yet to make a determination as to whether greenhouse gases were a threat to human health and safety under the Clean Air Act. The United States Supreme Court said that not only does the EPA have the authority, the jurisdiction to consider that issue, it had the obligation to do so. So EPA went back and it made an endangerment finding. And not only did it make an endangerment finding, it proposed regulations for stationary sources as well as for mobile sources. The D.C. circuit reviewed that decision and said that it did not find that it was in error. And so we have, although not implemented yet, we have the looming
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the utility's incremental cost of its own resources. Now I want to quickly move to carbon costs. And okay. The carbon cost figure that was used by the PUC here is \$10 by 2015, I believe, \$15 by 2020, and \$20 by 2025. And this figure is simply out of the range of normal expectation for what carbon costs will be. And if I could Sherry, if I could have that second slide real quick. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Do we need to everybody in the room, you're comfortable with this? MR. UDA: I'm fine. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. And so far as your verbalization of this, do we need to go off the record? MR. UDA: I don't think so. Because I'm going to describe it pretty generally. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. MR. UDA: This is from the Black & Veatch Fall 2010 Energy Market Perspective. And they did a calculation of various different scenarios. And they included EIA carbon cost scenarios in it. And as you can see from the slide, the 5, 10, 15	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect. The game changer, of course, is the recent I believe it was June of 2012 decision in Coalition For Responsible Regulation versus EPA 684 F.3d 102 in 2012, as I said. The reason that decision is so important is because in 2008 a number of states, coastal states not surprisingly, sued EPA because EPA had yet to make a determination as to whether greenhouse gases were a threat to human health and safety under the Clean Air Act. The United States Supreme Court said that not only does the EPA have the authority, the jurisdiction to consider that issue, it had the obligation to do so. So EPA went back and it made an endangerment finding. And not only did it make an endangerment finding, it proposed regulations for stationary sources as well as for mobile sources. The D.C. circuit reviewed that decision and said that it did not find that it was in error. And so we have, although not implemented yet, we have the looming threat of the EPA essentially forcing limitations on
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	not use the market dispatch portion of that model when it made its calculation. In fact, it relied solely on the utility's incremental cost of its own resources. Now I want to quickly move to carbon costs. And okay. The carbon cost figure that was used by the PUC here is \$10 by 2015, I believe, \$15 by 2020, and \$20 by 2025. And this figure is simply out of the range of normal expectation for what carbon costs will be. And if I could Sherry, if I could have that second slide real quick. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Do we need to everybody in the room, you're comfortable with this? MR. UDA: I'm fine. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. And so far as your verbalization of this, do we need to go off the record? MR. UDA: I don't think so. Because I'm going to describe it pretty generally. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. MR. UDA: This is from the Black & Veatch Fall 2010 Energy Market Perspective. And they did a calculation of various different scenarios. And they included EIA carbon cost scenarios in it.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	that to you. I think that's a pretty good analysis of what you can expect. The game changer, of course, is the recent I believe it was June of 2012 decision in Coalition For Responsible Regulation versus EPA 684 F.3d 102 in 2012, as I said. The reason that decision is so important is because in 2008 a number of states, coastal states not surprisingly, sued EPA because EPA had yet to make a determination as to whether greenhouse gases were a threat to human health and safety under the Clean Air Act. The United States Supreme Court said that not only does the EPA have the authority, the jurisdiction to consider that issue, it had the obligation to do so. So EPA went back and it made an endangerment finding. And not only did it make an endangerment finding, it proposed regulations for stationary sources as well as for mobile sources. The D.C. circuit reviewed that decision and said that it did not find that it was in error. And so we have, although not implemented yet, we have the looming

10/09/2012 11:54:07 AM

	13	1	15
1	extremely expensive. And it may be an impetus, for	1	Now it wasn't clear to me whether this was an
2	example, for Congress to move back toward the cap and	2	unintentional issue, but 18 CFR 292, 304(d) 2 gives a
3	trade approach, which seemed to be the preferred approach	3	right to a qualifying facility to have a rate forecast at
4	prior to 2010.	4	the time the legally enforceable obligation is incurred.
5	And another point related to this is the Staff	5	Given that, and the Commission's finding that
6	has said, and I agree with them, that you need to take	6	the LEO occurred as of February 25, 2011, I think it
7	into account when calculating potential greenhouse gas	7	would be contrary to the law to permit the use of current
8	emission regulations, or carbon costs as we've	8	information. I think that for whatever you want to call
9	shorthandedly referred to it here, you need to consider	9	it, a lock-in or whatever else, I think it would be
10	the likelihood of it being adopted and what gets adopted.	10	inappropriate to do that.
11	I think that's a fair point.	11	I want to briefly refer to a couple of
12	And I think that's what happened in both the	12	arguments. And I believe Staff agrees with us on this
13	Black & Veatch forecast and in the Northwest Power	13	issue. This has to do with the current-information
14	Conservation Council and NorthWestern's own calculations.	14	issue. NorthWestern argued that Mr. Lauckhart either
15	They said, well, we don't think it's going to get adopted	15	ignored or failed to consider information available to
16	this year. If you look at NorthWestern's calculations,	16	him on February 25, 2011, including the game changing
17	they don't have any carbon costs until 2019. So even	17	November 2010 EIA AEO forecast. And Mr. Lauckhart's
18	though it's very expensive in the outer years, it's	18	testimony makes it clear he did consider it, but he
19	discounted by those early years where there's nothing	19	didn't think that it was sufficient at that point to
20	there. So I think that discount has already taken place.	20	change his calculations.
21	Now I want to make a point about the EIA	21	And to the extent that you think the November
22	forecast because I think this is really important. The	22	2010 EIA AEO was game changing because it showed an
23	EIA forecast has the AEO has a number of different	23	increase in technically-recoverable reserves, take a look
24	scenarios. They have a reference case. The reference	24	at the 2012 forecast. That number has dropped
25	case what it does is it says basically if nothing	25	precipitously. That may be an indication of a
_	14		16
1	changes, this is the number.	1	fundamental change in the market or not but it's not
	•		randamental change in the market of not but its not
2	It doesn't take into account either legislation	2	anything you need to consider because current information
2 3	It doesn't take into account either legislation that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted,	2 3	_
	that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted,		anything you need to consider because current information
3	-	3	anything you need to consider because current information should be used.
3 4	that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted, for example, the EPA's HAP regulations dealing with	3 4	anything you need to consider because current information should be used. They also argued that Mr. Lauckhart had access
3 4 5	that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted, for example, the EPA's HAP regulations dealing with hazardous and toxic pollutants because that has not been	3 4 5	anything you need to consider because current information should be used. They also argued that Mr. Lauckhart had access to the Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective for
3 4 5 6	that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted, for example, the EPA's HAP regulations dealing with hazardous and toxic pollutants because that has not been funded yet. And the same thing is true for EPA's	3 4 5 6	anything you need to consider because current information should be used. They also argued that Mr. Lauckhart had access to the Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective for spring of 2011, but he didn't. The spring forecast came
3 4 5 6 7	that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted, for example, the EPA's HAP regulations dealing with hazardous and toxic pollutants because that has not been funded yet. And the same thing is true for EPA's regulations. So at this point that EIA reference	3 4 5 6 7	anything you need to consider because current information should be used. They also argued that Mr. Lauckhart had access to the Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective for spring of 2011, but he didn't. The spring forecast came out in late spring or early summer, something like that.
3 4 5 6 7 8	that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted, for example, the EPA's HAP regulations dealing with hazardous and toxic pollutants because that has not been funded yet. And the same thing is true for EPA's regulations. So at this point that EIA reference forecast does not include those items.	3 4 5 6 7 8	anything you need to consider because current information should be used. They also argued that Mr. Lauckhart had access to the Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective for spring of 2011, but he didn't. The spring forecast came out in late spring or early summer, something like that. He was involved in the process but he was not privy to
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted, for example, the EPA's HAP regulations dealing with hazardous and toxic pollutants because that has not been funded yet. And the same thing is true for EPA's regulations. So at this point that EIA reference forecast does not include those items. But they do, the council does have a forecast	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	anything you need to consider because current information should be used. They also argued that Mr. Lauckhart had access to the Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective for spring of 2011, but he didn't. The spring forecast came out in late spring or early summer, something like that. He was involved in the process but he was not privy to the outcome of that process as of February 25, 2011.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted, for example, the EPA's HAP regulations dealing with hazardous and toxic pollutants because that has not been funded yet. And the same thing is true for EPA's regulations. So at this point that EIA reference forecast does not include those items. But they do, the council does have a forecast that includes various different scenarios including a \$25	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	anything you need to consider because current information should be used. They also argued that Mr. Lauckhart had access to the Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective for spring of 2011, but he didn't. The spring forecast came out in late spring or early summer, something like that. He was involved in the process but he was not privy to the outcome of that process as of February 25, 2011. And I would point out that under the
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted, for example, the EPA's HAP regulations dealing with hazardous and toxic pollutants because that has not been funded yet. And the same thing is true for EPA's regulations. So at this point that EIA reference forecast does not include those items. But they do, the council does have a forecast that includes various different scenarios including a \$25 per ton carbon cost calculation, and you can run those	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	anything you need to consider because current information should be used. They also argued that Mr. Lauckhart had access to the Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective for spring of 2011, but he didn't. The spring forecast came out in late spring or early summer, something like that. He was involved in the process but he was not privy to the outcome of that process as of February 25, 2011. And I would point out that under the Commission's current order NorthWestern can argue that
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted, for example, the EPA's HAP regulations dealing with hazardous and toxic pollutants because that has not been funded yet. And the same thing is true for EPA's regulations. So at this point that EIA reference forecast does not include those items. But they do, the council does have a forecast that includes various different scenarios including a \$25 per ton carbon cost calculation, and you can run those scenarios side by side.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	anything you need to consider because current information should be used. They also argued that Mr. Lauckhart had access to the Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective for spring of 2011, but he didn't. The spring forecast came out in late spring or early summer, something like that. He was involved in the process but he was not privy to the outcome of that process as of February 25, 2011. And I would point out that under the Commission's current order NorthWestern can argue that Mr. Lauckhart's calculations were wrong but that doesn't
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted, for example, the EPA's HAP regulations dealing with hazardous and toxic pollutants because that has not been funded yet. And the same thing is true for EPA's regulations. So at this point that EIA reference forecast does not include those items. But they do, the council does have a forecast that includes various different scenarios including a \$25 per ton carbon cost calculation, and you can run those scenarios side by side. Okay. We know that retrofitting those plants,	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	anything you need to consider because current information should be used. They also argued that Mr. Lauckhart had access to the Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective for spring of 2011, but he didn't. The spring forecast came out in late spring or early summer, something like that. He was involved in the process but he was not privy to the outcome of that process as of February 25, 2011. And I would point out that under the Commission's current order NorthWestern can argue that Mr. Lauckhart's calculations were wrong but that doesn't have anything to do with the use of current information.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted, for example, the EPA's HAP regulations dealing with hazardous and toxic pollutants because that has not been funded yet. And the same thing is true for EPA's regulations. So at this point that EIA reference forecast does not include those items. But they do, the council does have a forecast that includes various different scenarios including a \$25 per ton carbon cost calculation, and you can run those scenarios side by side. Okay. We know that retrofitting those plants, one of the criticisms Mr. Lauckhart had of the EIA	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	anything you need to consider because current information should be used. They also argued that Mr. Lauckhart had access to the Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective for spring of 2011, but he didn't. The spring forecast came out in late spring or early summer, something like that. He was involved in the process but he was not privy to the outcome of that process as of February 25, 2011. And I would point out that under the Commission's current order NorthWestern can argue that Mr. Lauckhart's calculations were wrong but that doesn't have anything to do with the use of current information. They can argue he should have considered this, he should
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted, for example, the EPA's HAP regulations dealing with hazardous and toxic pollutants because that has not been funded yet. And the same thing is true for EPA's regulations. So at this point that EIA reference forecast does not include those items. But they do, the council does have a forecast that includes various different scenarios including a \$25 per ton carbon cost calculation, and you can run those scenarios side by side. Okay. We know that retrofitting those plants, one of the criticisms Mr. Lauckhart had of the EIA forecast is it didn't take into account retirement of	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	anything you need to consider because current information should be used. They also argued that Mr. Lauckhart had access to the Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective for spring of 2011, but he didn't. The spring forecast came out in late spring or early summer, something like that. He was involved in the process but he was not privy to the outcome of that process as of February 25, 2011. And I would point out that under the Commission's current order NorthWestern can argue that Mr. Lauckhart's calculations were wrong but that doesn't have anything to do with the use of current information. They can argue he should have considered this, he should have considered that and his calculations are incorrect.
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted, for example, the EPA's HAP regulations dealing with hazardous and toxic pollutants because that has not been funded yet. And the same thing is true for EPA's regulations. So at this point that EIA reference forecast does not include those items. But they do, the council does have a forecast that includes various different scenarios including a \$25 per ton carbon cost calculation, and you can run those scenarios side by side. Okay. We know that retrofitting those plants, one of the criticisms Mr. Lauckhart had of the EIA forecast is it didn't take into account retirement of coal plants based on these regulations. We know both in	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	anything you need to consider because current information should be used. They also argued that Mr. Lauckhart had access to the Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective for spring of 2011, but he didn't. The spring forecast came out in late spring or early summer, something like that. He was involved in the process but he was not privy to the outcome of that process as of February 25, 2011. And I would point out that under the Commission's current order NorthWestern can argue that Mr. Lauckhart's calculations were wrong but that doesn't have anything to do with the use of current information. They can argue he should have considered this, he should have considered that and his calculations are incorrect. But they can't say that he didn't consider it.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted, for example, the EPA's HAP regulations dealing with hazardous and toxic pollutants because that has not been funded yet. And the same thing is true for EPA's regulations. So at this point that EIA reference forecast does not include those items. But they do, the council does have a forecast that includes various different scenarios including a \$25 per ton carbon cost calculation, and you can run those scenarios side by side. Okay. We know that retrofitting those plants, one of the criticisms Mr. Lauckhart had of the EIA forecast is it didn't take into account retirement of coal plants based on these regulations. We know both in North Dakota and South Dakota that that is going to be a	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	anything you need to consider because current information should be used. They also argued that Mr. Lauckhart had access to the Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective for spring of 2011, but he didn't. The spring forecast came out in late spring or early summer, something like that. He was involved in the process but he was not privy to the outcome of that process as of February 25, 2011. And I would point out that under the Commission's current order NorthWestern can argue that Mr. Lauckhart's calculations were wrong but that doesn't have anything to do with the use of current information. They can argue he should have considered this, he should have considered that and his calculations are incorrect. But they can't say that he didn't consider it. Now two quick points just how much time do I
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted, for example, the EPA's HAP regulations dealing with hazardous and toxic pollutants because that has not been funded yet. And the same thing is true for EPA's regulations. So at this point that EIA reference forecast does not include those items. But they do, the council does have a forecast that includes various different scenarios including a \$25 per ton carbon cost calculation, and you can run those scenarios side by side. Okay. We know that retrofitting those plants, one of the criticisms Mr. Lauckhart had of the EIA forecast is it didn't take into account retirement of coal plants based on these regulations. We know both in North Dakota and South Dakota that that is going to be a considerable expense if you just take Big Stone standing	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	anything you need to consider because current information should be used. They also argued that Mr. Lauckhart had access to the Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective for spring of 2011, but he didn't. The spring forecast came out in late spring or early summer, something like that. He was involved in the process but he was not privy to the outcome of that process as of February 25, 2011. And I would point out that under the Commission's current order NorthWestern can argue that Mr. Lauckhart's calculations were wrong but that doesn't have anything to do with the use of current information. They can argue he should have considered this, he should have considered that and his calculations are incorrect. But they can't say that he didn't consider it. Now two quick points just how much time do I have left, Mr. Chairman?
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted, for example, the EPA's HAP regulations dealing with hazardous and toxic pollutants because that has not been funded yet. And the same thing is true for EPA's regulations. So at this point that EIA reference forecast does not include those items. But they do, the council does have a forecast that includes various different scenarios including a \$25 per ton carbon cost calculation, and you can run those scenarios side by side. Okay. We know that retrofitting those plants, one of the criticisms Mr. Lauckhart had of the EIA forecast is it didn't take into account retirement of coal plants based on these regulations. We know both in North Dakota and South Dakota that that is going to be a considerable expense if you just take Big Stone standing alone. There are going to be considerable costs	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	anything you need to consider because current information should be used. They also argued that Mr. Lauckhart had access to the Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective for spring of 2011, but he didn't. The spring forecast came out in late spring or early summer, something like that. He was involved in the process but he was not privy to the outcome of that process as of February 25, 2011. And I would point out that under the Commission's current order NorthWestern can argue that Mr. Lauckhart's calculations were wrong but that doesn't have anything to do with the use of current information. They can argue he should have considered this, he should have considered that and his calculations are incorrect. But they can't say that he didn't consider it. Now two quick points just how much time do I have left, Mr. Chairman? CHAIRMAN NELSON: You have 11 minutes.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted, for example, the EPA's HAP regulations dealing with hazardous and toxic pollutants because that has not been funded yet. And the same thing is true for EPA's regulations. So at this point that EIA reference forecast does not include those items. But they do, the council does have a forecast that includes various different scenarios including a \$25 per ton carbon cost calculation, and you can run those scenarios side by side. Okay. We know that retrofitting those plants, one of the criticisms Mr. Lauckhart had of the EIA forecast is it didn't take into account retirement of coal plants based on these regulations. We know both in North Dakota and South Dakota that that is going to be a considerable expense if you just take Big Stone standing alone. There are going to be considerable costs associated with that. And a lot of utilities, at least	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	anything you need to consider because current information should be used. They also argued that Mr. Lauckhart had access to the Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective for spring of 2011, but he didn't. The spring forecast came out in late spring or early summer, something like that. He was involved in the process but he was not privy to the outcome of that process as of February 25, 2011. And I would point out that under the Commission's current order NorthWestern can argue that Mr. Lauckhart's calculations were wrong but that doesn't have anything to do with the use of current information. They can argue he should have considered this, he should have considered that and his calculations are incorrect. But they can't say that he didn't consider it. Now two quick points just how much time do I have left, Mr. Chairman? CHAIRMAN NELSON: You have 11 minutes. MR. UDA: Okay. This is on NorthWestern's motion for reconsideration. First, NorthWestern argues that
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted, for example, the EPA's HAP regulations dealing with hazardous and toxic pollutants because that has not been funded yet. And the same thing is true for EPA's regulations. So at this point that EIA reference forecast does not include those items. But they do, the council does have a forecast that includes various different scenarios including a \$25 per ton carbon cost calculation, and you can run those scenarios side by side. Okay. We know that retrofitting those plants, one of the criticisms Mr. Lauckhart had of the EIA forecast is it didn't take into account retirement of coal plants based on these regulations. We know both in North Dakota and South Dakota that that is going to be a considerable expense if you just take Big Stone standing alone. There are going to be considerable costs associated with that. And a lot of utilities, at least according to Black & Veatch, a lot of utilities are going	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	anything you need to consider because current information should be used. They also argued that Mr. Lauckhart had access to the Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective for spring of 2011, but he didn't. The spring forecast came out in late spring or early summer, something like that. He was involved in the process but he was not privy to the outcome of that process as of February 25, 2011. And I would point out that under the Commission's current order NorthWestern can argue that Mr. Lauckhart's calculations were wrong but that doesn't have anything to do with the use of current information. They can argue he should have considered this, he should have considered that and his calculations are incorrect. But they can't say that he didn't consider it. Now two quick points just how much time do I have left, Mr. Chairman? CHAIRMAN NELSON: You have 11 minutes. MR. UDA: Okay. This is on NorthWestern's motion for
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	that's been passed or regulations that have been adopted, for example, the EPA's HAP regulations dealing with hazardous and toxic pollutants because that has not been funded yet. And the same thing is true for EPA's regulations. So at this point that EIA reference forecast does not include those items. But they do, the council does have a forecast that includes various different scenarios including a \$25 per ton carbon cost calculation, and you can run those scenarios side by side. Okay. We know that retrofitting those plants, one of the criticisms Mr. Lauckhart had of the EIA forecast is it didn't take into account retirement of coal plants based on these regulations. We know both in North Dakota and South Dakota that that is going to be a considerable expense if you just take Big Stone standing alone. There are going to be considerable costs associated with that. And a lot of utilities, at least according to Black & Veatch, a lot of utilities are going to be retiring coal plants rather than proceeding to use	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	anything you need to consider because current information should be used. They also argued that Mr. Lauckhart had access to the Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective for spring of 2011, but he didn't. The spring forecast came out in late spring or early summer, something like that. He was involved in the process but he was not privy to the outcome of that process as of February 25, 2011. And I would point out that under the Commission's current order NorthWestern can argue that Mr. Lauckhart's calculations were wrong but that doesn't have anything to do with the use of current information. They can argue he should have considered this, he should have considered that and his calculations are incorrect. But they can't say that he didn't consider it. Now two quick points just how much time do I have left, Mr. Chairman? CHAIRMAN NELSON: You have 11 minutes. MR. UDA: Okay. This is on NorthWestern's motion for reconsideration. First, NorthWestern argues that

	17		19
1	you're trying to figure out what price you need to pay to	1	those things that could be when we have a hearing on the
2	a qualifying facility, you need to figure out what costs	2	technical matters involving the calculations, the rate
3	you're avoiding.	3	should be included.
4	So if in the resource plan, for example, the	4	Neither of the cases also cited by
5	utility says, well, we need to hedge our risk against gas	5	NorthWestern for the proposition that you don't include
6	prices in the future by having other resources, for	6	avoided costs in you don't include carbon costs in the
7	example, renewable resources, whether it be wind, hydro,	7	calculation of avoided cost but you do it in resource
8	whatever, and in doing so they consider, for example, the	8	planning.
9	risk that there's going to be greenhouse gas regulation,	9	First of all, in Montana the issue about whether
10	if they do that and they incorporate in that forecast a	10	you include carbon cost is an issue presently before the
11	carbon cost of some kind, it makes absolutely no sense	11	Montana Commission. We believe that the Whitehall Wind
12	not to at the same time say, well, this is what the	12	decision in Montana said that they have to include it if
13	qualifying facility would get. You have to know what	13	it's in the integrated resource plan and that's what
14	costs are being avoided.	14	their electrical procurement plan is.
15	If carbon costs are being avoided by purchasing	15	The Utah decision, Rocky Mountain Power,
16	from a qualifying facility it must be included in the	16	included carbon costs in their calculation of avoided
17	avoided cost rate. That's as straightforward a decision	17	costs. The Utah Commission said this isn't consistent
18	as you need to make.	18	with what we've told you to do. Explain. And rather
19	The second point I would make is if you don't do	19	than explain, Rocky Mountain Power took it out. So I
20	it, you're discriminating against qualifying facilities	20	don't think either one of these cases is precedential for
21	by paying them less than you would pay the utility to	21	the proposition NorthWestern cites.
22	build its own resource. Now maybe the argument is that	22	Time, Mr. Chairman.
23	you don't give either one a carbon cost.	23	CHAIRMAN NELSON: 7 minutes.
24	Perhaps, but if you think that inclusion of	24	MR. UDA: On the issue of legally enforceable
25	carbon cost is important and appropriate as a hedge	25	obligation let's recall what the record shows here.
	10		
	18		20
1	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. ${ m I}$	1	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's
1 2	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple.	1 2	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a
_	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know,		The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they
2	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple.	2	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a
2 3	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know, you made a determination that there needed to be carbon costs included in the calculation, and you picked this	2 3	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they started writing letters and saying, hey, you know, we'd really like to sell you our output. And the response
2 3 4	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know, you made a determination that there needed to be carbon costs included in the calculation, and you picked this forecast that Lands Energy came up with, which as near as	2 3 4	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they started writing letters and saying, hey, you know, we'd really like to sell you our output. And the response they got back was, well, here's our avoided cost. If you
2 3 4 5	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know, you made a determination that there needed to be carbon costs included in the calculation, and you picked this forecast that Lands Energy came up with, which as near as I can tell was based on Mr. Lewis talking to some of his	2 3 4 5	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they started writing letters and saying, hey, you know, we'd really like to sell you our output. And the response
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know, you made a determination that there needed to be carbon costs included in the calculation, and you picked this forecast that Lands Energy came up with, which as near as I can tell was based on Mr. Lewis talking to some of his colleagues at Lands Energy.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they started writing letters and saying, hey, you know, we'd really like to sell you our output. And the response they got back was, well, here's our avoided cost. If you can provide it at that rate, we'd be happy to talk to you.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know, you made a determination that there needed to be carbon costs included in the calculation, and you picked this forecast that Lands Energy came up with, which as near as I can tell was based on Mr. Lewis talking to some of his colleagues at Lands Energy. Now that might be a perfectly appropriate way if	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they started writing letters and saying, hey, you know, we'd really like to sell you our output. And the response they got back was, well, here's our avoided cost. If you can provide it at that rate, we'd be happy to talk to you. The testimony from Mr. LaFave at hearing was he
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know, you made a determination that there needed to be carbon costs included in the calculation, and you picked this forecast that Lands Energy came up with, which as near as I can tell was based on Mr. Lewis talking to some of his colleagues at Lands Energy. Now that might be a perfectly appropriate way if you are, you know, trying to decide who you think is a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they started writing letters and saying, hey, you know, we'd really like to sell you our output. And the response they got back was, well, here's our avoided cost. If you can provide it at that rate, we'd be happy to talk to you. The testimony from Mr. LaFave at hearing was he didn't even think he could go beyond the short-term
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know, you made a determination that there needed to be carbon costs included in the calculation, and you picked this forecast that Lands Energy came up with, which as near as I can tell was based on Mr. Lewis talking to some of his colleagues at Lands Energy. Now that might be a perfectly appropriate way if you are, you know, trying to decide who you think is a better player, you know, Buster Posey versus Ryan Braun.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they started writing letters and saying, hey, you know, we'd really like to sell you our output. And the response they got back was, well, here's our avoided cost. If you can provide it at that rate, we'd be happy to talk to you. The testimony from Mr. LaFave at hearing was he didn't even think he could go beyond the short-term avoided cost rate which is like \$22 a megawatt hour at
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know, you made a determination that there needed to be carbon costs included in the calculation, and you picked this forecast that Lands Energy came up with, which as near as I can tell was based on Mr. Lewis talking to some of his colleagues at Lands Energy. Now that might be a perfectly appropriate way if you are, you know, trying to decide who you think is a better player, you know, Buster Posey versus Ryan Braun. But it's not an appropriate way to set avoided cost.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they started writing letters and saying, hey, you know, we'd really like to sell you our output. And the response they got back was, well, here's our avoided cost. If you can provide it at that rate, we'd be happy to talk to you. The testimony from Mr. LaFave at hearing was he didn't even think he could go beyond the short-term avoided cost rate which is like \$22 a megawatt hour at that point.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know, you made a determination that there needed to be carbon costs included in the calculation, and you picked this forecast that Lands Energy came up with, which as near as I can tell was based on Mr. Lewis talking to some of his colleagues at Lands Energy. Now that might be a perfectly appropriate way if you are, you know, trying to decide who you think is a better player, you know, Buster Posey versus Ryan Braun. But it's not an appropriate way to set avoided cost. The EIA, for example, does this thing called the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they started writing letters and saying, hey, you know, we'd really like to sell you our output. And the response they got back was, well, here's our avoided cost. If you can provide it at that rate, we'd be happy to talk to you. The testimony from Mr. LaFave at hearing was he didn't even think he could go beyond the short-term avoided cost rate which is like \$22 a megawatt hour at that point. And the interesting thing about that is of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know, you made a determination that there needed to be carbon costs included in the calculation, and you picked this forecast that Lands Energy came up with, which as near as I can tell was based on Mr. Lewis talking to some of his colleagues at Lands Energy. Now that might be a perfectly appropriate way if you are, you know, trying to decide who you think is a better player, you know, Buster Posey versus Ryan Braun. But it's not an appropriate way to set avoided cost. The EIA, for example, does this thing called the National Energy Modeling System which is so complicated	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they started writing letters and saying, hey, you know, we'd really like to sell you our output. And the response they got back was, well, here's our avoided cost. If you can provide it at that rate, we'd be happy to talk to you. The testimony from Mr. LaFave at hearing was he didn't even think he could go beyond the short-term avoided cost rate which is like \$22 a megawatt hour at that point. And the interesting thing about that is of course we weren't there to get a short-term avoided cost
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know, you made a determination that there needed to be carbon costs included in the calculation, and you picked this forecast that Lands Energy came up with, which as near as I can tell was based on Mr. Lewis talking to some of his colleagues at Lands Energy. Now that might be a perfectly appropriate way if you are, you know, trying to decide who you think is a better player, you know, Buster Posey versus Ryan Braun. But it's not an appropriate way to set avoided cost. The EIA, for example, does this thing called the National Energy Modeling System which is so complicated nobody really knows how it works but they spend a lot of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they started writing letters and saying, hey, you know, we'd really like to sell you our output. And the response they got back was, well, here's our avoided cost. If you can provide it at that rate, we'd be happy to talk to you. The testimony from Mr. LaFave at hearing was he didn't even think he could go beyond the short-term avoided cost rate which is like \$22 a megawatt hour at that point. And the interesting thing about that is of course we weren't there to get a short-term avoided cost rate
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know, you made a determination that there needed to be carbon costs included in the calculation, and you picked this forecast that Lands Energy came up with, which as near as I can tell was based on Mr. Lewis talking to some of his colleagues at Lands Energy. Now that might be a perfectly appropriate way if you are, you know, trying to decide who you think is a better player, you know, Buster Posey versus Ryan Braun. But it's not an appropriate way to set avoided cost. The EIA, for example, does this thing called the National Energy Modeling System which is so complicated nobody really knows how it works but they spend a lot of time doing it and they come up with a pretty good idea of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they started writing letters and saying, hey, you know, we'd really like to sell you our output. And the response they got back was, well, here's our avoided cost. If you can provide it at that rate, we'd be happy to talk to you. The testimony from Mr. LaFave at hearing was he didn't even think he could go beyond the short-term avoided cost rate which is like \$22 a megawatt hour at that point. And the interesting thing about that is of course we weren't there to get a short-term avoided cost rate so we could obtain financing for the project. And so a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know, you made a determination that there needed to be carbon costs included in the calculation, and you picked this forecast that Lands Energy came up with, which as near as I can tell was based on Mr. Lewis talking to some of his colleagues at Lands Energy. Now that might be a perfectly appropriate way if you are, you know, trying to decide who you think is a better player, you know, Buster Posey versus Ryan Braun. But it's not an appropriate way to set avoided cost. The EIA, for example, does this thing called the National Energy Modeling System which is so complicated nobody really knows how it works but they spend a lot of time doing it and they come up with a pretty good idea of what they think the range is. Black & Veatch does the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they started writing letters and saying, hey, you know, we'd really like to sell you our output. And the response they got back was, well, here's our avoided cost. If you can provide it at that rate, we'd be happy to talk to you. The testimony from Mr. LaFave at hearing was he didn't even think he could go beyond the short-term avoided cost rate which is like \$22 a megawatt hour at that point. And the interesting thing about that is of course we weren't there to get a short-term avoided cost rate so we could obtain financing for the project. And so a short-term rate of \$22 was plainly a nonstarter. So we
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know, you made a determination that there needed to be carbon costs included in the calculation, and you picked this forecast that Lands Energy came up with, which as near as I can tell was based on Mr. Lewis talking to some of his colleagues at Lands Energy. Now that might be a perfectly appropriate way if you are, you know, trying to decide who you think is a better player, you know, Buster Posey versus Ryan Braun. But it's not an appropriate way to set avoided cost. The EIA, for example, does this thing called the National Energy Modeling System which is so complicated nobody really knows how it works but they spend a lot of time doing it and they come up with a pretty good idea of what they think the range is. Black & Veatch does the same thing and any number of professional forecasting	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they started writing letters and saying, hey, you know, we'd really like to sell you our output. And the response they got back was, well, here's our avoided cost. If you can provide it at that rate, we'd be happy to talk to you. The testimony from Mr. LaFave at hearing was he didn't even think he could go beyond the short-term avoided cost rate which is like \$22 a megawatt hour at that point. And the interesting thing about that is of course we weren't there to get a short-term avoided cost rate so we could obtain financing for the project. And so a short-term rate of \$22 was plainly a nonstarter. So we kept trying to engage the utility, and the answers we got
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know, you made a determination that there needed to be carbon costs included in the calculation, and you picked this forecast that Lands Energy came up with, which as near as I can tell was based on Mr. Lewis talking to some of his colleagues at Lands Energy. Now that might be a perfectly appropriate way if you are, you know, trying to decide who you think is a better player, you know, Buster Posey versus Ryan Braun. But it's not an appropriate way to set avoided cost. The EIA, for example, does this thing called the National Energy Modeling System which is so complicated nobody really knows how it works but they spend a lot of time doing it and they come up with a pretty good idea of what they think the range is. Black & Veatch does the same thing and any number of professional forecasting entities put a considerable amount of time and effort	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they started writing letters and saying, hey, you know, we'd really like to sell you our output. And the response they got back was, well, here's our avoided cost. If you can provide it at that rate, we'd be happy to talk to you. The testimony from Mr. LaFave at hearing was he didn't even think he could go beyond the short-term avoided cost rate which is like \$22 a megawatt hour at that point. And the interesting thing about that is of course we weren't there to get a short-term avoided cost rate so we could obtain financing for the project. And so a short-term rate of \$22 was plainly a nonstarter. So we kept trying to engage the utility, and the answers we got back were the same.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know, you made a determination that there needed to be carbon costs included in the calculation, and you picked this forecast that Lands Energy came up with, which as near as I can tell was based on Mr. Lewis talking to some of his colleagues at Lands Energy. Now that might be a perfectly appropriate way if you are, you know, trying to decide who you think is a better player, you know, Buster Posey versus Ryan Braun. But it's not an appropriate way to set avoided cost. The EIA, for example, does this thing called the National Energy Modeling System which is so complicated nobody really knows how it works but they spend a lot of time doing it and they come up with a pretty good idea of what they think the range is. Black & Veatch does the same thing and any number of professional forecasting entities put a considerable amount of time and effort into figuring these things out.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they started writing letters and saying, hey, you know, we'd really like to sell you our output. And the response they got back was, well, here's our avoided cost. If you can provide it at that rate, we'd be happy to talk to you. The testimony from Mr. LaFave at hearing was he didn't even think he could go beyond the short-term avoided cost rate which is like \$22 a megawatt hour at that point. And the interesting thing about that is of course we weren't there to get a short-term avoided cost rate so we could obtain financing for the project. And so a short-term rate of \$22 was plainly a nonstarter. So we kept trying to engage the utility, and the answers we got back were the same. And nobody in this case, not even NorthWestern,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know, you made a determination that there needed to be carbon costs included in the calculation, and you picked this forecast that Lands Energy came up with, which as near as I can tell was based on Mr. Lewis talking to some of his colleagues at Lands Energy. Now that might be a perfectly appropriate way if you are, you know, trying to decide who you think is a better player, you know, Buster Posey versus Ryan Braun. But it's not an appropriate way to set avoided cost. The EIA, for example, does this thing called the National Energy Modeling System which is so complicated nobody really knows how it works but they spend a lot of time doing it and they come up with a pretty good idea of what they think the range is. Black & Veatch does the same thing and any number of professional forecasting entities put a considerable amount of time and effort into figuring these things out. And what I'm saying is is that I think that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they started writing letters and saying, hey, you know, we'd really like to sell you our output. And the response they got back was, well, here's our avoided cost. If you can provide it at that rate, we'd be happy to talk to you. The testimony from Mr. LaFave at hearing was he didn't even think he could go beyond the short-term avoided cost rate which is like \$22 a megawatt hour at that point. And the interesting thing about that is of course we weren't there to get a short-term avoided cost rate so we could obtain financing for the project. And so a short-term rate of \$22 was plainly a nonstarter. So we kept trying to engage the utility, and the answers we got back were the same. And nobody in this case, not even NorthWestern, is now maintaining that their long-term avoided cost was
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know, you made a determination that there needed to be carbon costs included in the calculation, and you picked this forecast that Lands Energy came up with, which as near as I can tell was based on Mr. Lewis talking to some of his colleagues at Lands Energy. Now that might be a perfectly appropriate way if you are, you know, trying to decide who you think is a better player, you know, Buster Posey versus Ryan Braun. But it's not an appropriate way to set avoided cost. The EIA, for example, does this thing called the National Energy Modeling System which is so complicated nobody really knows how it works but they spend a lot of time doing it and they come up with a pretty good idea of what they think the range is. Black & Veatch does the same thing and any number of professional forecasting entities put a considerable amount of time and effort into figuring these things out. And what I'm saying is is that I think that there is substantial support for your decision to include	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they started writing letters and saying, hey, you know, we'd really like to sell you our output. And the response they got back was, well, here's our avoided cost. If you can provide it at that rate, we'd be happy to talk to you. The testimony from Mr. LaFave at hearing was he didn't even think he could go beyond the short-term avoided cost rate which is like \$22 a megawatt hour at that point. And the interesting thing about that is of course we weren't there to get a short-term avoided cost rate so we could obtain financing for the project. And so a short-term rate of \$22 was plainly a nonstarter. So we kept trying to engage the utility, and the answers we got back were the same. And nobody in this case, not even NorthWestern, is now maintaining that their long-term avoided cost was \$22 a megawatt hour.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know, you made a determination that there needed to be carbon costs included in the calculation, and you picked this forecast that Lands Energy came up with, which as near as I can tell was based on Mr. Lewis talking to some of his colleagues at Lands Energy. Now that might be a perfectly appropriate way if you are, you know, trying to decide who you think is a better player, you know, Buster Posey versus Ryan Braun. But it's not an appropriate way to set avoided cost. The EIA, for example, does this thing called the National Energy Modeling System which is so complicated nobody really knows how it works but they spend a lot of time doing it and they come up with a pretty good idea of what they think the range is. Black & Veatch does the same thing and any number of professional forecasting entities put a considerable amount of time and effort into figuring these things out. And what I'm saying is is that I think that there is substantial support for your decision to include carbon costs. I'm not sure you got the carbon costs	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they started writing letters and saying, hey, you know, we'd really like to sell you our output. And the response they got back was, well, here's our avoided cost. If you can provide it at that rate, we'd be happy to talk to you. The testimony from Mr. LaFave at hearing was he didn't even think he could go beyond the short-term avoided cost rate which is like \$22 a megawatt hour at that point. And the interesting thing about that is of course we weren't there to get a short-term avoided cost rate so we could obtain financing for the project. And so a short-term rate of \$22 was plainly a nonstarter. So we kept trying to engage the utility, and the answers we got back were the same. And nobody in this case, not even NorthWestern, is now maintaining that their long-term avoided cost was \$22 a megawatt hour.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	against future risk, then you need to do it for both. I think that's pretty simple. I guess another point I would make is, you know, you made a determination that there needed to be carbon costs included in the calculation, and you picked this forecast that Lands Energy came up with, which as near as I can tell was based on Mr. Lewis talking to some of his colleagues at Lands Energy. Now that might be a perfectly appropriate way if you are, you know, trying to decide who you think is a better player, you know, Buster Posey versus Ryan Braun. But it's not an appropriate way to set avoided cost. The EIA, for example, does this thing called the National Energy Modeling System which is so complicated nobody really knows how it works but they spend a lot of time doing it and they come up with a pretty good idea of what they think the range is. Black & Veatch does the same thing and any number of professional forecasting entities put a considerable amount of time and effort into figuring these things out. And what I'm saying is is that I think that there is substantial support for your decision to include	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	The record shows that in early 2010 Oak Tree's representatives approached NorthWestern about obtaining a contract. They didn't really get anywhere so they started writing letters and saying, hey, you know, we'd really like to sell you our output. And the response they got back was, well, here's our avoided cost. If you can provide it at that rate, we'd be happy to talk to you. The testimony from Mr. LaFave at hearing was he didn't even think he could go beyond the short-term avoided cost rate which is like \$22 a megawatt hour at that point. And the interesting thing about that is of course we weren't there to get a short-term avoided cost rate so we could obtain financing for the project. And so a short-term rate of \$22 was plainly a nonstarter. So we kept trying to engage the utility, and the answers we got back were the same. And nobody in this case, not even NorthWestern, is now maintaining that their long-term avoided cost was \$22 a megawatt hour.

	21	1	00
			23
1	on it and we don't agree to those terms so, therefore,	1	great deal of obfuscation, irrelevancy, and plain
2	there's no legally enforceable obligation. Understand	2	mischaracterization.
3	that there's a difference between a legally enforceable	3	Given that I I fervently hope that
4	obligation and the contract terms themselves.	4	South Dakota does not repeat the mistakes that Montana
5	Legally enforceable obligation, and FERC has	5	made 30 years ago with respect to setting avoided cost
6	made this clear a number of times, most recently in Cedar	6	and promoting qualifying facilities, mistakes that are
7	Creek Wind, the legally enforceable obligation is created	7	costing NorthWestern's Montana consumers over \$600
8	when the qualifying facility commits to sell its output	8	million, that I can shed some light on the things that
9	to NorthWestern. As you may recall, the testimony of	9	are of significance in this proceeding.
10	Mr. Makens was they tried everything they possibly could	10	You have before you today NorthWestern Energy's
11	and the only purchaser that made sense, the only party to	11	application for reconsideration and Oak Tree's motion for
12	whom they could really sell it was NorthWestern. So they	12	reconsideration. Mr. Uda has talked about both. In my
13	continued to push on that front, and they are continuing	13	initial presentation I will only try to talk at least
14	to push today, obviously.	14	I'll try to restrict my comments to support of
15	But I think the most important aspect of this is	15	NorthWestern Energy's application for reconsideration.
16	at any point if NorthWestern had decided to negotiate,	16	We have the difference of terminology, "application" and
17	which your order from 1982 orders them to do, they could	17	"motion." "Application" comes from the rules. I'll try
18	have said we don't like this term, we like this term, we	18	to refer to both of them as "request" but if I slip into
19	don't like your price, can we negotiate on that. Can we	19	"motion," please accept that I mean it as a request. If
20	negotiate terms. They have the power today to do that.	20	I say "application," please accept that I mean it as a
21	But they haven't done it because they're not interested	21	request.
22	in it. Basically at this point their answer is no.	22	NorthWestern asked for reconsideration with
23	And at that point FERC says if the utility	23	respect to inclusion of carbon costs and the calculation
24	refuses to negotiate, at that point a legally enforceable	24	of avoided cost and with respect to the Commission's
25	obligation has been incurred and it was incurred and	25	determination that an LEO had been created on
	22		24
1	that's your order from February 25 it occurred on	1	February 25, 2011. First a few comments about the carbon
•			
2	February 25, 2011, and that's supported by the record	2	costs.
3	evidence in this case and there's no need to change	2 3	I think it's undisputed that as of today there
3 4	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that.		I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has
3 4 5	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that. I think the remaining issues in this case are	3 4 5	I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has been saying all along is that rate payers should not pay
3 4	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that. I think the remaining issues in this case are more technical issues, and they have to do with the	3 4 5 6	I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has been saying all along is that rate payers should not pay for something that doesn't exist.
3 4 5 6 7	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that. I think the remaining issues in this case are more technical issues, and they have to do with the proper calculation of the avoided costs including what	3 4 5 6 7	I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has been saying all along is that rate payers should not pay for something that doesn't exist. Now it's possible, I think Mr. Uda would say
3 4 5 6 7 8	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that. I think the remaining issues in this case are more technical issues, and they have to do with the proper calculation of the avoided costs including what gas price forecast you use, what escalation factors you	3 4 5 6 7 8	I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has been saying all along is that rate payers should not pay for something that doesn't exist. Now it's possible, I think Mr. Uda would say even probable, that there will be carbon costs of some
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that. I think the remaining issues in this case are more technical issues, and they have to do with the proper calculation of the avoided costs including what gas price forecast you use, what escalation factors you might use. And I would suggest the issue of the	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has been saying all along is that rate payers should not pay for something that doesn't exist. Now it's possible, I think Mr. Uda would say even probable, that there will be carbon costs of some kind in the next 20 years. But as of today when we are
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that. I think the remaining issues in this case are more technical issues, and they have to do with the proper calculation of the avoided costs including what gas price forecast you use, what escalation factors you might use. And I would suggest the issue of the calculation of carbon costs should be one of those	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has been saying all along is that rate payers should not pay for something that doesn't exist. Now it's possible, I think Mr. Uda would say even probable, that there will be carbon costs of some kind in the next 20 years. But as of today when we are trying to estimate, or I should say calculate,
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that. I think the remaining issues in this case are more technical issues, and they have to do with the proper calculation of the avoided costs including what gas price forecast you use, what escalation factors you might use. And I would suggest the issue of the calculation of carbon costs should be one of those issues. Because I think it's a technical issue. I don't	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has been saying all along is that rate payers should not pay for something that doesn't exist. Now it's possible, I think Mr. Uda would say even probable, that there will be carbon costs of some kind in the next 20 years. But as of today when we are trying to estimate, or I should say calculate, NorthWestern's avoided cost for the next 20 years they
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that. I think the remaining issues in this case are more technical issues, and they have to do with the proper calculation of the avoided costs including what gas price forecast you use, what escalation factors you might use. And I would suggest the issue of the calculation of carbon costs should be one of those issues. Because I think it's a technical issue. I don't think that the evidence in the record to date from Lands	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has been saying all along is that rate payers should not pay for something that doesn't exist. Now it's possible, I think Mr. Uda would say even probable, that there will be carbon costs of some kind in the next 20 years. But as of today when we are trying to estimate, or I should say calculate, NorthWestern's avoided cost for the next 20 years they don't exist.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that. I think the remaining issues in this case are more technical issues, and they have to do with the proper calculation of the avoided costs including what gas price forecast you use, what escalation factors you might use. And I would suggest the issue of the calculation of carbon costs should be one of those issues. Because I think it's a technical issue. I don't think that the evidence in the record to date from Lands Energy is sufficient to stand on its own.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has been saying all along is that rate payers should not pay for something that doesn't exist. Now it's possible, I think Mr. Uda would say even probable, that there will be carbon costs of some kind in the next 20 years. But as of today when we are trying to estimate, or I should say calculate, NorthWestern's avoided cost for the next 20 years they don't exist. Oak Tree has made much of the fact that
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that. I think the remaining issues in this case are more technical issues, and they have to do with the proper calculation of the avoided costs including what gas price forecast you use, what escalation factors you might use. And I would suggest the issue of the calculation of carbon costs should be one of those issues. Because I think it's a technical issue. I don't think that the evidence in the record to date from Lands Energy is sufficient to stand on its own. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has been saying all along is that rate payers should not pay for something that doesn't exist. Now it's possible, I think Mr. Uda would say even probable, that there will be carbon costs of some kind in the next 20 years. But as of today when we are trying to estimate, or I should say calculate, NorthWestern's avoided cost for the next 20 years they don't exist. Oak Tree has made much of the fact that NorthWestern and, quite frankly, other utilities consider
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that. I think the remaining issues in this case are more technical issues, and they have to do with the proper calculation of the avoided costs including what gas price forecast you use, what escalation factors you might use. And I would suggest the issue of the calculation of carbon costs should be one of those issues. Because I think it's a technical issue. I don't think that the evidence in the record to date from Lands Energy is sufficient to stand on its own. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my remarks.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has been saying all along is that rate payers should not pay for something that doesn't exist. Now it's possible, I think Mr. Uda would say even probable, that there will be carbon costs of some kind in the next 20 years. But as of today when we are trying to estimate, or I should say calculate, NorthWestern's avoided cost for the next 20 years they don't exist. Oak Tree has made much of the fact that NorthWestern and, quite frankly, other utilities consider things that may happen in their planning, in their
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that. I think the remaining issues in this case are more technical issues, and they have to do with the proper calculation of the avoided costs including what gas price forecast you use, what escalation factors you might use. And I would suggest the issue of the calculation of carbon costs should be one of those issues. Because I think it's a technical issue. I don't think that the evidence in the record to date from Lands Energy is sufficient to stand on its own. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my remarks. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. With that, we will	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has been saying all along is that rate payers should not pay for something that doesn't exist. Now it's possible, I think Mr. Uda would say even probable, that there will be carbon costs of some kind in the next 20 years. But as of today when we are trying to estimate, or I should say calculate, NorthWestern's avoided cost for the next 20 years they don't exist. Oak Tree has made much of the fact that NorthWestern and, quite frankly, other utilities consider things that may happen in their planning, in their resource planning. But consideration of carbon costs for
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that. I think the remaining issues in this case are more technical issues, and they have to do with the proper calculation of the avoided costs including what gas price forecast you use, what escalation factors you might use. And I would suggest the issue of the calculation of carbon costs should be one of those issues. Because I think it's a technical issue. I don't think that the evidence in the record to date from Lands Energy is sufficient to stand on its own. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my remarks. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. With that, we will turn to NorthWestern for 30 minutes.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has been saying all along is that rate payers should not pay for something that doesn't exist. Now it's possible, I think Mr. Uda would say even probable, that there will be carbon costs of some kind in the next 20 years. But as of today when we are trying to estimate, or I should say calculate, NorthWestern's avoided cost for the next 20 years they don't exist. Oak Tree has made much of the fact that NorthWestern and, quite frankly, other utilities consider things that may happen in their planning, in their resource planning. But consideration of carbon costs for planning does not justify including it in avoided cost.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that. I think the remaining issues in this case are more technical issues, and they have to do with the proper calculation of the avoided costs including what gas price forecast you use, what escalation factors you might use. And I would suggest the issue of the calculation of carbon costs should be one of those issues. Because I think it's a technical issue. I don't think that the evidence in the record to date from Lands Energy is sufficient to stand on its own. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my remarks. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. With that, we will turn to NorthWestern for 30 minutes. MR. BROGAN: Good afternoon, Commissioners.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has been saying all along is that rate payers should not pay for something that doesn't exist. Now it's possible, I think Mr. Uda would say even probable, that there will be carbon costs of some kind in the next 20 years. But as of today when we are trying to estimate, or I should say calculate, NorthWestern's avoided cost for the next 20 years they don't exist. Oak Tree has made much of the fact that NorthWestern and, quite frankly, other utilities consider things that may happen in their planning, in their resource planning. But consideration of carbon costs for planning does not justify including it in avoided cost. It's not something that as of now the utility
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that. I think the remaining issues in this case are more technical issues, and they have to do with the proper calculation of the avoided costs including what gas price forecast you use, what escalation factors you might use. And I would suggest the issue of the calculation of carbon costs should be one of those issues. Because I think it's a technical issue. I don't think that the evidence in the record to date from Lands Energy is sufficient to stand on its own. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my remarks. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. With that, we will turn to NorthWestern for 30 minutes. MR. BROGAN: Good afternoon, Commissioners. It's good to be back in Pierre. I have to say I'm not	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has been saying all along is that rate payers should not pay for something that doesn't exist. Now it's possible, I think Mr. Uda would say even probable, that there will be carbon costs of some kind in the next 20 years. But as of today when we are trying to estimate, or I should say calculate, NorthWestern's avoided cost for the next 20 years they don't exist. Oak Tree has made much of the fact that NorthWestern and, quite frankly, other utilities consider things that may happen in their planning, in their resource planning. But consideration of carbon costs for planning does not justify including it in avoided cost. It's not something that as of now the utility avoids. If the utility or to be specific, if
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that. I think the remaining issues in this case are more technical issues, and they have to do with the proper calculation of the avoided costs including what gas price forecast you use, what escalation factors you might use. And I would suggest the issue of the calculation of carbon costs should be one of those issues. Because I think it's a technical issue. I don't think that the evidence in the record to date from Lands Energy is sufficient to stand on its own. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my remarks. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. With that, we will turn to NorthWestern for 30 minutes. MR. BROGAN: Good afternoon, Commissioners. It's good to be back in Pierre. I have to say I'm not sure what to say today. I think nearly all, if not all	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has been saying all along is that rate payers should not pay for something that doesn't exist. Now it's possible, I think Mr. Uda would say even probable, that there will be carbon costs of some kind in the next 20 years. But as of today when we are trying to estimate, or I should say calculate, NorthWestern's avoided cost for the next 20 years they don't exist. Oak Tree has made much of the fact that NorthWestern and, quite frankly, other utilities consider things that may happen in their planning, in their resource planning. But consideration of carbon costs for planning does not justify including it in avoided cost. It's not something that as of now the utility avoids. If the utility or to be specific, if NorthWestern is looking at what resources to build, buy,
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that. I think the remaining issues in this case are more technical issues, and they have to do with the proper calculation of the avoided costs including what gas price forecast you use, what escalation factors you might use. And I would suggest the issue of the calculation of carbon costs should be one of those issues. Because I think it's a technical issue. I don't think that the evidence in the record to date from Lands Energy is sufficient to stand on its own. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my remarks. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. With that, we will turn to NorthWestern for 30 minutes. MR. BROGAN: Good afternoon, Commissioners. It's good to be back in Pierre. I have to say I'm not sure what to say today. I think nearly all, if not all of what I could say and what I hopefully not what I	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has been saying all along is that rate payers should not pay for something that doesn't exist. Now it's possible, I think Mr. Uda would say even probable, that there will be carbon costs of some kind in the next 20 years. But as of today when we are trying to estimate, or I should say calculate, NorthWestern's avoided cost for the next 20 years they don't exist. Oak Tree has made much of the fact that NorthWestern and, quite frankly, other utilities consider things that may happen in their planning, in their resource planning. But consideration of carbon costs for planning does not justify including it in avoided cost. It's not something that as of now the utility avoids. If the utility or to be specific, if NorthWestern is looking at what resources to build, buy, or purchase power from today, especially if it's looking
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that. I think the remaining issues in this case are more technical issues, and they have to do with the proper calculation of the avoided costs including what gas price forecast you use, what escalation factors you might use. And I would suggest the issue of the calculation of carbon costs should be one of those issues. Because I think it's a technical issue. I don't think that the evidence in the record to date from Lands Energy is sufficient to stand on its own. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my remarks. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. With that, we will turn to NorthWestern for 30 minutes. It's good to be back in Pierre. I have to say I'm not sure what to say today. I think nearly all, if not all of what I could say and what I hopefully not what I will say is in the briefs. Therefore, I fully intend or	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has been saying all along is that rate payers should not pay for something that doesn't exist. Now it's possible, I think Mr. Uda would say even probable, that there will be carbon costs of some kind in the next 20 years. But as of today when we are trying to estimate, or I should say calculate, NorthWestern's avoided cost for the next 20 years they don't exist. Oak Tree has made much of the fact that NorthWestern and, quite frankly, other utilities consider things that may happen in their planning, in their resource planning. But consideration of carbon costs for planning does not justify including it in avoided cost. It's not something that as of now the utility avoids. If the utility or to be specific, if NorthWestern is looking at what resources to build, buy, or purchase power from today, especially if it's looking long-term as to what resources it might build, certainly
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that. I think the remaining issues in this case are more technical issues, and they have to do with the proper calculation of the avoided costs including what gas price forecast you use, what escalation factors you might use. And I would suggest the issue of the calculation of carbon costs should be one of those issues. Because I think it's a technical issue. I don't think that the evidence in the record to date from Lands Energy is sufficient to stand on its own. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my remarks. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. With that, we will turn to NorthWestern for 30 minutes. It's good to be back in Pierre. I have to say I'm not sure what to say today. I think nearly all, if not all of what I could say and what I hopefully not what I will say is in the briefs. Therefore, I fully intend or fully hope not to use anywhere near my allotted 30	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has been saying all along is that rate payers should not pay for something that doesn't exist. Now it's possible, I think Mr. Uda would say even probable, that there will be carbon costs of some kind in the next 20 years. But as of today when we are trying to estimate, or I should say calculate, NorthWestern's avoided cost for the next 20 years they don't exist. Oak Tree has made much of the fact that NorthWestern and, quite frankly, other utilities consider things that may happen in their planning, in their resource planning. But consideration of carbon costs for planning does not justify including it in avoided cost. It's not something that as of now the utility avoids. If the utility or to be specific, if NorthWestern is looking at what resources to build, buy, or purchase power from today, especially if it's looking long-term as to what resources it might build, certainly it's going to as part of that resource planning consider
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	evidence in this case and there's no need to change that. I think the remaining issues in this case are more technical issues, and they have to do with the proper calculation of the avoided costs including what gas price forecast you use, what escalation factors you might use. And I would suggest the issue of the calculation of carbon costs should be one of those issues. Because I think it's a technical issue. I don't think that the evidence in the record to date from Lands Energy is sufficient to stand on its own. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my remarks. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. With that, we will turn to NorthWestern for 30 minutes. It's good to be back in Pierre. I have to say I'm not sure what to say today. I think nearly all, if not all of what I could say and what I hopefully not what I will say is in the briefs. Therefore, I fully intend or	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	I think it's undisputed that as of today there are no carbon costs. And I think what NorthWestern has been saying all along is that rate payers should not pay for something that doesn't exist. Now it's possible, I think Mr. Uda would say even probable, that there will be carbon costs of some kind in the next 20 years. But as of today when we are trying to estimate, or I should say calculate, NorthWestern's avoided cost for the next 20 years they don't exist. Oak Tree has made much of the fact that NorthWestern and, quite frankly, other utilities consider things that may happen in their planning, in their resource planning. But consideration of carbon costs for planning does not justify including it in avoided cost. It's not something that as of now the utility avoids. If the utility or to be specific, if NorthWestern is looking at what resources to build, buy, or purchase power from today, especially if it's looking long-term as to what resources it might build, certainly

6 of 31 sheets

	25		27
1	individual lives try to anticipate things that may	1	option in a QF's fate. They can't say I've created an
2	happen, but that doesn't necessarily mean we start paying	2	LEO, now I'm going to see if I can build the project.
3	for them at this point.	3	Because if that were the case, there was nothing for the
4	But what Oak Tree is asking is that you include	4	utility to enforce. And, unfortunately, that's what we
5	a speculative carbon cost in calculating the avoided	5	have here.
6	cost.	6	Oak Tree offered to sell at a price much higher
7	Keep in mind this doesn't affect NorthWestern.	7	than NorthWestern's avoided cost. And the record
8	This affects NorthWestern's customers. It isn't	8	evidence also shows that when this Commission asked
9	NorthWestern that pays it. It's NorthWestern's customers	9	NorthWestern about or excuse me. Asked Oak Tree about
10	that pay it. And there's no reason that they should be	10	what it would do if the Commission set an avoided cost at
11	paying for something that we can't show that NorthWestern	11	a given level, Oak Tree would not commit to delivering.
12	is actually avoiding. It may well be that down the road	12	You know, if merely offering to sell at some
13	it's possible, but at this point it's not.	13	price and negotiating it later is enough to create an
14	My last comments at this point with respect to	14	LEO, then anyone can offer to sell to a utility at any
15	carbon is that the parties definitely disagree as to the	15	price. Say \$1,000 a megawatt offer. I've offered to
16	value of carbon if they are included. As I said, that's	16	sell it to you. I've committed to doing it. Then they
17	part of Oak Tree's motion. I'll discuss it during my	17	can Petition the Commission to determine that there was
18	rebuttal or I guess I would call it response as	18	an LEO based on that offer, find out what the price is,
19	opposed to rebuttal.	19	then shop the project around. During all of this time,
20	So let me turn next to the issue the second	20	of course, the utility can't do anything else with
21	issue that NorthWestern applied for reconsideration on,	21	respect to resource acquisition because it may have this
22	and that was the issue of the legally enforceable	22	QF.
23	obligation.	23	And then once the Commission sets the true
24	This may be surprising considering that this is	24	avoided cost rate if the QF in shopping it around doesn't
25	my fourth time here in less than a year to discuss this	25	find anybody that will finance it for them or any way
	26	1	28
1	particular docket but I think the parties actually agree on what an LEO is. I think we do. But I think we	1	that it can build it, they just walk away, and the
			utility is left holding the had
		2	utility is left holding the bag.
3	disagree fundamentally on what it takes to create an LEO.	3	And that's how come an offer to sell at a rate
3 4	disagree fundamentally on what it takes to create an LEO. NorthWestern Energy's position is that it takes	3 4	And that's how come an offer to sell at a rate other than avoided cost cannot create an LEO.
3	disagree fundamentally on what it takes to create an LEO. NorthWestern Energy's position is that it takes an unconditional commitment by a potential QF or an	3	And that's how come an offer to sell at a rate other than avoided cost cannot create an LEO. Now I'm not saying in case somebody wants to
3 4 5	disagree fundamentally on what it takes to create an LEO. NorthWestern Energy's position is that it takes	3 4 5	And that's how come an offer to sell at a rate other than avoided cost cannot create an LEO.
3 4 5 6	disagree fundamentally on what it takes to create an LEO. NorthWestern Energy's position is that it takes an unconditional commitment by a potential QF or an existing QF to sell at the avoided cost as determined by	3 4 5 6	And that's how come an offer to sell at a rate other than avoided cost cannot create an LEO. Now I'm not saying in case somebody wants to go there, I'm not saying that the parties have to agree
3 4 5 6 7	disagree fundamentally on what it takes to create an LEO. NorthWestern Energy's position is that it takes an unconditional commitment by a potential QF or an existing QF to sell at the avoided cost as determined by a regulatory body.	3 4 5 6 7	And that's how come an offer to sell at a rate other than avoided cost cannot create an LEO. Now I'm not saying in case somebody wants to go there, I'm not saying that the parties have to agree on that price before an LEO can be created. I'm not
3 4 5 6 7 8	disagree fundamentally on what it takes to create an LEO. NorthWestern Energy's position is that it takes an unconditional commitment by a potential QF or an existing QF to sell at the avoided cost as determined by a regulatory body. If I understand Oak Tree's response to	3 4 5 6 7 8	And that's how come an offer to sell at a rate other than avoided cost cannot create an LEO. Now I'm not saying in case somebody wants to go there, I'm not saying that the parties have to agree on that price before an LEO can be created. I'm not saying that they have to have entered into a contract
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	disagree fundamentally on what it takes to create an LEO. NorthWestern Energy's position is that it takes an unconditional commitment by a potential QF or an existing QF to sell at the avoided cost as determined by a regulatory body. If I understand Oak Tree's response to NorthWestern's application for reconsideration, Oak Tree	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	And that's how come an offer to sell at a rate other than avoided cost cannot create an LEO. Now I'm not saying in case somebody wants to go there, I'm not saying that the parties have to agree on that price before an LEO can be created. I'm not saying that they have to have entered into a contract before an LEO can be created.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	disagree fundamentally on what it takes to create an LEO. NorthWestern Energy's position is that it takes an unconditional commitment by a potential QF or an existing QF to sell at the avoided cost as determined by a regulatory body. If I understand Oak Tree's response to NorthWestern's application for reconsideration, Oak Tree seems to assert that an LEO can be created by an	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	And that's how come an offer to sell at a rate other than avoided cost cannot create an LEO. Now I'm not saying in case somebody wants to go there, I'm not saying that the parties have to agree on that price before an LEO can be created. I'm not saying that they have to have entered into a contract before an LEO can be created. An LEO doesn't take what attorneys normally
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	disagree fundamentally on what it takes to create an LEO. NorthWestern Energy's position is that it takes an unconditional commitment by a potential QF or an existing QF to sell at the avoided cost as determined by a regulatory body. If I understand Oak Tree's response to NorthWestern's application for reconsideration, Oak Tree seems to assert that an LEO can be created by an unenforceable, conditional offer to sell the output of a future project. I think we need to step back a little bit. When	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	And that's how come an offer to sell at a rate other than avoided cost cannot create an LEO. Now I'm not saying in case somebody wants to go there, I'm not saying that the parties have to agree on that price before an LEO can be created. I'm not saying that they have to have entered into a contract before an LEO can be created. An LEO doesn't take what attorneys normally consider to be the fundamentals of contract. You know, a meeting of the minds, a mutual agreement, certain terms. An LEO doesn't require any of that, but it does require a
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	disagree fundamentally on what it takes to create an LEO. NorthWestern Energy's position is that it takes an unconditional commitment by a potential QF or an existing QF to sell at the avoided cost as determined by a regulatory body. If I understand Oak Tree's response to NorthWestern's application for reconsideration, Oak Tree seems to assert that an LEO can be created by an unenforceable, conditional offer to sell the output of a future project. I think we need to step back a little bit. When we talk about legally enforceable obligation I think the	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	And that's how come an offer to sell at a rate other than avoided cost cannot create an LEO. Now I'm not saying in case somebody wants to go there, I'm not saying that the parties have to agree on that price before an LEO can be created. I'm not saying that they have to have entered into a contract before an LEO can be created. An LEO doesn't take what attorneys normally consider to be the fundamentals of contract. You know, a meeting of the minds, a mutual agreement, certain terms. An LEO doesn't require any of that, but it does require a commitment to deliver power, to sell power at the price
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	disagree fundamentally on what it takes to create an LEO. NorthWestern Energy's position is that it takes an unconditional commitment by a potential QF or an existing QF to sell at the avoided cost as determined by a regulatory body. If I understand Oak Tree's response to NorthWestern's application for reconsideration, Oak Tree seems to assert that an LEO can be created by an unenforceable, conditional offer to sell the output of a future project. I think we need to step back a little bit. When we talk about legally enforceable obligation I think the first question we have to ask legally enforceable by	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	And that's how come an offer to sell at a rate other than avoided cost cannot create an LEO. Now I'm not saying in case somebody wants to go there, I'm not saying that the parties have to agree on that price before an LEO can be created. I'm not saying that they have to have entered into a contract before an LEO can be created. An LEO doesn't take what attorneys normally consider to be the fundamentals of contract. You know, a meeting of the minds, a mutual agreement, certain terms. An LEO doesn't require any of that, but it does require a commitment to deliver power, to sell power at the price equal to a utility's avoided cost. Not at a price that
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	disagree fundamentally on what it takes to create an LEO. NorthWestern Energy's position is that it takes an unconditional commitment by a potential QF or an existing QF to sell at the avoided cost as determined by a regulatory body. If I understand Oak Tree's response to NorthWestern's application for reconsideration, Oak Tree seems to assert that an LEO can be created by an unenforceable, conditional offer to sell the output of a future project. I think we need to step back a little bit. When we talk about legally enforceable obligation I think the first question we have to ask legally enforceable by whom? Who are we talking about having the right to	3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	And that's how come an offer to sell at a rate other than avoided cost cannot create an LEO. Now I'm not saying in case somebody wants to go there, I'm not saying that the parties have to agree on that price before an LEO can be created. I'm not saying that they have to have entered into a contract before an LEO can be created. An LEO doesn't take what attorneys normally consider to be the fundamentals of contract. You know, a meeting of the minds, a mutual agreement, certain terms. An LEO doesn't require any of that, but it does require a commitment to deliver power, to sell power at the price equal to a utility's avoided cost. Not at a price that makes a QF financially viable.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	disagree fundamentally on what it takes to create an LEO. NorthWestern Energy's position is that it takes an unconditional commitment by a potential QF or an existing QF to sell at the avoided cost as determined by a regulatory body. If I understand Oak Tree's response to NorthWestern's application for reconsideration, Oak Tree seems to assert that an LEO can be created by an unenforceable, conditional offer to sell the output of a future project. I think we need to step back a little bit. When we talk about legally enforceable obligation I think the first question we have to ask legally enforceable by whom? Who are we talking about having the right to enforce this LEO?	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	And that's how come an offer to sell at a rate other than avoided cost cannot create an LEO. Now I'm not saying in case somebody wants to go there, I'm not saying that the parties have to agree on that price before an LEO can be created. I'm not saying that they have to have entered into a contract before an LEO can be created. An LEO doesn't take what attorneys normally consider to be the fundamentals of contract. You know, a meeting of the minds, a mutual agreement, certain terms. An LEO doesn't require any of that, but it does require a commitment to deliver power, to sell power at the price equal to a utility's avoided cost. Not at a price that makes a QF financially viable. There's nothing in PURPA that requires utilities
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	disagree fundamentally on what it takes to create an LEO. NorthWestern Energy's position is that it takes an unconditional commitment by a potential QF or an existing QF to sell at the avoided cost as determined by a regulatory body. If I understand Oak Tree's response to NorthWestern's application for reconsideration, Oak Tree seems to assert that an LEO can be created by an unenforceable, conditional offer to sell the output of a future project. I think we need to step back a little bit. When we talk about legally enforceable obligation I think the first question we have to ask legally enforceable by whom? Who are we talking about having the right to enforce this LEO? We have to remember it's the utility. This	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	And that's how come an offer to sell at a rate other than avoided cost cannot create an LEO. Now I'm not saying in case somebody wants to go there, I'm not saying that the parties have to agree on that price before an LEO can be created. I'm not saying that they have to have entered into a contract before an LEO can be created. An LEO doesn't take what attorneys normally consider to be the fundamentals of contract. You know, a meeting of the minds, a mutual agreement, certain terms. An LEO doesn't require any of that, but it does require a commitment to deliver power, to sell power at the price equal to a utility's avoided cost. Not at a price that makes a QF financially viable. There's nothing in PURPA that requires utilities to pay a rate that makes QFs financially viable, only
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	disagree fundamentally on what it takes to create an LEO. NorthWestern Energy's position is that it takes an unconditional commitment by a potential QF or an existing QF to sell at the avoided cost as determined by a regulatory body. If I understand Oak Tree's response to NorthWestern's application for reconsideration, Oak Tree seems to assert that an LEO can be created by an unenforceable, conditional offer to sell the output of a future project. I think we need to step back a little bit. When we talk about legally enforceable obligation I think the first question we have to ask legally enforceable by whom? Who are we talking about having the right to enforce this LEO? We have to remember it's the utility. This comes from both FERC and court cases who have repeatedly	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	And that's how come an offer to sell at a rate other than avoided cost cannot create an LEO. Now I'm not saying in case somebody wants to go there, I'm not saying that the parties have to agree on that price before an LEO can be created. I'm not saying that they have to have entered into a contract before an LEO can be created. An LEO doesn't take what attorneys normally consider to be the fundamentals of contract. You know, a meeting of the minds, a mutual agreement, certain terms. An LEO doesn't require any of that, but it does require a commitment to deliver power, to sell power at the price equal to a utility's avoided cost. Not at a price that makes a QF financially viable. There's nothing in PURPA that requires utilities to pay a rate that makes QFs financially viable, only that they pay the avoided cost.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	disagree fundamentally on what it takes to create an LEO. NorthWestern Energy's position is that it takes an unconditional commitment by a potential QF or an existing QF to sell at the avoided cost as determined by a regulatory body. If I understand Oak Tree's response to NorthWestern's application for reconsideration, Oak Tree seems to assert that an LEO can be created by an unenforceable, conditional offer to sell the output of a future project. I think we need to step back a little bit. When we talk about legally enforceable obligation I think the first question we have to ask legally enforceable by whom? Who are we talking about having the right to enforce this LEO? We have to remember it's the utility. This comes from both FERC and court cases who have repeatedly said a QF by binding itself to deliver binds the utility	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	And that's how come an offer to sell at a rate other than avoided cost cannot create an LEO. Now I'm not saying in case somebody wants to go there, I'm not saying that the parties have to agree on that price before an LEO can be created. I'm not saying that they have to have entered into a contract before an LEO can be created. An LEO doesn't take what attorneys normally consider to be the fundamentals of contract. You know, a meeting of the minds, a mutual agreement, certain terms. An LEO doesn't require any of that, but it does require a commitment to deliver power, to sell power at the price equal to a utility's avoided cost. Not at a price that makes a QF financially viable. There's nothing in PURPA that requires utilities to pay a rate that makes QFs financially viable, only that they pay the avoided cost.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	disagree fundamentally on what it takes to create an LEO. NorthWestern Energy's position is that it takes an unconditional commitment by a potential QF or an existing QF to sell at the avoided cost as determined by a regulatory body. If I understand Oak Tree's response to NorthWestern's application for reconsideration, Oak Tree seems to assert that an LEO can be created by an unenforceable, conditional offer to sell the output of a future project. I think we need to step back a little bit. When we talk about legally enforceable obligation I think the first question we have to ask legally enforceable by whom? Who are we talking about having the right to enforce this LEO? We have to remember it's the utility. This comes from both FERC and court cases who have repeatedly said a QF by binding itself to deliver binds the utility to purchase. We need to think about that real carefully.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	And that's how come an offer to sell at a rate other than avoided cost cannot create an LEO. Now I'm not saying in case somebody wants to go there, I'm not saying that the parties have to agree on that price before an LEO can be created. I'm not saying that they have to have entered into a contract before an LEO can be created. An LEO doesn't take what attorneys normally consider to be the fundamentals of contract. You know, a meeting of the minds, a mutual agreement, certain terms. An LEO doesn't require any of that, but it does require a commitment to deliver power, to sell power at the price equal to a utility's avoided cost. Not at a price that makes a QF financially viable. There's nothing in PURPA that requires utilities to pay a rate that makes QFs financially viable, only that they pay the avoided cost. In a very brief summary I would point out that the utility is essentially a three-legged stool. And the
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	disagree fundamentally on what it takes to create an LEO. NorthWestern Energy's position is that it takes an unconditional commitment by a potential QF or an existing QF to sell at the avoided cost as determined by a regulatory body. If I understand Oak Tree's response to NorthWestern's application for reconsideration, Oak Tree seems to assert that an LEO can be created by an unenforceable, conditional offer to sell the output of a future project. I think we need to step back a little bit. When we talk about legally enforceable obligation I think the first question we have to ask legally enforceable by whom? Who are we talking about having the right to enforce this LEO? We have to remember it's the utility. This comes from both FERC and court cases who have repeatedly said a QF by binding itself to deliver binds the utility to purchase. We need to think about that real carefully. By binding itself to deliver it binds the utility. But	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	And that's how come an offer to sell at a rate other than avoided cost cannot create an LEO. Now I'm not saying in case somebody wants to go there, I'm not saying that the parties have to agree on that price before an LEO can be created. I'm not saying that they have to have entered into a contract before an LEO can be created. An LEO doesn't take what attorneys normally consider to be the fundamentals of contract. You know, a meeting of the minds, a mutual agreement, certain terms. An LEO doesn't require any of that, but it does require a commitment to deliver power, to sell power at the price equal to a utility's avoided cost. Not at a price that makes a QF financially viable. There's nothing in PURPA that requires utilities to pay a rate that makes QFs financially viable, only that they pay the avoided cost. In a very brief summary I would point out that the utility is essentially a three-legged stool. And the legs of that stool are the utility shareholders, the
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	disagree fundamentally on what it takes to create an LEO. NorthWestern Energy's position is that it takes an unconditional commitment by a potential QF or an existing QF to sell at the avoided cost as determined by a regulatory body. If I understand Oak Tree's response to NorthWestern's application for reconsideration, Oak Tree seems to assert that an LEO can be created by an unenforceable, conditional offer to sell the output of a future project. I think we need to step back a little bit. When we talk about legally enforceable obligation I think the first question we have to ask legally enforceable by whom? Who are we talking about having the right to enforce this LEO? We have to remember it's the utility. This comes from both FERC and court cases who have repeatedly said a QF by binding itself to deliver binds the utility to purchase. We need to think about that real carefully.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	And that's how come an offer to sell at a rate other than avoided cost cannot create an LEO. Now I'm not saying in case somebody wants to go there, I'm not saying that the parties have to agree on that price before an LEO can be created. I'm not saying that they have to have entered into a contract before an LEO can be created. An LEO doesn't take what attorneys normally consider to be the fundamentals of contract. You know, a meeting of the minds, a mutual agreement, certain terms. An LEO doesn't require any of that, but it does require a commitment to deliver power, to sell power at the price equal to a utility's avoided cost. Not at a price that makes a QF financially viable. There's nothing in PURPA that requires utilities to pay a rate that makes QFs financially viable, only that they pay the avoided cost. In a very brief summary I would point out that the utility is essentially a three-legged stool. And the

10/09/2012 11:54:07 AM

	29		31
1	start talking about PURPA and QFs. PURPA did not forget	1	was created.
2	about consumers. PURPA included language that required	2	Staff feels that carbon costs should be
3	consumers to be indifferent and prohibited utilities and	3	incorporated into the hybrid method and, therefore, does
4	prohibited regulatory commissions from requiring	4	not support NorthWestern's request to reconsider finding
5	utilities to pay any amount greater than true avoided	5	2 and finding 3, which stated that NorthWestern had not
6	cost.	6	incorporated carbon costs in the model, required inputs
7	Now that's full avoided cost but it's the true	7	to be modified, and adopted Lands Energy's carbon cost
8	avoided cost, not speculative or hypothetical.	8	projections.
9	For those reasons NorthWestern respectfully	9	Staff supports Oak Tree in its request to
10	requests that the Commission grant its application for	10	reconsider the carbon cost estimates to be included in
11	reconsideration, reverse its determination of the	11	the calculation of Oak Tree's avoided cost rates. Carbon
12	inclusion of carbon costs and avoided cost, and reverse	12	costs should be based on the evidentiary record presented
13	its determination that an LEO had been created by an	13	by the parties in this matter. The carbon cost estimate
14	illusory commitment.	14	provided by Lands Energy does not carry sufficient
15		15	evidentiary support to be used in this proceeding.
16	Thank you. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. We will now turn	16	
17	to Staff for 20 minutes.	17	No evidence was presented in the record to
18	MS. CREMER: Staff relies on its previously	18	support Mr. Lewis's carbon price estimate. Oak Tree provided the Commission with a carbon
19	filed Answer regarding Oak Tree's motion. That said, I	19	price estimate based on the actual proposed legislation
		_	
20	will summarize Staff's position as it applies to both	20	but did not discount the price based on the likelihood of
21	parties' motions, however.	21	any carbon legislation becoming law. Staff feels it is
22	As to the issue for reconsideration that the	22	appropriate for the Commission to exercise its judgment
23	hybrid method is inconsistent with PURPA, Staff believes	23	to establish a carbon price projection guided by
24 25	that the hybrid method is the only appropriate avoided	24 25	potential legislation and discounted based on the assumed
25	cost calculation methodology to use under the 30	25	probability that of that legislation becoming law.
1	circumstances.	1	In summary, Staff recommends denying the portion
2	This is due to NorthWestern's status in	2	of Oak Tree's motion asking the Commission to reconsider
3	South Dakota as a vertically-integrated utility that	3	the use of the hybrid calculation method. Staff
	predominantly relies on its own internal generation.	4	-
4			recommends granting the portion of Oak Tree's motion
5	The Commission cannot base an avoided cost rate	5	asking the Commission to reconsider the use of current
6	exclusively on market estimates or incremental costs of		market conditions and projections to determine proper
7	operating NorthWestern's internal resources as this does	7	natural gas and electric market price inputs.
8	not reflect the true nature of its South Dakota systems	8	Staff recommends rejecting NorthWestern's motion
9	in the costs associated with operating that system.	9	to reconsider the establishment of the LEO. Staff
10	In addition, strict reliance upon either of the	10	further recommends rejecting the portions of
11	cost components does not give proper effect to the	11	NorthWestern's motion asking to exclude the consideration
12	requirements of PURPA.	12	of a carbon price in the hybrid method. And Staff
13	Regarding current market conditions and a	13	recommends granting the portion of Oak Tree's motion to
14	legally enforceable obligation, Staff agrees with the	14	reconsider the use of Lands Energy's carbon price
15	Commission that the LEO was established as of February	15	estimate.
16	25, 2011. Thus, Staff does not support NorthWestern's	16	Finally, Staff recommends that the Commission
17	request to reconsider finding 4.	17	exercise its judgment to establish a discounted carbon
18	However, the Staff does support Oak Tree's	18	price projection guided by potential legislation.
19	request to reconsider the portion of the Commission's	19	Thank you.
20	order requiring the parties to utilize current market	20	CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you.
21	conditions and projections in order to determine the	21	NorthWestern, 10 minutes.
22	avoided cost rate.	22	MR. BROGAN: Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I'll
23	The language contained in	23	try to go very quickly but I may use the whole 10
24	18 CFR 292.304(d)(2)(ii) requires an avoided cost	24	minutes. I'm not sure.
25	rate be based on information available when the LEO 0/2012 11:54:07 AM Page 29 t	25	As I said earlier, I intended to use this time of 76 8 of 31 sheet
10/09	72012 11.07.07 Pit Page 29 0		5 0 51 Sileer

	33		35
1	to respond to Oak Tree's motion. The first part has to	1	look at it.
2	do with the hybrid method. And it has to do with things	2	I want to deal very briefly with the issue about
3	that Mr. Uda said during his initial oral argument.	3	current market conditions. If, indeed, an LEO was
4	He complains that the hybrid method creates a	4	created it's possible that looking at anything that
5	heads we win, tails you lose approach or result for Oak	5	happened after that would be violative of PURPA.
6	Tree or for NorthWestern. Obviously, we disagree.	6	However, that doesn't mean we should blindly accept what
7	In his oral in his initial argument he says	7	one expert has said.
8	the problem is that in the light hours NorthWestern sells	8	Because there are differing views and because
9	into the market and seems to suggest that NorthWestern	9	there is ample evidence in the record that there were a
10	selling into the market somehow affects the costs that	10	lot of things that were known or should have been known
11	NorthWestern avoids by purchasing power from Oak Tree.	11	by February by the end of February of 2010 that don't
12	Remember, that's what we're that's what we're	12	appear to be reflected in a Black & Veatch fall of 2010
13	trying to figure out. What costs does NorthWestern	13	report. And the mere fact that Mr. Lauckhart thought
14	actually avoid by taking power from Oak Tree? Shouldn't	14	those things weren't substantial enough to require some
15	be that hard, but obviously it is.	15	sort of adjustment to that fall plant should not be
16	He says that the problem is Oak Tree gets the	16	dispositive.
17	lower of cost of our market. They get the cost in the	17	Also I would point out, of course, that if the
18	low load hours and they get the market in the high load	18	Commission grants NorthWestern's motion for
19	hours. He says that doesn't represent what NorthWestern	19	reconsideration of the LEO issue, then clearly it can
20	does because NorthWestern doesn't back off its coal	20	consider anything up until it finds an LEO was created or
21	plants.	21	until certainly the end of the hearing.
22	That may be true, but it's totally irrelevant.	22	Finally, let's talk about carbon costs. And,
23	What NorthWestern does isn't the issue. What costs can	23	Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have left?
24	NorthWestern avoid? During the light load hours	24	CHAIRMAN NELSON: 4 minutes.
25	NorthWestern can only avoid the variable cost of	25	MR. BROGAN: I'm going to have to be very quick
	34		36
1	operating its base load plants.	1	and I apologize to the court reporter if I start talking
2	During the heavy load hours when NorthWestern's	2	too fast. First off, the demonstrative slide that's on
3			
	base load resources are not sufficient to meet its load,	3	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not
4	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs	3 4	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be
4 5	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs of acquiring that energy in excess of what the base load	3 4 5	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be talking about Exhibit 2 to Oak Tree's motion for
4 5 6	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs of acquiring that energy in excess of what the base load plants produce. And NorthWestern acquires energy at the	3 4 5 6	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be talking about Exhibit 2 to Oak Tree's motion for reconsideration. That slide includes things that are not
4 5 6 7	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs of acquiring that energy in excess of what the base load plants produce. And NorthWestern acquires energy at the lower of market or the cost of running its peaker plants.	3 4 5 6 7	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be talking about Exhibit 2 to Oak Tree's motion for reconsideration. That slide includes things that are not on that initial exhibit.
4 5 6 7 8	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs of acquiring that energy in excess of what the base load plants produce. And NorthWestern acquires energy at the lower of market or the cost of running its peaker plants. In the recent past and probably foreseeable	3 4 5 6 7 8	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be talking about Exhibit 2 to Oak Tree's motion for reconsideration. That slide includes things that are not on that initial exhibit. I also would so I would point out it's
4 5 6 7 8 9	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs of acquiring that energy in excess of what the base load plants produce. And NorthWestern acquires energy at the lower of market or the cost of running its peaker plants. In the recent past and probably foreseeable future that will be market and not operation of the	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be talking about Exhibit 2 to Oak Tree's motion for reconsideration. That slide includes things that are not on that initial exhibit. I also would so I would point out it's difficult for me to respond to something that I've never
4 5 7 8 9	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs of acquiring that energy in excess of what the base load plants produce. And NorthWestern acquires energy at the lower of market or the cost of running its peaker plants. In the recent past and probably foreseeable future that will be market and not operation of the peakers plants. The hybrid method accurately and	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be talking about Exhibit 2 to Oak Tree's motion for reconsideration. That slide includes things that are not on that initial exhibit. I also would so I would point out it's difficult for me to respond to something that I've never seen except that it, you know, basically is the exhibit
4 5 7 8 9 10 11	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs of acquiring that energy in excess of what the base load plants produce. And NorthWestern acquires energy at the lower of market or the cost of running its peaker plants. In the recent past and probably foreseeable future that will be market and not operation of the peakers plants. The hybrid method accurately and correctly determines the costs that NorthWestern can	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be talking about Exhibit 2 to Oak Tree's motion for reconsideration. That slide includes things that are not on that initial exhibit. I also would so I would point out it's difficult for me to respond to something that I've never seen except that it, you know, basically is the exhibit plus some Black & Veatch estimates. It's up to the
4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs of acquiring that energy in excess of what the base load plants produce. And NorthWestern acquires energy at the lower of market or the cost of running its peaker plants. In the recent past and probably foreseeable future that will be market and not operation of the peakers plants. The hybrid method accurately and correctly determines the costs that NorthWestern can actually avoid.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be talking about Exhibit 2 to Oak Tree's motion for reconsideration. That slide includes things that are not on that initial exhibit. I also would so I would point out it's difficult for me to respond to something that I've never seen except that it, you know, basically is the exhibit plus some Black & Veatch estimates. It's up to the Commission to determine the credibility of Black & Veatch
4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs of acquiring that energy in excess of what the base load plants produce. And NorthWestern acquires energy at the lower of market or the cost of running its peaker plants. In the recent past and probably foreseeable future that will be market and not operation of the peakers plants. The hybrid method accurately and correctly determines the costs that NorthWestern can actually avoid. Mr. Uda said the fundamental principle of	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be talking about Exhibit 2 to Oak Tree's motion for reconsideration. That slide includes things that are not on that initial exhibit. I also would so I would point out it's difficult for me to respond to something that I've never seen except that it, you know, basically is the exhibit plus some Black & Veatch estimates. It's up to the Commission to determine the credibility of Black & Veatch estimates as presented by Mr. Lauckhart.
4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs of acquiring that energy in excess of what the base load plants produce. And NorthWestern acquires energy at the lower of market or the cost of running its peaker plants. In the recent past and probably foreseeable future that will be market and not operation of the peakers plants. The hybrid method accurately and correctly determines the costs that NorthWestern can actually avoid. Mr. Uda said the fundamental principle of avoided cost is displacement of resources and that by	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be talking about Exhibit 2 to Oak Tree's motion for reconsideration. That slide includes things that are not on that initial exhibit. I also would so I would point out it's difficult for me to respond to something that I've never seen except that it, you know, basically is the exhibit plus some Black & Veatch estimates. It's up to the Commission to determine the credibility of Black & Veatch estimates as presented by Mr. Lauckhart. Secondly, Oak Tree asserts that the carbon costs
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs of acquiring that energy in excess of what the base load plants produce. And NorthWestern acquires energy at the lower of market or the cost of running its peaker plants. In the recent past and probably foreseeable future that will be market and not operation of the peakers plants. The hybrid method accurately and correctly determines the costs that NorthWestern can actually avoid. Mr. Uda said the fundamental principle of avoided cost is displacement of resources and that by selling into the market NorthWestern is displacing its	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be talking about Exhibit 2 to Oak Tree's motion for reconsideration. That slide includes things that are not on that initial exhibit. I also would so I would point out it's difficult for me to respond to something that I've never seen except that it, you know, basically is the exhibit plus some Black & Veatch estimates. It's up to the Commission to determine the credibility of Black & Veatch estimates as presented by Mr. Lauckhart. Secondly, Oak Tree asserts that the carbon costs from Mr. Lewis have no evidence in the record. Staff
4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs of acquiring that energy in excess of what the base load plants produce. And NorthWestern acquires energy at the lower of market or the cost of running its peaker plants. In the recent past and probably foreseeable future that will be market and not operation of the peakers plants. The hybrid method accurately and correctly determines the costs that NorthWestern can actually avoid. Mr. Uda said the fundamental principle of avoided cost is displacement of resources and that by selling into the market NorthWestern is displacing its base load resources.	3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be talking about Exhibit 2 to Oak Tree's motion for reconsideration. That slide includes things that are not on that initial exhibit. I also would so I would point out it's difficult for me to respond to something that I've never seen except that it, you know, basically is the exhibit plus some Black & Veatch estimates. It's up to the Commission to determine the credibility of Black & Veatch estimates as presented by Mr. Lauckhart. Secondly, Oak Tree asserts that the carbon costs from Mr. Lewis have no evidence in the record. Staff supported that. Basically when we get to carbon costs
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs of acquiring that energy in excess of what the base load plants produce. And NorthWestern acquires energy at the lower of market or the cost of running its peaker plants. In the recent past and probably foreseeable future that will be market and not operation of the peakers plants. The hybrid method accurately and correctly determines the costs that NorthWestern can actually avoid. Mr. Uda said the fundamental principle of avoided cost is displacement of resources and that by selling into the market NorthWestern is displacing its base load resources. To the extent that the fundamental principle of	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be talking about Exhibit 2 to Oak Tree's motion for reconsideration. That slide includes things that are not on that initial exhibit. I also would so I would point out it's difficult for me to respond to something that I've never seen except that it, you know, basically is the exhibit plus some Black & Veatch estimates. It's up to the Commission to determine the credibility of Black & Veatch estimates as presented by Mr. Lauckhart. Secondly, Oak Tree asserts that the carbon costs from Mr. Lewis have no evidence in the record. Staff supported that. Basically when we get to carbon costs we're talking about opinions. And experts can use many
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs of acquiring that energy in excess of what the base load plants produce. And NorthWestern acquires energy at the lower of market or the cost of running its peaker plants. In the recent past and probably foreseeable future that will be market and not operation of the peakers plants. The hybrid method accurately and correctly determines the costs that NorthWestern can actually avoid. Mr. Uda said the fundamental principle of avoided cost is displacement of resources and that by selling into the market NorthWestern is displacing its base load resources. To the extent that the fundamental principle of avoided cost is the displacement of resources, it's the	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be talking about Exhibit 2 to Oak Tree's motion for reconsideration. That slide includes things that are not on that initial exhibit. I also would so I would point out it's difficult for me to respond to something that I've never seen except that it, you know, basically is the exhibit plus some Black & Veatch estimates. It's up to the Commission to determine the credibility of Black & Veatch estimates as presented by Mr. Lauckhart. Secondly, Oak Tree asserts that the carbon costs from Mr. Lewis have no evidence in the record. Staff supported that. Basically when we get to carbon costs we're talking about opinions. And experts can use many ways to come up with their opinions.
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs of acquiring that energy in excess of what the base load plants produce. And NorthWestern acquires energy at the lower of market or the cost of running its peaker plants. In the recent past and probably foreseeable future that will be market and not operation of the peakers plants. The hybrid method accurately and correctly determines the costs that NorthWestern can actually avoid. Mr. Uda said the fundamental principle of avoided cost is displacement of resources and that by selling into the market NorthWestern is displacing its base load resources. To the extent that the fundamental principle of avoided cost is the displacement of resources, it's the displacement of resources by purchases from the QF, not	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be talking about Exhibit 2 to Oak Tree's motion for reconsideration. That slide includes things that are not on that initial exhibit. I also would so I would point out it's difficult for me to respond to something that I've never seen except that it, you know, basically is the exhibit plus some Black & Veatch estimates. It's up to the Commission to determine the credibility of Black & Veatch estimates as presented by Mr. Lauckhart. Secondly, Oak Tree asserts that the carbon costs from Mr. Lewis have no evidence in the record. Staff supported that. Basically when we get to carbon costs we're talking about opinions. And experts can use many ways to come up with their opinions. And to say that an opinion is reached through
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs of acquiring that energy in excess of what the base load plants produce. And NorthWestern acquires energy at the lower of market or the cost of running its peaker plants. In the recent past and probably foreseeable future that will be market and not operation of the peakers plants. The hybrid method accurately and correctly determines the costs that NorthWestern can actually avoid. Mr. Uda said the fundamental principle of avoided cost is displacement of resources and that by selling into the market NorthWestern is displacing its base load resources. To the extent that the fundamental principle of avoided cost is the displacement of resources, it's the displacement of resources from the QF, not by selling into the market. And, again, it would be to	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be talking about Exhibit 2 to Oak Tree's motion for reconsideration. That slide includes things that are not on that initial exhibit. I also would so I would point out it's difficult for me to respond to something that I've never seen except that it, you know, basically is the exhibit plus some Black & Veatch estimates. It's up to the Commission to determine the credibility of Black & Veatch estimates as presented by Mr. Lauckhart. Secondly, Oak Tree asserts that the carbon costs from Mr. Lewis have no evidence in the record. Staff supported that. Basically when we get to carbon costs we're talking about opinions. And experts can use many ways to come up with their opinions. And to say that an opinion is reached through mathematical analysis when we don't know the assumptions,
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs of acquiring that energy in excess of what the base load plants produce. And NorthWestern acquires energy at the lower of market or the cost of running its peaker plants. In the recent past and probably foreseeable future that will be market and not operation of the peakers plants. The hybrid method accurately and correctly determines the costs that NorthWestern can actually avoid. Mr. Uda said the fundamental principle of avoided cost is displacement of resources and that by selling into the market NorthWestern is displacing its base load resources. To the extent that the fundamental principle of avoided cost is the displacement of resources, it's the displacement of resources by purchases from the QF, not by selling into the market. And, again, it would be to some extent arguable that because NorthWestern doesn't	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be talking about Exhibit 2 to Oak Tree's motion for reconsideration. That slide includes things that are not on that initial exhibit. I also would so I would point out it's difficult for me to respond to something that I've never seen except that it, you know, basically is the exhibit plus some Black & Veatch estimates. It's up to the Commission to determine the credibility of Black & Veatch estimates as presented by Mr. Lauckhart. Secondly, Oak Tree asserts that the carbon costs from Mr. Lewis have no evidence in the record. Staff supported that. Basically when we get to carbon costs we're talking about opinions. And experts can use many ways to come up with their opinions. And to say that an opinion is reached through mathematical analysis when we don't know the assumptions, when we don't know the equations, when we don't know the
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs of acquiring that energy in excess of what the base load plants produce. And NorthWestern acquires energy at the lower of market or the cost of running its peaker plants. In the recent past and probably foreseeable future that will be market and not operation of the peakers plants. The hybrid method accurately and correctly determines the costs that NorthWestern can actually avoid. Mr. Uda said the fundamental principle of avoided cost is displacement of resources and that by selling into the market NorthWestern is displacing its base load resources. To the extent that the fundamental principle of avoided cost is the displacement of resources, it's the displacement of resources from the QF, not by selling into the market. And, again, it would be to some extent arguable that because NorthWestern doesn't back off its coal plants and won't if it purchases from	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be talking about Exhibit 2 to Oak Tree's motion for reconsideration. That slide includes things that are not on that initial exhibit. I also would so I would point out it's difficult for me to respond to something that I've never seen except that it, you know, basically is the exhibit plus some Black & Veatch estimates. It's up to the Commission to determine the credibility of Black & Veatch estimates as presented by Mr. Lauckhart. Secondly, Oak Tree asserts that the carbon costs from Mr. Lewis have no evidence in the record. Staff supported that. Basically when we get to carbon costs we're talking about opinions. And experts can use many ways to come up with their opinions. And to say that an opinion is reached through mathematical analysis when we don't know the assumptions, when we don't know the equations, when we don't know the
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs of acquiring that energy in excess of what the base load plants produce. And NorthWestern acquires energy at the lower of market or the cost of running its peaker plants. In the recent past and probably foreseeable future that will be market and not operation of the peakers plants. The hybrid method accurately and correctly determines the costs that NorthWestern can actually avoid. Mr. Uda said the fundamental principle of avoided cost is displacement of resources and that by selling into the market NorthWestern is displacing its base load resources. To the extent that the fundamental principle of avoided cost is the displacement of resources, it's the displacement of resources by purchases from the QF, not by selling into the market. And, again, it would be to some extent arguable that because NorthWestern doesn't back off its coal plants and won't if it purchases from Oak Tree, the avoided cost relative to the light load	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be talking about Exhibit 2 to Oak Tree's motion for reconsideration. That slide includes things that are not on that initial exhibit. I also would so I would point out it's difficult for me to respond to something that I've never seen except that it, you know, basically is the exhibit plus some Black & Veatch estimates. It's up to the Commission to determine the credibility of Black & Veatch estimates as presented by Mr. Lauckhart. Secondly, Oak Tree asserts that the carbon costs from Mr. Lewis have no evidence in the record. Staff supported that. Basically when we get to carbon costs we're talking about opinions. And experts can use many ways to come up with their opinions. And to say that an opinion is reached through mathematical analysis when we don't know the assumptions, when we don't know the equations, when we don't know the model doesn't give it any more credibility than an expert saying I reached this through my considered judgment and
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	the only costs that NorthWestern can avoid are the costs of acquiring that energy in excess of what the base load plants produce. And NorthWestern acquires energy at the lower of market or the cost of running its peaker plants. In the recent past and probably foreseeable future that will be market and not operation of the peakers plants. The hybrid method accurately and correctly determines the costs that NorthWestern can actually avoid. Mr. Uda said the fundamental principle of avoided cost is displacement of resources and that by selling into the market NorthWestern is displacing its base load resources. To the extent that the fundamental principle of avoided cost is the displacement of resources, it's the displacement of resources from the QF, not by selling into the market. And, again, it would be to some extent arguable that because NorthWestern doesn't back off its coal plants and won't if it purchases from	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	the screen, this is something that I guess I was not aware was coming today. I thought we were going to be talking about Exhibit 2 to Oak Tree's motion for reconsideration. That slide includes things that are not on that initial exhibit. I also would so I would point out it's difficult for me to respond to something that I've never seen except that it, you know, basically is the exhibit plus some Black & Veatch estimates. It's up to the Commission to determine the credibility of Black & Veatch estimates as presented by Mr. Lauckhart. Secondly, Oak Tree asserts that the carbon costs from Mr. Lewis have no evidence in the record. Staff supported that. Basically when we get to carbon costs we're talking about opinions. And experts can use many ways to come up with their opinions. And to say that an opinion is reached through mathematical analysis when we don't know the assumptions, when we don't know the equations, when we don't know the

	37		39
1	agrees thinks that carbon costs should be included, it	1	So how are you supposed to bind yourself to
2	has reached the proper decision by using the Lands Energy	2	deliver to something? If they had signed the contract
3	figures.	3	that we sent them along with our LEO letter on February
4	Staff suggested that we need to consider the	4	25, 2011, we'd be delivering power today. We would have
5	probabilities. I think we would have a lot of	5	gotten the production tax credit, and we would be
6	disagreement as to what's the probability of carbon	6	delivering a valuable resource to South Dakota today.
7	costs. Mr. Uda suggests it's high on the basis of the	7	And it would have been, we think, within the range on
8	EPA actions. Others would suggest, I think, and I'm	8	avoided costs.
9	trying to be careful not to try to provide any testimony	9	Now Mr. Brogan says, well, we don't have to
10	or evidence but I think others would suggest that the	10	agree on the price. Okay. We didn't. We don't have to
11	probability is very low.	11	agree on the contract terms. Yeah. We didn't.
12	CHAIRMAN NELSON: 1 minute.	12	What we said is we're going to do an
13	MR. BROGAN: Finally, I do want to correct a	13	Interconnection Agreement with NorthWestern. We're going
14	statement that was made with respect to the EIA reference	14	to commit the resources to do that. We're going to make
15	case. Mr. Uda referred to it as if nothing is adopted,	15	an offer to sell which is unconditional. If we sell to
16	this is what happens. That's not what EIA says about its	16	anybody it will be NorthWestern. We're not going to sell
17	reference case. What EIA says, this is what may happen.	17	it to anyone else. And the rights that are created under
18	It doesn't say this is what will happen.	18	PURPA are not for the utility. They're for the
19	Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your indulgence.	19	qualifying facility.
20	CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. At this time we	20	Now whether you agree with the decision or not,
21	will go to Oak Tree for 15 minutes' rebuttal.	21	Congress made the decision that qualifying facilities
22	MR. UDA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.	22	were going to be a special category, and it's the job of
23	We talked a little bit about carbon costs and	23	every state public utility or service commission to
24	why it's important to include them. And I didn't hear an	24	enforce that obligation.
25	explanation from Mr. Brogan or NorthWestern Energy why	25	And one of your obligations as State Commission
	38		40
1	38 including carbon costs violates the avoided cost	1	40 is to encourage the development of these resources. If
1 2		1 2	
	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost	_	is to encourage the development of these resources. If
2	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain.	2	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter
2 3	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain. Everything in an avoided cost calculation is uncertain. We've heard testimony that, you know, gas prices have been historically wrong, that inflation	2 3	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter what price we set, you have to deliver. And, you know, no one is going to do that. You know that. That's a practical issue.
2 3 4	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain. Everything in an avoided cost calculation is uncertain. We've heard testimony that, you know, gas prices have been historically wrong, that inflation factors can be off. We're estimating things here. What	2 3 4	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter what price we set, you have to deliver. And, you know, no one is going to do that. You know that. That's a practical issue. So if NorthWestern wanted to put contract
2 3 4 5	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain. Everything in an avoided cost calculation is uncertain. We've heard testimony that, you know, gas prices have been historically wrong, that inflation factors can be off. We're estimating things here. What we're trying to get our arms around is what makes sense.	2 3 4 5	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter what price we set, you have to deliver. And, you know, no one is going to do that. You know that. That's a practical issue. So if NorthWestern wanted to put contract provisions in place that said if you don't deliver as of
2 3 4 5 6	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain. Everything in an avoided cost calculation is uncertain. We've heard testimony that, you know, gas prices have been historically wrong, that inflation factors can be off. We're estimating things here. What we're trying to get our arms around is what makes sense. What is a reasonable approximation of what we think will	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter what price we set, you have to deliver. And, you know, no one is going to do that. You know that. That's a practical issue. So if NorthWestern wanted to put contract provisions in place that said if you don't deliver as of this date, whatever price you have to pay a penalty, that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain. Everything in an avoided cost calculation is uncertain. We've heard testimony that, you know, gas prices have been historically wrong, that inflation factors can be off. We're estimating things here. What we're trying to get our arms around is what makes sense. What is a reasonable approximation of what we think will happen? We have to do that.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter what price we set, you have to deliver. And, you know, no one is going to do that. You know that. That's a practical issue. So if NorthWestern wanted to put contract provisions in place that said if you don't deliver as of this date, whatever price you have to pay a penalty, that would have been a subject of negotiation. But the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain. Everything in an avoided cost calculation is uncertain. We've heard testimony that, you know, gas prices have been historically wrong, that inflation factors can be off. We're estimating things here. What we're trying to get our arms around is what makes sense. What is a reasonable approximation of what we think will happen? We have to do that. So just to say that today NorthWestern isn't	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter what price we set, you have to deliver. And, you know, no one is going to do that. You know that. That's a practical issue. So if NorthWestern wanted to put contract provisions in place that said if you don't deliver as of this date, whatever price you have to pay a penalty, that would have been a subject of negotiation. But the undisputed record is they didn't negotiate. Your
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain. Everything in an avoided cost calculation is uncertain. We've heard testimony that, you know, gas prices have been historically wrong, that inflation factors can be off. We're estimating things here. What we're trying to get our arms around is what makes sense. What is a reasonable approximation of what we think will happen? We have to do that. So just to say that today NorthWestern isn't experiencing any carbon costs doesn't mean you shouldn't	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter what price we set, you have to deliver. And, you know, no one is going to do that. You know that. That's a practical issue. So if NorthWestern wanted to put contract provisions in place that said if you don't deliver as of this date, whatever price you have to pay a penalty, that would have been a subject of negotiation. But the undisputed record is they didn't negotiate. Your February, 25, 2011, decision on the creation of an LEO is
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain. Everything in an avoided cost calculation is uncertain. We've heard testimony that, you know, gas prices have been historically wrong, that inflation factors can be off. We're estimating things here. What we're trying to get our arms around is what makes sense. What is a reasonable approximation of what we think will happen? We have to do that. So just to say that today NorthWestern isn't experiencing any carbon costs doesn't mean you shouldn't consider it. You have to consider it. And, in fact,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter what price we set, you have to deliver. And, you know, no one is going to do that. You know that. That's a practical issue. So if NorthWestern wanted to put contract provisions in place that said if you don't deliver as of this date, whatever price you have to pay a penalty, that would have been a subject of negotiation. But the undisputed record is they didn't negotiate. Your February, 25, 2011, decision on the creation of an LEO is correct. It's based on the record.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain. Everything in an avoided cost calculation is uncertain. We've heard testimony that, you know, gas prices have been historically wrong, that inflation factors can be off. We're estimating things here. What we're trying to get our arms around is what makes sense. What is a reasonable approximation of what we think will happen? We have to do that. So just to say that today NorthWestern isn't experiencing any carbon costs doesn't mean you shouldn't consider it. You have to consider it. And, in fact, NorthWestern in Montana says it would be prudent for a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter what price we set, you have to deliver. And, you know, no one is going to do that. You know that. That's a practical issue. So if NorthWestern wanted to put contract provisions in place that said if you don't deliver as of this date, whatever price you have to pay a penalty, that would have been a subject of negotiation. But the undisputed record is they didn't negotiate. Your February, 25, 2011, decision on the creation of an LEO is correct. It's based on the record. I want to talk briefly about the hybrid
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain. Everything in an avoided cost calculation is uncertain. We've heard testimony that, you know, gas prices have been historically wrong, that inflation factors can be off. We're estimating things here. What we're trying to get our arms around is what makes sense. What is a reasonable approximation of what we think will happen? We have to do that. So just to say that today NorthWestern isn't experiencing any carbon costs doesn't mean you shouldn't consider it. You have to consider it. And, in fact, NorthWestern in Montana says it would be prudent for a utility to consider those issues. They're not saying it	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter what price we set, you have to deliver. And, you know, no one is going to do that. You know that. That's a practical issue. So if NorthWestern wanted to put contract provisions in place that said if you don't deliver as of this date, whatever price you have to pay a penalty, that would have been a subject of negotiation. But the undisputed record is they didn't negotiate. Your February, 25, 2011, decision on the creation of an LEO is correct. It's based on the record. I want to talk briefly about the hybrid methodology. I think this is a point where I think we're
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain. Everything in an avoided cost calculation is uncertain. We've heard testimony that, you know, gas prices have been historically wrong, that inflation factors can be off. We're estimating things here. What we're trying to get our arms around is what makes sense. What is a reasonable approximation of what we think will happen? We have to do that. So just to say that today NorthWestern isn't experiencing any carbon costs doesn't mean you shouldn't consider it. You have to consider it. And, in fact, NorthWestern in Montana says it would be prudent for a utility to consider those issues. They're not saying it in this proceeding because essentially they're opposed to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter what price we set, you have to deliver. And, you know, no one is going to do that. You know that. That's a practical issue. So if NorthWestern wanted to put contract provisions in place that said if you don't deliver as of this date, whatever price you have to pay a penalty, that would have been a subject of negotiation. But the undisputed record is they didn't negotiate. Your February, 25, 2011, decision on the creation of an LEO is correct. It's based on the record. I want to talk briefly about the hybrid methodology. I think this is a point where I think we're talking past each other. What happens when NorthWestern
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain. Everything in an avoided cost calculation is uncertain. We've heard testimony that, you know, gas prices have been historically wrong, that inflation factors can be off. We're estimating things here. What we're trying to get our arms around is what makes sense. What is a reasonable approximation of what we think will happen? We have to do that. So just to say that today NorthWestern isn't experiencing any carbon costs doesn't mean you shouldn't consider it. You have to consider it. And, in fact, NorthWestern in Montana says it would be prudent for a utility to consider those issues. They're not saying it in this proceeding because essentially they're opposed to the idea of Oak Tree building a project.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter what price we set, you have to deliver. And, you know, no one is going to do that. You know that. That's a practical issue. So if NorthWestern wanted to put contract provisions in place that said if you don't deliver as of this date, whatever price you have to pay a penalty, that would have been a subject of negotiation. But the undisputed record is they didn't negotiate. Your February, 25, 2011, decision on the creation of an LEO is correct. It's based on the record. I want to talk briefly about the hybrid methodology. I think this is a point where I think we're talking past each other. What happens when NorthWestern is short of low cost coal or excuse me. Is long on
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain. Everything in an avoided cost calculation is uncertain. We've heard testimony that, you know, gas prices have been historically wrong, that inflation factors can be off. We're estimating things here. What we're trying to get our arms around is what makes sense. What is a reasonable approximation of what we think will happen? We have to do that. So just to say that today NorthWestern isn't experiencing any carbon costs doesn't mean you shouldn't consider it. You have to consider it. And, in fact, NorthWestern in Montana says it would be prudent for a utility to consider those issues. They're not saying it in this proceeding because essentially they're opposed to the idea of Oak Tree building a project. The LEO issue is kind of humorous because I	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter what price we set, you have to deliver. And, you know, no one is going to do that. You know that. That's a practical issue. So if NorthWestern wanted to put contract provisions in place that said if you don't deliver as of this date, whatever price you have to pay a penalty, that would have been a subject of negotiation. But the undisputed record is they didn't negotiate. Your February, 25, 2011, decision on the creation of an LEO is correct. It's based on the record. I want to talk briefly about the hybrid methodology. I think this is a point where I think we're talking past each other. What happens when NorthWestern is short of low cost coal or excuse me. Is long on low cost coal and is selling it into the marketplace?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain. Everything in an avoided cost calculation is uncertain. We've heard testimony that, you know, gas prices have been historically wrong, that inflation factors can be off. We're estimating things here. What we're trying to get our arms around is what makes sense. What is a reasonable approximation of what we think will happen? We have to do that. So just to say that today NorthWestern isn't experiencing any carbon costs doesn't mean you shouldn't consider it. You have to consider it. And, in fact, NorthWestern in Montana says it would be prudent for a utility to consider those issues. They're not saying it in this proceeding because essentially they're opposed to the idea of Oak Tree building a project. The LEO issue is kind of humorous because I think Mr. Brogan is correct that, you know, we agree	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter what price we set, you have to deliver. And, you know, no one is going to do that. You know that. That's a practical issue. So if NorthWestern wanted to put contract provisions in place that said if you don't deliver as of this date, whatever price you have to pay a penalty, that would have been a subject of negotiation. But the undisputed record is they didn't negotiate. Your February, 25, 2011, decision on the creation of an LEO is correct. It's based on the record. I want to talk briefly about the hybrid methodology. I think this is a point where I think we're talking past each other. What happens when NorthWestern is short of low cost coal or excuse me. Is long on low cost coal and is selling it into the marketplace? It's never really long. I mean, it's selling in the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain. Everything in an avoided cost calculation is uncertain. We've heard testimony that, you know, gas prices have been historically wrong, that inflation factors can be off. We're estimating things here. What we're trying to get our arms around is what makes sense. What is a reasonable approximation of what we think will happen? We have to do that. So just to say that today NorthWestern isn't experiencing any carbon costs doesn't mean you shouldn't consider it. You have to consider it. And, in fact, NorthWestern in Montana says it would be prudent for a utility to consider those issues. They're not saying it in this proceeding because essentially they're opposed to the idea of Oak Tree building a project. The LEO issue is kind of humorous because I think Mr. Brogan is correct that, you know, we agree generally. I think where we disagree is in the actual	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter what price we set, you have to deliver. And, you know, no one is going to do that. You know that. That's a practical issue. So if NorthWestern wanted to put contract provisions in place that said if you don't deliver as of this date, whatever price you have to pay a penalty, that would have been a subject of negotiation. But the undisputed record is they didn't negotiate. Your February, 25, 2011, decision on the creation of an LEO is correct. It's based on the record. I want to talk briefly about the hybrid methodology. I think this is a point where I think we're talking past each other. What happens when NorthWestern is short of low cost coal or excuse me. Is long on low cost coal and is selling it into the marketplace? It's never really long. I mean, it's selling in the market. What happens in that case if they buy from Oak
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain. Everything in an avoided cost calculation is uncertain. We've heard testimony that, you know, gas prices have been historically wrong, that inflation factors can be off. We're estimating things here. What we're trying to get our arms around is what makes sense. What is a reasonable approximation of what we think will happen? We have to do that. So just to say that today NorthWestern isn't experiencing any carbon costs doesn't mean you shouldn't consider it. You have to consider it. And, in fact, NorthWestern in Montana says it would be prudent for a utility to consider those issues. They're not saying it in this proceeding because essentially they're opposed to the idea of Oak Tree building a project. The LEO issue is kind of humorous because I think Mr. Brogan is correct that, you know, we agree generally. I think where we disagree is in the actual practical application of the LEO doctrine.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter what price we set, you have to deliver. And, you know, no one is going to do that. You know that. That's a practical issue. So if NorthWestern wanted to put contract provisions in place that said if you don't deliver as of this date, whatever price you have to pay a penalty, that would have been a subject of negotiation. But the undisputed record is they didn't negotiate. Your February, 25, 2011, decision on the creation of an LEO is correct. It's based on the record. I want to talk briefly about the hybrid methodology. I think this is a point where I think we're talking past each other. What happens when NorthWestern is short of low cost coal or excuse me. Is long on low cost coal and is selling it into the marketplace? It's never really long. I mean, it's selling in the market. What happens in that case if they buy from Oak Tree?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain. Everything in an avoided cost calculation is uncertain. We've heard testimony that, you know, gas prices have been historically wrong, that inflation factors can be off. We're estimating things here. What we're trying to get our arms around is what makes sense. What is a reasonable approximation of what we think will happen? We have to do that. So just to say that today NorthWestern isn't experiencing any carbon costs doesn't mean you shouldn't consider it. You have to consider it. And, in fact, NorthWestern in Montana says it would be prudent for a utility to consider those issues. They're not saying it in this proceeding because essentially they're opposed to the idea of Oak Tree building a project. The LEO issue is kind of humorous because I think Mr. Brogan is correct that, you know, we agree generally. I think where we disagree is in the actual practical application of the LEO doctrine. So let me ask you, so you go to NorthWestern,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter what price we set, you have to deliver. And, you know, no one is going to do that. You know that. That's a practical issue. So if NorthWestern wanted to put contract provisions in place that said if you don't deliver as of this date, whatever price you have to pay a penalty, that would have been a subject of negotiation. But the undisputed record is they didn't negotiate. Your February, 25, 2011, decision on the creation of an LEO is correct. It's based on the record. I want to talk briefly about the hybrid methodology. I think this is a point where I think we're talking past each other. What happens when NorthWestern is short of low cost coal or excuse me. Is long on low cost coal and is selling it into the marketplace? It's never really long. I mean, it's selling in the market. What happens in that case if they buy from Oak Tree? Yeah. Mr. Brogan's right. They're not going to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain. Everything in an avoided cost calculation is uncertain. We've heard testimony that, you know, gas prices have been historically wrong, that inflation factors can be off. We're estimating things here. What we're trying to get our arms around is what makes sense. What is a reasonable approximation of what we think will happen? We have to do that. So just to say that today NorthWestern isn't experiencing any carbon costs doesn't mean you shouldn't consider it. You have to consider it. And, in fact, NorthWestern in Montana says it would be prudent for a utility to consider those issues. They're not saying it in this proceeding because essentially they're opposed to the idea of Oak Tree building a project. The LEO issue is kind of humorous because I think Mr. Brogan is correct that, you know, we agree generally. I think where we disagree is in the actual practical application of the LEO doctrine. So let me ask you, so you go to NorthWestern, you're a developer and you say I want to build a project.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter what price we set, you have to deliver. And, you know, no one is going to do that. You know that. That's a practical issue. So if NorthWestern wanted to put contract provisions in place that said if you don't deliver as of this date, whatever price you have to pay a penalty, that would have been a subject of negotiation. But the undisputed record is they didn't negotiate. Your February, 25, 2011, decision on the creation of an LEO is correct. It's based on the record. I want to talk briefly about the hybrid methodology. I think this is a point where I think we're talking past each other. What happens when NorthWestern is short of low cost coal or excuse me. Is long on low cost coal and is selling it into the marketplace? It's never really long. I mean, it's selling in the market. What happens in that case if they buy from Oak Tree? Yeah. Mr. Brogan's right. They're not going to back down their coal plant. But what they are going to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain. Everything in an avoided cost calculation is uncertain. We've heard testimony that, you know, gas prices have been historically wrong, that inflation factors can be off. We're estimating things here. What we're trying to get our arms around is what makes sense. What is a reasonable approximation of what we think will happen? We have to do that. So just to say that today NorthWestern isn't experiencing any carbon costs doesn't mean you shouldn't consider it. You have to consider it. And, in fact, NorthWestern in Montana says it would be prudent for a utility to consider those issues. They're not saying it in this proceeding because essentially they're opposed to the idea of Oak Tree building a project. The LEO issue is kind of humorous because I think Mr. Brogan is correct that, you know, we agree generally. I think where we disagree is in the actual practical application of the LEO doctrine. So let me ask you, so you go to NorthWestern, you're a developer and you say I want to build a project. And they say, well, nuts to you. I mean, you can you	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter what price we set, you have to deliver. And, you know, no one is going to do that. You know that. That's a practical issue. So if NorthWestern wanted to put contract provisions in place that said if you don't deliver as of this date, whatever price you have to pay a penalty, that would have been a subject of negotiation. But the undisputed record is they didn't negotiate. Your February, 25, 2011, decision on the creation of an LEO is correct. It's based on the record. I want to talk briefly about the hybrid methodology. I think this is a point where I think we're talking past each other. What happens when NorthWestern is short of low cost coal or excuse me. Is long on low cost coal and is selling it into the marketplace? It's never really long. I mean, it's selling in the market. What happens in that case if they buy from Oak Tree? Yeah. Mr. Brogan's right. They're not going to back down their coal plant. But what they are going to be doing is reselling that in the market and somebody in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	including carbon costs violates the avoided cost principle. What he said is this is uncertain. Everything in an avoided cost calculation is uncertain. We've heard testimony that, you know, gas prices have been historically wrong, that inflation factors can be off. We're estimating things here. What we're trying to get our arms around is what makes sense. What is a reasonable approximation of what we think will happen? We have to do that. So just to say that today NorthWestern isn't experiencing any carbon costs doesn't mean you shouldn't consider it. You have to consider it. And, in fact, NorthWestern in Montana says it would be prudent for a utility to consider those issues. They're not saying it in this proceeding because essentially they're opposed to the idea of Oak Tree building a project. The LEO issue is kind of humorous because I think Mr. Brogan is correct that, you know, we agree generally. I think where we disagree is in the actual practical application of the LEO doctrine. So let me ask you, so you go to NorthWestern, you're a developer and you say I want to build a project.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	is to encourage the development of these resources. If you can say, well, you don't get an LEO because no matter what price we set, you have to deliver. And, you know, no one is going to do that. You know that. That's a practical issue. So if NorthWestern wanted to put contract provisions in place that said if you don't deliver as of this date, whatever price you have to pay a penalty, that would have been a subject of negotiation. But the undisputed record is they didn't negotiate. Your February, 25, 2011, decision on the creation of an LEO is correct. It's based on the record. I want to talk briefly about the hybrid methodology. I think this is a point where I think we're talking past each other. What happens when NorthWestern is short of low cost coal or excuse me. Is long on low cost coal and is selling it into the marketplace? It's never really long. I mean, it's selling in the market. What happens in that case if they buy from Oak Tree? Yeah. Mr. Brogan's right. They're not going to back down their coal plant. But what they are going to

	41		43
1	pretend it exists over here when it hurts Oak Tree and	1	we agree on this issue. Staff has said that they don't
2	down here when it hurts Oak Tree or you don't	2	think Lands Energy's forecast is supported by very much.
3	recognize it down here when it hurts Oak Tree.	3	And Mr. Brogan's argument seems to be that all opinions
4	And my point is you either pretend the market	4	are equal so, you know, why have a hearing? Why have
5	exists or it doesn't. You either give us the incremental	5	multiple experts? Why have a clash or a debate over
6	costs of NorthWestern's own resources or the market, but	6	those issues? Just listen to whoever comes up with
7	you can't discriminate by doing one when it hurts us and	7	something.
8	the other when it hurts us. Because that's what happens,	8	I'm not saying that Mr. Lewis is not an expert,
9	it automatically lowers avoided costs.	9	but what I am saying is Mr. Lewis is not creating
10	The point is a resource in the resource stack	10	sophisticated models to try to figure these things out to
11	that NorthWestern is is part of the market is being	11	the best of his ability.
12	displaced, and that's part of the calculation of avoided	12	There are organizations that devote considerable
13	cost.	13	resources to this. Now could they be wrong? Sure, they
14	Mr. Brogan said that one way of looking at this	14	could be wrong. But are you more likely to be wrong if
15	because they don't back down their coal plants is that	15	you just talk to a couple of people you work with, or are
16	avoided cost should be zero. It would never be zero	16	you more likely to be wrong if you do an exhaustive study
17	because there will always be a value associated with	17	of the issue, take into account all the opinions, and
18	operating those coal plants.	18	yes, actually crunch the numbers. Because sometimes
19	NorthWestern continues to have an obligation to	19	we're wrong about things like that.
20	buy it. The only question would be what is that cost?	20	For example, I'm using baseball again. Some
21	What we're saying is the simplest method, the best method	21	people will say a certain player is better than another
22	is to just adopt a market forecast approach because it	22	player, and there's any number of metrics you can look at
23	takes into account all hours and all variabilities within	23	to measure it. But that doesn't mean the debate isn't
24	the market, including any times when you get zero or less	24	worth having. Because sometimes you can convince
25	than zero, you get negative avoided cost.	25	yourself that there's a better way of looking at things.
	42		
	42		44
1	42 The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't	1	44 But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion
1 2		1 2	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with
	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't		But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion
2	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource	2	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with
2 3	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource that it doesn't need resources as though the market	2 3	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with a couple of other people.
2 3 4	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource that it doesn't need resources as though the market doesn't exist. It plays in the market. That's where the	2 3 4	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with a couple of other people. You should really look at this more as a
2 3 4 5	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource that it doesn't need resources as though the market doesn't exist. It plays in the market. That's where the incremental activity takes place. And I think that's an	2 3 4 5	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with a couple of other people. You should really look at this more as a scientific matter and I think that's the kind of
2 3 4 5 6	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource that it doesn't need resources as though the market doesn't exist. It plays in the market. That's where the incremental activity takes place. And I think that's an important consideration when you take into account this	2 3 4 5 6	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with a couple of other people. You should really look at this more as a scientific matter and I think that's the kind of technical issue that this Commission would benefit from
2 3 4 5 6 7	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource that it doesn't need resources as though the market doesn't exist. It plays in the market. That's where the incremental activity takes place. And I think that's an important consideration when you take into account this hybrid methodology, which I really do think is a heads we	2 3 4 5 6 7	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with a couple of other people. You should really look at this more as a scientific matter and I think that's the kind of technical issue that this Commission would benefit from in terms of having a hearing on it and considering all
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource that it doesn't need resources as though the market doesn't exist. It plays in the market. That's where the incremental activity takes place. And I think that's an important consideration when you take into account this hybrid methodology, which I really do think is a heads we win, tails you lose kind of methodology.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with a couple of other people. You should really look at this more as a scientific matter and I think that's the kind of technical issue that this Commission would benefit from in terms of having a hearing on it and considering all the different opinions and then you can explore with
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource that it doesn't need resources as though the market doesn't exist. It plays in the market. That's where the incremental activity takes place. And I think that's an important consideration when you take into account this hybrid methodology, which I really do think is a heads we win, tails you lose kind of methodology. The last issue I want to talk about just briefly is the current market conditions. I think Staff is correct if you read the regulation. If you believe that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with a couple of other people. You should really look at this more as a scientific matter and I think that's the kind of technical issue that this Commission would benefit from in terms of having a hearing on it and considering all the different opinions and then you can explore with Mr. Lewis what was the basis, what was the foundation for
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource that it doesn't need resources as though the market doesn't exist. It plays in the market. That's where the incremental activity takes place. And I think that's an important consideration when you take into account this hybrid methodology, which I really do think is a heads we win, tails you lose kind of methodology. The last issue I want to talk about just briefly is the current market conditions. I think Staff is correct if you read the regulation. If you believe that a legally enforceable obligation was created on February	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with a couple of other people. You should really look at this more as a scientific matter and I think that's the kind of technical issue that this Commission would benefit from in terms of having a hearing on it and considering all the different opinions and then you can explore with Mr. Lewis what was the basis, what was the foundation for this? What else did you consider? Those things were not discussed at hearing, and I think that's absent from the record now.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource that it doesn't need resources as though the market doesn't exist. It plays in the market. That's where the incremental activity takes place. And I think that's an important consideration when you take into account this hybrid methodology, which I really do think is a heads we win, tails you lose kind of methodology. The last issue I want to talk about just briefly is the current market conditions. I think Staff is correct if you read the regulation. If you believe that a legally enforceable obligation was created on February 25, 2011, that's the date on which the information	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with a couple of other people. You should really look at this more as a scientific matter and I think that's the kind of technical issue that this Commission would benefit from in terms of having a hearing on it and considering all the different opinions and then you can explore with Mr. Lewis what was the basis, what was the foundation for this? What else did you consider? Those things were not discussed at hearing, and I think that's absent from the record now. I believe the evidence you'll see in the record
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource that it doesn't need resources as though the market doesn't exist. It plays in the market. That's where the incremental activity takes place. And I think that's an important consideration when you take into account this hybrid methodology, which I really do think is a heads we win, tails you lose kind of methodology. The last issue I want to talk about just briefly is the current market conditions. I think Staff is correct if you read the regulation. If you believe that a legally enforceable obligation was created on February 25, 2011, that's the date on which the information matters.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with a couple of other people. You should really look at this more as a scientific matter and I think that's the kind of technical issue that this Commission would benefit from in terms of having a hearing on it and considering all the different opinions and then you can explore with Mr. Lewis what was the basis, what was the foundation for this? What else did you consider? Those things were not discussed at hearing, and I think that's absent from the record now. I believe the evidence you'll see in the record is that Mr. Lewis's forecast is on the lower end. And
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource that it doesn't need resources as though the market doesn't exist. It plays in the market. That's where the incremental activity takes place. And I think that's an important consideration when you take into account this hybrid methodology, which I really do think is a heads we win, tails you lose kind of methodology. The last issue I want to talk about just briefly is the current market conditions. I think Staff is correct if you read the regulation. If you believe that a legally enforceable obligation was created on February 25, 2011, that's the date on which the information matters. And I believe Mr. Brogan's argument has to do	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with a couple of other people. You should really look at this more as a scientific matter and I think that's the kind of technical issue that this Commission would benefit from in terms of having a hearing on it and considering all the different opinions and then you can explore with Mr. Lewis what was the basis, what was the foundation for this? What else did you consider? Those things were not discussed at hearing, and I think that's absent from the record now. I believe the evidence you'll see in the record is that Mr. Lewis's forecast is on the lower end. And this was actually part of Mr. Lauckhart's prefiled
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource that it doesn't need resources as though the market doesn't exist. It plays in the market. That's where the incremental activity takes place. And I think that's an important consideration when you take into account this hybrid methodology, which I really do think is a heads we win, tails you lose kind of methodology. The last issue I want to talk about just briefly is the current market conditions. I think Staff is correct if you read the regulation. If you believe that a legally enforceable obligation was created on February 25, 2011, that's the date on which the information matters.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with a couple of other people. You should really look at this more as a scientific matter and I think that's the kind of technical issue that this Commission would benefit from in terms of having a hearing on it and considering all the different opinions and then you can explore with Mr. Lewis what was the basis, what was the foundation for this? What else did you consider? Those things were not discussed at hearing, and I think that's absent from the record now. I believe the evidence you'll see in the record is that Mr. Lewis's forecast is on the lower end. And this was actually part of Mr. Lauckhart's prefiled direct testimony, I believe. I can't remember what
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource that it doesn't need resources as though the market doesn't exist. It plays in the market. That's where the incremental activity takes place. And I think that's an important consideration when you take into account this hybrid methodology, which I really do think is a heads we win, tails you lose kind of methodology. The last issue I want to talk about just briefly is the current market conditions. I think Staff is correct if you read the regulation. If you believe that a legally enforceable obligation was created on February 25, 2011, that's the date on which the information matters. Mnd I believe Mr. Brogan's argument has to do with whether or not Mr. Lauckhart's avoided cost calculation was correct, not the point at which that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with a couple of other people. You should really look at this more as a scientific matter and I think that's the kind of technical issue that this Commission would benefit from in terms of having a hearing on it and considering all the different opinions and then you can explore with Mr. Lewis what was the basis, what was the foundation for this? What else did you consider? Those things were not discussed at hearing, and I think that's absent from the record now. I believe the evidence you'll see in the record is that Mr. Lewis's forecast is on the lower end. And this was actually part of Mr. Lauckhart's prefiled direct testimony, I believe. I can't remember what exhibit it was, but it was attachment 5. So this was
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource that it doesn't need resources as though the market doesn't exist. It plays in the market. That's where the incremental activity takes place. And I think that's an important consideration when you take into account this hybrid methodology, which I really do think is a heads we win, tails you lose kind of methodology. The last issue I want to talk about just briefly is the current market conditions. I think Staff is correct if you read the regulation. If you believe that a legally enforceable obligation was created on February 25, 2011, that's the date on which the information matters. Mnd I believe Mr. Brogan's argument has to do with whether or not Mr. Lauckhart's avoided cost calculation was correct, not the point at which that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with a couple of other people. You should really look at this more as a scientific matter and I think that's the kind of technical issue that this Commission would benefit from in terms of having a hearing on it and considering all the different opinions and then you can explore with Mr. Lewis what was the basis, what was the foundation for this? What else did you consider? Those things were not discussed at hearing, and I think that's absent from the record now. I believe the evidence you'll see in the record is that Mr. Lewis's forecast is on the lower end. And this was actually part of Mr. Lauckhart's prefiled direct testimony, I believe. I can't remember what exhibit it was, but it was attachment 5. So this was always in the record. So I don't know why Mr. Brogan's
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource that it doesn't need resources as though the market doesn't exist. It plays in the market. That's where the incremental activity takes place. And I think that's an important consideration when you take into account this hybrid methodology, which I really do think is a heads we win, tails you lose kind of methodology. The last issue I want to talk about just briefly is the current market conditions. I think Staff is correct if you read the regulation. If you believe that a legally enforceable obligation was created on February 25, 2011, that's the date on which the information matters. Mad I believe Mr. Brogan's argument has to do with whether or not Mr. Lauckhart's avoided cost calculation was correct, not the point at which that calculation was made. That is my understanding is there's another hearing for that to determine whether he	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with a couple of other people. You should really look at this more as a scientific matter and I think that's the kind of technical issue that this Commission would benefit from in terms of having a hearing on it and considering all the different opinions and then you can explore with Mr. Lewis what was the basis, what was the foundation for this? What else did you consider? Those things were not discussed at hearing, and I think that's absent from the record now. I believe the evidence you'll see in the record is that Mr. Lewis's forecast is on the lower end. And this was actually part of Mr. Lauckhart's prefiled direct testimony, I believe. I can't remember what exhibit it was, but it was attachment 5. So this was
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource that it doesn't need resources as though the market doesn't exist. It plays in the market. That's where the incremental activity takes place. And I think that's an important consideration when you take into account this hybrid methodology, which I really do think is a heads we win, tails you lose kind of methodology. The last issue I want to talk about just briefly is the current market conditions. I think Staff is correct if you read the regulation. If you believe that a legally enforceable obligation was created on February 25, 2011, that's the date on which the information matters. And I believe Mr. Brogan's argument has to do with whether or not Mr. Lauckhart's avoided cost calculation was correct, not the point at which that calculation was made. That is my understanding is there's another hearing for that to determine whether he calculated avoided costs properly. But it's not the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with a couple of other people. You should really look at this more as a scientific matter and I think that's the kind of technical issue that this Commission would benefit from in terms of having a hearing on it and considering all the different opinions and then you can explore with Mr. Lewis what was the basis, what was the foundation for this? What else did you consider? Those things were not discussed at hearing, and I think that's absent from the record now. I believe the evidence you'll see in the record is that Mr. Lewis's forecast is on the lower end. And this was actually part of Mr. Lauckhart's prefiled direct testimony, I believe. I can't remember what exhibit it was, but it was attachment 5. So this was always in the record. So I don't know why Mr. Brogan's confused.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource that it doesn't need resources as though the market doesn't exist. It plays in the market. That's where the incremental activity takes place. And I think that's an important consideration when you take into account this hybrid methodology, which I really do think is a heads we win, tails you lose kind of methodology. The last issue I want to talk about just briefly is the current market conditions. I think Staff is correct if you read the regulation. If you believe that a legally enforceable obligation was created on February 25, 2011, that's the date on which the information matters. Mnd I believe Mr. Brogan's argument has to do with whether or not Mr. Lauckhart's avoided cost calculation was correct, not the point at which that calculation was made. That is my understanding is there's another hearing for that to determine whether he calculated avoided costs properly. But it's not the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with a couple of other people. You should really look at this more as a scientific matter and I think that's the kind of technical issue that this Commission would benefit from in terms of having a hearing on it and considering all the different opinions and then you can explore with Mr. Lewis what was the basis, what was the foundation for this? What else did you consider? Those things were not discussed at hearing, and I think that's absent from the record now. I believe the evidence you'll see in the record is that Mr. Lewis's forecast is on the lower end. And this was actually part of Mr. Lauckhart's prefiled direct testimony, I believe. I can't remember what exhibit it was, but it was attachment 5. So this was always in the record. So I don't know why Mr. Brogan's confused. Anyway, in closing what I'd like to say is on the three issues that we raise, we think the hybrid
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource that it doesn't need resources as though the market doesn't exist. It plays in the market. That's where the incremental activity takes place. And I think that's an important consideration when you take into account this hybrid methodology, which I really do think is a heads we win, tails you lose kind of methodology. The last issue I want to talk about just briefly is the current market conditions. I think Staff is correct if you read the regulation. If you believe that a legally enforceable obligation was created on February 25, 2011, that's the date on which the information matters. And I believe Mr. Brogan's argument has to do with whether or not Mr. Lauckhart's avoided cost calculation was made. That is my understanding is there's another hearing for that to determine whether he calculated avoided costs properly. But it's not the issue of whether current information should be considered. In other words, information today or	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with a couple of other people. You should really look at this more as a scientific matter and I think that's the kind of technical issue that this Commission would benefit from in terms of having a hearing on it and considering all the different opinions and then you can explore with Mr. Lewis what was the basis, what was the foundation for this? What else did you consider? Those things were not discussed at hearing, and I think that's absent from the record now. I believe the evidence you'll see in the record is that Mr. Lewis's forecast is on the lower end. And this was actually part of Mr. Lauckhart's prefiled direct testimony, I believe. I can't remember what exhibit it was, but it was attachment 5. So this was always in the record. So I don't know why Mr. Brogan's confused. Anyway, in closing what I'd like to say is on the three issues that we raise, we think the hybrid methodology is discriminatory. We think that it sets
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource that it doesn't need resources as though the market doesn't exist. It plays in the market. That's where the incremental activity takes place. And I think that's an important consideration when you take into account this hybrid methodology, which I really do think is a heads we win, tails you lose kind of methodology. The last issue I want to talk about just briefly is the current market conditions. I think Staff is correct if you read the regulation. If you believe that a legally enforceable obligation was created on February 25, 2011, that's the date on which the information matters. Mnd I believe Mr. Brogan's argument has to do with whether or not Mr. Lauckhart's avoided cost calculation was correct, not the point at which that calculation was made. That is my understanding is there's another hearing for that to determine whether he calculated avoided costs properly. But it's not the issue of whether current information should be considered. In other words, information today or anything that happened after February 25, 2011. That's a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with a couple of other people. You should really look at this more as a scientific matter and I think that's the kind of technical issue that this Commission would benefit from in terms of having a hearing on it and considering all the different opinions and then you can explore with Mr. Lewis what was the basis, what was the foundation for this? What else did you consider? Those things were not discussed at hearing, and I think that's absent from the record now. I believe the evidence you'll see in the record is that Mr. Lewis's forecast is on the lower end. And this was actually part of Mr. Lauckhart's prefiled direct testimony, I believe. I can't remember what exhibit it was, but it was attachment 5. So this was always in the record. So I don't know why Mr. Brogan's confused. Anyway, in closing what I'd like to say is on the three issues that we raise, we think that it sets too low an avoided cost. We are not saying what it is
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	The point is is that NorthWestern doesn't operate in the hours that it doesn't need resource that it doesn't need resources as though the market doesn't exist. It plays in the market. That's where the incremental activity takes place. And I think that's an important consideration when you take into account this hybrid methodology, which I really do think is a heads we win, tails you lose kind of methodology. The last issue I want to talk about just briefly is the current market conditions. I think Staff is correct if you read the regulation. If you believe that a legally enforceable obligation was created on February 25, 2011, that's the date on which the information matters. And I believe Mr. Brogan's argument has to do with whether or not Mr. Lauckhart's avoided cost calculation was made. That is my understanding is there's another hearing for that to determine whether he calculated avoided costs properly. But it's not the issue of whether current information should be considered. In other words, information today or	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	But that doesn't mean you stop with the first opinion that's based on nothing else than your conversation with a couple of other people. You should really look at this more as a scientific matter and I think that's the kind of technical issue that this Commission would benefit from in terms of having a hearing on it and considering all the different opinions and then you can explore with Mr. Lewis what was the basis, what was the foundation for this? What else did you consider? Those things were not discussed at hearing, and I think that's absent from the record now. I believe the evidence you'll see in the record is that Mr. Lewis's forecast is on the lower end. And this was actually part of Mr. Lauckhart's prefiled direct testimony, I believe. I can't remember what exhibit it was, but it was attachment 5. So this was always in the record. So I don't know why Mr. Brogan's confused. Anyway, in closing what I'd like to say is on the three issues that we raise, we think that it sets

10/09/2012 11:54:07 AM

	45		47
1	methodology.	1	Tree approached NorthWestern. Yes, NorthWestern believed
2	The second issue with respect to carbon costs, I	2	its avoided cost was what it stated and kept indicating
3	think we made clear what our position is on that.	3	that it needed to could only pay up to its avoided
4	Current information the same. We think the Commission	4	cost.
5	should find that there should be carbon costs, and we	5	What Mr. Uda did not say then is after the
6	think you shouldn't use current information. With	6	exchange of letters over a several-month period Oak Tree
7	respect to NorthWestern's argument that somehow carbon	7	disappeared for six months and didn't contact
8	cost inclusion would violate PURPA, I submit to you it	8	NorthWestern, and then suddenly in January there's a
9	makes no sense.	9	letter and in February there's a letter that says agree
10	And, second, the second argument on the LEO, I	10	to our price or we're going to sue you.
11	honestly don't know what else Oak Tree was supposed to	11	And then Mr. Uda says he doesn't know what else
12	do. They were left in a position where they were	12	Oak Tree could do. Quite frankly, I think it would have
13	bargaining against air. And if you're ever in that	13	been very, very simple. In the pricing term in the
14	situation and I think sometimes we all end up in that	14	contract that Oak Tree submitted strike out the dollars
15	situation, you know that you have no leverage.	15	and the inflation portion and say Northwestern offers to
16	The fact is the utility owns the marbles. They	16	sell you our power and commits to sell you our power at
17	have to let us be willing to play in their game. If they	17	the avoided cost as determined by the Commission. That's
18	want to tell us that we have to bring, you know, purees	18	all it would have taken.
19	or some kind of other marbles to the game, we would have	19	They did not do that. I have a lot of other
20	considered that. We would have discussed it with them.	20	things I'd like to say about the hybrid method, but I
21	The problem was no discussion took place.	21	won't. That's not within our motion so I won't say it.
22	If anything comes out of the Commission's	22	With respect to the carbon costs, I just want to
23	decision here, it should be that it's very clear that the	23	point out one thing very quickly. Mr. Uda just said that
24	utilities have an unconditional obligation to negotiate.	24	Mr. Lewis's carbon cost is at the lower end. He didn't
25	Because then you don't end up in these situations where	25	say it was out of the ballpark. It's at the lower end of
	46		48
1	there's arguments about whether an LEO was created based	1	estimates.
2	on the lack of bargaining. You end up with a clearer situation where you can then determine what rates should	2	And as the Commission will recall, NorthWestern has said all along that when you're binding rate payers
4	apply.	4	to pay something for 20 years you should make
5		-	
	And for example, even though there were	5	
6	And, for example, even though there were disputes, you know, there are ways of handling those	5 6	conservative assumptions and that the lower end is a
6	disputes, you know, there are ways of handling those	5 6 7	conservative assumptions and that the lower end is a conservative assumption.
6 7 8	disputes, you know, there are ways of handling those disputes. And I think that one of the things that you	6	conservative assumptions and that the lower end is a conservative assumption. Like Mr. Uda, I thank the Commission for its
7	disputes, you know, there are ways of handling those	6 7	conservative assumptions and that the lower end is a conservative assumption. Like Mr. Uda, I thank the Commission for its indulgence. I'm sorry that we're having to have so many
7 8	disputes, you know, there are ways of handling those disputes. And I think that one of the things that you can clearly say about everything that's happened in this particular case is we've been trying, and I've got the	6 7 8	conservative assumptions and that the lower end is a conservative assumption. Like Mr. Uda, I thank the Commission for its
7 8 9	disputes, you know, there are ways of handling those disputes. And I think that one of the things that you can clearly say about everything that's happened in this	6 7 8 9	conservative assumptions and that the lower end is a conservative assumption. Like Mr. Uda, I thank the Commission for its indulgence. I'm sorry that we're having to have so many hearings. I look forward to the Commission's order in
7 8 9 10	disputes, you know, there are ways of handling those disputes. And I think that one of the things that you can clearly say about everything that's happened in this particular case is we've been trying, and I've got the Makenses here today. They're still committed to selling	6 7 8 9 10	conservative assumptions and that the lower end is a conservative assumption. Like Mr. Uda, I thank the Commission for its indulgence. I'm sorry that we're having to have so many hearings. I look forward to the Commission's order in this matter and then probably our final hopefully our
7 8 9 10 11	disputes, you know, there are ways of handling those disputes. And I think that one of the things that you can clearly say about everything that's happened in this particular case is we've been trying, and I've got the Makenses here today. They're still committed to selling to NorthWestern. I don't know what else they could have	6 7 8 9 10 11	conservative assumptions and that the lower end is a conservative assumption. Like Mr. Uda, I thank the Commission for its indulgence. I'm sorry that we're having to have so many hearings. I look forward to the Commission's order in this matter and then probably our final hopefully our final hearing for the technical matters as Mr. Uda
7 8 9 10 11 12	disputes, you know, there are ways of handling those disputes. And I think that one of the things that you can clearly say about everything that's happened in this particular case is we've been trying, and I've got the Makenses here today. They're still committed to selling to NorthWestern. I don't know what else they could have done. They did everything within their power to bring	6 7 8 9 10 11 12	conservative assumptions and that the lower end is a conservative assumption. Like Mr. Uda, I thank the Commission for its indulgence. I'm sorry that we're having to have so many hearings. I look forward to the Commission's order in this matter and then probably our final hopefully our final hearing for the technical matters as Mr. Uda referred to them.
7 8 9 10 11 12 13	disputes, you know, there are ways of handling those disputes. And I think that one of the things that you can clearly say about everything that's happened in this particular case is we've been trying, and I've got the Makenses here today. They're still committed to selling to NorthWestern. I don't know what else they could have done. They did everything within their power to bring this process to a conclusion.	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	conservative assumptions and that the lower end is a conservative assumption. Like Mr. Uda, I thank the Commission for its indulgence. I'm sorry that we're having to have so many hearings. I look forward to the Commission's order in this matter and then probably our final hopefully our final hearing for the technical matters as Mr. Uda referred to them. Thank you.
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	disputes, you know, there are ways of handling those disputes. And I think that one of the things that you can clearly say about everything that's happened in this particular case is we've been trying, and I've got the Makenses here today. They're still committed to selling to NorthWestern. I don't know what else they could have done. They did everything within their power to bring this process to a conclusion. So with that, I would like to thank the	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	conservative assumptions and that the lower end is a conservative assumption. Like Mr. Uda, I thank the Commission for its indulgence. I'm sorry that we're having to have so many hearings. I look forward to the Commission's order in this matter and then probably our final hopefully our final hearing for the technical matters as Mr. Uda referred to them. Thank you. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. And I appreciate
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	disputes, you know, there are ways of handling those disputes. And I think that one of the things that you can clearly say about everything that's happened in this particular case is we've been trying, and I've got the Makenses here today. They're still committed to selling to NorthWestern. I don't know what else they could have done. They did everything within their power to bring this process to a conclusion. So with that, I would like to thank the Commission, Mr. Chair, Staff, for your indulgence, and	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	conservative assumptions and that the lower end is a conservative assumption. Like Mr. Uda, I thank the Commission for its indulgence. I'm sorry that we're having to have so many hearings. I look forward to the Commission's order in this matter and then probably our final hopefully our final hearing for the technical matters as Mr. Uda referred to them. Thank you. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. And I appreciate both sides appreciate your written submissions and
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	disputes, you know, there are ways of handling those disputes. And I think that one of the things that you can clearly say about everything that's happened in this particular case is we've been trying, and I've got the Makenses here today. They're still committed to selling to NorthWestern. I don't know what else they could have done. They did everything within their power to bring this process to a conclusion. So with that, I would like to thank the Commission, Mr. Chair, Staff, for your indulgence, and thank you for all your consideration.	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	conservative assumptions and that the lower end is a conservative assumption. Like Mr. Uda, I thank the Commission for its indulgence. I'm sorry that we're having to have so many hearings. I look forward to the Commission's order in this matter and then probably our final hopefully our final hearing for the technical matters as Mr. Uda referred to them. Thank you. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. And I appreciate both sides appreciate your written submissions and your brevity today. I did expect this to go longer.
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	disputes, you know, there are ways of handling those disputes. And I think that one of the things that you can clearly say about everything that's happened in this particular case is we've been trying, and I've got the Makenses here today. They're still committed to selling to NorthWestern. I don't know what else they could have done. They did everything within their power to bring this process to a conclusion. So with that, I would like to thank the Commission, Mr. Chair, Staff, for your indulgence, and thank you for all your consideration. CHAIRMAN NELSON: NorthWestern, time for your	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	conservative assumptions and that the lower end is a conservative assumption. Like Mr. Uda, I thank the Commission for its indulgence. I'm sorry that we're having to have so many hearings. I look forward to the Commission's order in this matter and then probably our final hopefully our final hearing for the technical matters as Mr. Uda referred to them. Thank you. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. And I appreciate both sides appreciate your written submissions and your brevity today. I did expect this to go longer. At this point we will turn to Commissioner questions. Commissioner Hanson, do you want to go first or
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	disputes, you know, there are ways of handling those disputes. And I think that one of the things that you can clearly say about everything that's happened in this particular case is we've been trying, and I've got the Makenses here today. They're still committed to selling to NorthWestern. I don't know what else they could have done. They did everything within their power to bring this process to a conclusion. So with that, I would like to thank the Commission, Mr. Chair, Staff, for your indulgence, and thank you for all your consideration. CHAIRMAN NELSON: NorthWestern, time for your rebuttal, limited to Oak Tree's rebuttal on your	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	conservative assumptions and that the lower end is a conservative assumption. Like Mr. Uda, I thank the Commission for its indulgence. I'm sorry that we're having to have so many hearings. I look forward to the Commission's order in this matter and then probably our final hopefully our final hearing for the technical matters as Mr. Uda referred to them. Thank you. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. And I appreciate both sides appreciate your written submissions and your brevity today. I did expect this to go longer. At this point we will turn to Commissioner questions.
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	disputes, you know, there are ways of handling those disputes. And I think that one of the things that you can clearly say about everything that's happened in this particular case is we've been trying, and I've got the Makenses here today. They're still committed to selling to NorthWestern. I don't know what else they could have done. They did everything within their power to bring this process to a conclusion. So with that, I would like to thank the Commission, Mr. Chair, Staff, for your indulgence, and thank you for all your consideration. CHAIRMAN NELSON: NorthWestern, time for your rebuttal, limited to Oak Tree's rebuttal on your application. 5 minutes. MR. BROGAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'll try to be very brief but 5 minutes is brief.	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	conservative assumptions and that the lower end is a conservative assumption. Like Mr. Uda, I thank the Commission for its indulgence. I'm sorry that we're having to have so many hearings. I look forward to the Commission's order in this matter and then probably our final hopefully our final hearing for the technical matters as Mr. Uda referred to them. Thank you. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. And I appreciate both sides appreciate your written submissions and your brevity today. I did expect this to go longer. At this point we will turn to Commissioner questions. Commissioner Hanson, do you want to go first or would you like us to? COMMISSIONER HANSON: Mr. Chair, I believe I've
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	disputes, you know, there are ways of handling those disputes. And I think that one of the things that you can clearly say about everything that's happened in this particular case is we've been trying, and I've got the Makenses here today. They're still committed to selling to NorthWestern. I don't know what else they could have done. They did everything within their power to bring this process to a conclusion. So with that, I would like to thank the Commission, Mr. Chair, Staff, for your indulgence, and thank you for all your consideration. CHAIRMAN NELSON: NorthWestern, time for your rebuttal, limited to Oak Tree's rebuttal on your application. 5 minutes. MR. BROGAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'll try to be very brief but 5 minutes is brief. First off, with respect to the LEO issue,	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	conservative assumptions and that the lower end is a conservative assumption. Like Mr. Uda, I thank the Commission for its indulgence. I'm sorry that we're having to have so many hearings. I look forward to the Commission's order in this matter and then probably our final hopefully our final hearing for the technical matters as Mr. Uda referred to them. Thank you. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. And I appreciate both sides appreciate your written submissions and your brevity today. I did expect this to go longer. At this point we will turn to Commissioner questions. COMMISSIONER HANSON: Mr. Chair, I believe I've had every opportunity I ever wanted to in a docket to
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	disputes, you know, there are ways of handling those disputes. And I think that one of the things that you can clearly say about everything that's happened in this particular case is we've been trying, and I've got the Makenses here today. They're still committed to selling to NorthWestern. I don't know what else they could have done. They did everything within their power to bring this process to a conclusion. So with that, I would like to thank the Commission, Mr. Chair, Staff, for your indulgence, and thank you for all your consideration. CHAIRMAN NELSON: NorthWestern, time for your rebuttal, limited to Oak Tree's rebuttal on your application. 5 minutes. MR. BROGAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'll try to be very brief but 5 minutes is brief. First off, with respect to the LEO issue, Mr. Uda has basically indicated that NorthWestern failed	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	conservative assumptions and that the lower end is a conservative assumption. Like Mr. Uda, I thank the Commission for its indulgence. I'm sorry that we're having to have so many hearings. I look forward to the Commission's order in this matter and then probably our final hopefully our final hearing for the technical matters as Mr. Uda referred to them. Thank you. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. And I appreciate both sides appreciate your written submissions and your brevity today. I did expect this to go longer. At this point we will turn to Commissioner questions. COMMISSIONER HANSON: Mr. Chair, I believe I've had every opportunity I ever wanted to in a docket to fully apprise myself of issues, especially on this one.
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	disputes, you know, there are ways of handling those disputes. And I think that one of the things that you can clearly say about everything that's happened in this particular case is we've been trying, and I've got the Makenses here today. They're still committed to selling to NorthWestern. I don't know what else they could have done. They did everything within their power to bring this process to a conclusion. So with that, I would like to thank the Commission, Mr. Chair, Staff, for your indulgence, and thank you for all your consideration. CHAIRMAN NELSON: NorthWestern, time for your rebuttal, limited to Oak Tree's rebuttal on your application. 5 minutes. MR. BROGAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'll try to be very brief but 5 minutes is brief. First off, with respect to the LEO issue,	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	conservative assumptions and that the lower end is a conservative assumption. Like Mr. Uda, I thank the Commission for its indulgence. I'm sorry that we're having to have so many hearings. I look forward to the Commission's order in this matter and then probably our final hopefully our final hearing for the technical matters as Mr. Uda referred to them. Thank you. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. And I appreciate both sides appreciate your written submissions and your brevity today. I did expect this to go longer. At this point we will turn to Commissioner questions. COMMISSIONER HANSON: Mr. Chair, I believe I've had every opportunity I ever wanted to in a docket to

	49	T	51
1	CHAIRMAN NELSON: Commissioner Fiegen?	1	reflects the utility's avoided cost. Because once you
2	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: You can start.	2	establish that avoided cost, then you will get projects
3	CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. I do have questions.	3	that can perform at that level.
4	Mr. Uda, and I think you hinted at this, but I	4	The problem here is that we had an enormous
5	just need to ask it very, very directly. Once this	5	difficulty getting any information out of NorthWestern
6	Commission sets the avoided cost does Oak Tree have an	6	about what its avoided costs were and, in fact, a lot of
7	absolute obligation to deliver at that cost, given our	7	that information didn't appear until we had to file a
8	finding that an LEO was created?	8	Motion To Compel in this matter.
9	MR. UDA: Mr. Chairman, it would be tempting for	9	So, you know, for us to say that we know as a
10	me to say that no matter what the rate is they have an	10	matter of fact whatever rate the Commission sets we
11	obligation to deliver. And I think that technically that	11	have to deliver, I don't think that's the legally
12	might be the case. But I think financially if they can't	12	enforceable obligation issue. I think that's a practical
13	do it I mean, can I just clarify what I'm trying to	13	issue.
14	say?	14	Is NorthWestern out anything if it doesn't get
15	CHAIRMAN NELSON: Feel free. We've got time.	15	output from NorthWestern and NorthWestern fails to
16	MR. UDA: Okay. So let's suppose the following	16	perform? Well, I suppose if they had this in their
17	circumstance happens. Let's suppose that you know that	17	resource queue and they were forestalling other
18	in order for you to actually build the project and make	18	investment decisions, it might be possible that they
19	any money you need \$50 a megawatt hour. Let's just	19	do.
20	suppose that as a hypothetical. And suppose the	20	But if that's the case, there's a solution to
21	Commission comes back at 10. Now at that point you can't	21	that. And, for example, Idaho is dealing with this issue
22	even buy your equipment. So obviously in that case if	22	of delayed performance, liquidated damages, and that's an
23	you say, well, it's an unconditional commitment, does	23	issue that I think the Commission could decide. But
24	that mean that you have to build your project and operate	24	that's a separate issue from whether or not a legally
25	it at a loss?	25	enforceable obligation exists in the first place. It's a
	50		52
1	I think that's not what FERC intended. What I	1	term of art and it isn't intended to bind a qualifying
1 2	I think that's not what FERC intended. What I think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a	1 2	term of art and it isn't intended to bind a qualifying facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission
2	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a	2	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission
23	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a legally enforceable obligation, and by that they mean you	2 3	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission sets.
2 3 4	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a legally enforceable obligation, and by that they mean you commit to sell your output to a utility, you have an	2 3 4	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission sets. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. The other question
2 3 4 5	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a legally enforceable obligation, and by that they mean you commit to sell your output to a utility, you have an obligation at that point to deliver that output to that	2 3 4 5	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission sets. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. The other question that I've got for you, several, is there a carbon cost
2 3 4 5 6	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a legally enforceable obligation, and by that they mean you commit to sell your output to a utility, you have an obligation at that point to deliver that output to that utility. You can't sell it to somebody else. You can't	2 3 4 5 6	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission sets. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. The other question that I've got for you, several, is there a carbon cost today? Mr. Brogan has told us there isn't. Do you concur with that? MR. UDA: I do. But if I might add to that,
2 3 4 5 6 7	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a legally enforceable obligation, and by that they mean you commit to sell your output to a utility, you have an obligation at that point to deliver that output to that utility. You can't sell it to somebody else. You can't sell it into the market. You can't play the market. You	2 3 4 5 6 7	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission sets. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. The other question that I've got for you, several, is there a carbon cost today? Mr. Brogan has told us there isn't. Do you concur with that?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a legally enforceable obligation, and by that they mean you commit to sell your output to a utility, you have an obligation at that point to deliver that output to that utility. You can't sell it to somebody else. You can't sell it into the market. You can't play the market. You have to sell it. If it's not financially feasible for you even to build the project, at that point, then even though there	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission sets. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. The other question that I've got for you, several, is there a carbon cost today? Mr. Brogan has told us there isn't. Do you concur with that? MR. UDA: I do. But if I might add to that, Commissioner Nelson, we are trying our best to get a handle on what the situation is going to be. And I think
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a legally enforceable obligation, and by that they mean you commit to sell your output to a utility, you have an obligation at that point to deliver that output to that utility. You can't sell it to somebody else. You can't sell it into the market. You can't play the market. You have to sell it. If it's not financially feasible for you even to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission sets. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. The other question that I've got for you, several, is there a carbon cost today? Mr. Brogan has told us there isn't. Do you concur with that? MR. UDA: I do. But if I might add to that, Commissioner Nelson, we are trying our best to get a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a legally enforceable obligation, and by that they mean you commit to sell your output to a utility, you have an obligation at that point to deliver that output to that utility. You can't sell it to somebody else. You can't sell it into the market. You can't play the market. You have to sell it. If it's not financially feasible for you even to build the project, at that point, then even though there might be a legally enforceable obligation, it's just not going to happen.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission sets. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. The other question that I've got for you, several, is there a carbon cost today? Mr. Brogan has told us there isn't. Do you concur with that? MR. UDA: I do. But if I might add to that, Commissioner Nelson, we are trying our best to get a handle on what the situation is going to be. And I think that's kind of the case for all estimates of everything that goes into the avoided cost calculation.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a legally enforceable obligation, and by that they mean you commit to sell your output to a utility, you have an obligation at that point to deliver that output to that utility. You can't sell it to somebody else. You can't sell it into the market. You can't play the market. You have to sell it. If it's not financially feasible for you even to build the project, at that point, then even though there might be a legally enforceable obligation, it's just not going to happen. So I think that's one way of looking at it.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission sets. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. The other question that I've got for you, several, is there a carbon cost today? Mr. Brogan has told us there isn't. Do you concur with that? MR. UDA: I do. But if I might add to that, Commissioner Nelson, we are trying our best to get a handle on what the situation is going to be. And I think that's kind of the case for all estimates of everything that goes into the avoided cost calculation. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Is it possible that there will
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a legally enforceable obligation, and by that they mean you commit to sell your output to a utility, you have an obligation at that point to deliver that output to that utility. You can't sell it to somebody else. You can't sell it into the market. You can't play the market. You have to sell it. If it's not financially feasible for you even to build the project, at that point, then even though there might be a legally enforceable obligation, it's just not going to happen. So I think that's one way of looking at it. And I think this is kind of what Mr. Brogan was	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission sets. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. The other question that I've got for you, several, is there a carbon cost today? Mr. Brogan has told us there isn't. Do you concur with that? MR. UDA: I do. But if I might add to that, Commissioner Nelson, we are trying our best to get a handle on what the situation is going to be. And I think that's kind of the case for all estimates of everything that goes into the avoided cost calculation. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Is it possible that there will not be a carbon cost over the next 20 years?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a legally enforceable obligation, and by that they mean you commit to sell your output to a utility, you have an obligation at that point to deliver that output to that utility. You can't sell it to somebody else. You can't sell it into the market. You can't play the market. You have to sell it. If it's not financially feasible for you even to build the project, at that point, then even though there might be a legally enforceable obligation, it's just not going to happen. So I think that's one way of looking at it. And I think this is kind of what Mr. Brogan was kind of hinting at. You know, the point is is that we	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission sets. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. The other question that I've got for you, several, is there a carbon cost today? Mr. Brogan has told us there isn't. Do you concur with that? MR. UDA: I do. But if I might add to that, Commissioner Nelson, we are trying our best to get a handle on what the situation is going to be. And I think that's kind of the case for all estimates of everything that goes into the avoided cost calculation. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Is it possible that there will not be a carbon cost over the next 20 years? MR. UDA: I think that that is a vanishing
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a legally enforceable obligation, and by that they mean you commit to sell your output to a utility, you have an obligation at that point to deliver that output to that utility. You can't sell it to somebody else. You can't sell it into the market. You can't play the market. You have to sell it. If it's not financially feasible for you even to build the project, at that point, then even though there might be a legally enforceable obligation, it's just not going to happen. So I think that's one way of looking at it. And I think this is kind of what Mr. Brogan was kind of hinting at. You know, the point is is that we tendered a contract to NorthWestern and there isn't any	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission sets. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. The other question that I've got for you, several, is there a carbon cost today? Mr. Brogan has told us there isn't. Do you concur with that? MR. UDA: I do. But if I might add to that, Commissioner Nelson, we are trying our best to get a handle on what the situation is going to be. And I think that's kind of the case for all estimates of everything that goes into the avoided cost calculation. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Is it possible that there will not be a carbon cost over the next 20 years? MR. UDA: I think that that is a vanishing improbability. I think that if Congress doesn't act to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a legally enforceable obligation, and by that they mean you commit to sell your output to a utility, you have an obligation at that point to deliver that output to that utility. You can't sell it to somebody else. You can't sell it into the market. You can't play the market. You have to sell it. If it's not financially feasible for you even to build the project, at that point, then even though there might be a legally enforceable obligation, it's just not going to happen. So I think that's one way of looking at it. And I think this is kind of what Mr. Brogan was kind of hinting at. You know, the point is is that we tendered a contract to NorthWestern and there isn't any performance penalty in it.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission sets. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. The other question that I've got for you, several, is there a carbon cost today? Mr. Brogan has told us there isn't. Do you concur with that? MR. UDA: I do. But if I might add to that, Commissioner Nelson, we are trying our best to get a handle on what the situation is going to be. And I think that's kind of the case for all estimates of everything that goes into the avoided cost calculation. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Is it possible that there will not be a carbon cost over the next 20 years? MR. UDA: I think that that is a vanishing improbability. I think that if Congress doesn't act to do something like Waxman-Markey, EPA is going to do it.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a legally enforceable obligation, and by that they mean you commit to sell your output to a utility, you have an obligation at that point to deliver that output to that utility. You can't sell it to somebody else. You can't sell it into the market. You can't play the market. You have to sell it. If it's not financially feasible for you even to build the project, at that point, then even though there might be a legally enforceable obligation, it's just not going to happen. So I think that's one way of looking at it. And I think this is kind of what Mr. Brogan was kind of hinting at. You know, the point is is that we tendered a contract to NorthWestern and there isn't any performance penalty in it. So, for example, if they wanted a performance	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission sets. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. The other question that I've got for you, several, is there a carbon cost today? Mr. Brogan has told us there isn't. Do you concur with that? MR. UDA: I do. But if I might add to that, Commissioner Nelson, we are trying our best to get a handle on what the situation is going to be. And I think that's kind of the case for all estimates of everything that goes into the avoided cost calculation. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Is it possible that there will not be a carbon cost over the next 20 years? MR. UDA: I think that if Congress doesn't act to do something like Waxman-Markey, EPA is going to do it. I think the Supreme Court has told them they have to do
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a legally enforceable obligation, and by that they mean you commit to sell your output to a utility, you have an obligation at that point to deliver that output to that utility. You can't sell it to somebody else. You can't sell it into the market. You can't play the market. You have to sell it. If it's not financially feasible for you even to build the project, at that point, then even though there might be a legally enforceable obligation, it's just not going to happen. So I think that's one way of looking at it. And I think this is kind of what Mr. Brogan was kind of hinting at. You know, the point is is that we tendered a contract to NorthWestern and there isn't any performance penalty in it. So, for example, if they wanted a performance penalty, that's some they could have negotiated for.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission sets. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. The other question that I've got for you, several, is there a carbon cost today? Mr. Brogan has told us there isn't. Do you concur with that? MR. UDA: I do. But if I might add to that, Commissioner Nelson, we are trying our best to get a handle on what the situation is going to be. And I think that's kind of the case for all estimates of everything that goes into the avoided cost calculation. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Is it possible that there will not be a carbon cost over the next 20 years? MR. UDA: I think that that is a vanishing improbability. I think that if Congress doesn't act to do something like Waxman-Markey, EPA is going to do it. I think the Supreme Court has told them they have to do it. I think the D.C. circuit has affirmed the method
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a legally enforceable obligation, and by that they mean you commit to sell your output to a utility, you have an obligation at that point to deliver that output to that utility. You can't sell it to somebody else. You can't sell it into the market. You can't play the market. You have to sell it. If it's not financially feasible for you even to build the project, at that point, then even though there might be a legally enforceable obligation, it's just not going to happen. So I think that's one way of looking at it. And I think this is kind of what Mr. Brogan was kind of hinting at. You know, the point is is that we tendered a contract to NorthWestern and there isn't any performance penalty in it. So, for example, if they wanted a performance penalty, that's something they could have negotiated for. They didn't say anything about it at all until this	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission sets. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. The other question that I've got for you, several, is there a carbon cost today? Mr. Brogan has told us there isn't. Do you concur with that? MR. UDA: I do. But if I might add to that, Commissioner Nelson, we are trying our best to get a handle on what the situation is going to be. And I think that's kind of the case for all estimates of everything that goes into the avoided cost calculation. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Is it possible that there will not be a carbon cost over the next 20 years? MR. UDA: I think that that is a vanishing improbability. I think that if Congress doesn't act to do something like Waxman-Markey, EPA is going to do it. I think the Supreme Court has told them they have to do it. I think the D.C. circuit has affirmed the method that they have used is appropriate. The question of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a legally enforceable obligation, and by that they mean you commit to sell your output to a utility, you have an obligation at that point to deliver that output to that utility. You can't sell it to somebody else. You can't sell it into the market. You can't play the market. You have to sell it. If it's not financially feasible for you even to build the project, at that point, then even though there might be a legally enforceable obligation, it's just not going to happen. So I think that's one way of looking at it. And I think this is kind of what Mr. Brogan was kind of hinting at. You know, the point is is that we tendered a contract to NorthWestern and there isn't any performance penalty in it. So, for example, if they wanted a performance penalty, that's something they could have negotiated for. They didn't say anything about it at all until this proceeding commenced. So they're obviously unhappy with	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission sets. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. The other question that I've got for you, several, is there a carbon cost today? Mr. Brogan has told us there isn't. Do you concur with that? MR. UDA: I do. But if I might add to that, Commissioner Nelson, we are trying our best to get a handle on what the situation is going to be. And I think that's kind of the case for all estimates of everything that goes into the avoided cost calculation. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Is it possible that there will not be a carbon cost over the next 20 years? MR. UDA: I think that that is a vanishing improbability. I think that if Congress doesn't act to do something like Waxman-Markey, EPA is going to do it. I think the Supreme Court has told them they have to do it. I think the D.C. circuit has affirmed the method that they have used is appropriate. The question of costs is going to be something that's going to have to be
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a legally enforceable obligation, and by that they mean you commit to sell your output to a utility, you have an obligation at that point to deliver that output to that utility. You can't sell it to somebody else. You can't sell it not the market. You can't play the market. You have to sell it. If it's not financially feasible for you even to build the project, at that point, then even though there might be a legally enforceable obligation, it's just not going to happen. So I think that's one way of looking at it. And I think this is kind of what Mr. Brogan was kind of hinting at. You know, the point is is that we tendered a contract to NorthWestern and there isn't any performance penalty in it. So, for example, if they wanted a performance penalty, that's something they could have negotiated for. They didn't say anything about it at all until this proceeding commenced. So they're obviously unhappy with the lack of that. But I think that's one way you can	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission sets. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. The other question that I've got for you, several, is there a carbon cost today? Mr. Brogan has told us there isn't. Do you concur with that? MR. UDA: I do. But if I might add to that, Commissioner Nelson, we are trying our best to get a handle on what the situation is going to be. And I think that's kind of the case for all estimates of everything that goes into the avoided cost calculation. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Is it possible that there will not be a carbon cost over the next 20 years? MR. UDA: I think that that is a vanishing improbability. I think that if Congress doesn't act to do something like Waxman-Markey, EPA is going to do it. I think the Supreme Court has told them they have to do it. I think the D.C. circuit has affirmed the method that they have used is appropriate. The question of costs is going to be something that's going to have to be considered.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a legally enforceable obligation, and by that they mean you commit to sell your output to a utility, you have an obligation at that point to deliver that output to that utility. You can't sell it to somebody else. You can't sell it not the market. You can't play the market. You have to sell it. If it's not financially feasible for you even to build the project, at that point, then even though there might be a legally enforceable obligation, it's just not going to happen. So I think that's one way of looking at it. And I think this is kind of what Mr. Brogan was kind of hinting at. You know, the point is is that we tendered a contract to NorthWestern and there isn't any performance penalty in it. So, for example, if they wanted a performance penalty, that's something they could have negotiated for. They didn't say anything about it at all until this proceeding commenced. So they're obviously unhappy with the lack of that. But I think that's one way you can ensure performance.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission sets. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. The other question that I've got for you, several, is there a carbon cost today? Mr. Brogan has told us there isn't. Do you concur with that? MR. UDA: I do. But if I might add to that, Commissioner Nelson, we are trying our best to get a handle on what the situation is going to be. And I think that's kind of the case for all estimates of everything that goes into the avoided cost calculation. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Is it possible that there will not be a carbon cost over the next 20 years? MR. UDA: I think that that is a vanishing improbability. I think that if Congress doesn't act to do something like Waxman-Markey, EPA is going to do it. I think the Supreme Court has told them they have to do it. I think the D.C. circuit has affirmed the method that they have used is appropriate. The question of costs is going to be something that's going to have to be considered. But I think that in the alternative to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	think FERC intended is to say, okay, once you have a legally enforceable obligation, and by that they mean you commit to sell your output to a utility, you have an obligation at that point to deliver that output to that utility. You can't sell it to somebody else. You can't sell it not the market. You can't play the market. You have to sell it. If it's not financially feasible for you even to build the project, at that point, then even though there might be a legally enforceable obligation, it's just not going to happen. So I think that's one way of looking at it. And I think this is kind of what Mr. Brogan was kind of hinting at. You know, the point is is that we tendered a contract to NorthWestern and there isn't any performance penalty in it. So, for example, if they wanted a performance penalty, that's something they could have negotiated for. They didn't say anything about it at all until this proceeding commenced. So they're obviously unhappy with the lack of that. But I think that's one way you can	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	facility to deliver no matter what rate the Commission sets. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. The other question that I've got for you, several, is there a carbon cost today? Mr. Brogan has told us there isn't. Do you concur with that? MR. UDA: I do. But if I might add to that, Commissioner Nelson, we are trying our best to get a handle on what the situation is going to be. And I think that's kind of the case for all estimates of everything that goes into the avoided cost calculation. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Is it possible that there will not be a carbon cost over the next 20 years? MR. UDA: I think that that is a vanishing improbability. I think that if Congress doesn't act to do something like Waxman-Markey, EPA is going to do it. I think the Supreme Court has told them they have to do it. I think the D.C. circuit has affirmed the method that they have used is appropriate. The question of costs is going to be something that's going to have to be considered.

	53		55
1	to do, it's going to be substantially more expensive than	1	saying that the parties have to agree on a price in order
2	a cap and trade. That's my opinion and not based on	2	for it to be created. And then I think you talked about
3	anything in this record.	3	the fact that if Oak Tree had simply said we're going to
4	But I think that's one of the reasons having a	4	leave it up to the Commission.
5	technical hearing on this issue might clarify some of	5	And so is it your understanding that really the
6	these better. You wouldn't have to listen to me. You	6	only way a LEO can be created is if that price question
7	could actually listen to someone who actually knows what	7	is left to a Commission in every case?
8	they're talking about.	8	MR. BROGAN: Mr. Chairman, no. I don't believe
9	CHAIRMAN NELSON: Ms. Cremer, you've talked	9	that.
10	on the same issue of carbon costs, you talked about the	10	I believe that's the situation in this case. I
11	fact that we should include calculating the probability.	11	would point out as an example that is different is that
12	Is there anything in the record that speaks to	12	in the state of Texas, for instance, the Public Utilities
13	probability?	13	Commission has adopted a rule that an LEO cannot be
14	MS. CREMER: As you know, I wasn't the attorney	14	created until the QF can show it can deliver energy
15	on that so I will let Mr. Rounds who was at the hearing	14	within 90 days. Which basically as a practical matter I
16	address that.	16	think we would all agree means the QF has to build before
17	MR. ROUNDS: Yeah. I think the only thing	17	it can create an LEO. And that provision has been upheld
18	that you're going to find in the record is my own	18	by the courts.
19	testimony.	19	But, you know, the point is that to create an
20	CHAIRMAN NELSON: And can you refresh me on	20	LEO, in my opinion, at a minimum a QF has to commit to
20	that.	20	deliver power at the avoided cost. And I think I would
22	MR. ROUNDS: Yeah. I had just made the	22	add that, you know, utilities are prohibited from paying
23	suggestion that because utilities typically when they're	23	more than avoided cost and they're prohibited from paying
24	doing resource planning and taking carbon costs into	24	less.
25	account they'll look at a case in which there is a carbon	25	CHAIRMAN NELSON: Thank you. No further
20	54	20	56
	54		50
1	cost or there is a low carbon cost and they'll look at a	1	questions
1	cost or there is a low carbon cost and they'll look at a case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based	1	questions.
2	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based	2	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a
2 3	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of	2 3	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to
2 3 4	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables	2 3 4	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you
2 3 4 5	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables held constant.	2 3 4 5	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you went back to the fall of 2010 and the Commission kind of
2 3 4 5 6	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables held constant. So if	2 3 4 5 6	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you went back to the fall of 2010 and the Commission kind of wanted current. And we understand that maybe that's not
2 3 4 5 6 7	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables held constant. So if CHAIRMAN NELSON: Go ahead.	2 3 4 5 6 7	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you went back to the fall of 2010 and the Commission kind of wanted current. And we understand that maybe that's not perfect either. And the report actually didn't come out
2 3 4 5 6	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables held constant. So if CHAIRMAN NELSON: Go ahead. MR. ROUNDS: For example, if, say, in the no	2 3 4 5 6	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you went back to the fall of 2010 and the Commission kind of wanted current. And we understand that maybe that's not perfect either. And the report actually didn't come out until the spring of 2011, but I'm sure a lot of work was
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables held constant. So if CHAIRMAN NELSON: Go ahead. MR. ROUNDS: For example, if, say, in the no carbon situation the decision is going to result in a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you went back to the fall of 2010 and the Commission kind of wanted current. And we understand that maybe that's not perfect either. And the report actually didn't come out until the spring of 2011, but I'm sure a lot of work was done by February 25 or March 1 or whatever.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables held constant. So if CHAIRMAN NELSON: Go ahead. MR. ROUNDS: For example, if, say, in the no	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you went back to the fall of 2010 and the Commission kind of wanted current. And we understand that maybe that's not perfect either. And the report actually didn't come out until the spring of 2011, but I'm sure a lot of work was
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables held constant. So if CHAIRMAN NELSON: Go ahead. MR. ROUNDS: For example, if, say, in the no carbon situation the decision is going to result in a cost of \$50 million but in the case of a the high	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you went back to the fall of 2010 and the Commission kind of wanted current. And we understand that maybe that's not perfect either. And the report actually didn't come out until the spring of 2011, but I'm sure a lot of work was done by February 25 or March 1 or whatever. How can we acquire that information or how can
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables held constant. So if CHAIRMAN NELSON: Go ahead. MR. ROUNDS: For example, if, say, in the no carbon situation the decision is going to result in a cost of \$50 million but in the case of a the high carbon price you see the cost of or a benefit of \$100	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you went back to the fall of 2010 and the Commission kind of wanted current. And we understand that maybe that's not perfect either. And the report actually didn't come out until the spring of 2011, but I'm sure a lot of work was done by February 25 or March 1 or whatever. How can we acquire that information or how can we work together to try to get the information that is
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables held constant. So if CHAIRMAN NELSON: Go ahead. MR. ROUNDS: For example, if, say, in the no carbon situation the decision is going to result in a cost of \$50 million but in the case of a the high carbon price you see the cost of or a benefit of \$100 million, it gives them that information to know what	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you went back to the fall of 2010 and the Commission kind of wanted current. And we understand that maybe that's not perfect either. And the report actually didn't come out until the spring of 2011, but I'm sure a lot of work was done by February 25 or March 1 or whatever. How can we acquire that information or how can we work together to try to get the information that is more current on February 25 instead of the old
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables held constant. So if CHAIRMAN NELSON: Go ahead. MR. ROUNDS: For example, if, say, in the no carbon situation the decision is going to result in a cost of \$50 million but in the case of a the high carbon price you see the cost of or a benefit of \$100 million, it gives them that information to know what their risk is given those futures.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you went back to the fall of 2010 and the Commission kind of wanted current. And we understand that maybe that's not perfect either. And the report actually didn't come out until the spring of 2011, but I'm sure a lot of work was done by February 25 or March 1 or whatever. How can we acquire that information or how can we work together to try to get the information that is more current on February 25 instead of the old information from the fall?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables held constant. So if CHAIRMAN NELSON: Go ahead. MR. ROUNDS: For example, if, say, in the no carbon situation the decision is going to result in a cost of \$50 million but in the case of a the high carbon price you see the cost of or a benefit of \$100 million, it gives them that information to know what their risk is given those futures. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Well, and I understand that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you went back to the fall of 2010 and the Commission kind of wanted current. And we understand that maybe that's not perfect either. And the report actually didn't come out until the spring of 2011, but I'm sure a lot of work was done by February 25 or March 1 or whatever. How can we acquire that information or how can we work together to try to get the information that is more current on February 25 instead of the old information from the fall? MR. UDA: That's a good question, Commissioner
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables held constant. So if CHAIRMAN NELSON: Go ahead. MR. ROUNDS: For example, if, say, in the no carbon situation the decision is going to result in a cost of \$50 million but in the case of a the high carbon price you see the cost of or a benefit of \$100 million, it gives them that information to know what their risk is given those futures. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Well, and I understand that you can run scenarios using high numbers and low numbers	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you went back to the fall of 2010 and the Commission kind of wanted current. And we understand that maybe that's not perfect either. And the report actually didn't come out until the spring of 2011, but I'm sure a lot of work was done by February 25 or March 1 or whatever. How can we acquire that information or how can we work together to try to get the information that is more current on February 25 instead of the old information from the fall? MR. UDA: That's a good question, Commissioner Fiegen.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables held constant. So if CHAIRMAN NELSON: Go ahead. MR. ROUNDS: For example, if, say, in the no carbon situation the decision is going to result in a cost of \$50 million but in the case of a the high carbon price you see the cost of or a benefit of \$100 million, it gives them that information to know what their risk is given those futures. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Well, and I understand that you can run scenarios using high numbers and low numbers to get a range of what's of what those different	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you went back to the fall of 2010 and the Commission kind of wanted current. And we understand that maybe that's not perfect either. And the report actually didn't come out until the spring of 2011, but I'm sure a lot of work was done by February 25 or March 1 or whatever. How can we acquire that information or how can we work together to try to get the information that is more current on February 25 instead of the old information from the fall? MR. UDA: That's a good question, Commissioner Fiegen. What actually transpired. First, I'll just tell
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables held constant. So if CHAIRMAN NELSON: Go ahead. MR. ROUNDS: For example, if, say, in the no carbon situation the decision is going to result in a cost of \$50 million but in the case of a the high carbon price you see the cost of or a benefit of \$100 million, it gives them that information to know what their risk is given those futures. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Well, and I understand that you can run scenarios using high numbers and low numbers to get a range of what's of what those different possibilities would be, but that still doesn't give us	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you went back to the fall of 2010 and the Commission kind of wanted current. And we understand that maybe that's not perfect either. And the report actually didn't come out until the spring of 2011, but I'm sure a lot of work was done by February 25 or March 1 or whatever. How can we acquire that information or how can we work together to try to get the information that is more current on February 25 instead of the old information from the fall? MR. UDA: That's a good question, Commissioner Fiegen. What actually transpired. First, I'll just tell you what we did. We used the November 2010 Black &
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables held constant. So if CHAIRMAN NELSON: Go ahead. MR. ROUNDS: For example, if, say, in the no carbon situation the decision is going to result in a cost of \$50 million but in the case of a the high carbon price you see the cost of or a benefit of \$100 million, it gives them that information to know what their risk is given those futures. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Well, and I understand that you can run scenarios using high numbers and low numbers to get a range of what's of what those different possibilities would be, but that still doesn't give us any testimony as to what the actual probability is of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you went back to the fall of 2010 and the Commission kind of wanted current. And we understand that maybe that's not perfect either. And the report actually didn't come out until the spring of 2011, but I'm sure a lot of work was done by February 25 or March 1 or whatever. How can we acquire that information or how can we work together to try to get the information that is more current on February 25 instead of the old information from the fall? MR. UDA: That's a good question, Commissioner Fiegen. What actually transpired. First, I'll just tell you what we did. We used the November 2010 Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective, the fall one, didn't
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables held constant. So if CHAIRMAN NELSON: Go ahead. MR. ROUNDS: For example, if, say, in the no carbon situation the decision is going to result in a cost of \$50 million but in the case of a the high carbon price you see the cost of or a benefit of \$100 million, it gives them that information to know what their risk is given those futures. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Well, and I understand that you can run scenarios using high numbers and low numbers to get a range of what's of what those different possibilities would be, but that still doesn't give us any testimony as to what the actual probability is of either of those actually happening.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you went back to the fall of 2010 and the Commission kind of wanted current. And we understand that maybe that's not perfect either. And the report actually didn't come out until the spring of 2011, but I'm sure a lot of work was done by February 25 or March 1 or whatever. How can we acquire that information or how can we work together to try to get the information that is more current on February 25 instead of the old information from the fall? MR. UDA: That's a good question, Commissioner Fiegen. What actually transpired. First, I'll just tell you what we did. We used the November 2010 Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective, the fall one, didn't come out until November. It usually takes them six
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables held constant. So if CHAIRMAN NELSON: Go ahead. MR. ROUNDS: For example, if, say, in the no carbon situation the decision is going to result in a cost of \$50 million but in the case of a the high carbon price you see the cost of or a benefit of \$100 million, it gives them that information to know what their risk is given those futures. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Well, and I understand that you can run scenarios using high numbers and low numbers to get a range of what's of what those different possibilities would be, but that still doesn't give us any testimony as to what the actual probability is of either of those actually happening. MR. ROUNDS: Right. And my testimony on that,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you went back to the fall of 2010 and the Commission kind of wanted current. And we understand that maybe that's not perfect either. And the report actually didn't come out until the spring of 2011, but I'm sure a lot of work was done by February 25 or March 1 or whatever. How can we acquire that information or how can we work together to try to get the information that is more current on February 25 instead of the old information from the fall? MR. UDA: That's a good question, Commissioner Fiegen. What actually transpired. First, I'll just tell you what we did. We used the November 2010 Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective, the fall one, didn't come out until November. It usually takes them six months to get everything put together because they have
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables held constant. So if CHAIRMAN NELSON: Go ahead. MR. ROUNDS: For example, if, say, in the no carbon situation the decision is going to result in a cost of \$50 million but in the case of a the high carbon price you see the cost of or a benefit of \$100 million, it gives them that information to know what their risk is given those futures. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Well, and I understand that you can run scenarios using high numbers and low numbers to get a range of what's of what those different possibilities would be, but that still doesn't give us any testimony as to what the actual probability is of either of those actually happening. MR. ROUNDS: Right. And my testimony on that, as I recall, was that we think that is a pretty	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you went back to the fall of 2010 and the Commission kind of wanted current. And we understand that maybe that's not perfect either. And the report actually didn't come out until the spring of 2011, but I'm sure a lot of work was done by February 25 or March 1 or whatever. How can we acquire that information or how can we work together to try to get the information that is more current on February 25 instead of the old information from the fall? MR. UDA: That's a good question, Commissioner Fiegen. What actually transpired. First, I'll just tell you what we did. We used the November 2010 Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective, the fall one, didn't come out until November. It usually takes them six months to get everything put together because they have all these different groups that are working on it,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables held constant. So if CHAIRMAN NELSON: Go ahead. MR. ROUNDS: For example, if, say, in the no carbon situation the decision is going to result in a cost of \$50 million but in the case of a the high carbon price you see the cost of or a benefit of \$100 million, it gives them that information to know what their risk is given those futures. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Well, and I understand that you can run scenarios using high numbers and low numbers to get a range of what's of what those different possibilities would be, but that still doesn't give us any testimony as to what the actual probability is of either of those actually happening. MR. ROUNDS: Right. And my testimony on that, as I recall, was that we think that is a pretty subjective decision and that's why we thought it was a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you went back to the fall of 2010 and the Commission kind of wanted current. And we understand that maybe that's not perfect either. And the report actually didn't come out until the spring of 2011, but I'm sure a lot of work was done by February 25 or March 1 or whatever. How can we acquire that information or how can we work together to try to get the information that is more current on February 25 instead of the old information from the fall? MR. UDA: That's a good question, Commissioner Fiegen. What actually transpired. First, I'll just tell you what we did. We used the November 2010 Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective, the fall one, didn't come out until November. It usually takes them six months to get everything put together because they have all these different groups that are working on it, national gas group, markets group, people who are working
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	case where there's a high carbon cost, and then based on they can use the information that they glean out of the results of those two scenarios with other variables held constant. So if CHAIRMAN NELSON: Go ahead. MR. ROUNDS: For example, if, say, in the no carbon situation the decision is going to result in a cost of \$50 million but in the case of a the high carbon price you see the cost of or a benefit of \$100 million, it gives them that information to know what their risk is given those futures. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Well, and I understand that you can run scenarios using high numbers and low numbers to get a range of what's of what those different possibilities would be, but that still doesn't give us any testimony as to what the actual probability is of either of those actually happening. MR. ROUNDS: Right. And my testimony on that, as I recall, was that we think that is a pretty subjective decision and that's why we thought it was a good decision for the Commission to make.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick question on, on February 25, 2011 we're trying to figure out the costs of the inputs, and I believe you went back to the fall of 2010 and the Commission kind of wanted current. And we understand that maybe that's not perfect either. And the report actually didn't come out until the spring of 2011, but I'm sure a lot of work was done by February 25 or March 1 or whatever. How can we acquire that information or how can we work together to try to get the information that is more current on February 25 instead of the old information from the fall? MR. UDA: That's a good question, Commissioner Fiegen. What actually transpired. First, I'll just tell you what we did. We used the November 2010 Black & Veatch Energy Market Perspective, the fall one, didn't come out until November. It usually takes them six months to get everything put together because they have all these different groups that are working on it, national gas group, markets group, people who are working on transmission constraints and issues like that. They

	57		59
1	So when Mr. Lauckhart was relying on it, that	1	disagreements, is how you come up with a method that
2	was the most recent work that Black & Veatch had done	2	basically can be fairly easily calculated and updated
3	that was actually a final product. I mean, to a	3	that reduces some of the fights about the methodology
4	certain extent, I mean, he was aware of the work that	4	itself.
5	was going on and he assisted in preparing the spring 2011	5	The difficulty is is what are you going to say
6	forecast, but he was you know, for one thing he	6	that avoided cost is in any given situation. So, for
7	couldn't have said anything or published anything public	7	example, when you're looking at a utility and it's not
8	about what was being said because of his agreement with	8	using its peaking resources because it's relying on the
9	Black & Veatch.	9	market, do you say, well, in some hours we're going to
10	But second of all, he looked at the direction	10	assume that they're not relying on the market and were
11	the market was heading. And I think it's still his	11	using peaking resources? That is sort of antithetical to
12	opinion today that that the forecast that he used was	12	reality because that's not what's going on.
13	in the money. And it was an accurate forecast when he	13	In the hours where there is sufficient coal,
14	prepared it. And he looked at the movement and various	14	base load coal, to meet NorthWestern's base load needs do
15	different things, the EIA, AEO forecast and so on and	15	you say, well, we're going to use the incremental costs
16	said that he didn't feel like the fundamentals in the	16	of operating those coal plants? Because that's not in
17	market had moved enough to change his forecast.	17	reality what's really happening.
18	So the question of how you get that. If, you	18	What's really happening is regardless of the
19	know, the technical hearing is going to I assume get	19	hour, they're playing in the market. So is it possible
20	into that as to what is the appropriate information to	20	that you could come up with something that sort of fixed
21	use at that point in time, then I think what you have to	21	the hybrid methodology? You could but I think you'd
22	do is to see what other information was available and	22	be I'm not sure my law professor used to use this
23	whether or not other information should have informed	23	expression, "The game's not worth the candle." I guess
24	that decision that was available as of February 25, 2011.	24	it was at a time when people played games late at night
25	And I think if you look at the various	25	and they had to decide whether they were going to use
	58		60
1	58 forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some	1	60 another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this
1 2		1 2	
	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some		another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this
2	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think	2	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the
2 3	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think Mr. Lauckhart and Black & Veatch's estimate was somewhere in the middle. Did I answer your question?	2 3	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the candle because I think you'd end up complicating things more. So I think the simplest thing to do is to come
2 3 4	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think Mr. Lauckhart and Black & Veatch's estimate was somewhere in the middle. Did I answer your question? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Did I like the answer to	2 3 4 5 6	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the candle because I think you'd end up complicating things more. So I think the simplest thing to do is to come up with a method that's replicable that everybody kind of
2 3 4 5 6 7	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think Mr. Lauckhart and Black & Veatch's estimate was somewhere in the middle. Did I answer your question? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Did I like the answer to your question?	2 3 4 5 6 7	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the candle because I think you'd end up complicating things more. So I think the simplest thing to do is to come up with a method that's replicable that everybody kind of understands and that gives a proper signal both to the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think Mr. Lauckhart and Black & Veatch's estimate was somewhere in the middle. Did I answer your question? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Did I like the answer to your question? MR. UDA: That's a whole different thing.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the candle because I think you'd end up complicating things more. So I think the simplest thing to do is to come up with a method that's replicable that everybody kind of understands and that gives a proper signal both to the utility and to prospective QFs about how this method will
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think Mr. Lauckhart and Black & Veatch's estimate was somewhere in the middle. Did I answer your question? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Did I like the answer to your question? MR. UDA: That's a whole different thing. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Another quick question on	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the candle because I think you'd end up complicating things more. So I think the simplest thing to do is to come up with a method that's replicable that everybody kind of understands and that gives a proper signal both to the utility and to prospective QFs about how this method will be calculated in the future.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think Mr. Lauckhart and Black & Veatch's estimate was somewhere in the middle. Did I answer your question? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Did I like the answer to your question? MR. UDA: That's a whole different thing. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Another quick question on the hybrid method. Because all the time we've spent on	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the candle because I think you'd end up complicating things more. So I think the simplest thing to do is to come up with a method that's replicable that everybody kind of understands and that gives a proper signal both to the utility and to prospective QFs about how this method will be calculated in the future. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: So currently the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think Mr. Lauckhart and Black & Veatch's estimate was somewhere in the middle. Did I answer your question? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Did I like the answer to your question? MR. UDA: That's a whole different thing. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Another quick question on the hybrid method. Because all the time we've spent on trying to figure out avoidable cost, of course, is the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the candle because I think you'd end up complicating things more. So I think the simplest thing to do is to come up with a method that's replicable that everybody kind of understands and that gives a proper signal both to the utility and to prospective QFs about how this method will be calculated in the future. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: So currently the Commission's order is that we have chosen the hybrid
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think Mr. Lauckhart and Black & Veatch's estimate was somewhere in the middle. Did I answer your question? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Did I like the answer to your question? MR. UDA: That's a whole different thing. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Another quick question on the hybrid method. Because all the time we've spent on trying to figure out avoidable cost, of course, is the main concern. And, you know, how can you make that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the candle because I think you'd end up complicating things more. So I think the simplest thing to do is to come up with a method that's replicable that everybody kind of understands and that gives a proper signal both to the utility and to prospective QFs about how this method will be calculated in the future. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: So currently the Commission's order is that we have chosen the hybrid method. How can you make that workable?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think Mr. Lauckhart and Black & Veatch's estimate was somewhere in the middle. Did I answer your question? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Did I like the answer to your question? MR. UDA: That's a whole different thing. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Another quick question on the hybrid method. Because all the time we've spent on trying to figure out avoidable cost, of course, is the main concern. And, you know, how can you make that workable, the hybrid method?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the candle because I think you'd end up complicating things more. So I think the simplest thing to do is to come up with a method that's replicable that everybody kind of understands and that gives a proper signal both to the utility and to prospective QFs about how this method will be calculated in the future. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: So currently the Commission's order is that we have chosen the hybrid method. How can you make that workable? MR. UDA: Well, I mean, one of the things we
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think Mr. Lauckhart and Black & Veatch's estimate was somewhere in the middle. Did I answer your question? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Did I like the answer to your question? MR. UDA: That's a whole different thing. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Another quick question on the hybrid method. Because all the time we've spent on trying to figure out avoidable cost, of course, is the main concern. And, you know, how can you make that workable, the hybrid method? MR. UDA: How could you make the hybrid method	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the candle because I think you'd end up complicating things more. So I think the simplest thing to do is to come up with a method that's replicable that everybody kind of understands and that gives a proper signal both to the utility and to prospective QFs about how this method will be calculated in the future. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: So currently the Commission's order is that we have chosen the hybrid method. How can you make that workable? MR. UDA: Well, I mean, one of the things we don't know, the unknown is we haven't had the technical
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think Mr. Lauckhart and Black & Veatch's estimate was somewhere in the middle. Did I answer your question? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Did I like the answer to your question? MR. UDA: That's a whole different thing. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Another quick question on the hybrid method. Because all the time we've spent on trying to figure out avoidable cost, of course, is the main concern. And, you know, how can you make that workable, the hybrid method? MR. UDA: How could you make the hybrid method workable?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the candle because I think you'd end up complicating things more. So I think the simplest thing to do is to come up with a method that's replicable that everybody kind of understands and that gives a proper signal both to the utility and to prospective QFs about how this method will be calculated in the future. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: So currently the Commission's order is that we have chosen the hybrid method. How can you make that workable? MR. UDA: Well, I mean, one of the things we don't know, the unknown is we haven't had the technical hearing yet. And if it turns out that we employ the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think Mr. Lauckhart and Black & Veatch's estimate was somewhere in the middle. Did I answer your question? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Did I like the answer to your question? MR. UDA: That's a whole different thing. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Another quick question on the hybrid method. Because all the time we've spent on trying to figure out avoidable cost, of course, is the main concern. And, you know, how can you make that workable, the hybrid method? MR. UDA: How could you make the hybrid method workable? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Uh-huh.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the candle because I think you'd end up complicating things more. So I think the simplest thing to do is to come up with a method that's replicable that everybody kind of understands and that gives a proper signal both to the utility and to prospective QFs about how this method will be calculated in the future. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: So currently the Commission's order is that we have chosen the hybrid method. How can you make that workable? MR. UDA: Well, I mean, one of the things we don't know, the unknown is we haven't had the technical hearing yet. And if it turns out that we employ the hybrid methodology in that setting and it produces a good
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think Mr. Lauckhart and Black & Veatch's estimate was somewhere in the middle. Did I answer your question? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Did I like the answer to your question? MR. UDA: That's a whole different thing. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Another quick question on the hybrid method. Because all the time we've spent on trying to figure out avoidable cost, of course, is the main concern. And, you know, how can you make that workable, the hybrid method? MR. UDA: How could you make the hybrid method workable? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Uh-huh. MR. UDA: You know, there's probably somebody	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the candle because I think you'd end up complicating things more. So I think the simplest thing to do is to come up with a method that's replicable that everybody kind of understands and that gives a proper signal both to the utility and to prospective QFs about how this method will be calculated in the future. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: So currently the Commission's order is that we have chosen the hybrid method. How can you make that workable? MR. UDA: Well, I mean, one of the things we don't know, the unknown is we haven't had the technical hearing yet. And if it turns out that we employ the hybrid methodology in that setting and it produces a good result, and by good, not necessarily good for my client.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think Mr. Lauckhart and Black & Veatch's estimate was somewhere in the middle. Did I answer your question? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Did I like the answer to your question? MR. UDA: That's a whole different thing. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Another quick question on the hybrid method. Because all the time we've spent on trying to figure out avoidable cost, of course, is the main concern. And, you know, how can you make that workable, the hybrid method? MR. UDA: How could you make the hybrid method workable? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Uh-huh. MR. UDA: You know, there's probably somebody way smarter than me that could answer that question.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the candle because I think you'd end up complicating things more. So I think the simplest thing to do is to come up with a method that's replicable that everybody kind of understands and that gives a proper signal both to the utility and to prospective QFs about how this method will be calculated in the future. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: So currently the Commission's order is that we have chosen the hybrid method. How can you make that workable? MR. UDA: Well, I mean, one of the things we don't know, the unknown is we haven't had the technical hearing yet. And if it turns out that we employ the hybrid methodology in that setting and it produces a good result, and by good, not necessarily good for my client. I mean, a good result in the sense that it produces
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think Mr. Lauckhart and Black & Veatch's estimate was somewhere in the middle. Did I answer your question? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Did I like the answer to your question? MR. UDA: That's a whole different thing. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Another quick question on the hybrid method. Because all the time we've spent on trying to figure out avoidable cost, of course, is the main concern. And, you know, how can you make that workable, the hybrid method? MR. UDA: How could you make the hybrid method workable? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Uh-huh. MR. UDA: You know, there's probably somebody way smarter than me that could answer that question. But, you know, I guess my feeling about it is is that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the candle because I think you'd end up complicating things more. So I think the simplest thing to do is to come up with a method that's replicable that everybody kind of understands and that gives a proper signal both to the utility and to prospective QFs about how this method will be calculated in the future. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: So currently the Commission's order is that we have chosen the hybrid method. How can you make that workable? MR. UDA: Well, I mean, one of the things we don't know, the unknown is we haven't had the technical hearing yet. And if it turns out that we employ the hybrid methodology in that setting and it produces a good result, and by good, not necessarily good for my client. I mean, a good result in the sense that it produces something that's reliable and replicable and so on, I
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think Mr. Lauckhart and Black & Veatch's estimate was somewhere in the middle. Did I answer your question? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Did I like the answer to your question? MR. UDA: That's a whole different thing. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Another quick question on the hybrid method. Because all the time we've spent on trying to figure out avoidable cost, of course, is the main concern. And, you know, how can you make that workable, the hybrid method? MR. UDA: How could you make the hybrid method workable? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Uh-huh. MR. UDA: You know, there's probably somebody way smarter than me that could answer that question. But, you know, I guess my feeling about it is is that and this is in a way sort of my opinion about guidance	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the candle because I think you'd end up complicating things more. So I think the simplest thing to do is to come up with a method that's replicable that everybody kind of understands and that gives a proper signal both to the utility and to prospective QFs about how this method will be calculated in the future. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: So currently the Commission's order is that we have chosen the hybrid method. How can you make that workable? MR. UDA: Well, I mean, one of the things we don't know, the unknown is we haven't had the technical hearing yet. And if it turns out that we employ the hybrid methodology in that setting and it produces a good result, and by good, not necessarily good for my client. I mean, a good result in the sense that it produces something that's reliable and replicable and so on, I think that at that point the Commission has done its
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think Mr. Lauckhart and Black & Veatch's estimate was somewhere in the middle. Did I answer your question? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Did I like the answer to your question? MR. UDA: That's a whole different thing. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Another quick question on the hybrid method. Because all the time we've spent on trying to figure out avoidable cost, of course, is the main concern. And, you know, how can you make that workable, the hybrid method? MR. UDA: How could you make the hybrid method workable? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Uh-huh. MR. UDA: You know, there's probably somebody way smarter than me that could answer that question. But, you know, I guess my feeling about it is is that and this is in a way sort of my opinion about guidance for the Commission in the future. But I think you need	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the candle because I think you'd end up complicating things more. So I think the simplest thing to do is to come up with a method that's replicable that everybody kind of understands and that gives a proper signal both to the utility and to prospective QFs about how this method will be calculated in the future. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: So currently the Commission's order is that we have chosen the hybrid method. How can you make that workable? MR. UDA: Well, I mean, one of the things we don't know, the unknown is we haven't had the technical hearing yet. And if it turns out that we employ the hybrid methodology in that setting and it produces a good result, and by good, not necessarily good for my client. I mean, a good result in the sense that it produces something that's reliable and replicable and so on, I think that at that point the Commission has done its job.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think Mr. Lauckhart and Black & Veatch's estimate was somewhere in the middle. Did I answer your question? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Did I like the answer to your question? MR. UDA: That's a whole different thing. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Another quick question on the hybrid method. Because all the time we've spent on trying to figure out avoidable cost, of course, is the main concern. And, you know, how can you make that workable, the hybrid method? MR. UDA: How could you make the hybrid method workable? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Uh-huh. MR. UDA: You know, there's probably somebody way smarter than me that could answer that question. But, you know, I guess my feeling about it is is that and this is in a way sort of my opinion about guidance for the Commission in the future. But I think you need to come up with something that's easily replicable.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the candle because I think you'd end up complicating things more. So I think the simplest thing to do is to come up with a method that's replicable that everybody kind of understands and that gives a proper signal both to the utility and to prospective QFs about how this method will be calculated in the future. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: So currently the Commission's order is that we have chosen the hybrid method. How can you make that workable? MR. UDA: Well, I mean, one of the things we don't know, the unknown is we haven't had the technical hearing yet. And if it turns out that we employ the hybrid methodology in that setting and it produces a good result, and by good, not necessarily good for my client. I mean, a good result in the sense that it produces something that's reliable and replicable and so on, I think that at that point the Commission has done its job.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think Mr. Lauckhart and Black & Veatch's estimate was somewhere in the middle. Did I answer your question? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Did I like the answer to your question? MR. UDA: That's a whole different thing. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Another quick question on the hybrid method. Because all the time we've spent on trying to figure out avoidable cost, of course, is the main concern. And, you know, how can you make that workable, the hybrid method? MR. UDA: How could you make the hybrid method workable? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Uh-huh. MR. UDA: You know, there's probably somebody way smarter than me that could answer that question. But, you know, I guess my feeling about it is is that and this is in a way sort of my opinion about guidance for the Commission in the future. But I think you need to come up with something that's easily replicable. I mean, one of the things that we've struggled	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the candle because I think you'd end up complicating things more. So I think the simplest thing to do is to come up with a method that's replicable that everybody kind of understands and that gives a proper signal both to the utility and to prospective QFs about how this method will be calculated in the future. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: So currently the Commission's order is that we have chosen the hybrid method. How can you make that workable? MR. UDA: Well, I mean, one of the things we don't know, the unknown is we haven't had the technical hearing yet. And if it turns out that we employ the hybrid methodology in that setting and it produces a good result, and by good, not necessarily good for my client. I mean, a good result in the sense that it produces something that's reliable and replicable and so on, I think that at that point the Commission has done its job. I think the issue comes down to for us, is it comes down to is that approach is that fair? And we
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	forecasts, I think that, you know, you could say some were higher and some were lower. And I think Mr. Lauckhart and Black & Veatch's estimate was somewhere in the middle. Did I answer your question? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Did I like the answer to your question? MR. UDA: That's a whole different thing. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Another quick question on the hybrid method. Because all the time we've spent on trying to figure out avoidable cost, of course, is the main concern. And, you know, how can you make that workable, the hybrid method? MR. UDA: How could you make the hybrid method workable? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Uh-huh. MR. UDA: You know, there's probably somebody way smarter than me that could answer that question. But, you know, I guess my feeling about it is is that and this is in a way sort of my opinion about guidance for the Commission in the future. But I think you need to come up with something that's easily replicable.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	another candle or not. But I'm not sure that in this circumstance that particular game would be worth the candle because I think you'd end up complicating things more. So I think the simplest thing to do is to come up with a method that's replicable that everybody kind of understands and that gives a proper signal both to the utility and to prospective QFs about how this method will be calculated in the future. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: So currently the Commission's order is that we have chosen the hybrid method. How can you make that workable? MR. UDA: Well, I mean, one of the things we don't know, the unknown is we haven't had the technical hearing yet. And if it turns out that we employ the hybrid methodology in that setting and it produces a good result, and by good, not necessarily good for my client. I mean, a good result in the sense that it produces something that's reliable and replicable and so on, I think that at that point the Commission has done its job.

	61	Τ	63
1	But I think that you looking at the hybrid	1	Waxman-Markey, I wouldn't say if if it's dead, it's
2	methodology and getting the inputs right, that's an	2	definitely undead. I think that in light of EPA's
3	important part of that equation. Because, I mean, just	3	intention to regulate greenhouse gas emissions and
4		4	
5	having the methodology is one thing, but it's like the old saying, "Garbage in, garbage out." I mean, if you	5	I think Mr. Brogan may be correct. There's no actual cost imposed on NorthWestern Energy as of yet by that
6	get bad inputs, you're going to get bad results.	6	particular legislation by that particular regulation,
7	CHAIRMAN NELSON: I'm about to go to Staff to	7	you know, there are going to be costs associated with
8	see if they have any questions, but, Cheri, are you okay	8	it. And I think those costs will be substantially
9	for a few more minutes?	9	higher.
10	John or Greg, any questions?	10	And maybe this is just my cynical view, but I
11	MR. SMITH: I have one.	11	think part of this is, the reason the EPA did what it
12	CHAIRMAN NELSON: Go ahead, John.	12	did, other than being a little bit chastised by the
12	MR. SMITH: Back on the status of carbon costs,	12	
14		14	Supreme Court was to force action on something like Waxman-Markey. I don't know that Waxman-Markey will be
14	be it through some kind of cap and trade tax or the other	14	
16	potential high kind of cost scenario would be regulation, what is the exact status of the EPA now? Is there a NOPR	16	the model, but I think everybody in the industry would
17		17	prefer the cap and trade approach. So even if
18	currently outstanding, or is there just talk about a NOPR?	18	Waxman-Markey is technically dead, and I think it
19	MR. UDA: No. There are actual rules that were	10	technically is dead, I think it's more likely to be undead and I think it will come back in some form.
20		20	
20	reviewed by the D.C. circuit in June. And the proposed	20	MR. RISLOV: Okay. Number two, I'm going to be
22	rules, I haven't read them, but the D.C. circuit reviewed	22	more specific. MR. UDA: Okay.
22	them and did not find them arbitrary or capricious. MR. SMITH: And do you have any comment on that,	22	MR. RISLOV: We talked about the forecast, the
23	Al?	23	fall of 2010 and that's what you included in your filing.
24	MR. BROGAN: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Smith, it's my	24 25	And I believe if I read this correctly the costs that I'm
23	62	23	And I believe in Tread this correctly the costs that Thi
	02		07
1	understanding that those rules do not actually impose a	1	reading here came out in the subsequent six-month
1	understanding that those rules do not actually impose a carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have	1	reading here came out in the subsequent six-month projection by Black & Veatch: is that correct?
1 2 3	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have	2	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct?
2	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more.		projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're
2 3	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Rislov?	2 3	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're referring to when you say
2 3 4	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Rislov? MR. RISLOV: Thank you. This would be directed	2 3 4	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're referring to when you say MR. RISLOV: The revised numbers that appear on
2 3 4 5	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Rislov? MR. RISLOV: Thank you. This would be directed to Oak Tree. I am looking at a document and it has a	2 3 4 5	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're referring to when you say
2 3 4 5 6	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Rislov? MR. RISLOV: Thank you. This would be directed	2 3 4 5 6	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're referring to when you say MR. RISLOV: The revised numbers that appear on the top paragraph on page 7.
2 3 4 5 6 7	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Rislov? MR. RISLOV: Thank you. This would be directed to Oak Tree. I am looking at a document and it has a real long name but it's NorthWestern Energy's Answer in	2 3 4 5 6 7	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're referring to when you say MR. RISLOV: The revised numbers that appear on the top paragraph on page 7. MR. UDA: Yes. I think that comes back to the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Rislov? MR. RISLOV: Thank you. This would be directed to Oak Tree. I am looking at a document and it has a real long name but it's NorthWestern Energy's Answer in Opposition to Oak Tree's Motion.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're referring to when you say MR. RISLOV: The revised numbers that appear on the top paragraph on page 7. MR. UDA: Yes. I think that comes back to the question of current information, what information did
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Rislov? MR. RISLOV: Thank you. This would be directed to Oak Tree. I am looking at a document and it has a real long name but it's NorthWestern Energy's Answer in Opposition to Oak Tree's Motion. MR. UDA: Uh-huh.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're referring to when you say MR. RISLOV: The revised numbers that appear on the top paragraph on page 7. MR. UDA: Yes. I think that comes back to the question of current information, what information did Mr. Lauckhart have available to him when he calculated
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Rislov? MR. RISLOV: Thank you. This would be directed to Oak Tree. I am looking at a document and it has a real long name but it's NorthWestern Energy's Answer in Opposition to Oak Tree's Motion. MR. UDA: Uh-huh. MR. RISLOV: And specifically I'm looking at the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're referring to when you say MR. RISLOV: The revised numbers that appear on the top paragraph on page 7. MR. UDA: Yes. I think that comes back to the question of current information, what information did Mr. Lauckhart have available to him when he calculated the avoided costs in the first instance. I don't think
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Rislov? MR. RISLOV: Thank you. This would be directed to Oak Tree. I am looking at a document and it has a real long name but it's NorthWestern Energy's Answer in Opposition to Oak Tree's Motion. MR. UDA: Uh-huh. MR. RISLOV: And specifically I'm looking at the bottom of page 6 and the top of page 7.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're referring to when you say MR. RISLOV: The revised numbers that appear on the top paragraph on page 7. MR. UDA: Yes. I think that comes back to the question of current information, what information did Mr. Lauckhart have available to him when he calculated the avoided costs in the first instance. I don't think he had that particular thing.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Rislov? MR. RISLOV: Thank you. This would be directed to Oak Tree. I am looking at a document and it has a real long name but it's NorthWestern Energy's Answer in Opposition to Oak Tree's Motion. MR. UDA: Uh-huh. MR. RISLOV: And specifically I'm looking at the bottom of page 6 and the top of page 7. MR. UDA: See if I have that, Mr. Rislov. Just	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're referring to when you say MR. RISLOV: The revised numbers that appear on the top paragraph on page 7. MR. UDA: Yes. I think that comes back to the question of current information, what information did Mr. Lauckhart have available to him when he calculated the avoided costs in the first instance. I don't think he had that particular thing. And I would point out that if you looked at
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Rislov? MR. RISLOV: Thank you. This would be directed to Oak Tree. I am looking at a document and it has a real long name but it's NorthWestern Energy's Answer in Opposition to Oak Tree's Motion. MR. UDA: Uh-huh. MR. RISLOV: And specifically I'm looking at the bottom of page 6 and the top of page 7. MR. UDA: See if I have that, Mr. Rislov. Just maybe you could just tell me what it says.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're referring to when you say MR. RISLOV: The revised numbers that appear on the top paragraph on page 7. MR. UDA: Yes. I think that comes back to the question of current information, what information did Mr. Lauckhart have available to him when he calculated the avoided costs in the first instance. I don't think he had that particular thing. And I would point out that if you looked at Black & Veatch's employment forecast, those numbers are
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Rislov? MR. RISLOV: Thank you. This would be directed to Oak Tree. I am looking at a document and it has a real long name but it's NorthWestern Energy's Answer in Opposition to Oak Tree's Motion. MR. UDA: Uh-huh. MR. RISLOV: And specifically I'm looking at the bottom of page 6 and the top of page 7. MR. UDA: See if I have that, Mr. Rislov. Just maybe you could just tell me what it says. MR. RISLOV: Okay. It says, "Mr. Lauckhart	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're referring to when you say MR. RISLOV: The revised numbers that appear on the top paragraph on page 7. MR. UDA: Yes. I think that comes back to the question of current information, what information did Mr. Lauckhart have available to him when he calculated the avoided costs in the first instance. I don't think he had that particular thing. And I would point out that if you looked at Black & Veatch's employment forecast, those numbers are significantly higher.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Rislov? MR. RISLOV: Thank you. This would be directed to Oak Tree. I am looking at a document and it has a real long name but it's NorthWestern Energy's Answer in Opposition to Oak Tree's Motion. MR. UDA: Uh-huh. MR. RISLOV: And specifically I'm looking at the bottom of page 6 and the top of page 7. MR. UDA: See if I have that, Mr. Rislov. Just maybe you could just tell me what it says. MR. RISLOV: Okay. It says, "Mr. Lauckhart failed to consider that the Waxman-Markey Bill was dead."	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're referring to when you say MR. RISLOV: The revised numbers that appear on the top paragraph on page 7. MR. UDA: Yes. I think that comes back to the question of current information, what information did Mr. Lauckhart have available to him when he calculated the avoided costs in the first instance. I don't think he had that particular thing. And I would point out that if you looked at Black & Veatch's employment forecast, those numbers are significantly higher. MR. RISLOV: Again, focusing on February 25,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Rislov? MR. RISLOV: Thank you. This would be directed to Oak Tree. I am looking at a document and it has a real long name but it's NorthWestern Energy's Answer in Opposition to Oak Tree's Motion. MR. UDA: Uh-huh. MR. RISLOV: And specifically I'm looking at the bottom of page 6 and the top of page 7. MR. UDA: See if I have that, Mr. Rislov. Just maybe you could just tell me what it says. MR. RISLOV: Okay. It says, "Mr. Lauckhart failed to consider that the Waxman-Markey Bill was dead." And then it goes on to say that the carbon costs, and I'm	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're referring to when you say MR. RISLOV: The revised numbers that appear on the top paragraph on page 7. MR. UDA: Yes. I think that comes back to the question of current information, what information did Mr. Lauckhart have available to him when he calculated the avoided costs in the first instance. I don't think he had that particular thing. And I would point out that if you looked at Black & Veatch's employment forecast, those numbers are significantly higher. MR. RISLOV: Again, focusing on February 25, 2011.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Rislov? MR. RISLOV: Thank you. This would be directed to Oak Tree. I am looking at a document and it has a real long name but it's NorthWestern Energy's Answer in Opposition to Oak Tree's Motion. MR. UDA: Uh-huh. MR. RISLOV: And specifically I'm looking at the bottom of page 6 and the top of page 7. MR. UDA: See if I have that, Mr. Rislov. Just maybe you could just tell me what it says. MR. RISLOV: Okay. It says, "Mr. Lauckhart failed to consider that the Waxman-Markey Bill was dead." And then it goes on to say that the carbon costs, and I'm going to go on to the top of page 7, the carbon costs	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're referring to when you say MR. RISLOV: The revised numbers that appear on the top paragraph on page 7. MR. UDA: Yes. I think that comes back to the question of current information, what information did Mr. Lauckhart have available to him when he calculated the avoided costs in the first instance. I don't think he had that particular thing. And I would point out that if you looked at Black & Veatch's employment forecast, those numbers are significantly higher. MR. RISLOV: Again, focusing on February 25, 2011. MR. UDA: Right.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Rislov? MR. RISLOV: Thank you. This would be directed to Oak Tree. I am looking at a document and it has a real long name but it's NorthWestern Energy's Answer in Opposition to Oak Tree's Motion. MR. UDA: Uh-huh. MR. RISLOV: And specifically I'm looking at the bottom of page 6 and the top of page 7. MR. UDA: See if I have that, Mr. Rislov. Just maybe you could just tell me what it says. MR. RISLOV: Okay. It says, "Mr. Lauckhart failed to consider that the Waxman-Markey Bill was dead." And then it goes on to say that the carbon costs, and I'm going to go on to the top of page 7, the carbon costs reflected in your filing have diminished what I would say	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're referring to when you say MR. RISLOV: The revised numbers that appear on the top paragraph on page 7. MR. UDA: Yes. I think that comes back to the question of current information, what information did Mr. Lauckhart have available to him when he calculated the avoided costs in the first instance. I don't think he had that particular thing. And I would point out that if you looked at Black & Veatch's employment forecast, those numbers are significantly higher. MR. RISLOV: Again, focusing on February 25, 2011. MR. UDA: Right. MR. RISLOV: In knowing that that fall forecast
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Rislov? MR. RISLOV: Thank you. This would be directed to Oak Tree. I am looking at a document and it has a real long name but it's NorthWestern Energy's Answer in Opposition to Oak Tree's Motion. MR. UDA: Uh-huh. MR. RISLOV: And specifically I'm looking at the bottom of page 6 and the top of page 7. MR. UDA: See if I have that, Mr. Rislov. Just maybe you could just tell me what it says. MR. RISLOV: Okay. It says, "Mr. Lauckhart failed to consider that the Waxman-Markey Bill was dead." And then it goes on to say that the carbon costs, and I'm going to go on to the top of page 7, the carbon costs reflected in your filing have diminished what I would say is significantly, looking at the bottom paragraph on page	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're referring to when you say MR. RISLOV: The revised numbers that appear on the top paragraph on page 7. MR. UDA: Yes. I think that comes back to the question of current information, what information did Mr. Lauckhart have available to him when he calculated the avoided costs in the first instance. I don't think he had that particular thing. And I would point out that if you looked at Black & Veatch's employment forecast, those numbers are significantly higher. MR. RISLOV: Again, focusing on February 25, 2011. MR. UDA: Right. MR. RISLOV: In knowing that that fall forecast was already old news, although albeit not that old news,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Rislov? MR. RISLOV: Thank you. This would be directed to Oak Tree. I am looking at a document and it has a real long name but it's NorthWestern Energy's Answer in Opposition to Oak Tree's Motion. MR. UDA: Uh-huh. MR. RISLOV: And specifically I'm looking at the bottom of page 6 and the top of page 7. MR. UDA: See if I have that, Mr. Rislov. Just maybe you could just tell me what it says. MR. RISLOV: Okay. It says, "Mr. Lauckhart failed to consider that the Waxman-Markey Bill was dead." And then it goes on to say that the carbon costs, and I'm going to go on to the top of page 7, the carbon costs reflected in your filing have diminished what I would say is significantly, looking at the bottom paragraph on page 6 and the top paragraph on page 7.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're referring to when you say MR. RISLOV: The revised numbers that appear on the top paragraph on page 7. MR. UDA: Yes. I think that comes back to the question of current information, what information did Mr. Lauckhart have available to him when he calculated the avoided costs in the first instance. I don't think he had that particular thing. And I would point out that if you looked at Black & Veatch's employment forecast, those numbers are significantly higher. MR. RISLOV: Again, focusing on February 25, 2011. MR. UDA: Right. MR. RISLOV: In knowing that that fall forecast was already old news, although albeit not that old news, but still when you're doing six-month forecast it becomes
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Rislov? MR. RISLOV: Thank you. This would be directed to Oak Tree. I am looking at a document and it has a real long name but it's NorthWestern Energy's Answer in Opposition to Oak Tree's Motion. MR. UDA: Uh-huh. MR. RISLOV: And specifically I'm looking at the bottom of page 6 and the top of page 7. MR. UDA: See if I have that, Mr. Rislov. Just maybe you could just tell me what it says. MR. RISLOV: Okay. It says, "Mr. Lauckhart failed to consider that the Waxman-Markey Bill was dead." And then it goes on to say that the carbon costs, and I'm going to go on to the top of page 7, the carbon costs reflected in your filing have diminished what I would say is significantly, looking at the bottom paragraph on page 6 and the top paragraph on page 7. And my question is well, number one, my	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're referring to when you say MR. RISLOV: The revised numbers that appear on the top paragraph on page 7. MR. UDA: Yes. I think that comes back to the question of current information, what information did Mr. Lauckhart have available to him when he calculated the avoided costs in the first instance. I don't think he had that particular thing. And I would point out that if you looked at Black & Veatch's employment forecast, those numbers are significantly higher. MR. RISLOV: Again, focusing on February 25, 2011. MR. UDA: Right. MR. RISLOV: In knowing that that fall forecast was already old news, although albeit not that old news, but still when you're doing six-month forecast it becomes old news fast. In this case do you believe it could be
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	carbon cost on NorthWestern at this time. I would have to review them carefully to comment more. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Mr. Rislov? MR. RISLOV: Thank you. This would be directed to Oak Tree. I am looking at a document and it has a real long name but it's NorthWestern Energy's Answer in Opposition to Oak Tree's Motion. MR. UDA: Uh-huh. MR. RISLOV: And specifically I'm looking at the bottom of page 6 and the top of page 7. MR. UDA: See if I have that, Mr. Rislov. Just maybe you could just tell me what it says. MR. RISLOV: Okay. It says, "Mr. Lauckhart failed to consider that the Waxman-Markey Bill was dead." And then it goes on to say that the carbon costs, and I'm going to go on to the top of page 7, the carbon costs reflected in your filing have diminished what I would say is significantly, looking at the bottom paragraph on page 6 and the top paragraph on page 7. And my question is well, number one, my question to you would be what is your response to those	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	projection by Black & Veatch; is that correct? MR. UDA: I'm not sure, Mr. Rislov, what you're referring to when you say MR. RISLOV: The revised numbers that appear on the top paragraph on page 7. MR. UDA: Yes. I think that comes back to the question of current information, what information did Mr. Lauckhart have available to him when he calculated the avoided costs in the first instance. I don't think he had that particular thing. And I would point out that if you looked at Black & Veatch's employment forecast, those numbers are significantly higher. MR. RISLOV: Again, focusing on February 25, 2011. MR. UDA: Right. MR. RISLOV: In knowing that that fall forecast was already old news, although albeit not that old news, but still when you're doing six-month forecast it becomes old news fast. In this case do you believe it could be argued that these numbers shown on the top paragraph of

	65	T	67
1	you have to consider whether that information was	1	energy but for the purchase from the cogenerator."
2	actually available on February 25, 2011. And the	2	MR. UDA: Uh-huh.
3	accuracy of it notwithstanding, those numbers reflect	3	MR. RISLOV: Is that not what the hybrid method
4	Black & Veatch's opinion sometime into the future. And	4	offered by NorthWestern, in fact, does?
5	you're right. I mean, when you're doing it every six	5	MR. UDA: Mr. Rislov, Mr. Chairman, members of
6	months the numbers become stale relatively quickly.	6	the Commission, no. It doesn't. Because NorthWestern is
7	But, you know, in any event, what you're doing	7	not operating in a vacuum. Before there were organized
8	is estimating. And so, you know, there's a margin of	8	markets, utilities used their incremental costs of their
9	error in any of those estimates. And what will happen is	9	generating resources as the basis for avoided cost. And
10	if you see the EIA forecasts and the various different	10	if you look around the country you will not find another
11	scenarios they run and look at the Black & Veatch or any	11	one that's using the hybrid methodology. And the reason
12	of the other forecasting entities, those forecasts change	12	they're not using the hybrid methodology is because it's
13	over time.	13	illegal.
14	So, you know, is it more accurate? I don't	14	What they're actually doing with this
15	know. It might be less accurate. I mean, they didn't	15	incremental cost is if they were assigning the
16	have for example, Black & Veatch didn't have the EPA	16	incremental costs in all of the hours I would agree with
17	decision that just came out in June. I think that would	17	you. That's not what's going on with the hybrid
18	substantially affect their opinion.	18	methodology.
19	MR. RISLOV: And I would ask you this question:	19	MR. RISLOV: And I would like to turn to
20	To the extent that fall 2010 forecast came out reflected	20	NorthWestern and go back to the first question I had
21	that prior six I don't know exactly which six months	21	asked with regard to the numbers that appeared, the
22	in 2010, but I would assume the one that came out	22	significant lower numbers that appeared in the subsequent
23	subsequently, February 25 was in that study period for	23	report. I assume it was called the spring of 2011 report
24	the following six months.	24	put out by Black & Veatch. And, again, referring to your
25	Would you agree?	25	answer in opposition to the Oak Tree motion. Bottom of
	66		68
	00		00
1	oo MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's	1	page
1 2		1 2	
_	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's		page
2	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more	2	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al,
2 3	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more the expert on that than I am. I'm not sure the process that they go through. I don't know if February 25 was a period they were including in the subsequent forecast or	2 3	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al, was there an issue about confidentiality on this?
2 3 4	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more the expert on that than I am. I'm not sure the process that they go through. I don't know if February 25 was a	2 3 4	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al, was there an issue about confidentiality on this? MR. BROGAN: Mr. Commission, Mr. Rislov, Mr. Uda, I believe there is. I'll be very careful with my answer.
2 3 4 5	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more the expert on that than I am. I'm not sure the process that they go through. I don't know if February 25 was a period they were including in the subsequent forecast or not. I don't know what they based the subsequent forecast on.	2 3 4 5	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al, was there an issue about confidentiality on this? MR. BROGAN: Mr. Commission, Mr. Rislov, Mr. Uda, I believe there is. I'll be very careful with my answer. MR. UDA: Thank you.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more the expert on that than I am. I'm not sure the process that they go through. I don't know if February 25 was a period they were including in the subsequent forecast or not. I don't know what they based the subsequent forecast on. What I do know is that Mr. Lauckhart only had	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al, was there an issue about confidentiality on this? MR. BROGAN: Mr. Commission, Mr. Rislov, Mr. Uda, I believe there is. I'll be very careful with my answer. MR. UDA: Thank you. MR. BROGAN: Mr. Rislov, if I understood your
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more the expert on that than I am. I'm not sure the process that they go through. I don't know if February 25 was a period they were including in the subsequent forecast or not. I don't know what they based the subsequent forecast on. What I do know is that Mr. Lauckhart only had the November 2010 forecast in its final form when he used	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al, was there an issue about confidentiality on this? MR. BROGAN: Mr. Commission, Mr. Rislov, Mr. Uda, I believe there is. I'll be very careful with my answer. MR. UDA: Thank you. MR. BROGAN: Mr. Rislov, if I understood your first question, it had to do with Mr. Uda's response to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more the expert on that than I am. I'm not sure the process that they go through. I don't know if February 25 was a period they were including in the subsequent forecast or not. I don't know what they based the subsequent forecast on. What I do know is that Mr. Lauckhart only had the November 2010 forecast in its final form when he used it and I assume that if we had filed this later or	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al, was there an issue about confidentiality on this? MR. BROGAN: Mr. Commission, Mr. Rislov, Mr. Uda, I believe there is. I'll be very careful with my answer. MR. UDA: Thank you. MR. BROGAN: Mr. Rislov, if I understood your first question, it had to do with Mr. Uda's response to the statements that were made at the bottom of 6 and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more the expert on that than I am. I'm not sure the process that they go through. I don't know if February 25 was a period they were including in the subsequent forecast or not. I don't know what they based the subsequent forecast on. What I do know is that Mr. Lauckhart only had the November 2010 forecast in its final form when he used it and I assume that if we had filed this later or earlier those numbers would be different. I don't know	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al, was there an issue about confidentiality on this? MR. BROGAN: Mr. Commission, Mr. Rislov, Mr. Uda, I believe there is. I'll be very careful with my answer. MR. UDA: Thank you. MR. BROGAN: Mr. Rislov, if I understood your first question, it had to do with Mr. Uda's response to the statements that were made at the bottom of 6 and bottom of 7. And if I understand your question to me and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more the expert on that than I am. I'm not sure the process that they go through. I don't know if February 25 was a period they were including in the subsequent forecast or not. I don't know what they based the subsequent forecast on. What I do know is that Mr. Lauckhart only had the November 2010 forecast in its final form when he used it and I assume that if we had filed this later or earlier those numbers would be different. I don't know what direction they would have gone in.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al, was there an issue about confidentiality on this? MR. BROGAN: Mr. Commission, Mr. Rislov, Mr. Uda, I believe there is. I'll be very careful with my answer. MR. UDA: Thank you. MR. BROGAN: Mr. Rislov, if I understood your first question, it had to do with Mr. Uda's response to the statements that were made at the bottom of 6 and bottom of 7. And if I understand your question to me and I guess I'm asking for clarification is is this from a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more the expert on that than I am. I'm not sure the process that they go through. I don't know if February 25 was a period they were including in the subsequent forecast or not. I don't know what they based the subsequent forecast on. What I do know is that Mr. Lauckhart only had the November 2010 forecast in its final form when he used it and I assume that if we had filed this later or earlier those numbers would be different. I don't know what direction they would have gone in. MR. RISLOV: I have one more question for you.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al, was there an issue about confidentiality on this? MR. BROGAN: Mr. Commission, Mr. Rislov, Mr. Uda, I believe there is. I'll be very careful with my answer. MR. UDA: Thank you. MR. BROGAN: Mr. Rislov, if I understood your first question, it had to do with Mr. Uda's response to the statements that were made at the bottom of 6 and bottom of 7. And if I understand your question to me and I guess I'm asking for clarification is is this from a spring 2011 Black & Veatch forecast? Is that what you're
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more the expert on that than I am. I'm not sure the process that they go through. I don't know if February 25 was a period they were including in the subsequent forecast or not. I don't know what they based the subsequent forecast on. What I do know is that Mr. Lauckhart only had the November 2010 forecast in its final form when he used it and I assume that if we had filed this later or earlier those numbers would be different. I don't know what direction they would have gone in. MR. RISLOV: I have one more question for you. And that was in the Staff's answer to Oak Tree's motion	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al, was there an issue about confidentiality on this? MR. BROGAN: Mr. Commission, Mr. Rislov, Mr. Uda, I believe there is. I'll be very careful with my answer. MR. UDA: Thank you. MR. BROGAN: Mr. Rislov, if I understood your first question, it had to do with Mr. Uda's response to the statements that were made at the bottom of 6 and bottom of 7. And if I understand your question to me and I guess I'm asking for clarification is is this from a spring 2011 Black & Veatch forecast? Is that what you're asking?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more the expert on that than I am. I'm not sure the process that they go through. I don't know if February 25 was a period they were including in the subsequent forecast or not. I don't know what they based the subsequent forecast on. What I do know is that Mr. Lauckhart only had the November 2010 forecast in its final form when he used it and I assume that if we had filed this later or earlier those numbers would be different. I don't know what direction they would have gone in. MR. RISLOV: I have one more question for you. And that was in the Staff's answer to Oak Tree's motion on page 3 of 7. And I would expect being this is the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al, was there an issue about confidentiality on this? MR. BROGAN: Mr. Commission, Mr. Rislov, Mr. Uda, I believe there is. I'll be very careful with my answer. MR. UDA: Thank you. MR. BROGAN: Mr. Rislov, if I understood your first question, it had to do with Mr. Uda's response to the statements that were made at the bottom of 6 and bottom of 7. And if I understand your question to me and I guess I'm asking for clarification is is this from a spring 2011 Black & Veatch forecast? Is that what you're asking? MR. RISLOV: That would be a good start, yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more the expert on that than I am. I'm not sure the process that they go through. I don't know if February 25 was a period they were including in the subsequent forecast or not. I don't know what they based the subsequent forecast on. What I do know is that Mr. Lauckhart only had the November 2010 forecast in its final form when he used it and I assume that if we had filed this later or earlier those numbers would be different. I don't know what direction they would have gone in. MR. RISLOV: I have one more question for you. And that was in the Staff's answer to Oak Tree's motion on page 3 of 7. And I would expect being this is the first time for this Commission through this matter that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al, was there an issue about confidentiality on this? MR. BROGAN: Mr. Commission, Mr. Rislov, Mr. Uda, I believe there is. I'll be very careful with my answer. MR. UDA: Thank you. MR. BROGAN: Mr. Rislov, if I understood your first question, it had to do with Mr. Uda's response to the statements that were made at the bottom of 6 and bottom of 7. And if I understand your question to me and I guess I'm asking for clarification is is this from a spring 2011 Black & Veatch forecast? Is that what you're asking? MR. RISLOV: That would be a good start, yes. MR. BROGAN: And I would refer you to footnote
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more the expert on that than I am. I'm not sure the process that they go through. I don't know if February 25 was a period they were including in the subsequent forecast or not. I don't know what they based the subsequent forecast on. What I do know is that Mr. Lauckhart only had the November 2010 forecast in its final form when he used it and I assume that if we had filed this later or earlier those numbers would be different. I don't know what direction they would have gone in. MR. RISLOV: I have one more question for you. And that was in the Staff's answer to Oak Tree's motion on page 3 of 7. And I would expect being this is the first time for this Commission through this matter that the definition of avoided cost can be an issue of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al, was there an issue about confidentiality on this? MR. BROGAN: Mr. Commission, Mr. Rislov, Mr. Uda, I believe there is. I'll be very careful with my answer. MR. UDA: Thank you. MR. BROGAN: Mr. Rislov, if I understood your first question, it had to do with Mr. Uda's response to the statements that were made at the bottom of 6 and bottom of 7. And if I understand your question to me and I guess I'm asking for clarification is is this from a spring 2011 Black & Veatch forecast? Is that what you're asking? MR. RISLOV: That would be a good start, yes. MR. BROGAN: And I would refer you to footnote No. 22 that indicated that it did come from the spring
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more the expert on that than I am. I'm not sure the process that they go through. I don't know if February 25 was a period they were including in the subsequent forecast or not. I don't know what they based the subsequent forecast on. What I do know is that Mr. Lauckhart only had the November 2010 forecast in its final form when he used it and I assume that if we had filed this later or earlier those numbers would be different. I don't know what direction they would have gone in. MR. RISLOV: I have one more question for you. And that was in the Staff's answer to Oak Tree's motion on page 3 of 7. And I would expect being this is the first time for this Commission through this matter that the definition of avoided cost can be an issue of sorts.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al, was there an issue about confidentiality on this? MR. BROGAN: Mr. Commission, Mr. Rislov, Mr. Uda, I believe there is. I'll be very careful with my answer. MR. UDA: Thank you. MR. BROGAN: Mr. Rislov, if I understood your first question, it had to do with Mr. Uda's response to the statements that were made at the bottom of 6 and bottom of 7. And if I understand your question to me and I guess I'm asking for clarification is is this from a spring 2011 Black & Veatch forecast? Is that what you're asking? MR. RISLOV: That would be a good start, yes. MR. BROGAN: And I would refer you to footnote No. 22 that indicated that it did come from the spring 2011 forecast slide No. 67.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more the expert on that than I am. I'm not sure the process that they go through. I don't know if February 25 was a period they were including in the subsequent forecast or not. I don't know what they based the subsequent forecast on. What I do know is that Mr. Lauckhart only had the November 2010 forecast in its final form when he used it and I assume that if we had filed this later or earlier those numbers would be different. I don't know what direction they would have gone in. MR. RISLOV: I have one more question for you. And that was in the Staff's answer to Oak Tree's motion on page 3 of 7. And I would expect being this is the first time for this Commission through this matter that the definition of avoided cost can be an issue of sorts. But about halfway down the page we see A, B, and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al, was there an issue about confidentiality on this? MR. BROGAN: Mr. Commission, Mr. Rislov, Mr. Uda, I believe there is. I'll be very careful with my answer. MR. UDA: Thank you. MR. BROGAN: Mr. Rislov, if I understood your first question, it had to do with Mr. Uda's response to the statements that were made at the bottom of 6 and bottom of 7. And if I understand your question to me and I guess I'm asking for clarification is is this from a spring 2011 Black & Veatch forecast? Is that what you're asking? MR. RISLOV: That would be a good start, yes. MR. BROGAN: And I would refer you to footnote No. 22 that indicated that it did come from the spring 2011 forecast slide No. 67. MR. RISLOV: I believe you heard the questions I
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more the expert on that than I am. I'm not sure the process that they go through. I don't know if February 25 was a period they were including in the subsequent forecast or not. I don't know what they based the subsequent forecast on. What I do know is that Mr. Lauckhart only had the November 2010 forecast in its final form when he used it and I assume that if we had filed this later or earlier those numbers would be different. I don't know what direction they would have gone in. MR. RISLOV: I have one more question for you. And that was in the Staff's answer to Oak Tree's motion on page 3 of 7. And I would expect being this is the first time for this Commission through this matter that the definition of avoided cost can be an issue of sorts. But about halfway down the page we see A, B, and C that are quoted from PURPA. And then the following	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al, was there an issue about confidentiality on this? MR. BROGAN: Mr. Commission, Mr. Rislov, Mr. Uda, I believe there is. I'll be very careful with my answer. MR. UDA: Thank you. MR. BROGAN: Mr. Rislov, if I understood your first question, it had to do with Mr. Uda's response to the statements that were made at the bottom of 6 and bottom of 7. And if I understand your question to me and I guess I'm asking for clarification is is this from a spring 2011 Black & Veatch forecast? Is that what you're asking? MR. RISLOV: That would be a good start, yes. MR. BROGAN: And I would refer you to footnote No. 22 that indicated that it did come from the spring 2011 forecast slide No. 67. MR. RISLOV: I believe you heard the questions I asked Mr. Uda, but what is your belief with regard to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more the expert on that than I am. I'm not sure the process that they go through. I don't know if February 25 was a period they were including in the subsequent forecast or not. I don't know what they based the subsequent forecast on. What I do know is that Mr. Lauckhart only had the November 2010 forecast in its final form when he used it and I assume that if we had filed this later or earlier those numbers would be different. I don't know what direction they would have gone in. MR. RISLOV: I have one more question for you. And that was in the Staff's answer to Oak Tree's motion on page 3 of 7. And I would expect being this is the first time for this Commission through this matter that the definition of avoided cost can be an issue of sorts. But about halfway down the page we see A, B, and C that are quoted from PURPA. And then the following paragraph which cites a couple of cases.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al, was there an issue about confidentiality on this? MR. BROGAN: Mr. Commission, Mr. Rislov, Mr. Uda, I believe there is. I'll be very careful with my answer. MR. UDA: Thank you. MR. BROGAN: Mr. Rislov, if I understood your first question, it had to do with Mr. Uda's response to the statements that were made at the bottom of 6 and bottom of 7. And if I understand your question to me and I guess I'm asking for clarification is is this from a spring 2011 Black & Veatch forecast? Is that what you're asking? MR. RISLOV: That would be a good start, yes. MR. BROGAN: And I would refer you to footnote No. 22 that indicated that it did come from the spring 2011 forecast slide No. 67. MR. RISLOV: I believe you heard the questions I asked Mr. Uda, but what is your belief with regard to and this is making some assumptions I realize you have
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more the expert on that than I am. I'm not sure the process that they go through. I don't know if February 25 was a period they were including in the subsequent forecast or not. I don't know what they based the subsequent forecast on. What I do know is that Mr. Lauckhart only had the November 2010 forecast in its final form when he used it and I assume that if we had filed this later or earlier those numbers would be different. I don't know what direction they would have gone in. MR. RISLOV: I have one more question for you. And that was in the Staff's answer to Oak Tree's motion on page 3 of 7. And I would expect being this is the first time for this Commission through this matter that the definition of avoided cost can be an issue of sorts. But about halfway down the page we see A, B, and C that are quoted from PURPA. And then the following paragraph which cites a couple of cases. MR. UDA: Uh-huh.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al, was there an issue about confidentiality on this? MR. BROGAN: Mr. Commission, Mr. Rislov, Mr. Uda, I believe there is. I'll be very careful with my answer. MR. UDA: Thank you. MR. BROGAN: Mr. Rislov, if I understood your first question, it had to do with Mr. Uda's response to the statements that were made at the bottom of 6 and bottom of 7. And if I understand your question to me and I guess I'm asking for clarification is is this from a spring 2011 Black & Veatch forecast? Is that what you're asking? MR. RISLOV: That would be a good start, yes. MR. BROGAN: And I would refer you to footnote No. 22 that indicated that it did come from the spring 2011 forecast slide No. 67. MR. RISLOV: I believe you heard the questions I asked Mr. Uda, but what is your belief with regard to and this is making some assumptions I realize you have not necessarily agreed to. But if we assume that an LEO
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more the expert on that than I am. I'm not sure the process that they go through. I don't know if February 25 was a period they were including in the subsequent forecast or not. I don't know what they based the subsequent forecast on. What I do know is that Mr. Lauckhart only had the November 2010 forecast in its final form when he used it and I assume that if we had filed this later or earlier those numbers would be different. I don't know what direction they would have gone in. MR. RISLOV: I have one more question for you. And that was in the Staff's answer to Oak Tree's motion on page 3 of 7. And I would expect being this is the first time for this Commission through this matter that the definition of avoided cost can be an issue of sorts. But about halfway down the page we see A, B, and C that are quoted from PURPA. And then the following paragraph which cites a couple of cases. MR. UDA: Uh-huh. MR. RISLOV: And it begins reading, "The	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al, was there an issue about confidentiality on this? MR. BROGAN: Mr. Commission, Mr. Rislov, Mr. Uda, I believe there is. I'll be very careful with my answer. MR. UDA: Thank you. MR. BROGAN: Mr. Rislov, if I understood your first question, it had to do with Mr. Uda's response to the statements that were made at the bottom of 6 and bottom of 7. And if I understand your question to me and I guess I'm asking for clarification is is this from a spring 2011 Black & Veatch forecast? Is that what you're asking? MR. RISLOV: That would be a good start, yes. MR. BROGAN: And I would refer you to footnote No. 22 that indicated that it did come from the spring 2011 forecast slide No. 67. MR. RISLOV: I believe you heard the questions I asked Mr. Uda, but what is your belief with regard to and this is making some assumptions I realize you have not necessarily agreed to. But if we assume that an LEO was created on February 25, 2011 well, it's in your
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR. UDA: You know, I don't know that that's exactly how it was done. I mean, Mr. Lauckhart is more the expert on that than I am. I'm not sure the process that they go through. I don't know if February 25 was a period they were including in the subsequent forecast or not. I don't know what they based the subsequent forecast on. What I do know is that Mr. Lauckhart only had the November 2010 forecast in its final form when he used it and I assume that if we had filed this later or earlier those numbers would be different. I don't know what direction they would have gone in. MR. RISLOV: I have one more question for you. And that was in the Staff's answer to Oak Tree's motion on page 3 of 7. And I would expect being this is the first time for this Commission through this matter that the definition of avoided cost can be an issue of sorts. But about halfway down the page we see A, B, and C that are quoted from PURPA. And then the following paragraph which cites a couple of cases. MR. UDA: Uh-huh.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	page MR. UDA: Before we get too far into this, Al, was there an issue about confidentiality on this? MR. BROGAN: Mr. Commission, Mr. Rislov, Mr. Uda, I believe there is. I'll be very careful with my answer. MR. UDA: Thank you. MR. BROGAN: Mr. Rislov, if I understood your first question, it had to do with Mr. Uda's response to the statements that were made at the bottom of 6 and bottom of 7. And if I understand your question to me and I guess I'm asking for clarification is is this from a spring 2011 Black & Veatch forecast? Is that what you're asking? MR. RISLOV: That would be a good start, yes. MR. BROGAN: And I would refer you to footnote No. 22 that indicated that it did come from the spring 2011 forecast slide No. 67. MR. RISLOV: I believe you heard the questions I asked Mr. Uda, but what is your belief with regard to and this is making some assumptions I realize you have not necessarily agreed to. But if we assume that an LEO

	69		71
1	Did you compute a levelized cost related to	1	And what that was meant to do is then with the
2	these numbers?	2	various inputs that we requested in the order, the
3	MR. BROGAN: Related to the updated Black &	3	Commission did, that was meant to allow the submission of
4	Veatch numbers?	4	additional evidence and analysis and then to hold a
5	MR. RISLOV: That's correct.	5	subsequent follow-on hearing to again get information
6	MR. BROGAN: No, we did not.	6	that complied or comported with the interim order. That
7	MR. RISLOV: That's all I had. Thank you.	7	was the point of that and that's what they're talking
8	CHAIRMAN NELSON: Any other questions from the	8	about.
9	Commission?	9	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Thank you. First of all,
10	(A short recess is taken)	10	I enjoyed everybody's information today. This is a big
11	CHAIRMAN NELSON: We will call the hearing back	11	case, and the avoided costs, I started talking to my 11
12	to order. We need to do a rollcall of who is on the	12	year old the other day about avoided costs when he was
13	telephone line.	13	dealing with an issue. And I just looked at myself like,
14	Commissioner Hanson, are you with us?	14	okay, Kristie, I know you've dealt with avoided costs for
15	COMMISSIONER HANSON: Yes, I am.	15	a long time with this hearing but you don't have to bring
16	CHAIRMAN NELSON: Yvette LaFrentz, are you with	16	it to your 11 year old.
17	us?	17	But I think we do need to get it right and I
18	MS. LAFRENTZ: Yes, I am.	18	still have some questions about the hybrid method and the
19	CHAIRMAN NELSON: Do we have anybody else on the	19	appropriate avoided costs. And I just want to make sure
20	line?	20	that we make the correct decision and would like some
21	MR. MAKENS: Matt Makens.	21	time certainly on that one.
22	CHAIRMAN NELSON: Matt Makens. Thank you.	22	There's some of these that I could vote on
23	Anybody else on the line? Thank you.	23	today. I would rather just bring a whole package on
24	With that, we are at the point of discussion	24	Tuesday to the Commission with my final decisions on all
25	and/or action on any of the points. And maybe the first	25	of them.
	70		72
1	thing, I'm just going to visit with the two fellow	1	CHAIRMAN NELSON: Commissioner Hanson, your
2	Commissioners and see if they are ready to move forward	2	thoughts? Commissioner Hanson.
3	at this point. At this point, I will say that I am ready	3	COMMISSIONER HANSON: Can you hear me all right?
4	to move forward.	4	CHAIRMAN NELSON: Oh, now we can, yes.
5	Commissioner Fiegen, your thoughts?	5	COMMISSIONER HANSON: All right. Well,
6	COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Mr. Chairman, first of	6	apparently I had it on mute when I didn't believe I had
7	all, on the motion to reconsider is that where we bring	7	it on mute. I always give deference to fellow
8	it to reconsider and then we go to another hearing or	8	Commissioners on matters when they feel that they would
9 10	could you clarify that, John? MR. SMITH: No. It's we're not with our	9 10	like to have some additional time or additional information. I've been in that position myself a few
11	MR. SMITH. NO. It's we're not with our	10	information. The been in that position myself a few
	rule on reconcideration it's like a similar motion in a	11	times, and cortainly Commissioner Fiegen is absolutely
12	rule on reconsideration it's like a similar motion in a	11	times, and certainly Commissioner Fiegen is absolutely
12	court proceeding. It's not a parliamentary motion.	12	correct from the standpoint of wanting to get this right.
13	court proceeding. It's not a parliamentary motion. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Okay.	12 13	correct from the standpoint of wanting to get this right. It is a very complex issue and we do want to
13 14	court proceeding. It's not a parliamentary motion. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Okay. MR. SMITH: It's not like in the legislature or	12 13 14	correct from the standpoint of wanting to get this right. It is a very complex issue and we do want to make certain we get it correct. Because as has been
13 14 15	court proceeding. It's not a parliamentary motion. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Okay. MR. SMITH: It's not like in the legislature or in that kind of a setting. So they have a right to	12 13 14 15	correct from the standpoint of wanting to get this right. It is a very complex issue and we do want to make certain we get it correct. Because as has been pointed out in testimony and as is very much cognizant to
13 14 15 16	court proceeding. It's not a parliamentary motion. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Okay. MR. SMITH: It's not like in the legislature or in that kind of a setting. So they have a right to reconsideration. That's a right under our rules. It's	12 13 14 15 16	correct from the standpoint of wanting to get this right. It is a very complex issue and we do want to make certain we get it correct. Because as has been pointed out in testimony and as is very much cognizant to each one of us is the fact that this will affect a
13 14 15 16 17	court proceeding. It's not a parliamentary motion. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Okay. MR. SMITH: It's not like in the legislature or in that kind of a setting. So they have a right to reconsideration. That's a right under our rules. It's just then you need to make a decision on the merits. So	12 13 14 15 16 17	correct from the standpoint of wanting to get this right. It is a very complex issue and we do want to make certain we get it correct. Because as has been pointed out in testimony and as is very much cognizant to each one of us is the fact that this will affect a significant number of rate payers and, in fact, it
13 14 15 16 17 18	court proceeding. It's not a parliamentary motion. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Okay. MR. SMITH: It's not like in the legislature or in that kind of a setting. So they have a right to reconsideration. That's a right under our rules. It's just then you need to make a decision on the merits. So that's where we're at.	12 13 14 15 16 17 18	correct from the standpoint of wanting to get this right. It is a very complex issue and we do want to make certain we get it correct. Because as has been pointed out in testimony and as is very much cognizant to each one of us is the fact that this will affect a significant number of rate payers and, in fact, it will affect rate payers in the future. So from that
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	court proceeding. It's not a parliamentary motion. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Okay. MR. SMITH: It's not like in the legislature or in that kind of a setting. So they have a right to reconsideration. That's a right under our rules. It's just then you need to make a decision on the merits. So that's where we're at. When they're talking about the subsequent	12 13 14 15 16 17	correct from the standpoint of wanting to get this right. It is a very complex issue and we do want to make certain we get it correct. Because as has been pointed out in testimony and as is very much cognizant to each one of us is the fact that this will affect a significant number of rate payers and, in fact, it will affect rate payers in the future. So from that standpoint I would give deference to Commissioner
13 14 15 16 17 18	court proceeding. It's not a parliamentary motion. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Okay. MR. SMITH: It's not like in the legislature or in that kind of a setting. So they have a right to reconsideration. That's a right under our rules. It's just then you need to make a decision on the merits. So that's where we're at. When they're talking about the subsequent hearing, they're talking about the follow-on hearing that	12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	correct from the standpoint of wanting to get this right. It is a very complex issue and we do want to make certain we get it correct. Because as has been pointed out in testimony and as is very much cognizant to each one of us is the fact that this will affect a significant number of rate payers and, in fact, it will affect rate payers in the future. So from that standpoint I would give deference to Commissioner Fiegen's desire to have additional time.
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	court proceeding. It's not a parliamentary motion. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Okay. MR. SMITH: It's not like in the legislature or in that kind of a setting. So they have a right to reconsideration. That's a right under our rules. It's just then you need to make a decision on the merits. So that's where we're at. When they're talking about the subsequent hearing, they're talking about the follow-on hearing that is referenced in the interim order that was originally	12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	correct from the standpoint of wanting to get this right. It is a very complex issue and we do want to make certain we get it correct. Because as has been pointed out in testimony and as is very much cognizant to each one of us is the fact that this will affect a significant number of rate payers and, in fact, it will affect rate payers in the future. So from that standpoint I would give deference to Commissioner
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	court proceeding. It's not a parliamentary motion. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Okay. MR. SMITH: It's not like in the legislature or in that kind of a setting. So they have a right to reconsideration. That's a right under our rules. It's just then you need to make a decision on the merits. So that's where we're at. When they're talking about the subsequent hearing, they're talking about the follow-on hearing that	12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	correct from the standpoint of wanting to get this right. It is a very complex issue and we do want to make certain we get it correct. Because as has been pointed out in testimony and as is very much cognizant to each one of us is the fact that this will affect a significant number of rate payers and, in fact, it will affect rate payers in the future. So from that standpoint I would give deference to Commissioner Fiegen's desire to have additional time. With regard to the hybrid method sorry. I
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	court proceeding. It's not a parliamentary motion. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Okay. MR. SMITH: It's not like in the legislature or in that kind of a setting. So they have a right to reconsideration. That's a right under our rules. It's just then you need to make a decision on the merits. So that's where we're at. When they're talking about the subsequent hearing, they're talking about the follow-on hearing that is referenced in the interim order that was originally scheduled for June 19, which we cancelled when all the	12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	correct from the standpoint of wanting to get this right. It is a very complex issue and we do want to make certain we get it correct. Because as has been pointed out in testimony and as is very much cognizant to each one of us is the fact that this will affect a significant number of rate payers and, in fact, it will affect rate payers in the future. So from that standpoint I would give deference to Commissioner Fiegen's desire to have additional time. With regard to the hybrid method sorry. I seem to be

	73			75
1	method, I believe that the hybrid method is the correct	1	CHAIRMAN NELSON: With that, we will defer and	
2	method to use, and I certainly would encourage my fellow	2	we are adjourned. Thank you.	
3	Commissioners to support that. I very much appreciate	3	(The hearing is concluded at 3:25 p.m.)	
4	the questions regarding CO2 and the appropriateness of	4		
5	whether we should make those considerations.	5		
6	Both sides have argued vehemently for accuracy,	6		
7	and yet this is an extremely challenging number of issues	7		
8	to have accuracy with. There's a lot of guessing as to	8		
9	what the future is going to look like with this. And	9		
10	from that perspective I think we need to have as many	10		
11	inputs as we can to have it accurate.	11		
12	And when I look at the CO2, you know, that	12		
13	number can be danced around with and used in so many	13		
14	different directions that I'm frankly uncomfortable with	14		
15	it and I'm very uncomfortable with, as I know my fellow	15		
16	Commissioners are, the judicial activism and bureaucratic	16		
17	activism and that has created the situations that we have	17		
18	today that causes some of the difficulties that we're	18		
19	faced with on this issue.	19		
20	So those are just some of my comments at this	20		
21	time, and I would certainly, as I say, give deference to	21		
22	my fellow Commissioner.	22		
23	Thank you.	23		
24	CHAIRMAN NELSON: With that and so just so I	24		
25	understand, there's none of these six issues that you	25		
	74			76
	74			70
1	would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on	1	STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA)	70
1 2		2	:SS CERTIFICATE	70
	would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on	2 3		70
2	would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package?	2	:SS CERTIFICATE COUNTY OF SULLY)	70
23	would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package? COMMISSIONER HANSON: Unless Commissioner Fiegen	2 3 4	:SS CERTIFICATE	70
2 3 4	would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package? COMMISSIONER HANSON: Unless Commissioner Fiegen has one or two that whatever she and you are	2 3 4 5	:SS CERTIFICATE COUNTY OF SULLY) I, CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered	76
2 3 4 5	would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package? COMMISSIONER HANSON: Unless Commissioner Fiegen has one or two that whatever she and you are comfortable with deciding at this juncture, I'm	2 3 4 5 6	:SS CERTIFICATE COUNTY OF SULLY) I, CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and	76
2 3 4 5 6	would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package? COMMISSIONER HANSON: Unless Commissioner Fiegen has one or two that whatever she and you are comfortable with deciding at this juncture, I'm comfortable with deciding any of them; however, whatever you folks want to tackle, I'm happy to tackle. If you want to give until Tuesday, that's fine with me too.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	:SS CERTIFICATE COUNTY OF SULLY) I, CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of South Dakota: DO HEREBY CERTIFY that as the duly-appointed shorthand reporter, I took in shorthand the proceedings	76
2 3 4 5 6 7	would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package? COMMISSIONER HANSON: Unless Commissioner Fiegen has one or two that whatever she and you are comfortable with deciding at this juncture, I'm comfortable with deciding any of them; however, whatever you folks want to tackle, I'm happy to tackle. If you want to give until Tuesday, that's fine with me too. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Thank you.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	:SS CERTIFICATE COUNTY OF SULLY) I, CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of South Dakota: DO HEREBY CERTIFY that as the duly-appointed shorthand reporter, I took in shorthand the proceedings had in the above-entitled matter on the 2nd day of	76
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package? COMMISSIONER HANSON: Unless Commissioner Fiegen has one or two that whatever she and you are comfortable with deciding at this juncture, I'm comfortable with deciding any of them; however, whatever you folks want to tackle, I'm happy to tackle. If you want to give until Tuesday, that's fine with me too. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Thank you. Commissioner Fiegen.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	:SS CERTIFICATE COUNTY OF SULLY) I, CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of South Dakota: DO HEREBY CERTIFY that as the duly-appointed shorthand reporter, I took in shorthand the proceedings had in the above-entitled matter on the 2nd day of October, 2012, and that the attached is a true and	76
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	<pre>would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package?</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	:SS CERTIFICATE COUNTY OF SULLY) I, CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of South Dakota: DO HEREBY CERTIFY that as the duly-appointed shorthand reporter, I took in shorthand the proceedings had in the above-entitled matter on the 2nd day of October, 2012, and that the attached is a true and correct transcription of the proceedings so taken.	76
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	<pre>would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package? COMMISSIONER HANSON: Unless Commissioner Fiegen has one or two that whatever she and you are comfortable with deciding at this juncture, I'm comfortable with deciding any of them; however, whatever you folks want to tackle, I'm happy to tackle. If you want to give until Tuesday, that's fine with me too. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Thank you. Commissioner Fiegen. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: You know, I would just prefer to bring the whole package on Tuesday.</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	:SS CERTIFICATE COUNTY OF SULLY) I, CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of South Dakota: DO HEREBY CERTIFY that as the duly-appointed shorthand reporter, I took in shorthand the proceedings had in the above-entitled matter on the 2nd day of October, 2012, and that the attached is a true and	76
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	<pre>would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package?</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	:SS CERTIFICATE COUNTY OF SULLY) I, CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of South Dakota: DO HEREBY CERTIFY that as the duly-appointed shorthand reporter, I took in shorthand the proceedings had in the above-entitled matter on the 2nd day of October, 2012, and that the attached is a true and correct transcription of the proceedings so taken. Dated at Onida, South Dakota this 9th day of	76
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	<pre>would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package? COMMISSIONER HANSON: Unless Commissioner Fiegen has one or two that whatever she and you are comfortable with deciding at this juncture, I'm comfortable with deciding any of them; however, whatever you folks want to tackle, I'm happy to tackle. If you want to give until Tuesday, that's fine with me too. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Thank you. Commissioner Fiegen. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: You know, I would just prefer to bring the whole package on Tuesday. CHAIRMAN NELSON: We will defer until the meeting on Tuesday, October the 9th. Yeah. And</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	:SS CERTIFICATE COUNTY OF SULLY) I, CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of South Dakota: DO HEREBY CERTIFY that as the duly-appointed shorthand reporter, I took in shorthand the proceedings had in the above-entitled matter on the 2nd day of October, 2012, and that the attached is a true and correct transcription of the proceedings so taken. Dated at Onida, South Dakota this 9th day of	76
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package? COMMISSIONER HANSON: Unless Commissioner Fiegen has one or two that whatever she and you are comfortable with deciding at this juncture, I'm comfortable with deciding any of them; however, whatever you folks want to tackle, I'm happy to tackle. If you want to give until Tuesday, that's fine with me too. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Thank you. Commissioner Fiegen. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: You know, I would just prefer to bring the whole package on Tuesday. CHAIRMAN NELSON: We will defer until the meeting on Tuesday, October the 9th. Yeah. And certainly your presence by telephone is just fine.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	:SS CERTIFICATE COUNTY OF SULLY) I, CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of South Dakota: DO HEREBY CERTIFY that as the duly-appointed shorthand reporter, I took in shorthand the proceedings had in the above-entitled matter on the 2nd day of October, 2012, and that the attached is a true and correct transcription of the proceedings so taken. Dated at Onida, South Dakota this 9th day of	76
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	<pre>would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package? COMMISSIONER HANSON: Unless Commissioner Fiegen has one or two that whatever she and you are comfortable with deciding at this juncture, I'm comfortable with deciding any of them; however, whatever you folks want to tackle, I'm happy to tackle. If you want to give until Tuesday, that's fine with me too. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Thank you. Commissioner Fiegen. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: You know, I would just prefer to bring the whole package on Tuesday. CHAIRMAN NELSON: We will defer until the meeting on Tuesday, October the 9th. Yeah. And certainly your presence by telephone is just fine. Anything further for the good of the order?</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	:SS CERTIFICATE COUNTY OF SULLY) I, CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of South Dakota: DO HEREBY CERTIFY that as the duly-appointed shorthand reporter, I took in shorthand the proceedings had in the above-entitled matter on the 2nd day of October, 2012, and that the attached is a true and correct transcription of the proceedings so taken. Dated at Onida, South Dakota this 9th day of October, 2012.	76
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	<pre>would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package? COMMISSIONER HANSON: Unless Commissioner Fiegen has one or two that whatever she and you are comfortable with deciding at this juncture, I'm comfortable with deciding any of them; however, whatever you folks want to tackle, I'm happy to tackle. If you want to give until Tuesday, that's fine with me too. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Thank you. Commissioner Fiegen. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: You know, I would just prefer to bring the whole package on Tuesday. CHAIRMAN NELSON: We will defer until the meeting on Tuesday, October the 9th. Yeah. And certainly your presence by telephone is just fine. Anything further for the good of the order? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Because my assumption on</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	SCOUNTY OF SULLY : COUNTY OF SULLY : COUNTY OF SULLY : COUNTY OF SULLY : COUNTY OF SULLY : CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of South Dakota: DO HEREBY CERTIFY that as the duly-appointed shorthand reporter, I took in shorthand the proceedings had in the above-entitled matter on the 2nd day of October, 2012, and that the attached is a true and correct transcription of the proceedings so taken. Dated at Onida, South Dakota this 9th day of October, 2012.	76
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package? COMMISSIONER HANSON: Unless Commissioner Fiegen has one or two that whatever she and you are comfortable with deciding at this juncture, I'm comfortable with deciding any of them; however, whatever you folks want to tackle, I'm happy to tackle. If you want to give until Tuesday, that's fine with me too. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Thank you. Commissioner Fiegen. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: You know, I would just prefer to bring the whole package on Tuesday. CHAIRMAN NELSON: We will defer until the meeting on Tuesday, October the 9th. Yeah. And certainly your presence by telephone is just fine. Anything further for the good of the order? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Because my assumption on Tuesday, it is very brief. We will have our decisions	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	:S CERTIFICATE COUNTY OF SULLY) I, CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of South Dakota: DO HEREBY CERTIFY that as the duly-appointed shorthand reporter, I took in shorthand the proceedings had in the above-entitled matter on the 2nd day of October, 2012, and that the attached is a true and correct transcription of the proceedings so taken. Dated at Onida, South Dakota this 9th day of October, 2012.	76
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package? COMMISSIONER HANSON: Unless Commissioner Fiegen has one or two that whatever she and you are comfortable with deciding at this juncture, I'm comfortable with deciding any of them; however, whatever you folks want to tackle, I'm happy to tackle. If you want to give until Tuesday, that's fine with me too. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Thank you. Commissioner Fiegen. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: You know, I would just prefer to bring the whole package on Tuesday. CHAIRMAN NELSON: We will defer until the meeting on Tuesday, October the 9th. Yeah. And certainly your presence by telephone is just fine. Anything further for the good of the order? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Because my assumption on Tuesday, it is very brief. We will have our decisions made. We will discuss it as a Commission. It should be	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	SCOUNTY OF SULLY : COUNTY OF SULLY : COUNTY OF SULLY : COUNTY OF SULLY : COUNTY OF SULLY : CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of South Dakota: DO HEREBY CERTIFY that as the duly-appointed shorthand reporter, I took in shorthand the proceedings had in the above-entitled matter on the 2nd day of October, 2012, and that the attached is a true and correct transcription of the proceedings so taken. Dated at Onida, South Dakota this 9th day of October, 2012.	76
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package? COMMISSIONER HANSON: Unless Commissioner Fiegen has one or two that whatever she and you are comfortable with deciding at this juncture, I'm comfortable with deciding any of them; however, whatever you folks want to tackle, I'm happy to tackle. If you want to give until Tuesday, that's fine with me too. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Thank you. Commissioner Fiegen. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: You know, I would just prefer to bring the whole package on Tuesday. CHAIRMAN NELSON: We will defer until the meeting on Tuesday, October the 9th. Yeah. And certainly your presence by telephone is just fine. Anything further for the good of the order? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Because my assumption on Tuesday, it is very brief. We will have our decisions made. We will discuss it as a Commission. It should be done and I'm not expecting to ask any more questions	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	:SS CERTIFICATE COUNTY OF SULLY) I, CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of South Dakota: DO HEREBY CERTIFY that as the duly-appointed shorthand reporter, I took in shorthand the proceedings had in the above-entitled matter on the 2nd day of October, 2012, and that the attached is a true and correct transcription of the proceedings so taken. Dated at Onida, South Dakota this 9th day of October, 2012.	76
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package? COMMISSIONER HANSON: Unless Commissioner Fiegen has one or two that whatever she and you are comfortable with deciding at this juncture, I'm comfortable with deciding any of them; however, whatever you folks want to tackle, I'm happy to tackle. If you want to give until Tuesday, that's fine with me too. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Thank you. Commissioner Fiegen. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: You know, I would just prefer to bring the whole package on Tuesday. CHAIRMAN NELSON: We will defer until the meeting on Tuesday, October the 9th. Yeah. And certainly your presence by telephone is just fine. Anything further for the good of the order? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Because my assumption on Tuesday, it is very brief. We will have our decisions made. We will discuss it as a Commission. It should be done and I'm not expecting to ask any more questions	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	:SS CERTIFICATE COUNTY OF SULLY) I, CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of South Dakota: DO HEREBY CERTIFY that as the duly-appointed shorthand reporter, I took in shorthand the proceedings had in the above-entitled matter on the 2nd day of October, 2012, and that the attached is a true and correct transcription of the proceedings so taken. Dated at Onida, South Dakota this 9th day of October, 2012.	76
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package? COMMISSIONER HANSON: Unless Commissioner Fiegen has one or two that whatever she and you are comfortable with deciding at this juncture, I'm comfortable with deciding any of them; however, whatever you folks want to tackle, I'm happy to tackle. If you want to give until Tuesday, that's fine with me too. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Thank you. Commissioner Fiegen. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: You know, I would just prefer to bring the whole package on Tuesday. CHAIRMAN NELSON: We will defer until the meeting on Tuesday, October the 9th. Yeah. And certainly your presence by telephone is just fine. Anything further for the good of the order? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Because my assumption on Tuesday, it is very brief. We will have our decisions made. We will discuss it as a Commission. It should be done and I'm not expecting to ask any more questions unless something comes up. CHAIRMAN NELSON: You don't think we're going to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	:SS CERTIFICATE COUNTY OF SULLY) I, CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of South Dakota: DO HEREBY CERTIFY that as the duly-appointed shorthand reporter, I took in shorthand the proceedings had in the above-entitled matter on the 2nd day of October, 2012, and that the attached is a true and correct transcription of the proceedings so taken. Dated at Onida, South Dakota this 9th day of October, 2012.	76
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	<pre>would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package? COMMISSIONER HANSON: Unless Commissioner Fiegen has one or two that whatever she and you are comfortable with deciding at this juncture, I'm comfortable with deciding any of them; however, whatever you folks want to tackle, I'm happy to tackle. If you want to give until Tuesday, that's fine with me too. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Thank you. Commissioner Fiegen. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: You know, I would just prefer to bring the whole package on Tuesday. CHAIRMAN NELSON: We will defer until the meeting on Tuesday, October the 9th. Yeah. And certainly your presence by telephone is just fine. Anything further for the good of the order? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Because my assumption on Tuesday, it is very brief. We will have our decisions made. We will discuss it as a Commission. It should be done and I'm not expecting to ask any more questions unless something comes up. CHAIRMAN NELSON: You don't think we're going to get into any heated debate?</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	:SS CERTIFICATE COUNTY OF SULLY) I, CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of South Dakota: DO HEREBY CERTIFY that as the duly-appointed shorthand reporter, I took in shorthand the proceedings had in the above-entitled matter on the 2nd day of October, 2012, and that the attached is a true and correct transcription of the proceedings so taken. Dated at Onida, South Dakota this 9th day of October, 2012.	76
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	would want to handle today? Correct? Wait and work on them as a package? COMMISSIONER HANSON: Unless Commissioner Fiegen has one or two that whatever she and you are comfortable with deciding at this juncture, I'm comfortable with deciding any of them; however, whatever you folks want to tackle, I'm happy to tackle. If you want to give until Tuesday, that's fine with me too. CHAIRMAN NELSON: Okay. Thank you. Commissioner Fiegen. COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: You know, I would just prefer to bring the whole package on Tuesday. CHAIRMAN NELSON: We will defer until the meeting on Tuesday, October the 9th. Yeah. And certainly your presence by telephone is just fine. Anything further for the good of the order? COMMISSIONER FIEGEN: Because my assumption on Tuesday, it is very brief. We will have our decisions made. We will discuss it as a Commission. It should be done and I'm not expecting to ask any more questions unless something comes up. CHAIRMAN NELSON: You don't think we're going to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	:SS CERTIFICATE COUNTY OF SULLY) I, CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of South Dakota: DO HEREBY CERTIFY that as the duly-appointed shorthand reporter, I took in shorthand the proceedings had in the above-entitled matter on the 2nd day of October, 2012, and that the attached is a true and correct transcription of the proceedings so taken. Dated at Onida, South Dakota this 9th day of October, 2012.	76

\$	76:11, 76:14	9th [2] - 74:14, 76:13	65:18, 72:16, 72:18	46:19
	2015 [1] - 10:6		affects [2] - 25:8,	applied [1] - 25:21
¢4 000 m 07:15	2019 [2] - 11:14, 13:17	A	33:10	applies [1] - 29:20
\$1,000 [1] - 27:15	2020 [1] - 10:6		affirmed [1] - 52:19	apply [1] - 46:4
\$10 [1] - 10:6	2025 [1] - 10:7	ability [1] - 43:11	afternoon [1] - 22:18	appointed [1] - 76:8
\$100 [1] - 54:11	22 [1] - 68:17	above-entitled [2] -	AGAINST [1] - 1:4	appreciate [3] - 48:14,
\$15 [1] - 10:6	23 [1] - 11:16	2:2, 76:10	ago [1] - 23:5	48:15, 73:3
\$20 [1] - 10:6	25 [21] - 15:6, 15:16,		agree [15] - 13:6, 21:1,	apprise [1] - 48:23
\$22 [3] - 20:11, 20:17,	16:9, 22:1, 22:2,	absent [1] - 44:11	26:1, 28:6, 38:18,	approach [6] - 13:3,
20:22	24:1, 30:16, 39:4,	absolute [1] - 49:7	39:10, 39:11, 39:20,	33:5, 41:22, 60:23,
\$25 [2] - 11:16, 14:10	40:11, 42:13, 42:23,	absolutely [2] - 17:11,	43:1, 47:9, 54:24,	63:16
\$50 [2] - 49:19, 54:10	56:3, 56:9, 56:12,	72:11	55:1, 55:16, 65:25,	approached [2] - 20:2,
\$600 [1] - 23:7	57:24, 64:15, 64:23,	accept [3] - 23:19,	67:16	47:1
	65:2, 65:23, 66:4,	23:20, 35:6	agreed [1] - 68:22	appropriate [10] -
0	68:23	access [1] - 16:4	Agreement [1] - 39:13	9:17, 17:25, 18:9,
	292 [1] - 15:2	according [1] - 14:21	agreement [2] - 28:12,	18:12, 18:25, 29:24,
	292.304(d)(2)(ii [1] -	account [7] - 13:7,	57:8	31:22, 52:20, 57:20,
0 [1] - 11:10	30:24	14:2, 14:15, 41:23,	AGREEMENT [1] - 1:6	71:19
	2nd [2] - 2:4, 76:10	42:6, 43:17, 53:25	agrees [3] - 15:12,	appropriateness [1] -
1		accuracy [3] - 65:3,	30:14, 37:1	73:4
	3	73:6, 73:8	ahead [2] - 54:7, 61:12	approximation [1] -
1 [2] - 37:12, 56:9	J	accurate [5] - 57:13,	Air [1] - 12:11	38:8
1 [2] - 37:12, 56:9 10 [7] - 3:21, 10:23,		64:23, 65:14, 65:15,	air [1] - 45:13	arbitrary [1] - 61:22
	3 [2] - 31:5, 66:15	73:11		arguable [1] - 34:21
11:11, 11:16, 32:21,	30 [5] - 3:18, 3:19,	accurately [2] - 8:5,	AI [3] - 1:17, 61:24,	argue [2] - 16:11,
32:23, 49:21	22:17, 22:23, 23:5	34:10	68:2	16:14
102 [1] - 12:5	304(d [1] - 15:2	acquire [1] - 56:10	albeit [1] - 64:19	
11 [3] - 16:19, 71:11,	3:25 [1] - 75:3	acquires [1] - 34:6	allotted [1] - 22:23	argued [5] - 15:14,
71:16		acquiring [2] - 7:1,	allow [2] - 3:23, 71:3	16:4, 20:24, 64:22,
15 [5] - 3:22, 10:23,	4	34:5	alone [1] - 14:19	73:6
11:11, 11:17, 37:21		acquisition [1] - 27:21	alternative [3] - 6:1,	argues [1] - 16:22
18 [2] - 15:2, 30:24		Act [1] - 12:12	7:17, 52:23	argument [10] - 7:22,
19 [2] - 4:9, 70:22	4 [2] - 30:17, 35:24	act [1] - 52:16	alternatively [1] - 7:10	7:23, 8:16, 17:22,
1982 [1] - 21:17	413 [1] - 2:3	action [3] - 4:1, 63:13,	alternatives [1] - 6:22	33:3, 33:7, 42:15,
1:30 [1] - 2:5		69:25	amount [3] - 18:19,	43:3, 45:7, 45:10
	- 5		29:5, 66:24	arguments [6] - 3:18,
2		actions [1] - 37:8	ample [1] - 35:9	3:19, 3:20, 8:4,
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		activism [2] - 73:16,	analysis [4] - 7:12,	15:12, 46:1
	5 [8] - 3:23, 10:23,	73:17	12:1, 36:20, 71:4	Arkansas [1] - 9:17
2 [4] - 1:8, 15:2, 31:5,	11:10, 11:16, 20:23,	activity [4] - 8:19,	answer [7] - 21:22,	arms [1] - 38:7
36:5	44:17, 46:19, 46:21	8:21, 8:22, 42:5	58:5, 58:6, 58:18,	art [1] - 52:1
20 [6] - 3:19, 24:9,	500 [1] - 2:3	actual [5] - 31:19,	66:14, 67:25, 68:6	aspect [1] - 21:15
24:11, 29:17, 48:4,		38:19, 54:18, 61:19,	Answer [2] - 29:19,	assert [1] - 26:10
52:14	6	63:4	62:7	asserts [1] - 36:14
52:14 2008 [1] - 12:8	6	add [3] - 5:9, 52:8,	62:7 answers [1] - 20:18	asserts [1] - 36:14 assign [2] - 7:8, 7:10
52:14 2008 [1] - 12:8 2009 [1] - 11:7		add [3] - 5:9, 52:8, 55:22	answers [1] - 20:18	
52:14 2008 [1] - 12:8 2009 [1] - 11:7 2010 [14] - 10:20, 13:4,	6 [3] - 62:11, 62:20,	add [3] - 5:9, 52:8, 55:22 addition [2] - 4:13,	answers [1] - 20:18 anticipate [1] - 25:1	assign [2] - 7:8, 7:10 assigning [1] - 67:15
52:14 2008 [1] - 12:8 2009 [1] - 11:7	6 [3] - 62:11, 62:20, 68:10	add [3] - 5:9, 52:8, 55:22 addition [2] - 4:13, 30:10	answers [1] - 20:18 anticipate [1] - 25:1 antithetical [1] - 59:11	assign [2] - 7:8, 7:10 assigning [1] - 67:15 assisted [1] - 57:5
52:14 2008 [1] - 12:8 2009 [1] - 11:7 2010 [14] - 10:20, 13:4,	6 [3] - 62:11, 62:20, 68:10 67 [1] - 68:18	 add [3] - 5:9, 52:8, 55:22 addition [2] - 4:13, 30:10 additional [4] - 71:4, 	answers [1] - 20:18 anticipate [1] - 25:1 antithetical [1] - 59:11 anytime [2] - 6:12,	assign [2] - 7:8, 7:10 assigning [1] - 67:15 assisted [1] - 57:5 associated [5] - 5:13,
52:14 2008 [1] - 12:8 2009 [1] - 11:7 2010 [14] - 10:20, 13:4, 15:17, 15:22, 20:1,	6 [3] - 62:11, 62:20, 68:10	add [3] - 5:9, 52:8, 55:22 addition [2] - 4:13, 30:10	answers [1] - 20:18 anticipate [1] - 25:1 antithetical [1] - 59:11 anytime [2] - 6:12, 6:18	assign [2] - 7:8, 7:10 assigning [1] - 67:15 assisted [1] - 57:5 associated [5] - 5:13, 14:20, 30:9, 41:17,
52:14 2008 [1] - 12:8 2009 [1] - 11:7 2010 [14] - 10:20, 13:4, 15:17, 15:22, 20:1, 35:11, 35:12, 46:25,	6 [3] - 62:11, 62:20, 68:10 67 [1] - 68:18 684 [1] - 12:5	 add [3] - 5:9, 52:8, 55:22 addition [2] - 4:13, 30:10 additional [4] - 71:4, 	answers [1] - 20:18 anticipate [1] - 25:1 antithetical [1] - 59:11 anytime [2] - 6:12, 6:18 anyway [1] - 44:20	assign [2] - 7:8, 7:10 assigning [1] - 67:15 assisted [1] - 57:5 associated [5] - 5:13, 14:20, 30:9, 41:17, 63:7
52:14 2008 [1] - 12:8 2009 [1] - 11:7 2010 [14] - 10:20, 13:4, 15:17, 15:22, 20:1, 35:11, 35:12, 46:25, 56:5, 56:17, 63:24, 65:20, 65:22, 66:9	6 [3] - 62:11, 62:20, 68:10 67 [1] - 68:18	 add [3] - 5:9, 52:8, 55:22 addition [2] - 4:13, 30:10 additional [4] - 71:4, 72:9, 72:20 	answers [1] - 20:18 anticipate [1] - 25:1 antithetical [1] - 59:11 anytime [2] - 6:12, 6:18 anyway [1] - 44:20 apologize [1] - 36:1	assign [2] - 7:8, 7:10 assigning [1] - 67:15 assisted [1] - 57:5 associated [5] - 5:13, 14:20, 30:9, 41:17, 63:7 assume [9] - 9:6, 9:7,
52:14 2008 [1] - 12:8 2009 [1] - 11:7 2010 [14] - 10:20, 13:4, 15:17, 15:22, 20:1, 35:11, 35:12, 46:25, 56:5, 56:17, 63:24, 65:20, 65:22, 66:9	6 [3] - 62:11, 62:20, 68:10 67 [1] - 68:18 684 [1] - 12:5	add [3] - 5:9, 52:8, 55:22 addition [2] - 4:13, 30:10 additional [4] - 71:4, 72:9, 72:20 address [2] - 7:21,	answers [1] - 20:18 anticipate [1] - 25:1 antithetical [1] - 59:11 anytime [2] - 6:12, 6:18 anyway [1] - 44:20 apologize [1] - 36:1 appear [3] - 35:12,	assign [2] - 7:8, 7:10 assigning [1] - 67:15 assisted [1] - 57:5 associated [5] - 5:13, 14:20, 30:9, 41:17, 63:7 assume [9] - 9:6, 9:7, 11:12, 57:19, 59:10,
52:14 2008 [1] - 12:8 2009 [1] - 11:7 2010 [14] - 10:20, 13:4, 15:17, 15:22, 20:1, 35:11, 35:12, 46:25, 56:5, 56:17, 63:24, 65:20, 65:22, 66:9 2011 [23] - 11:7, 11:13, 15:6, 15:16, 16:6,	6 [3] - 62:11, 62:20, 68:10 67 [1] - 68:18 684 [1] - 12:5 7	add [3] - 5:9, 52:8, 55:22 addition [2] - 4:13, 30:10 additional [4] - 71:4, 72:9, 72:20 address [2] - 7:21, 53:16	answers [1] - 20:18 anticipate [1] - 25:1 antithetical [1] - 59:11 anytime [2] - 6:12, 6:18 anyway [1] - 44:20 apologize [1] - 36:1 appear [3] - 35:12, 51:7, 64:5	assign [2] - 7:8, 7:10 assigning [1] - 67:15 assisted [1] - 57:5 associated [5] - 5:13, 14:20, 30:9, 41:17, 63:7 assume [9] - 9:6, 9:7, 11:12, 57:19, 59:10, 65:22, 66:10, 67:23,
52:14 2008 [1] - 12:8 2009 [1] - 11:7 2010 [14] - 10:20, 13:4, 15:17, 15:22, 20:1, 35:11, 35:12, 46:25, 56:5, 56:17, 63:24, 65:20, 65:22, 66:9 2011 [23] - 11:7, 11:13, 15:6, 15:16, 16:6, 16:9, 22:2, 24:1,	6 [3] - 62:11, 62:20, 68:10 67 [1] - 68:18 684 [1] - 12:5 7 7 [8] - 19:23, 62:11,	add [3] - 5:9, 52:8, 55:22 addition [2] - 4:13, 30:10 additional [4] - 71:4, 72:9, 72:20 address [2] - 7:21, 53:16 adjourned [1] - 75:2 adjustment [1] - 35:15	answers [1] - 20:18 anticipate [1] - 25:1 antithetical [1] - 59:11 anytime [2] - 6:12, 6:18 anyway [1] - 44:20 apologize [1] - 36:1 appear [3] - 35:12, 51:7, 64:5 APPEARANCES [1] -	assign [2] - 7:8, 7:10 assigning [1] - 67:15 assisted [1] - 57:5 associated [5] - 5:13, 14:20, 30:9, 41:17, 63:7 assume [9] - 9:6, 9:7, 11:12, 57:19, 59:10, 65:22, 66:10, 67:23, 68:22
52:14 2008 [1] - 12:8 2009 [1] - 11:7 2010 [14] - 10:20, 13:4, 15:17, 15:22, 20:1, 35:11, 35:12, 46:25, 56:5, 56:17, 63:24, 65:20, 65:22, 66:9 2011 [23] - 11:7, 11:13, 15:6, 15:16, 16:6, 16:9, 22:2, 24:1, 30:16, 39:4, 40:11,	6 [3] - 62:11, 62:20, 68:10 67 [1] - 68:18 684 [1] - 12:5 7 7 [8] - 19:23, 62:11, 62:17, 62:20, 64:6,	add [3] - 5:9, 52:8, 55:22 addition [2] - 4:13, 30:10 additional [4] - 71:4, 72:9, 72:20 address [2] - 7:21, 53:16 adjourned [1] - 75:2 adjustment [1] - 35:15 adopt [1] - 41:22	answers [1] - 20:18 anticipate [1] - 25:1 antithetical [1] - 59:11 anytime [2] - 6:12, 6:18 anyway [1] - 44:20 apologize [1] - 36:1 appear [3] - 35:12, 51:7, 64:5 APPEARANCES [1] - 1:16	assign [2] - 7:8, 7:10 assigning [1] - 67:15 assisted [1] - 57:5 associated [5] - 5:13, 14:20, 30:9, 41:17, 63:7 assume [9] - 9:6, 9:7, 11:12, 57:19, 59:10, 65:22, 66:10, 67:23, 68:22 assumed [1] - 31:24
52:14 2008 [1] - 12:8 2009 [1] - 11:7 2010 [14] - 10:20, 13:4, 15:17, 15:22, 20:1, 35:11, 35:12, 46:25, 56:5, 56:17, 63:24, 65:20, 65:22, 66:9 2011 [23] - 11:7, 11:13, 15:6, 15:16, 16:6, 16:9, 22:2, 24:1, 30:16, 39:4, 40:11, 42:13, 42:23, 56:3,	6 [3] - 62:11, 62:20, 68:10 67 [1] - 68:18 684 [1] - 12:5 7 7 [8] - 19:23, 62:11,	add [3] - 5:9, 52:8, 55:22 addition [2] - 4:13, 30:10 additional [4] - 71:4, 72:9, 72:20 address [2] - 7:21, 53:16 adjourned [1] - 75:2 adjustment [1] - 35:15 adopt [1] - 41:22 adopted [8] - 11:11,	answers [1] - 20:18 anticipate [1] - 25:1 antithetical [1] - 59:11 anytime [2] - 6:12, 6:18 anyway [1] - 44:20 apologize [1] - 36:1 appear [3] - 35:12, 51:7, 64:5 APPEARANCES [1] - 1:16 appeared [2] - 67:21,	assign [2] - 7:8, 7:10 assigning [1] - 67:15 assisted [1] - 57:5 associated [5] - 5:13, 14:20, 30:9, 41:17, 63:7 assume [9] - 9:6, 9:7, 11:12, 57:19, 59:10, 65:22, 66:10, 67:23, 68:22 assumed [1] - 31:24 assuming [1] - 11:17
52:14 2008 [1] - 12:8 2009 [1] - 11:7 2010 [14] - 10:20, 13:4, 15:17, 15:22, 20:1, 35:11, 35:12, 46:25, 56:5, 56:17, 63:24, 65:20, 65:22, 66:9 2011 [23] - 11:7, 11:13, 15:6, 15:16, 16:6, 16:9, 22:2, 24:1, 30:16, 39:4, 40:11, 42:13, 42:23, 56:3, 56:8, 57:5, 57:24,	6 [3] - 62:11, 62:20, 68:10 67 [1] - 68:18 684 [1] - 12:5 7 7 [8] - 19:23, 62:11, 62:17, 62:20, 64:6, 64:23, 66:15, 68:11	add [3] - 5:9, 52:8, 55:22 addition [2] - 4:13, 30:10 additional [4] - 71:4, 72:9, 72:20 address [2] - 7:21, 53:16 adjourned [1] - 75:2 adjustment [1] - 35:15 adopt [1] - 41:22 adopted [8] - 11:11, 13:10, 13:15, 14:3,	answers [1] - 20:18 anticipate [1] - 25:1 antithetical [1] - 59:11 anytime [2] - 6:12, 6:18 anyway [1] - 44:20 apologize [1] - 36:1 appear [3] - 35:12, 51:7, 64:5 APPEARANCES [1] - 1:16 appeared [2] - 67:21, 67:22	assign [2] - 7:8, 7:10 assigning [1] - 67:15 assisted [1] - 57:5 associated [5] - 5:13, 14:20, 30:9, 41:17, 63:7 assume [9] - 9:6, 9:7, 11:12, 57:19, 59:10, 65:22, 66:10, 67:23, 68:22 assumed [1] - 31:24 assuming [1] - 11:17 assumption [3] -
52:14 2009 [1] - 12:8 2009 [1] - 11:7 2010 [14] - 10:20, 13:4, 15:17, 15:22, 20:1, 35:11, 35:12, 46:25, 56:5, 56:17, 63:24, 65:20, 65:22, 66:9 2011 [23] - 11:7, 11:13, 15:6, 15:16, 16:6, 16:9, 22:2, 24:1, 30:16, 39:4, 40:11, 42:13, 42:23, 56:3, 56:8, 57:5, 57:24, 64:16, 65:2, 67:23,	6 [3] - 62:11, 62:20, 68:10 67 [1] - 68:18 684 [1] - 12:5 7 7 [8] - 19:23, 62:11, 62:17, 62:20, 64:6,	add [3] - 5:9, 52:8, 55:22 addition [2] - 4:13, 30:10 additional [4] - 71:4, 72:9, 72:20 address [2] - 7:21, 53:16 adjourned [1] - 75:2 adjustment [1] - 35:15 adopt [1] - 41:22 adopted [8] - 11:11, 13:10, 13:15, 14:3, 31:7, 37:15, 55:13	answers [1] - 20:18 anticipate [1] - 25:1 antithetical [1] - 59:11 anytime [2] - 6:12, 6:18 anyway [1] - 44:20 apologize [1] - 36:1 appear [3] - 35:12, 51:7, 64:5 APPEARANCES [1] - 1:16 appeared [2] - 67:21, 67:22 application [10] -	assign [2] - 7:8, 7:10 assigning [1] - 67:15 assisted [1] - 57:5 associated [5] - 5:13, 14:20, 30:9, 41:17, 63:7 assume [9] - 9:6, 9:7, 11:12, 57:19, 59:10, 65:22, 66:10, 67:23, 68:22 assumed [1] - 31:24 assuming [1] - 11:17 assumption [3] - 10:24, 48:6, 74:17
52:14 2008 [1] - 12:8 2009 [1] - 11:7 2010 [14] - 10:20, 13:4, 15:17, 15:22, 20:1, 35:11, 35:12, 46:25, 56:5, 56:17, 63:24, 65:20, 65:22, 66:9 2011 [23] - 11:7, 11:13, 15:6, 15:16, 16:6, 16:9, 22:2, 24:1, 30:16, 39:4, 40:11, 42:13, 42:23, 56:3, 56:8, 57:5, 57:24, 64:16, 65:2, 67:23, 68:13, 68:18, 68:23	6 [3] - 62:11, 62:20, 68:10 67 [1] - 68:18 684 [1] - 12:5 7 7 [8] - 19:23, 62:11, 62:17, 62:20, 64:6, 64:23, 66:15, 68:11	add [3] - 5:9, 52:8, 55:22 addition [2] - 4:13, 30:10 additional [4] - 71:4, 72:9, 72:20 address [2] - 7:21, 53:16 adjourned [1] - 75:2 adjustment [1] - 35:15 adopt [1] - 41:22 adopted [8] - 11:11, 13:10, 13:15, 14:3, 31:7, 37:15, 55:13 AEO [4] - 13:23,	answers [1] - 20:18 anticipate [1] - 25:1 antithetical [1] - 59:11 anytime [2] - 6:12, 6:18 anyway [1] - 44:20 apologize [1] - 36:1 appear [3] - 35:12, 51:7, 64:5 APPEARANCES [1] - 1:16 appeared [2] - 67:21, 67:22	assign [2] - 7:8, 7:10 assigning [1] - 67:15 assisted [1] - 57:5 associated [5] - 5:13, 14:20, 30:9, 41:17, 63:7 assume [9] - 9:6, 9:7, 11:12, 57:19, 59:10, 65:22, 66:10, 67:23, 68:22 assumed [1] - 31:24 assuming [1] - 11:17 assumption [3] - 10:24, 48:6, 74:17 assumptions [3] -
52:14 2008 [1] - 12:8 2009 [1] - 11:7 2010 [14] - 10:20, 13:4, 15:17, 15:22, 20:1, 35:11, 35:12, 46:25, 56:5, 56:17, 63:24, 65:20, 65:22, 66:9 2011 [23] - 11:7, 11:13, 15:6, 15:16, 16:6, 16:9, 22:2, 24:1, 30:16, 39:4, 40:11, 42:13, 42:23, 56:3, 56:8, 57:5, 57:24, 64:16, 65:2, 67:23,	6 [3] - 62:11, 62:20, 68:10 67 [1] - 68:18 684 [1] - 12:5 7 7 [8] - 19:23, 62:11, 62:17, 62:20, 64:6, 64:23, 66:15, 68:11	add [3] - 5:9, 52:8, 55:22 addition [2] - 4:13, 30:10 additional [4] - 71:4, 72:9, 72:20 address [2] - 7:21, 53:16 adjourned [1] - 75:2 adjustment [1] - 35:15 adopt [1] - 41:22 adopted [8] - 11:11, 13:10, 13:15, 14:3, 31:7, 37:15, 55:13	answers [1] - 20:18 anticipate [1] - 25:1 antithetical [1] - 59:11 anytime [2] - 6:12, 6:18 anyway [1] - 44:20 apologize [1] - 36:1 appear [3] - 35:12, 51:7, 64:5 APPEARANCES [1] - 1:16 appeared [2] - 67:21, 67:22 application [10] -	assign [2] - 7:8, 7:10 assigning [1] - 67:15 assisted [1] - 57:5 associated [5] - 5:13, 14:20, 30:9, 41:17, 63:7 assume [9] - 9:6, 9:7, 11:12, 57:19, 59:10, 65:22, 66:10, 67:23, 68:22 assumed [1] - 31:24 assuming [1] - 11:17 assumption [3] - 10:24, 48:6, 74:17

attachment [1] - 44:17	based [15] - 14:16,	15:11, 35:2, 40:13,	61:14, 63:16	CHAIRMAN [45] -
attorney [1] - 53:14	18:7, 27:18, 30:25,	42:9	capacity [4] - 4:12,	1:11, 1:11, 3:1, 3:9,
attorneys [1] - 28:10	31:12, 31:19, 31:20,	briefs [3] - 11:4,	5:3, 5:9, 8:8	10:11, 10:14, 10:18,
authority [1] - 12:14	31:24, 40:12, 44:2,	22:22, 22:25	Capitol [2] - 2:3	16:19, 19:23, 20:23,
automatically [2] -	46:1, 52:25, 53:2,	bring [6] - 45:18,	capricious [1] - 61:22	22:16, 29:16, 32:20,
41:9, 44:25	54:2, 66:6	46:12, 70:7, 71:15,	carbon [71] - 10:4,	35:24, 37:12, 37:20,
available [6] - 15:15,	basis [4] - 11:23, 37:7,	71:23, 74:12	10:5, 10:8, 10:22,	46:17, 48:14, 49:1,
30:25, 57:22, 57:24,	44:9, 67:9	Brogan [10] - 1:17,	11:6, 11:25, 13:8,	49:3, 49:15, 52:4,
64:9, 65:2	become [1] - 65:6	37:25, 38:18, 39:9,	13:17, 14:11, 16:23,	52:13, 53:9, 53:20,
Avenue [1] - 2:3	becomes [1] - 64:20	41:14, 50:14, 52:6,	17:11, 17:15, 17:23,	54:7, 54:14, 54:24,
averages [1] - 11:15	becoming [2] - 31:21,	54:24, 63:4, 70:25	17:25, 18:4, 18:23,	55:25, 61:7, 61:12,
avoid [5] - 33:14,	31:25	BROGAN [12] - 22:18,	19:6, 19:10, 19:16,	62:4, 69:8, 69:11,
33:24, 33:25, 34:4,	BEFORE [1] - 1:10	32:22, 35:25, 37:13,	22:10, 23:23, 24:1,	69:16, 69:19, 69:22,
34:12	begins [1] - 66:23	46:20, 55:8, 61:25,	24:4, 24:8, 24:16,	72:1, 72:4, 72:23,
avoidable [1] - 58:11	belief [1] - 68:20	68:4, 68:8, 68:16,	25:5, 25:15, 25:16,	73:24, 74:9, 74:13,
avoided [74] - 6:23,	believes [1] - 29:23	69:3, 69:6	29:12, 31:2, 31:6,	74:22, 75:1
8:17, 9:5, 9:11, 9:19,	below [1] - 10:24	Brogan's [4] - 40:21,	31:7, 31:10, 31:11,	Chairman [14] - 16:18,
9:20, 9:24, 16:23,	benefit [2] - 44:6,	42:15, 43:3, 44:18	31:13, 31:17, 31:18,	19:22, 22:14, 32:22,
17:14, 17:15, 17:17,	54:11	build [11] - 9:21,	31:21, 31:23, 32:12,	35:23, 37:19, 37:22,
18:12, 19:6, 19:7,	best [3] - 41:21, 43:11,	17:22, 24:20, 24:22,	32:14, 32:17, 35:22,	46:20, 49:9, 55:8,
19:16, 20:6, 20:11,	52:9	27:2, 28:1, 38:22,	36:14, 36:16, 37:1,	56:2, 61:25, 67:5,
20:14, 20:15, 20:21,	better [5] - 18:11,	49:18, 49:24, 50:10,	37:6, 37:23, 38:1,	70:6
22:7, 23:5, 23:24,	43:21, 43:25, 53:6,	55:16	38:11, 42:25, 45:2,	challenging [1] - 73:7
24:11, 24:17, 25:5,	58:25	Building [1] - 2:3	45:5, 45:7, 47:22,	change [5] - 15:20,
26:6, 27:7, 27:10,	between [2] - 11:16,	building [1] - 38:16	47:24, 52:5, 52:14,	16:1, 22:3, 57:17,
27:24, 28:4, 28:15,	21:3	bunch [1] - 20:25	52:25, 53:10, 53:24,	65:12
28:19, 29:5, 29:7,	beyond [1] - 20:10	bureaucratic [1] -	53:25, 54:1, 54:2,	changer [1] - 12:3
29:8, 29:12, 29:24,	Big [1] - 14:18	73:16	54:9, 54:11, 61:13,	changes [1] - 14:1
30:5, 30:22, 30:24,	big [1] - 71:10	business [1] - 24:25	62:2, 62:16, 62:17	changing [2] - 15:16,
31:11, 34:14, 34:18,	Bill [1] - 62:15	Buster [1] - 18:11	careful [2] - 37:9, 68:5	15:22
34:23, 38:1, 38:3,	bind [3] - 26:23, 39:1,	buy [4] - 24:20, 40:19,	carefully [2] - 26:21,	chastised [1] - 63:12
39:8, 41:9, 41:12,	52:1	41:20, 49:22	62:3	Cheri [3] - 1:21, 61:8,
41:16, 41:25, 42:16,	binding [3] - 26:20,	BY [1] - 1:4	carry [1] - 31:14	76:18
	Difiuitiu 31 - 20.20.			
42:20, 44:23, 47:2,			case [25] - 7:2, 8:6,	CHERI [1] - 76:5
42:20, 44:23, 47:2, 47:3, 47:17, 49:6,	26:22, 48:3		case [25] - 7:2, 8:6, 9:18, 13:24, 13:25,	
47:3, 47:17, 49:6, 50:25, 51:1, 51:2,	26:22, 48:3 binds [2] - 26:20,	С	case [25] - 7:2, 8:6, 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, 20:20, 22:3, 22:5,	CHERI [1] - 76:5
47:3, 47:17, 49:6,	26:22, 48:3 binds [2] - 26:20, 26:22	C	case [25] - 7:2, 8:6, 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, 27:3, 28:5, 37:15,	CHERI [1] - 76:5 chosen [1] - 60:11
47:3, 47:17, 49:6, 50:25, 51:1, 51:2,	26:22, 48:3 binds [2] - 26:20, 26:22 bit [4] - 4:8, 26:13,	C calculate [1] - 24:10	case [25] - 7:2, 8:6, 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, 37:17, 40:19, 46:9,	CHERI [1] - 76:5 chosen [1] - 60:11 CHRIS [1] - 1:11
47:3, 47:17, 49:6, 50:25, 51:1, 51:2, 51:6, 52:12, 55:21, 55:23, 59:6, 64:10, 66:17, 67:9, 71:11,	26:22, 48:3 binds [2] - 26:20, 26:22 bit [4] - 4:8, 26:13, 37:23, 63:12	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13,	case [25] - 7:2, 8:6, 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, 49:12, 49:22, 51:20,	CHERI [1] - 76:5 chosen [1] - 60:11 CHRIS [1] - 1:11 chris [1] - 1:15
47:3, 47:17, 49:6, 50:25, 51:1, 51:2, 51:6, 52:12, 55:21, 55:23, 59:6, 64:10, 66:17, 67:9, 71:11, 71:12, 71:14, 71:19	26:22, 48:3 binds [2] - 26:20, 26:22 bit [4] - 4:8, 26:13, 37:23, 63:12 Black [23] - 7:12,	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9,	case [25] - 7:2, 8:6, 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, 52:11, 53:25, 54:2,	CHERI [1] - 76:5 chosen [1] - 60:11 CHRIS [1] - 1:11 chris [1] - 1:15 circuit [4] - 12:20,
47:3, 47:17, 49:6, 50:25, 51:1, 51:2, 51:6, 52:12, 55:21, 55:23, 59:6, 64:10, 66:17, 67:9, 71:11, 71:12, 71:14, 71:19 avoiding [2] - 17:3,	26:22, 48:3 binds [2] - 26:20, 26:22 bit [4] - 4:8, 26:13, 37:23, 63:12 Black [23] - 7:12, 10:19, 10:25, 11:19,	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9, 64:9	case [25] - 7:2, 8:6, 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, 52:11, 53:25, 54:2, 54:10, 55:7, 55:10,	CHERI [1] - 76:5 chosen [1] - 60:11 CHRIS [1] - 1:11 chris [1] - 1:15 circuit [4] - 12:20, 52:19, 61:20, 61:21
47:3, 47:17, 49:6, 50:25, 51:1, 51:2, 51:6, 52:12, 55:21, 55:23, 59:6, 64:10, 66:17, 67:9, 71:11, 71:12, 71:14, 71:19 avoiding [2] - 17:3, 25:12	26:22, 48:3 binds [2] - 26:20, 26:22 bit [4] - 4:8, 26:13, 37:23, 63:12 Black [23] - 7:12,	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9, 64:9 calculating [4] - 9:20,	case [25] - 7:2, 8:6, 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, 52:11, 53:25, 54:2, 54:10, 55:7, 55:10, 64:21, 71:11	CHERI [1] - 76:5 chosen [1] - 60:11 CHRIS [1] - 1:11 chris [1] - 1:15 circuit [4] - 12:20, 52:19, 61:20, 61:21 circumstance [2] -
47:3, 47:17, 49:6, 50:25, 51:1, 51:2, 51:6, 52:12, 55:21, 55:23, 59:6, 64:10, 66:17, 67:9, 71:11, 71:12, 71:14, 71:19 avoiding [2] - 17:3, 25:12 avoids [2] - 24:19,	26:22, 48:3 binds [2] - 26:20, 26:22 bit [4] - 4:8, 26:13, 37:23, 63:12 Black [23] - 7:12, 10:19, 10:25, 11:19, 13:13, 14:21, 16:5,	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9, 64:9 calculating [4] - 9:20, 13:7, 25:5, 53:11	case [25] - 7:2, 8:6, 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, 52:11, 53:25, 54:2, 54:10, 55:7, 55:10, 64:21, 71:11 cases [5] - 9:15, 19:4,	CHERI [1] - 76:5 chosen [1] - 60:11 CHRIS [1] - 1:11 chris [1] - 1:15 circuit [4] - 12:20, 52:19, 61:20, 61:21 circumstance [2] - 49:17, 60:2
47:3, 47:17, 49:6, 50:25, 51:1, 51:2, 51:6, 52:12, 55:21, 55:23, 59:6, 64:10, 66:17, 67:9, 71:11, 71:12, 71:14, 71:19 avoiding [2] - 17:3, 25:12 avoids [2] - 24:19, 33:11	26:22, 48:3 binds [2] - 26:20, 26:22 bit [4] - 4:8, 26:13, 37:23, 63:12 Black [23] - 7:12, 10:19, 10:25, 11:19, 13:13, 14:21, 16:5, 18:17, 35:12, 36:11,	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9, 64:9 calculating [4] - 9:20, 13:7, 25:5, 53:11 calculation [22] - 10:2,	case [25] - 7:2, 8:6, 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, 52:11, 53:25, 54:2, 54:10, 55:7, 55:10, 64:21, 71:11 cases [5] - 9:15, 19:4, 19:20, 26:19, 66:21	CHERI [1] - 76:5 chosen [1] - 60:11 CHRIS [1] - 1:11 chris [1] - 1:15 circuit [4] - 12:20, 52:19, 61:20, 61:21 circumstance [2] - 49:17, 60:2 circumstances [1] - 30:1 cite [1] - 9:22
47:3, 47:17, 49:6, 50:25, 51:1, 51:2, 51:6, 52:12, 55:21, 55:23, 59:6, 64:10, 66:17, 67:9, 71:11, 71:12, 71:14, 71:19 avoiding [2] - 17:3, 25:12 avoids [2] - 24:19, 33:11	26:22, 48:3 binds [2] - 26:20, 26:22 bit [4] - 4:8, 26:13, 37:23, 63:12 Black [23] - 7:12, 10:19, 10:25, 11:19, 13:13, 14:21, 16:5, 18:17, 35:12, 36:11, 36:12, 56:17, 57:2,	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9, 64:9 calculating [4] - 9:20, 13:7, 25:5, 53:11 calculation [22] - 10:2, 10:21, 11:6, 11:9,	case [25] - 7:2, 8:6, 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, 52:11, 53:25, 54:2, 54:10, 55:7, 55:10, 64:21, 71:11 cases [5] - 9:15, 19:4, 19:20, 26:19, 66:21 category [1] - 39:22	CHERI [1] - 76:5 chosen [1] - 60:11 CHRIS [1] - 1:11 chris [1] - 1:15 circuit [4] - 12:20, 52:19, 61:20, 61:21 circumstance [2] - 49:17, 60:2 circumstances [1] - 30:1
47:3, 47:17, 49:6, 50:25, 51:1, 51:2, 51:6, 52:12, 55:21, 55:23, 59:6, 64:10, 66:17, 67:9, 71:11, 71:12, 71:14, 71:19 avoiding [2] - 17:3, 25:12 avoids [2] - 24:19, 33:11 aware [2] - 36:4, 57:4	26:22, 48:3 binds [2] - 26:20, 26:22 bit [4] - 4:8, 26:13, 37:23, 63:12 Black [23] - 7:12, 10:19, 10:25, 11:19, 13:13, 14:21, 16:5, 18:17, 35:12, 36:11, 36:12, 56:17, 57:2, 57:9, 58:3, 64:2,	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9, 64:9 calculating [4] - 9:20, 13:7, 25:5, 53:11 calculation [22] - 10:2, 10:21, 11:6, 11:9, 11:23, 14:11, 18:5,	case [25] - 7:2, 8:6, 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, 52:11, 53:25, 54:2, 54:10, 55:7, 55:10, 64:21, 71:11 cases [5] - 9:15, 19:4, 19:20, 26:19, 66:21 category [1] - 39:22 causes [1] - 73:18	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{CHERI} [1] - 76:5\\ \textbf{chosen} [1] - 60:11\\ \textbf{CHRIS} [1] - 1:11\\ \textbf{chris} [1] - 1:15\\ \textbf{circuit} [4] - 12:20,\\ 52:19, 61:20, 61:21\\ \textbf{circumstance} [2] -\\ 49:17, 60:2\\ \textbf{circumstances} [1] -\\ 30:1\\ \textbf{cite} [1] - 9:22\\ \textbf{cited} [2] - 9:17, 19:4\\ \textbf{cites} [3] - 9:14, 19:21, \end{array}$
47:3, 47:17, 49:6, 50:25, 51:1, 51:2, 51:6, 52:12, 55:21, 55:23, 59:6, 64:10, 66:17, 67:9, 71:11, 71:12, 71:14, 71:19 avoiding [2] - 17:3, 25:12 avoids [2] - 24:19, 33:11	26:22, 48:3 binds [2] - 26:20, 26:22 bit [4] - 4:8, 26:13, 37:23, 63:12 Black [23] - 7:12, 10:19, 10:25, 11:19, 13:13, 14:21, 16:5, 18:17, 35:12, 36:11, 36:12, 56:17, 57:2, 57:9, 58:3, 64:2, 64:13, 65:4, 65:11,	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9, 64:9 calculating [4] - 9:20, 13:7, 25:5, 53:11 calculation [22] - 10:2, 10:21, 11:6, 11:9, 11:23, 14:11, 18:5, 19:7, 19:16, 22:7,	case [25] - 7:2, 8:6, 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, 52:11, 53:25, 54:2, 54:10, 55:7, 55:10, 64:21, 71:11 cases [5] - 9:15, 19:4, 19:20, 26:19, 66:21 category [1] - 39:22 causes [1] - 73:18 Cedar [1] - 21:6	CHERI [1] - 76:5 chosen [1] - 60:11 CHRIS [1] - 1:11 chris [1] - 1:15 circuit [4] - 12:20, 52:19, 61:20, 61:21 circumstance [2] - 49:17, 60:2 circumstances [1] - 30:1 cite [1] - 9:22 cited [2] - 9:17, 19:4
47:3, 47:17, 49:6, 50:25, 51:1, 51:2, 51:6, 52:12, 55:21, 55:23, 59:6, 64:10, 66:17, 67:9, 71:11, 71:12, 71:14, 71:19 avoiding [2] - 17:3, 25:12 avoids [2] - 24:19, 33:11 aware [2] - 36:4, 57:4	26:22, 48:3 binds [2] - 26:20, 26:22 bit [4] - 4:8, 26:13, 37:23, 63:12 Black [23] - 7:12, 10:19, 10:25, 11:19, 13:13, 14:21, 16:5, 18:17, 35:12, 36:11, 36:12, 56:17, 57:2, 57:9, 58:3, 64:2, 64:13, 65:4, 65:11, 65:16, 67:24, 68:13,	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9, 64:9 calculating [4] - 9:20, 13:7, 25:5, 53:11 calculation [22] - 10:2, 10:21, 11:6, 11:9, 11:23, 14:11, 18:5, 19:7, 19:16, 22:7, 22:10, 23:23, 29:25,	case [25] - 7:2, 8:6, 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, 52:11, 53:25, 54:2, 54:10, 55:7, 55:10, 64:21, 71:11 cases [5] - 9:15, 19:4, 19:20, 26:19, 66:21 category [1] - 39:22 causes [1] - 73:18 Cedar [1] - 21:6 certain [4] - 28:12,	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{CHERI} [1] - 76:5\\ \textbf{chosen} [1] - 60:11\\ \textbf{CHRIS} [1] - 1:11\\ \textbf{chris} [1] - 1:15\\ \textbf{circuit} [4] - 12:20,\\ 52:19, 61:20, 61:21\\ \textbf{circumstance} [2] - \\ 49:17, 60:2\\ \textbf{circumstances} [1] - \\ 30:1\\ \textbf{cite} [1] - 9:22\\ \textbf{cited} [2] - 9:17, 19:4\\ \textbf{cites} [3] - 9:14, 19:21,\\ 66:21\\ \textbf{clarification} [1] - \end{array}$
47:3, 47:17, 49:6, 50:25, 51:1, 51:2, 51:6, 52:12, 55:21, 55:23, 59:6, 64:10, 66:17, 67:9, 71:11, 71:12, 71:14, 71:19 avoiding [2] - 17:3, 25:12 avoids [2] - 24:19, 33:11 aware [2] - 36:4, 57:4	26:22, 48:3 binds [2] - 26:20, 26:22 bit [4] - 4:8, 26:13, 37:23, 63:12 Black [23] - 7:12, 10:19, 10:25, 11:19, 13:13, 14:21, 16:5, 18:17, 35:12, 36:11, 36:12, 56:17, 57:2, 57:9, 58:3, 64:2, 64:13, 65:4, 65:11, 65:16, 67:24, 68:13, 69:3	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9, 64:9 calculating [4] - 9:20, 13:7, 25:5, 53:11 calculation [22] - 10:2, 10:21, 11:6, 11:9, 11:23, 14:11, 18:5, 19:7, 19:16, 22:7, 22:10, 23:23, 29:25, 31:11, 32:3, 38:3,	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{case} [25] - 7:2, 8:6, \\ 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, \\ 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, \\ 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, \\ 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, \\ 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, \\ 52:11, 53:25, 54:2, \\ 54:10, 55:7, 55:10, \\ 64:21, 71:11 \\ \textbf{cases} [5] - 9:15, 19:4, \\ 19:20, 26:19, 66:21 \\ \textbf{category} [1] - 39:22 \\ \textbf{causes} [1] - 73:18 \\ \textbf{Cedar} [1] - 21:6 \\ \textbf{certain} [4] - 28:12, \\ 43:21, 57:4, 72:14 \\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{CHERI} [1] - 76:5\\ \textbf{chosen} [1] - 60:11\\ \textbf{CHRIS} [1] - 1:11\\ \textbf{chris} [1] - 1:15\\ \textbf{circuit} [4] - 12:20,\\ 52:19, 61:20, 61:21\\ \textbf{circumstance} [2] -\\ 49:17, 60:2\\ \textbf{circumstances} [1] -\\ 30:1\\ \textbf{cite} [1] - 9:22\\ \textbf{cited} [2] - 9:17, 19:4\\ \textbf{cites} [3] - 9:14, 19:21,\\ 66:21\\ \textbf{clarification} [1] -\\ 68:12\\ \end{array}$
47:3, 47:17, 49:6, 50:25, 51:1, 51:2, 51:6, 52:12, 55:21, 55:23, 59:6, 64:10, 66:17, 67:9, 71:11, 71:12, 71:14, 71:19 avoiding [2] - 17:3, 25:12 avoids [2] - 24:19, 33:11 aware [2] - 36:4, 57:4 B	26:22, 48:3 binds [2] - 26:20, 26:22 bit [4] - 4:8, 26:13, 37:23, 63:12 Black [23] - 7:12, 10:19, 10:25, 11:19, 13:13, 14:21, 16:5, 18:17, 35:12, 36:11, 36:12, 56:17, 57:2, 57:9, 58:3, 64:2, 64:13, 65:4, 65:11, 65:16, 67:24, 68:13, 69:3 blindly [1] - 35:6	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9, 64:9 calculating [4] - 9:20, 13:7, 25:5, 53:11 calculation [22] - 10:2, 10:21, 11:6, 11:9, 11:23, 14:11, 18:5, 19:7, 19:16, 22:7, 22:10, 23:23, 29:25, 31:11, 32:3, 38:3, 41:12, 42:17, 42:18,	case [25] - 7:2, 8:6, 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, 52:11, 53:25, 54:2, 54:10, 55:7, 55:10, 64:21, 71:11 cases [5] - 9:15, 19:4, 19:20, 26:19, 66:21 category [1] - 39:22 causes [1] - 73:18 Cedar [1] - 21:6 certain [4] - 28:12, 43:21, 57:4, 72:14 certainly [7] - 24:22,	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{CHERI} [1] - 76:5\\ \textbf{chosen} [1] - 60:11\\ \textbf{CHRIS} [1] - 1:11\\ \textbf{chris} [1] - 1:15\\ \textbf{circuit} [4] - 12:20,\\ 52:19, 61:20, 61:21\\ \textbf{circumstance} [2] -\\ 49:17, 60:2\\ \textbf{circumstances} [1] -\\ 30:1\\ \textbf{cite} [1] - 9:22\\ \textbf{cited} [2] - 9:17, 19:4\\ \textbf{cites} [3] - 9:14, 19:21,\\ 66:21\\ \textbf{clarification} [1] -\\ 68:12\\ \textbf{clarify} [3] - 49:13,\\ \end{array}$
47:3, 47:17, 49:6, 50:25, 51:1, 51:2, 51:6, 52:12, 55:21, 55:23, 59:6, 64:10, 66:17, 67:9, 71:11, 71:12, 71:14, 71:19 avoiding [2] - 17:3, 25:12 avoids [2] - 24:19, 33:11 aware [2] - 36:4, 57:4 B backing [4] - 8:6, 8:12, 8:25, 9:3	26:22, 48:3 binds [2] - 26:20, 26:22 bit [4] - 4:8, 26:13, 37:23, 63:12 Black [23] - 7:12, 10:19, 10:25, 11:19, 13:13, 14:21, 16:5, 18:17, 35:12, 36:11, 36:12, 56:17, 57:2, 57:9, 58:3, 64:2, 64:13, 65:4, 65:11, 65:16, 67:24, 68:13, 69:3 blindly [1] - 35:6 blue [3] - 5:6, 5:15,	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9, 64:9 calculation [4] - 9:20, 13:7, 25:5, 53:11 calculation [22] - 10:2, 10:21, 11:6, 11:9, 11:23, 14:11, 18:5, 19:7, 19:16, 22:7, 22:10, 23:23, 29:25, 31:11, 32:3, 38:3, 41:12, 42:17, 42:18, 50:25, 52:12, 52:25	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{case} [25] - 7:2, 8:6, \\ 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, \\ 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, \\ 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, \\ 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, \\ 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, \\ 52:11, 53:25, 54:2, \\ 54:10, 55:7, 55:10, \\ 64:21, 71:11 \\ \textbf{cases} [5] - 9:15, 19:4, \\ 19:20, 26:19, 66:21 \\ \textbf{category} [1] - 39:22 \\ \textbf{causes} [1] - 73:18 \\ \textbf{Cedar} [1] - 21:6 \\ \textbf{certain} [4] - 28:12, \\ 43:21, 57:4, 72:14 \\ \textbf{certainly} [7] - 24:22, \\ 35:21, 71:21, 72:11, \\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{CHERI} [1] - 76:5\\ \textbf{chosen} [1] - 60:11\\ \textbf{CHRIS} [1] - 1:11\\ \textbf{chris} [1] - 1:15\\ \textbf{circuit} [4] - 12:20,\\ 52:19, 61:20, 61:21\\ \textbf{circumstance} [2] - \\ 49:17, 60:2\\ \textbf{circumstances} [1] - \\ 30:1\\ \textbf{cite} [1] - 9:22\\ \textbf{cited} [2] - 9:17, 19:4\\ \textbf{cites} [3] - 9:14, 19:21,\\ 66:21\\ \textbf{clarification} [1] - \\ 68:12\\ \textbf{clarify} [3] - 49:13,\\ 53:5, 70:9\\ \end{array}$
47:3, 47:17, 49:6, 50:25, 51:1, 51:2, 51:6, 52:12, 55:21, 55:23, 59:6, 64:10, 66:17, 67:9, 71:11, 71:12, 71:14, 71:19 avoiding [2] - 17:3, 25:12 avoids [2] - 24:19, 33:11 aware [2] - 36:4, 57:4 B backing [4] - 8:6, 8:12, 8:25, 9:3 bad [2] - 61:6	26:22, 48:3 binds [2] - 26:20, 26:22 bit [4] - 4:8, 26:13, 37:23, 63:12 Black [23] - 7:12, 10:19, 10:25, 11:19, 13:13, 14:21, 16:5, 18:17, 35:12, 36:11, 36:12, 56:17, 57:2, 57:9, 58:3, 64:2, 64:13, 65:4, 65:11, 65:16, 67:24, 68:13, 69:3 blindly [1] - 35:6 blue [3] - 5:6, 5:15, 11:1	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9, 64:9 calculating [4] - 9:20, 13:7, 25:5, 53:11 calculation [22] - 10:2, 10:21, 11:6, 11:9, 11:23, 14:11, 18:5, 19:7, 19:16, 22:7, 22:10, 23:23, 29:25, 31:11, 32:3, 38:3, 41:12, 42:17, 42:18, 50:25, 52:12, 52:25 calculations [6] -	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{case} [25] - 7:2, 8:6, \\ 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, \\ 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, \\ 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, \\ 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, \\ 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, \\ 52:11, 53:25, 54:2, \\ 54:10, 55:7, 55:10, \\ 64:21, 71:11 \\ \textbf{cases} [5] - 9:15, 19:4, \\ 19:20, 26:19, 66:21 \\ \textbf{category} [1] - 39:22 \\ \textbf{causes} [1] - 73:18 \\ \textbf{Cedar} [1] - 21:6 \\ \textbf{certain} [4] - 28:12, \\ 43:21, 57:4, 72:14 \\ \textbf{certainly} [7] - 24:22, \\ 35:21, 71:21, 72:11, \\ 73:2, 73:21, 74:15 \\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{CHERI} [1] - 76:5\\ \textbf{chosen} [1] - 60:11\\ \textbf{CHRIS} [1] - 1:11\\ \textbf{chris} [1] - 1:15\\ \textbf{circuit} [4] - 12:20,\\ 52:19, 61:20, 61:21\\ \textbf{circumstance} [2] - 49:17, 60:2\\ \textbf{circumstances} [1] - 30:1\\ \textbf{cite} [1] - 9:22\\ \textbf{cited} [2] - 9:17, 19:4\\ \textbf{cites} [3] - 9:14, 19:21,\\ 66:21\\ \textbf{clarification} [1] - 68:12\\ \textbf{clarify} [3] - 49:13,\\ 53:5, 70:9\\ \textbf{Clark} [1] - 4:9\\ \end{array}$
47:3, 47:17, 49:6, 50:25, 51:1, 51:2, 51:6, 52:12, 55:21, 55:23, 59:6, 64:10, 66:17, 67:9, 71:11, 71:12, 71:14, 71:19 avoiding [2] - 17:3, 25:12 avoids [2] - 24:19, 33:11 aware [2] - 36:4, 57:4 B backing [4] - 8:6, 8:12, 8:25, 9:3 bad [2] - 61:6 bag [1] - 28:2	$\begin{array}{c} 26:22, 48:3 \\ \textbf{binds} [2] - 26:20, \\ 26:22 \\ \textbf{bit} [4] - 4:8, 26:13, \\ 37:23, 63:12 \\ \textbf{Black} [23] - 7:12, \\ 10:19, 10:25, 11:19, \\ 13:13, 14:21, 16:5, \\ 18:17, 35:12, 36:11, \\ 36:12, 56:17, 57:2, \\ 57:9, 58:3, 64:2, \\ 64:13, 65:4, 65:11, \\ 65:16, 67:24, 68:13, \\ 69:3 \\ \textbf{blindly} [1] - 35:6 \\ \textbf{blue} [3] - 5:6, 5:15, \\ 11:1 \\ \textbf{body} [1] - 26:7 \\ \end{array}$	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9, 64:9 calculating [4] - 9:20, 13:7, 25:5, 53:11 calculation [22] - 10:2, 10:21, 11:6, 11:9, 11:23, 14:11, 18:5, 19:7, 19:16, 22:7, 22:10, 23:23, 29:25, 31:11, 32:3, 38:3, 41:12, 42:17, 42:18, 50:25, 52:12, 52:25 calculations [6] - 13:14, 13:16, 15:20,	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{case} [25] - 7:2, 8:6, \\ 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, \\ 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, \\ 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, \\ 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, \\ 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, \\ 52:11, 53:25, 54:2, \\ 54:10, 55:7, 55:10, \\ 64:21, 71:11 \\ \textbf{cases} [5] - 9:15, 19:4, \\ 19:20, 26:19, 66:21 \\ \textbf{category} [1] - 39:22 \\ \textbf{causes} [1] - 73:18 \\ \textbf{Cedar} [1] - 21:6 \\ \textbf{certain} [4] - 28:12, \\ 43:21, 57:4, 72:14 \\ \textbf{certainly} [7] - 24:22, \\ 35:21, 71:21, 72:11, \\ 73:2, 73:21, 74:15 \\ \textbf{CERTIFICATE} [1] - \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{CHERI} [1] - 76:5\\ \textbf{chosen} [1] - 60:11\\ \textbf{CHRIS} [1] - 1:11\\ \textbf{chris} [1] - 1:15\\ \textbf{circuit} [4] - 12:20,\\ 52:19, 61:20, 61:21\\ \textbf{circumstance} [2] - 49:17, 60:2\\ \textbf{circumstances} [1] - 30:1\\ \textbf{cite} [1] - 9:22\\ \textbf{cited} [2] - 9:17, 19:4\\ \textbf{cites} [3] - 9:14, 19:21,\\ 66:21\\ \textbf{clarification} [1] - 68:12\\ \textbf{clarify} [3] - 49:13,\\ 53:5, 70:9\\ \textbf{Clark} [1] - 43:5\\ \end{array}$
47:3, 47:17, 49:6, 50:25, 51:1, 51:2, 51:6, 52:12, 55:21, 55:23, 59:6, 64:10, 66:17, 67:9, 71:11, 71:12, 71:14, 71:19 avoiding [2] - 17:3, 25:12 avoids [2] - 24:19, 33:11 aware [2] - 36:4, 57:4 B backing [4] - 8:6, 8:12, 8:25, 9:3 bad [2] - 61:6 bag [1] - 28:2 ballpark [1] - 47:25	$\begin{array}{c} 26:22, 48:3\\ \textbf{binds} [2] - 26:20,\\ 26:22\\ \textbf{bit} [4] - 4:8, 26:13,\\ 37:23, 63:12\\ \textbf{Black} [23] - 7:12,\\ 10:19, 10:25, 11:19,\\ 13:13, 14:21, 16:5,\\ 18:17, 35:12, 36:11,\\ 36:12, 56:17, 57:2,\\ 57:9, 58:3, 64:2,\\ 64:13, 65:4, 65:11,\\ 65:16, 67:24, 68:13,\\ 69:3\\ \textbf{blindly} [1] - 35:6\\ \textbf{blue} [3] - 5:6, 5:15,\\ 11:1\\ \textbf{body} [1] - 26:7\\ \textbf{bottom} [6] - 5:12,\\ \end{array}$	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9, 64:9 calculating [4] - 9:20, 13:7, 25:5, 53:11 calculation [22] - 10:2, 10:21, 11:6, 11:9, 11:23, 14:11, 18:5, 19:7, 19:16, 22:7, 22:10, 23:23, 29:25, 31:11, 32:3, 38:3, 41:12, 42:17, 42:18, 50:25, 52:12, 52:25 calculations [6] - 13:14, 13:16, 15:20, 16:12, 16:15, 19:2	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{case} [25] - 7:2, 8:6, \\ 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, \\ 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, \\ 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, \\ 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, \\ 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, \\ 52:11, 53:25, 54:2, \\ 54:10, 55:7, 55:10, \\ 64:21, 71:11 \\ \textbf{cases} [5] - 9:15, 19:4, \\ 19:20, 26:19, 66:21 \\ \textbf{category} [1] - 39:22 \\ \textbf{causes} [1] - 73:18 \\ \textbf{Cedar} [1] - 21:6 \\ \textbf{certain} [4] - 28:12, \\ 43:21, 57:4, 72:14 \\ \textbf{certainly} [7] - 24:22, \\ 35:21, 71:21, 72:11, \\ 73:2, 73:21, 74:15 \\ \textbf{CERTIFICATE} [1] - \\ 76:2 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{CHERI} [1] - 76:5\\ \textbf{chosen} [1] - 60:11\\ \textbf{CHRIS} [1] - 1:11\\ \textbf{chris} [1] - 1:15\\ \textbf{circuit} [4] - 12:20,\\ 52:19, 61:20, 61:21\\ \textbf{circumstance} [2] - 49:17, 60:2\\ \textbf{circumstances} [1] - 30:1\\ \textbf{cite} [1] - 9:22\\ \textbf{cited} [2] - 9:17, 19:4\\ \textbf{cites} [3] - 9:14, 19:21,\\ 66:21\\ \textbf{clarification} [1] - 68:12\\ \textbf{clarify} [3] - 49:13,\\ 53:5, 70:9\\ \textbf{Clark} [1] - 43:5\\ \textbf{Clean} [1] - 12:11\\ \end{array}$
$\begin{array}{c} 47:3,47:17,49:6,\\ 50:25,51:1,51:2,\\ 51:6,52:12,55:21,\\ 55:23,59:6,64:10,\\ 66:17,67:9,71:11,\\ 71:12,71:14,71:19\\ \textbf{avoiding}{}_{[2]}-17:3,\\ 25:12\\ \textbf{avoids}{}_{[2]}-24:19,\\ 33:11\\ \textbf{aware}{}_{[2]}-24:19,\\ 33:11\\ \textbf{aware}{}_{[2]}-36:4,57:4\\ \hline {\textbf{B}}\\ \begin{array}{c} \textbf{backing}{}_{[4]}-8:6,\\ 8:12,8:25,9:3\\ \textbf{bad}{}_{[2]}-61:6\\ \textbf{bag}{}_{[1]}-28:2\\ \textbf{ballpark}{}_{[1]}-47:25\\ \textbf{bargaining}{}_{[2]}-45:13,\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 26:22, 48:3 \\ \textbf{binds} [2] - 26:20, \\ 26:22 \\ \textbf{bit} [4] - 4:8, 26:13, \\ 37:23, 63:12 \\ \textbf{Black} [23] - 7:12, \\ 10:19, 10:25, 11:19, \\ 13:13, 14:21, 16:5, \\ 18:17, 35:12, 36:11, \\ 36:12, 56:17, 57:2, \\ 57:9, 58:3, 64:2, \\ 64:13, 65:4, 65:11, \\ 65:16, 67:24, 68:13, \\ 69:3 \\ \textbf{blindly} [1] - 35:6 \\ \textbf{blue} [3] - 5:6, 5:15, \\ 11:1 \\ \textbf{body} [1] - 26:7 \\ \textbf{bottom} [6] - 5:12, \\ 62:11, 62:19, 67:25, \\ \end{array}$	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9, 64:9 calculation [4] - 9:20, 13:7, 25:5, 53:11 calculation [22] - 10:2, 10:21, 11:6, 11:9, 11:23, 14:11, 18:5, 19:7, 19:16, 22:7, 22:10, 23:23, 29:25, 31:11, 32:3, 38:3, 41:12, 42:17, 42:18, 50:25, 52:12, 52:25 calculations [6] - 13:14, 13:16, 15:20, 16:12, 16:15, 19:2 cancelled [1] - 70:22	case [25] - 7:2, 8:6, 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, 52:11, 53:25, 54:2, 54:10, 55:7, 55:10, 64:21, 71:11 cases [5] - 9:15, 19:4, 19:20, 26:19, 66:21 category [1] - 39:22 causes [1] - 73:18 Cedar [1] - 21:6 certain [4] - 28:12, 43:21, 57:4, 72:14 certainly [7] - 24:22, 35:21, 71:21, 72:11, 73:2, 73:21, 74:15 CERTIFICATE [1] - 76:2 Certified [2] - 76:6,	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{CHERI} [1] - 76:5\\ \textbf{chosen} [1] - 60:11\\ \textbf{CHRIS} [1] - 1:11\\ \textbf{chris} [1] - 1:15\\ \textbf{circuit} [4] - 12:20,\\ 52:19, 61:20, 61:21\\ \textbf{circumstance} [2] -\\ 49:17, 60:2\\ \textbf{circumstances} [1] -\\ 30:1\\ \textbf{cite} [1] - 9:22\\ \textbf{cited} [2] - 9:17, 19:4\\ \textbf{cites} [3] - 9:14, 19:21,\\ 66:21\\ \textbf{clarification} [1] -\\ 68:12\\ \textbf{clarify} [3] - 49:13,\\ 53:5, 70:9\\ \textbf{Clark} [1] - 4:9\\ \textbf{clash} [1] - 43:5\\ \textbf{Clean} [1] - 12:11\\ \textbf{clear} [5] - 15:1, 15:18,\\ \end{array}$
$\begin{array}{c} 47:3,\ 47:17,\ 49:6,\\ 50:25,\ 51:1,\ 51:2,\\ 51:6,\ 52:12,\ 55:21,\\ 55:23,\ 59:6,\ 64:10,\\ 66:17,\ 67:9,\ 71:11,\\ 71:12,\ 71:14,\ 71:19\\ \textbf{avoiding}\ [2]-17:3,\\ 25:12\\ \textbf{avoids}\ [2]-24:19,\\ 33:11\\ \textbf{aware}\ [2]-24:19,\\ 33:11\\ \textbf{aware}\ [2]-36:4,\ 57:4\\ \hline \begin{array}{c} \textbf{B}\\ \hline \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 26:22, 48:3 \\ \textbf{binds} [2] - 26:20, \\ 26:22 \\ \textbf{bit} [4] - 4:8, 26:13, \\ 37:23, 63:12 \\ \textbf{Black} [23] - 7:12, \\ 10:19, 10:25, 11:19, \\ 13:13, 14:21, 16:5, \\ 18:17, 35:12, 36:11, \\ 36:12, 56:17, 57:2, \\ 57:9, 58:3, 64:2, \\ 64:13, 65:4, 65:11, \\ 65:16, 67:24, 68:13, \\ 69:3 \\ \textbf{blindly} [1] - 35:6 \\ \textbf{blue} [3] - 5:6, 5:15, \\ 11:1 \\ \textbf{body} [1] - 26:7 \\ \textbf{bottom} [6] - 5:12, \\ 62:11, 62:19, 67:25, \\ 68:10, 68:11 \\ \end{array}$	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9, 64:9 calculation [4] - 9:20, 13:7, 25:5, 53:11 calculation [22] - 10:2, 10:21, 11:6, 11:9, 11:23, 14:11, 18:5, 19:7, 19:16, 22:7, 22:10, 23:23, 29:25, 31:11, 32:3, 38:3, 41:12, 42:17, 42:18, 50:25, 52:12, 52:25 calculations [6] - 13:14, 13:16, 15:20, 16:12, 16:15, 19:2 cancelled [1] - 70:22 candle [3] - 59:23,	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{case} [25] - 7:2, 8:6, \\ 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, \\ 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, \\ 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, \\ 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, \\ 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, \\ 52:11, 53:25, 54:2, \\ 54:10, 55:7, 55:10, \\ 64:21, 71:11 \\ \textbf{cases} [5] - 9:15, 19:4, \\ 19:20, 26:19, 66:21 \\ \textbf{category} [1] - 39:22 \\ \textbf{causes} [1] - 73:18 \\ \textbf{Cedar} [1] - 21:6 \\ \textbf{certain} [4] - 28:12, \\ 43:21, 57:4, 72:14 \\ \textbf{certainly} [7] - 24:22, \\ 35:21, 71:21, 72:11, \\ 73:2, 73:21, 74:15 \\ \textbf{CERTIFICATE} [1] - \\ 76:2 \\ \textbf{Certified} [2] - 76:6, \\ 76:19 \\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{CHERI} [1] - 76:5\\ \textbf{chosen} [1] - 60:11\\ \textbf{CHRIS} [1] - 1:11\\ \textbf{chris} [1] - 1:15\\ \textbf{circuit} [4] - 12:20,\\ 52:19, 61:20, 61:21\\ \textbf{circumstance} [2] - 49:17, 60:2\\ \textbf{circumstances} [1] - 30:1\\ \textbf{cite} [1] - 9:22\\ \textbf{cited} [2] - 9:17, 19:4\\ \textbf{cites} [3] - 9:14, 19:21,\\ 66:21\\ \textbf{clarification} [1] - 68:12\\ \textbf{clarify} [3] - 49:13,\\ 53:5, 70:9\\ \textbf{Clark} [1] - 43:5\\ \textbf{Clean} [1] - 12:11\\ \end{array}$
$\begin{array}{c} 47:3,\ 47:17,\ 49:6,\\ 50:25,\ 51:1,\ 51:2,\\ 51:6,\ 52:12,\ 55:21,\\ 55:23,\ 59:6,\ 64:10,\\ 66:17,\ 67:9,\ 71:11,\\ 71:12,\ 71:14,\ 71:19\\ \textbf{avoiding}\ [2]-17:3,\\ 25:12\\ \textbf{avoids}\ [2]-24:19,\\ 33:11\\ \textbf{aware}\ [2]-24:19,\\ 33:11\\ \textbf{aware}\ [2]-24:19,\\ 33:11\\ \textbf{aware}\ [2]-36:4,\ 57:4\\ \hline \begin{array}{c} \textbf{B}\\ \hline \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 26:22, 48:3 \\ \textbf{binds} [2] - 26:20, \\ 26:22 \\ \textbf{bit} [4] - 4:8, 26:13, \\ 37:23, 63:12 \\ \textbf{Black} [23] - 7:12, \\ 10:19, 10:25, 11:19, \\ 13:13, 14:21, 16:5, \\ 18:17, 35:12, 36:11, \\ 36:12, 56:17, 57:2, \\ 57:9, 58:3, 64:2, \\ 64:13, 65:4, 65:11, \\ 65:16, 67:24, 68:13, \\ 69:3 \\ \textbf{blindly} [1] - 35:6 \\ \textbf{blue} [3] - 5:6, 5:15, \\ 11:1 \\ \textbf{body} [1] - 26:7 \\ \textbf{bottom} [6] - 5:12, \\ 62:11, 62:19, 67:25, \\ 68:10, 68:11 \\ \textbf{Braun} [1] - 18:11 \\ \end{array}$	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9, 64:9 calculation [4] - 9:20, 13:7, 25:5, 53:11 calculation [22] - 10:2, 10:21, 11:6, 11:9, 11:23, 14:11, 18:5, 19:7, 19:16, 22:7, 22:10, 23:23, 29:25, 31:11, 32:3, 38:3, 41:12, 42:17, 42:18, 50:25, 52:12, 52:25 calculations [6] - 13:14, 13:16, 15:20, 16:12, 16:15, 19:2 cancelled [1] - 70:22 candle [3] - 59:23, 60:1, 60:3	case [25] - 7:2, 8:6, 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, 52:11, 53:25, 54:2, 54:10, 55:7, 55:10, 64:21, 71:11 cases [5] - 9:15, 19:4, 19:20, 26:19, 66:21 category [1] - 39:22 causes [1] - 73:18 Cedar [1] - 21:6 certain [4] - 28:12, 43:21, 57:4, 72:14 certainly [7] - 24:22, 35:21, 71:21, 72:11, 73:2, 73:21, 74:15 CERTIFICATE [1] - 76:2 Certified [2] - 76:6, 76:19 CERTIFY [1] - 76:8	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{CHERI} [1] - 76:5\\ \textbf{chosen} [1] - 60:11\\ \textbf{CHRIS} [1] - 1:11\\ \textbf{chris} [1] - 1:15\\ \textbf{circuit} [4] - 12:20,\\ 52:19, 61:20, 61:21\\ \textbf{circumstance} [2] -\\ 49:17, 60:2\\ \textbf{circumstances} [1] -\\ 30:1\\ \textbf{cite} [1] - 9:22\\ \textbf{cited} [2] - 9:17, 19:4\\ \textbf{cites} [3] - 9:14, 19:21,\\ 66:21\\ \textbf{clarification} [1] -\\ 68:12\\ \textbf{clarify} [3] - 49:13,\\ 53:5, 70:9\\ \textbf{Clark} [1] - 4:9\\ \textbf{clash} [1] - 43:5\\ \textbf{Clean} [1] - 12:11\\ \textbf{clear} [5] - 15:1, 15:18,\\ \end{array}$
$\begin{array}{c} 47:3,\ 47:17,\ 49:6,\\ 50:25,\ 51:1,\ 51:2,\\ 51:6,\ 52:12,\ 55:21,\\ 55:23,\ 59:6,\ 64:10,\\ 66:17,\ 67:9,\ 71:11,\\ 71:12,\ 71:14,\ 71:19\\ \textbf{avoiding [2] - 17:3,}\\ 25:12\\ \textbf{avoids [2] - 24:19,}\\ 33:11\\ \textbf{aware [2] - 36:4,\ 57:4}\\ \hline \\ \hline$	$\begin{array}{c} 26:22, 48:3\\ \textbf{binds} [2] - 26:20,\\ 26:22\\ \textbf{bit} [4] - 4:8, 26:13,\\ 37:23, 63:12\\ \textbf{Black} [23] - 7:12,\\ 10:19, 10:25, 11:19,\\ 13:13, 14:21, 16:5,\\ 18:17, 35:12, 36:11,\\ 36:12, 56:17, 57:2,\\ 57:9, 58:3, 64:2,\\ 64:13, 65:4, 65:11,\\ 65:16, 67:24, 68:13,\\ 69:3\\ \textbf{blindly} [1] - 35:6\\ \textbf{blue} [3] - 5:6, 5:15,\\ 11:1\\ \textbf{body} [1] - 26:7\\ \textbf{bottom} [6] - 5:12,\\ 62:11, 62:19, 67:25,\\ 68:10, 68:11\\ \textbf{Braun} [1] - 18:11\\ \textbf{brevity} [1] - 48:16\\ \end{array}$	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9, 64:9 calculating [4] - 9:20, 13:7, 25:5, 53:11 calculation [22] - 10:2, 10:21, 11:6, 11:9, 11:23, 14:11, 18:5, 19:7, 19:16, 22:7, 22:10, 23:23, 29:25, 31:11, 32:3, 38:3, 41:12, 42:17, 42:18, 50:25, 52:12, 52:25 calculations [6] - 13:14, 13:16, 15:20, 16:12, 16:15, 19:2 cancelled [1] - 70:22 candle [3] - 59:23, 60:1, 60:3 cannot [4] - 26:24,	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{case} [25] - 7:2, 8:6, \\ 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, \\ 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, \\ 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, \\ 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, \\ 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, \\ 52:11, 53:25, 54:2, \\ 54:10, 55:7, 55:10, \\ 64:21, 71:11 \\ \textbf{cases} [5] - 9:15, 19:4, \\ 19:20, 26:19, 66:21 \\ \textbf{category} [1] - 39:22 \\ \textbf{causes} [1] - 73:18 \\ \textbf{Cedar} [1] - 21:6 \\ \textbf{certain} [4] - 28:12, \\ 43:21, 57:4, 72:14 \\ \textbf{certainly} [7] - 24:22, \\ 35:21, 71:21, 72:11, \\ 73:2, 73:21, 74:15 \\ \textbf{CERTIFICATE} [1] - \\ 76:2 \\ \textbf{Certified} [2] - 76:6, \\ 76:19 \\ \textbf{CERTIFY} [1] - 76:8 \\ \textbf{CFR} [2] - 15:2, 30:24 \\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{l} \textbf{CHERI} [1] - 76:5\\ \textbf{chosen} [1] - 60:11\\ \textbf{CHRIS} [1] - 1:11\\ \textbf{chris} [1] - 1:15\\ \textbf{circuit} [4] - 12:20,\\ 52:19, 61:20, 61:21\\ \textbf{circumstance} [2] -\\ 49:17, 60:2\\ \textbf{circumstances} [1] -\\ 30:1\\ \textbf{cite} [1] - 9:22\\ \textbf{cited} [2] - 9:17, 19:4\\ \textbf{cites} [3] - 9:14, 19:21,\\ 66:21\\ \textbf{clarification} [1] -\\ 68:12\\ \textbf{clarify} [3] - 49:13,\\ 53:5, 70:9\\ \textbf{Clark} [1] - 43:5\\ \textbf{Clean} [1] - 12:11\\ \textbf{clear} [5] - 15:1, 15:18,\\ 21:6, 45:3, 45:23\\ \end{array}$
$\begin{array}{c} 47:3,47:17,49:6,\\ 50:25,51:1,51:2,\\ 51:6,52:12,55:21,\\ 55:23,59:6,64:10,\\ 66:17,67:9,71:11,\\ 71:12,71:14,71:19\\ \textbf{avoiding [2] - 17:3,}\\ 25:12\\ \textbf{avoids [2] - 24:19,}\\ 33:11\\ \textbf{aware [2] - 36:4,57:4}\\ \hline \\ \hline$	$\begin{array}{c} 26:22, 48:3\\ \textbf{binds} [2] - 26:20,\\ 26:22\\ \textbf{bit} [4] - 4:8, 26:13,\\ 37:23, 63:12\\ \textbf{Black} [23] - 7:12,\\ 10:19, 10:25, 11:19,\\ 13:13, 14:21, 16:5,\\ 18:17, 35:12, 36:11,\\ 36:12, 56:17, 57:2,\\ 57:9, 58:3, 64:2,\\ 64:13, 65:4, 65:11,\\ 65:16, 67:24, 68:13,\\ 69:3\\ \textbf{blindly} [1] - 35:6\\ \textbf{blue} [3] - 5:6, 5:15,\\ 11:1\\ \textbf{body} [1] - 26:7\\ \textbf{bottom} [6] - 5:12,\\ 62:11, 62:19, 67:25,\\ 68:10, 68:11\\ \textbf{Braun} [1] - 18:11\\ \textbf{brevity} [1] - 48:16\\ \textbf{Brian} [1] - 1:15\\ \end{array}$	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9, 64:9 calculating [4] - 9:20, 13:7, 25:5, 53:11 calculation [22] - 10:2, 10:21, 11:6, 11:9, 11:23, 14:11, 18:5, 19:7, 19:16, 22:7, 22:10, 23:23, 29:25, 31:11, 32:3, 38:3, 41:12, 42:17, 42:18, 50:25, 52:12, 52:25 calculations [6] - 13:14, 13:16, 15:20, 16:12, 16:15, 19:2 cancelled [1] - 70:22 candle [3] - 59:23, 60:1, 60:3 cannot [4] - 26:24, 28:4, 30:5, 55:13	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{case} [25] - 7:2, 8:6, \\ 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, \\ 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, \\ 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, \\ 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, \\ 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, \\ 52:11, 53:25, 54:2, \\ 54:10, 55:7, 55:10, \\ 64:21, 71:11 \\ \textbf{cases} [5] - 9:15, 19:4, \\ 19:20, 26:19, 66:21 \\ \textbf{category} [1] - 39:22 \\ \textbf{causes} [1] - 73:18 \\ \textbf{Cedar} [1] - 21:6 \\ \textbf{certain} [4] - 28:12, \\ 43:21, 57:4, 72:14 \\ \textbf{certainly} [7] - 24:22, \\ 35:21, 71:21, 72:11, \\ 73:2, 73:21, 74:15 \\ \textbf{CERTIFICATE} [1] - \\ 76:2 \\ \textbf{Certified} [2] - 76:6, \\ 76:19 \\ \textbf{CFR} [2] - 15:2, 30:24 \\ \textbf{chair} [3] - 4:5, 46:15, \\ \end{array}$	CHERI [1] - 76:5 chosen [1] - 60:11 CHRIS [1] - 1:11 chris [1] - 1:15 circuit [4] - 12:20, 52:19, 61:20, 61:21 circumstance [2] - 49:17, 60:2 circumstances [1] - 30:1 cite [1] - 9:22 cited [2] - 9:17, 19:4 cites [3] - 9:14, 19:21, 66:21 clarification [1] - 68:12 clarify [3] - 49:13, 53:5, 70:9 Clark [1] - 49: clash [1] - 43:5 Clean [1] - 12:11 clear [5] - 15:1, 15:18, 21:6, 45:3, 45:23 clearer [1] - 46:2
$\begin{array}{c} 47:3,\ 47:17,\ 49:6,\\ 50:25,\ 51:1,\ 51:2,\\ 51:6,\ 52:12,\ 55:21,\\ 55:23,\ 59:6,\ 64:10,\\ 66:17,\ 67:9,\ 71:11,\\ 71:12,\ 71:14,\ 71:19\\ \textbf{avoiding [2] - 17:3,}\\ 25:12\\ \textbf{avoids [2] - 24:19,}\\ 33:11\\ \textbf{aware [2] - 36:4,\ 57:4}\\ \hline \\ \hline$	$\begin{array}{c} 26:22, 48:3 \\ \textbf{binds} [2] - 26:20, \\ 26:22 \\ \textbf{bit} [4] - 4:8, 26:13, \\ 37:23, 63:12 \\ \textbf{Black} [23] - 7:12, \\ 10:19, 10:25, 11:19, \\ 13:13, 14:21, 16:5, \\ 18:17, 35:12, 36:11, \\ 36:12, 56:17, 57:2, \\ 57:9, 58:3, 64:2, \\ 64:13, 65:4, 65:11, \\ 65:16, 67:24, 68:13, \\ 69:3 \\ \textbf{blindly} [1] - 35:6 \\ \textbf{blue} [3] - 5:6, 5:15, \\ 11:1 \\ \textbf{body} [1] - 26:7 \\ \textbf{bottom} [6] - 5:12, \\ 62:11, 62:19, 67:25, \\ 68:10, 68:11 \\ \textbf{Braun} [1] - 18:11 \\ \textbf{brevity} [1] - 48:16 \\ \textbf{Brian} [1] - 1:15 \\ \textbf{brief} [4] - 28:20, \\ \end{array}$	C calculate [1] - 24:10 calculated [5] - 7:13, 42:20, 59:2, 60:9, 64:9 calculating [4] - 9:20, 13:7, 25:5, 53:11 calculation [22] - 10:2, 10:21, 11:6, 11:9, 11:23, 14:11, 18:5, 19:7, 19:16, 22:7, 22:10, 23:23, 29:25, 31:11, 32:3, 38:3, 41:12, 42:17, 42:18, 50:25, 52:12, 52:25 calculations [6] - 13:14, 13:16, 15:20, 16:12, 16:15, 19:2 cancelled [1] - 70:22 candle [3] - 59:23, 60:1, 60:3 cannot [4] - 26:24,	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{case} [25] - 7:2, 8:6, \\ 9:18, 13:24, 13:25, \\ 20:20, 22:3, 22:5, \\ 27:3, 28:5, 37:15, \\ 37:17, 40:19, 46:9, \\ 49:12, 49:22, 51:20, \\ 52:11, 53:25, 54:2, \\ 54:10, 55:7, 55:10, \\ 64:21, 71:11 \\ \textbf{cases} [5] - 9:15, 19:4, \\ 19:20, 26:19, 66:21 \\ \textbf{category} [1] - 39:22 \\ \textbf{causes} [1] - 73:18 \\ \textbf{Cedar} [1] - 21:6 \\ \textbf{certain} [4] - 28:12, \\ 43:21, 57:4, 72:14 \\ \textbf{certainly} [7] - 24:22, \\ 35:21, 71:21, 72:11, \\ 73:2, 73:21, 74:15 \\ \textbf{CERTIFICATE} [1] - \\ 76:2 \\ \textbf{Certified} [2] - 76:6, \\ 76:19 \\ \textbf{CERTIFY} [1] - 76:8 \\ \textbf{CFR} [2] - 15:2, 30:24 \\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{l} \textbf{CHERI} [1] - 76:5\\ \textbf{chosen} [1] - 60:11\\ \textbf{CHRIS} [1] - 1:11\\ \textbf{chris} [1] - 1:15\\ \textbf{circuit} [4] - 12:20,\\ 52:19, 61:20, 61:21\\ \textbf{circumstance} [2] -\\ 49:17, 60:2\\ \textbf{circumstances} [1] -\\ 30:1\\ \textbf{cite} [1] - 9:22\\ \textbf{cited} [2] - 9:17, 19:4\\ \textbf{cites} [3] - 9:14, 19:21,\\ 66:21\\ \textbf{clarification} [1] -\\ 68:12\\ \textbf{clarify} [3] - 49:13,\\ 53:5, 70:9\\ \textbf{Clark} [1] - 4:9\\ \textbf{clash} [1] - 43:5\\ \textbf{Clean} [1] - 12:11\\ \textbf{clear} [5] - 15:1, 15:18,\\ 21:6, 45:3, 45:23\\ \textbf{clearer} [1] - 46:2\\ \textbf{clearly} [2] - 35:19,\\ \end{array}$

closing [1] - 44:20	- 1:12, 3:8, 48:21,	38:12, 38:14, 44:10,	28:19, 29:6, 29:7,	court [3] - 26:19, 36:1, 3
CO2 [2] - 73:4, 73:12	49:2, 56:2, 58:6,	62:15, 65:1	29:8, 29:12, 29:25,	70:12
coal [26] - 5:4, 5:5,	58:9, 58:16, 60:10,	considerable [4] -	30:5, 30:11, 30:22,	courts [1] - 55:18
5:8, 5:21, 6:3, 6:6,	69:15, 70:6, 70:13,	14:18, 14:19, 18:19,	30:24, 31:7, 31:10,	create [5] - 26:3,
6:14, 6:15, 6:20,	71:9, 72:3, 72:5,	43:12	31:11, 31:13, 33:17,	27:13, 28:4, 55:17,
6:21, 7:8, 7:9, 8:7,	72:25, 74:3, 74:11,	consideration [5] -	33:25, 34:7, 34:14,	55:19
8:12, 14:16, 14:22,	74:17, 74:24	4:19, 24:16, 32:11,	34:18, 34:23, 38:1,	created [20] - 21:7,
33:20, 34:22, 40:16,	Commissioners [5] -	42:6, 46:16	38:3, 40:16, 40:17,	23:25, 26:10, 26:24,
40:17, 40:22, 41:15,	22:18, 70:2, 72:8,	considerations [1] -	41:13, 41:16, 41:20,	27:1, 28:7, 28:9,
41:18, 59:13, 59:14,	73:3, 73:16	73:5	41:25, 42:16, 44:23,	29:13, 31:1, 35:4,
59:16	commissions [1] -	considered [6] -	45:8, 47:2, 47:4,	35:20, 39:17, 42:12,
Coalition [1] - 12:4	29:4	16:14, 16:15, 36:23,	47:17, 47:24, 49:6,	46:1, 49:8, 55:2,
coastal [1] - 12:8	commit [4] - 27:11,	42:22, 45:20, 52:22	49:7, 50:25, 51:1,	55:6, 55:14, 68:23,
cogenerator [1] - 67:1	39:14, 50:4, 55:20	considering [2] -	51:2, 52:5, 52:12,	73:17
cognizant [1] - 72:15	commitment [4] -	25:24, 44:7	52:14, 52:25, 54:1,	creates [1] - 33:4
colleagues [1] - 18:8	26:5, 28:14, 29:14,	consistent [2] - 9:8,	54:2, 54:10, 54:11,	creating [1] - 43:9
comfortable [3] -	49:23	19:17	55:21, 55:23, 58:11,	creation [1] - 40:11
10:12, 74:5, 74:6	commits [2] - 21:8,	constant [1] - 54:5	59:6, 61:15, 62:2,	credibility [2] - 36:12,
coming [1] - 36:4	47:16	constraints [1] - 56:23	63:5, 66:17, 66:24,	36:22
• • •	committed [2] - 27:16,	consultation [1] -	66:25, 67:9, 67:15,	credit [1] - 39:5
commenced [1] -	46:10	36:24	69:1	Creek [1] - 39:5
50:21	committee [2] - 3:3,		costing [1] - 23:7	
commencing [1] - 2:5	3:7	consumers [5] - 23:7, 28:24, 28:25, 29:2,	costs [76] - 8:17, 9:19,	CREMER [2] - 29:18,
commend [2] - 11:4,	Compel [1] - 51:8		9:24, 10:4, 10:8,	53:14
11:25		29:3	11:6, 11:14, 11:25,	Cremer [2] - 1:14, 53:9
comment [2] - 61:23,	complains [1] - 33:4	contact [1] - 47:7	13:8, 13:17, 14:19,	criticisms [1] - 14:14
62:3	COMPLAINT [1] - 1:4	contained [1] - 30:23	16:23, 17:2, 17:14,	CRR [1] - 1:21
comments [4] - 23:14,	completely [1] - 42:24	continued [1] - 21:13	17:15, 18:5, 18:23,	crunch [1] - 43:18
24:1, 25:14, 73:20	complex [1] - 72:13	continues [1] - 41:19	19:6, 19:16, 19:17,	current [18] - 14:25,
commission [1] -	complicated [1] -	continuing [1] - 21:13	22:7, 22:10, 23:23,	15:7, 15:13, 16:2,
39:23	18:14	contract [10] - 20:3,	24:2, 24:4, 24:8,	16:11, 16:13, 30:13,
COMMISSION [3] -	complicating [1] -	20:25, 21:4, 28:8,	24:16, 29:12, 30:6,	30:20, 32:5, 35:3,
1:1, 1:10, 1:13	60:3	28:11, 39:2, 39:11,	30:9, 31:2, 31:6,	42:10, 42:21, 45:4,
Commission [45] -	complied [1] - 71:6	40:6, 47:14, 50:16	31:12, 33:10, 33:13,	45:6, 56:6, 56:12,
4:6, 11:11, 19:11,	components [1] -	contrary [1] - 15:7	33:23, 34:4, 34:11,	64:8
19:17, 27:8, 27:10,	30:11	conversation [1] -	35:22, 36:14, 36:16,	current-information
27:17, 27:23, 29:10,	comported [1] - 71:6	44:2	37:1, 37:7, 37:23,	[1] - 15:13
30:5, 30:15, 31:18,	compute [1] - 69:1	convince [1] - 43:24	38:1, 38:11, 39:8,	curve [1] - 7:12
31:22, 32:2, 32:5,	concern [1] - 58:12	correct [14] - 37:13,	41:6, 41:9, 42:20,	customers [2] - 25:8,
32:16, 35:18, 36:12,	conclude [1] - 22:14	38:18, 40:12, 42:11,	42:25, 45:2, 45:5,	25:9
36:25, 39:25, 44:6,	concluded [1] - 75:3	42:17, 63:4, 64:2,	47:22, 51:6, 52:21,	cutting [1] - 72:23
45:4, 46:15, 47:17,	conclusion [1] - 46:13	69:5, 71:20, 72:12,	53:10, 53:24, 56:4,	cynical [1] - 63:10
48:2, 48:7, 49:6,	concur [1] - 52:7	72:14, 73:1, 74:1,	59:15, 61:13, 62:16,	
49:21, 51:10, 51:23,	conditional [1] - 26:11	76:12	62:17, 63:7, 63:8,	D
52:2, 54:23, 55:4,	conditions [5] - 30:13,	correctly [2] - 34:11,	63:25, 64:10, 67:8,	
55:7, 55:13, 56:5,	30:21, 32:6, 35:3,	63:25	67:16, 71:11, 71:12,	DC 141 12:20 52:40
58:21, 60:20, 66:16,	42:10	cost [112] - 5:7, 5:13,	71:14, 71:19	D.C [4] - 12:20, 52:19,
67:6, 68:4, 69:9,	confidentiality [1] -	5:16, 6:3, 6:5, 6:14,	council [1] - 14:9	61:20, 61:21
71:3, 71:24, 74:19	68:3	6:15, 6:23, 6:24, 7:3,	Council [1] - 13:14	DAKOTA [2] - 1:2,
Commission's [7] -	confused [1] - 44:19	7:6, 7:8, 7:9, 7:24,	Council's [1] - 11:24	76:1 Dekoto koz 2:2 2:4
15:5, 16:11, 23:24,	Congress [3] - 13:2,	8:17, 9:5, 9:11, 9:20,	country [2] - 56:24,	Dakota [12] - 2:2, 2:4,
30:19, 45:22, 48:9,	39:21, 52:16	10:3, 10:5, 10:22,	67:10	4:10, 4:13, 14:17,
60:11	Conservation [2] -	14:11, 16:23, 17:11,	COUNTY [1] - 76:3	23:4, 30:3, 30:8,
Commissioner [18] -	11:24, 13:14	17:17, 17:23, 17:25,	couple [4] - 15:11,	39:6, 76:7, 76:13
3:2, 3:3, 3:25, 48:17,	conservative [2] -	18:12, 18:25, 19:7,	43:15, 44:3, 66:21	damages [1] - 51:22
48:19, 49:1, 52:9,	48:5, 48:6	19:10, 20:6, 20:11,		danced [1] - 73:13
56:14, 69:14, 70:5,	consider [19] - 8:21,	20:14, 20:15, 20:21,	course [5] - 12:3,	date [3] - 22:12, 40:8,
72:1, 72:2, 72:11,	12:15, 13:9, 15:15,	23:5, 23:24, 24:11,	20:14, 27:20, 35:17,	42:13
72:19, 73:22, 74:3,	15:18, 16:2, 16:16,	24:17, 25:5, 25:6,	58:11	Dated [1] - 76:13
74:10	17:8, 24:14, 24:23,	26:6, 27:7, 27:10,	Court [3] - 12:13,	Daugaard [1] - 1:15
COMMISSIONER [20]	28:11, 35:20, 37:4,	27:24, 28:4, 28:15,	52:18, 63:13	days [2] - 5:3, 55:15
1		1	1	

	Г	1		
dead [4] - 62:15, 63:1,	development [1] -	68:24	34:5, 34:6, 55:14,	24 :10, 31:13, 31:17, 4
63:17, 63:18	40:1	dollars [1] - 47:14	67:1	31:19, 32:15, 58:3
deal [3] - 9:18, 23:1,	devote [1] - 43:12	done [8] - 7:18, 21:21,	Energy [12] - 1:17,	estimates [8] - 11:2,
35:2	difference [2] - 21:3,	46:12, 56:9, 57:2,	10:20, 16:5, 18:6,	30:6, 31:10, 36:11,
dealing [4] - 3:15,	23:16	60:20, 66:2, 74:20	18:8, 18:14, 22:13,	36:13, 48:1, 52:11,
14:4, 51:21, 71:13	different [15] - 10:21,	down [12] - 8:6, 8:12,	31:14, 37:2, 37:25,	65:9
dealt [3] - 4:15, 9:19,	11:8, 13:23, 14:10,	8:25, 9:3, 25:12,	56:18, 63:5	estimating [2] - 38:6,
71:14	42:24, 44:8, 54:16,	40:22, 41:2, 41:3,	ENERGY [2] - 1:4, 1:5	65:8
debate [3] - 43:5,	55:11, 56:21, 57:15,	41:15, 60:22, 60:23,	Energy's [7] - 23:10,	event [1] - 65:7
43:23, 74:23	58:8, 65:10, 66:11,	66:19	23:15, 26:4, 31:7,	evidence [9] - 22:3,
decide [3] - 18:10,	68:25, 73:14	dropped [1] - 15:24	32:14, 43:2, 62:7	22:12, 27:8, 31:16,
51:23, 59:25	differing [1] - 35:8	due [1] - 30:2	enforce [3] - 26:17,	35:9, 36:15, 37:10,
decided [1] - 21:16	difficult [1] - 36:9	duly [1] - 76:8	27:4, 39:24	44:13, 71:4
deciding [2] - 74:5,	difficulties [1] - 73:18	duly-appointed [1] -	enforceable [16] -	evidentiary [2] -
74:6	difficulty [2] - 51:5,	76:8	15:4, 19:24, 21:2,	31:12, 31:15
decision [26] - 5:23,	59:5	during [5] - 25:17,	21:3, 21:5, 21:7,	exact [1] - 61:16
8:9, 8:23, 9:18, 9:22,	diminished [1] - 62:18	27:19, 33:3, 33:24,	21:24, 25:22, 26:14,	exactly [2] - 65:21,
9:23, 12:4, 12:7,	direct [1] - 44:16	34:2	26:15, 30:14, 42:12,	66:2
12:20, 17:17, 18:22,	directed [1] - 62:5		50:3, 50:11, 51:12,	example [17] - 5:1,
18:24, 19:12, 19:15,	direction [2] - 57:10,	E	51:25	8:11, 13:2, 14:4,
37:2, 39:20, 39:21,	66:12		engage [1] - 20:18	17:4, 17:7, 17:8,
40:11, 45:23, 54:9,	directions [1] - 73:14	oorburg 19:10 10:7	enjoyed [1] - 71:10	18:13, 43:20, 46:5,
54:22, 54:23, 57:24,	directly [1] - 49:5	early [4] - 13:19, 16:7,	enormous [1] - 51:4	50:18, 51:21, 54:8,
65:17, 70:17, 71:20	disagree [4] - 25:15,	20:1, 46:25	ensure [2] - 50:23,	55:11, 58:24, 59:7,
decisions [3] - 51:18,	26:3, 33:6, 38:19	easily [2] - 58:22, 59:2	50:24	65:16
71:24, 74:18	disagreement [1] -	East [1] - 2:3	ENTER [1] - 1:5	except [1] - 36:10
defer [2] - 74:13, 75:1	37:6	effect [1] - 30:11	entered [1] - 28:8	excess [2] - 5:9, 34:5
deference [3] - 72:7,	disagreements [1] -	effort [1] - 18:19 EIA [13] - 10:22, 13:21,	Entergy [1] - 9:17	exchange [1] - 47:6
72:19, 73:21	59:1	EIA [13] - 10.22, 13.21, 13:23, 14:7, 14:14,	entities [2] - 18:19,	exclude [1] - 32:11
definitely [2] - 25:15,	disappeared [1] - 47:7	15:17, 15:22, 18:13,	65:12	exclusively [1] - 30:6
63:2	discount [2] - 13:20,	37:14, 37:16, 37:17,	entitled [2] - 2:2,	excuse [3] - 27:9,
definition [3] - 6:23,	31:20	57:15, 65:10	76:10	40:16, 68:25
8:17, 66:17	discounted [3] -	either [15] - 6:18, 6:19,	EPA _[12] - 12:5, 12:9,	exercise [3] - 31:22,
delayed [4] - 11:13,	13:19, 31:24, 32:17	7:2, 8:1, 9:6, 14:2,	12:14, 12:16, 12:23,	32:17, 56:25
11:17, 11:20, 51:22	discriminate [1] - 41:7	15:14, 17:23, 19:20,	37:8, 52:17, 52:25,	exhaustive [2] - 43:16,
deliver [14] - 26:20,	discriminating [1] -	30:10, 40:24, 41:4,	61:16, 63:11, 65:16	56:24
26:22, 26:24, 28:14, 20:2, 40:2, 40:7	17:20	41:5, 54:19, 56:7	EPA's [3] - 14:4, 14:6, 63:2	Exhibit [1] - 36:5
39:2, 40:3, 40:7, 49:7, 49:11, 50:5,	discriminatory [1] -	EL11-006 [2] - 1:4,	equal [2] - 28:15, 43:4	exhibit [3] - 36:7,
49.7, 49.11, 50.5, 51:11, 52:2, 55:14,	44:22	3:15		36:10, 44:17
51:11, 52:2, 55:14, 55:21	discuss [3] - 25:17,	Electric [1] - 9:24	equation [3] - 6:19, 8:2, 61:3	exist [3] - 24:6, 24:12, 42:4
delivering [3] - 27:11,	25:25, 74:19	electric [2] - 32:7,	equations [1] - 36:21	42.4 existing [2] - 9:20,
39:4, 39:6	discussed [2] - 44:11,	66:25	equipment [1] - 49:22	26:6
demonstrative [3] -	45:20	electrical [1] - 19:14	error [2] - 12:21, 65:9	exists [4] - 40:25,
5:1, 5:11, 36:2	discussion [4] - 3:25,	emission [1] - 13:8	escalation [1] - 22:8	41:1, 41:5, 51:25
denying [1] - 32:1	28:24, 45:21, 69:24	emissions [2] - 12:24,	especially [2] - 24:21,	expect [3] - 12:2,
describe [1] - 10:17	dispatch [1] - 10:1	63:3	48:23	48:16, 66:15
desire [1] - 72:20	displaced [2] - 9:4,	employ [1] - 60:15	essentially [9] - 6:24,	expectation [2] - 10:8,
determination [7] -	41:12	employees [1] - 28:23	7:19, 8:4, 8:24,	12:25
9:8, 9:9, 12:10, 18:4,	displacement [3] - 34:14, 34:18, 34:19	employment [1] -	11:19, 12:23, 28:21,	expecting [1] - 74:20
23:25, 29:11, 29:13	displacing [2] - 14:23,	64:13	38:15, 38:24	expense [1] - 14:18
determine [6] - 27:17,		encourage [2] - 40:1,	establish [3] - 31:23,	expensive [4] - 5:25,
30:21, 32:6, 36:12,	34:15 dispositive [1] - 35:16	73:2	32:17, 51:2	13:1, 13:18, 53:1
42:19, 46:3	disputes [2] - 46:6,	end [10] - 35:11,	established [1] -	experience [1] - 7:15
determined [3] - 9:24,	46:7	35:21, 44:14, 45:14,	30:15	experiencing [1] -
26:6, 47:17	40:7 DO [1] - 76:8	45:25, 46:2, 47:24,	establishes [1] -	38:11
determines [1] - 34:11	docket [2] - 26:1,	47:25, 48:5, 60:3	46:25	expert [4] - 35:7,
developer [1] - 38:22	48:22	endangerment [2] -	establishment [1] -	36:22, 43:8, 66:3
developers [2] - 4:15,	doctrine [1] - 38:20	12:16, 12:17	32:9	experts [3] - 36:17,
		energy [5] - 4:12,	estimate [7] - 11:25,	36:24, 43:5
4:18	document [2] - 62:6,	JJ (- 1		30.Z4, 43.5

explain [2] - 19:18,	56:15, 70:5, 72:11,	64:20, 64:24, 65:20,	30:4	hearings [1] - 48:9
19:19	74:3, 74:10	66:5, 66:7, 66:9,	given [6] - 15:5, 23:3,	heated [1] - 74:23
explanation [1] -	FIEGEN [13] - 1:11,	68:13, 68:18	27:11, 49:7, 54:13,	heavy [1] - 34:2
37:25	49:2, 56:2, 58:6,	forecasting [2] -	59:6	hedge [2] - 17:5,
explore [1] - 44:8	58:9, 58:16, 60:10,	18:18, 65:12	glean [1] - 54:3	17:25
expression [1] - 59:23	70:6, 70:13, 71:9,	forecasts [3] - 58:1,	grant [1] - 29:10	held [2] - 2:1, 54:5
extensively [1] - 11:4	74:11, 74:17, 74:24	65:10, 65:12	granting [2] - 32:4,	help [2] - 6:12, 6:18
extent [6] - 15:21,	Fiegen's [1] - 72:20	foreseeable [1] - 34:8	32:13	HEREBY [1] - 76:8
34:17, 34:21, 36:25,	fights [1] - 59:3	forestalling [1] - 51:17	grants [1] - 35:18	high [7] - 11:15,
57:4, 65:20	figure [8] - 10:5, 10:7,	forget [2] - 28:25, 29:1	great [1] - 23:1	33:18, 37:7, 54:2,
	17:1, 17:2, 33:13,	form [2] - 63:19, 66:9	greater [1] - 29:5	
extremely [2] - 13:1,	43:10, 56:4, 58:11		•	54:10, 54:15, 61:15
73:7	figures [1] - 37:3	forward [3] - 48:9,	green [1] - 5:5	higher [5] - 6:5, 27:6,
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	70:2, 70:4	greenhouse [5] -	58:2, 63:9, 64:14
F	figuring [1] - 18:20	foundation [1] - 44:9	12:10, 12:24, 13:7,	hinted [1] - 49:4
	file [1] - 51:7	fourth [1] - 25:25	17:9, 63:3	hinting [1] - 50:15
F.3d [1] - 12:5	filed [3] - 29:19, 66:10,	frankly [3] - 24:14,	Greg [2] - 1:14, 61:10	historically [1] - 38:5
	70:23	47:12, 73:14	group [2] - 56:22	hold [1] - 71:4
faced [1] - 73:19	filing [2] - 62:18,	free [1] - 49:15	groups [1] - 56:21	holding [1] - 28:2
facilities [4] - 7:15,	63:24	front [2] - 4:7, 21:13	guess [7] - 18:3,	honestly [1] - 45:11
17:20, 23:6, 39:21	final [5] - 48:10, 48:11,	full [1] - 29:7	25:18, 36:3, 58:19,	hope [2] - 22:23, 23:3
facility [8] - 7:1, 15:3,	57:3, 66:9, 71:24	fully [3] - 22:22, 22:23,	59:23, 68:12, 68:24	hopefully [3] - 3:13,
17:2, 17:13, 17:16,	finally [3] - 32:16,	48:23	guessing [1] - 73:8	22:21, 48:10
21:8, 39:19, 52:2	35:22, 37:13	fundamental [4] - 9:5,	guidance [1] - 58:20	hour [4] - 20:11,
fact [12] - 10:2, 24:13,	finance [1] - 27:25	16:1, 34:13, 34:17	guided [2] - 31:23,	20:22, 49:19, 59:19
35:13, 38:12, 45:16,	financially [4] - 28:16,	fundamentally [1] -	32:18	hours [23] - 5:20, 6:2,
51:6, 51:10, 53:11,	28:18, 49:12, 50:9	26:3		6:4, 6:7, 6:13, 6:16,
55:3, 67:4, 72:16,	financing [1] - 20:16	fundamentals [2] -	Н	6:19, 6:20, 7:5, 7:7,
72:17	fine [4] - 10:13, 48:24,	28:11, 57:16	п	
factors [2] - 22:8, 38:6	74:8, 74:15	funded [1] - 14:6		7:11, 33:8, 33:18,
failed [3] - 15:15,	first [24] - 4:6, 4:22,		half [3] - 4:9, 5:2, 5:12	33:19, 33:24, 34:2,
46:23, 62:15		future [9] - 17:6, 18:1,	halfway [1] - 66:19	34:24, 41:23, 42:2,
fails [1] - 51:15	5:2, 8:4, 9:17, 16:22,	26:12, 34:9, 58:21,	handle [3] - 52:10,	59:9, 59:13, 67:16
fair [2] - 13:11, 60:23	19:9, 24:1, 26:15,	60:9, 65:4, 72:18,	58:25, 74:1	human [1] - 12:11
fairly [1] - 59:2	33:1, 36:2, 44:1,	73:9	handling [1] - 46:6	humorous [1] - 38:17
fall [10] - 10:19, 35:12,	46:22, 48:19, 51:25,	futures [1] - 54:13	HANSON [8] - 1:12,	hurts [5] - 41:1, 41:2,
35:15, 56:5, 56:13,	56:16, 62:24, 64:10,		3:8, 48:21, 69:15,	41:3, 41:7, 41:8
	66:16, 67:20, 68:9,	G		hybrid [31] - 5:14,
56:18, 63:24, 64:18,	69:25, 70:6, 71:9		72:3, 72:5, 72:25,	5:19, 7:18, 9:16,
64:24, 65:20	firstly [1] - 64:25		74:3	29:23, 29:24, 31:3,
far [2] - 10:14, 68:2	fixed [1] - 59:20	game [7] - 7:20, 12:3,	Hanson [5] - 3:3,	32:3, 32:12, 33:2,
fast [2] - 36:2, 64:21	focusing [1] - 64:15	15:16, 15:22, 45:17,	48:19, 69:14, 72:1,	33:4, 34:10, 40:13,
fate [1] - 27:1	folks [1] - 74:7	45:19, 60:2	72:2	42:7, 44:21, 47:20,
feasible [1] - 50:9	follow [2] - 70:20, 71:5	game's [1] - 59:23	HAP [1] - 14:4	58:10, 58:13, 58:14,
February [24] - 15:6,	follow-on [2] - 70:20,	games [1] - 59:24	happy [2] - 20:7, 74:7	59:21, 60:11, 60:16,
15:16, 16:9, 22:1,	71:5	Garbage [1] - 61:5	hard [1] - 33:15	61:1, 67:3, 67:11,
22:2, 24:1, 30:15,	following [3] - 49:16,	garbage [1] - 61:5	haul [1] - 4:17	67:12, 67:17, 71:18,
35:11, 39:3, 40:11,	65:24, 66:20	Gary [2] - 3:5, 72:24	hazardous [1] - 14:5	72:21, 72:25, 73:1
42:12, 42:23, 47:9,	follows [1] - 5:20	GARY [1] - 1:12	heading [1] - 57:11	hydro [1] - 17:7
56:3, 56:9, 56:12,	footnote [1] - 68:16	gas [11] - 5:6, 5:8,	heads [4] - 7:19, 9:11,	hypothetical [3] - 5:3,
E7.04 64.15 64.00		12:24, 13:7, 17:5,	33:5, 42:7	29:8, 49:20
57:24, 64:15, 64:23,	FOR [1] - 1.5			20.0, 70.20
65:2, 65:23, 66:4,	FOR [1] - 1:5	17:9, 22:8, 32:7,	health [1] - 12:11	
	force [1] - 63:13	17:9, 22:8, 32:7, 38:4, 56:22, 63:3	health [1] - 12:11 hear [2] - 37:24, 72:3	
65:2, 65:23, 66:4, 68:23	force [1] - 63:13 forcing [1] - 12:23	38:4, 56:22, 63:3	hear [2] - 37:24, 72:3	I
65:2, 65:23, 66:4, 68:23	force [1] - 63:13 forcing [1] - 12:23 forecast [33] - 10:25,	38:4, 56:22, 63:3 gases [1] - 12:10	hear [2] - 37:24, 72:3 heard [5] - 7:22, 8:3,	I
65:2, 65:23, 66:4, 68:23 fellow [5] - 70:1, 72:7, 73:2, 73:15, 73:22	force [1] - 63:13 forcing [1] - 12:23 forecast [33] - 10:25, 13:13, 13:22, 13:23,	38:4, 56:22, 63:3 gases [1] - 12:10 generally [2] - 10:17,	hear [2] - 37:24, 72:3 heard [5] - 7:22, 8:3, 8:16, 38:4, 68:19	I Idaho [2] - 51:21
65:2, 65:23, 66:4, 68:23 fellow [5] - 70:1, 72:7, 73:2, 73:15, 73:22 FERC [5] - 21:5,	force [1] - 63:13 forcing [1] - 12:23 forecast [33] - 10:25, 13:13, 13:22, 13:23, 14:8, 14:9, 14:15,	38:4, 56:22, 63:3 gases [1] - 12:10 generally [2] - 10:17, 38:19	hear [2] - 37:24, 72:3 heard [5] - 7:22, 8:3, 8:16, 38:4, 68:19 hearing [19] - 19:1,	l Idaho [2] - 51:21, 58:24
65:2, 65:23, 66:4, 68:23 fellow [5] - 70:1, 72:7, 73:2, 73:15, 73:22 FERC [5] - 21:5, 21:23, 26:19, 50:1,	force [1] - 63:13 forcing [1] - 12:23 forecast [33] - 10:25, 13:13, 13:22, 13:23, 14:8, 14:9, 14:15, 15:3, 15:17, 15:24,	38:4, 56:22, 63:3 gases [1] - 12:10 generally [2] - 10:17, 38:19 generate [2] - 6:25,	hear [2] - 37:24, 72:3 heard [5] - 7:22, 8:3, 8:16, 38:4, 68:19 hearing [19] - 19:1, 20:9, 35:21, 42:19,	58:24
65:2, 65:23, 66:4, 68:23 fellow [5] - 70:1, 72:7, 73:2, 73:15, 73:22 FERC [5] - 21:5, 21:23, 26:19, 50:1, 50:2	force [1] - 63:13 forcing [1] - 12:23 forecast [33] - 10:25, 13:13, 13:22, 13:23, 14:8, 14:9, 14:15, 15:3, 15:17, 15:24, 16:6, 17:10, 18:6,	38:4, 56:22, 63:3 gases [1] - 12:10 generally [2] - 10:17, 38:19 generate [2] - 6:25, 66:25	hear [2] - 37:24, 72:3 heard [5] - 7:22, 8:3, 8:16, 38:4, 68:19 hearing [19] - 19:1, 20:9, 35:21, 42:19, 43:4, 44:7, 44:11,	58:24 idea [2] - 18:16, 38:16
65:2, 65:23, 66:4, 68:23 fellow [5] - 70:1, 72:7, 73:2, 73:15, 73:22 FERC [5] - 21:5, 21:23, 26:19, 50:1, 50:2 fervently [1] - 23:3	force [1] - 63:13 forcing [1] - 12:23 forecast [33] - 10:25, 13:13, 13:22, 13:23, 14:8, 14:9, 14:15, 15:3, 15:17, 15:24, 16:6, 17:10, 18:6, 22:8, 41:22, 43:2,	38:4, 56:22, 63:3 gases [1] - 12:10 generally [2] - 10:17, 38:19 generate [2] - 6:25, 66:25 generating [2] - 5:8,	hear [2] - 37:24, 72:3 heard [5] - 7:22, 8:3, 8:16, 38:4, 68:19 hearing [19] - 19:1, 20:9, 35:21, 42:19, 43:4, 44:7, 44:11, 48:11, 53:5, 53:15,	58:24 idea [2] - 18:16, 38:16 ignored [1] - 15:15
65:2, 65:23, 66:4, 68:23 fellow [5] - 70:1, 72:7, 73:2, 73:15, 73:22 FERC [5] - 21:5, 21:23, 26:19, 50:1, 50:2 fervently [1] - 23:3 few [3] - 24:1, 61:9,	force [1] - 63:13 forcing [1] - 12:23 forecast [33] - 10:25, 13:13, 13:22, 13:23, 14:8, 14:9, 14:15, 15:3, 15:17, 15:24, 16:6, 17:10, 18:6,	38:4, 56:22, 63:3 gases [1] - 12:10 generally [2] - 10:17, 38:19 generate [2] - 6:25, 66:25 generating [2] - 5:8, 67:9	hear [2] - 37:24, 72:3 heard [5] - 7:22, 8:3, 8:16, 38:4, 68:19 hearing [19] - 19:1, 20:9, 35:21, 42:19, 43:4, 44:7, 44:11, 48:11, 53:5, 53:15, 57:19, 60:15, 69:11,	58:24 idea [2] - 18:16, 38:16 ignored [1] - 15:15 illegal [1] - 67:13
65:2, 65:23, 66:4, 68:23 fellow [5] - 70:1, 72:7, 73:2, 73:15, 73:22 FERC [5] - 21:5, 21:23, 26:19, 50:1,	force [1] - 63:13 forcing [1] - 12:23 forecast [33] - 10:25, 13:13, 13:22, 13:23, 14:8, 14:9, 14:15, 15:3, 15:17, 15:24, 16:6, 17:10, 18:6, 22:8, 41:22, 43:2,	38:4, 56:22, 63:3 gases [1] - 12:10 generally [2] - 10:17, 38:19 generate [2] - 6:25, 66:25 generating [2] - 5:8,	hear [2] - 37:24, 72:3 heard [5] - 7:22, 8:3, 8:16, 38:4, 68:19 hearing [19] - 19:1, 20:9, 35:21, 42:19, 43:4, 44:7, 44:11, 48:11, 53:5, 53:15,	58:24 idea [2] - 18:16, 38:16 ignored [1] - 15:15

impetus [1] - 13:1	37:19, 46:15, 48:8	71:13, 72:13, 73:19	Lauckhart [12] - 7:11,	limited [2] - 3:24,
implementation [3] -	industry [1] - 63:15	issues [10] - 22:5,	14:14, 15:14, 16:4,	46:18
11:13, 11:17, 11:20	inflation [2] - 38:5,	22:6, 22:11, 38:14,	35:13, 36:13, 57:1,	line [11] - 3:4, 3:6, 5:4,
implemented [1] -	47:15	43:6, 44:21, 48:23,	58:3, 62:14, 64:9,	5:5, 5:6, 5:15, 5:18,
12:22	information [30] - 3:5,	56:23, 73:7, 73:25	66:2, 66:8	11:1, 69:13, 69:20,
important [9] - 4:14,	14:25, 15:8, 15:13,	items [1] - 14:8	Lauckhart's [4] -	69:23
4:19, 12:7, 13:22,	15:15, 16:2, 16:13,	itself [6] - 6:24, 7:1,	15:17, 16:12, 42:16,	liquidated [1] - 51:22
17:25, 21:15, 37:24,	30:25, 42:13, 42:21,	26:20, 26:22, 26:23,	44:15	listen [3] - 43:6, 53:6,
42:6, 61:3	42:22, 45:4, 45:6,	59:4	law [4] - 15:7, 31:21,	53:7
importantly [1] - 28:23	51:5, 51:7, 54:3,	33.4	31:25, 59:22	lives [1] - 25:1
• • • • •	54:12, 56:10, 56:11,	J	least [2] - 14:20, 23:13	LLC [1] - 1:4
impose [1] - 62:1	56:13, 57:20, 57:22,	J	leave [1] - 55:4	
imposed [1] - 63:5	57:23, 64:8, 65:1,		left [5] - 16:18, 28:2,	load [20] - 5:3, 5:6,
improbability [1] -	71:5, 71:10, 72:10	January [1] - 47:8		5:9, 5:22, 6:4, 7:8,
52:16	informed [1] - 57:23	job [2] - 39:22, 60:21	35:23, 45:12, 55:7	8:13, 9:2, 33:18,
IN [1] - 1:4		John [4] - 1:13, 61:10,	legally [16] - 15:4,	33:24, 34:1, 34:2,
inappropriate [1] -	initial [5] - 3:18, 23:13,	61:12, 70:9	19:24, 21:2, 21:3,	34:3, 34:5, 34:16,
15:10	33:3, 33:7, 36:7	judgment [3] - 31:22,	21:5, 21:7, 21:24,	34:23, 59:14
include [9] - 14:8,	inputs [7] - 31:6, 32:7,	32:17, 36:23	25:22, 26:14, 26:15,	lock [1] - 15:9
18:22, 19:5, 19:6,	56:4, 61:2, 61:6,	judicial [1] - 73:16	30:14, 42:12, 50:3,	lock-in [1] - 15:9
19:10, 19:12, 25:4,	71:2, 73:11	juncture [1] - 74:5	50:11, 51:11, 51:24	long-term [4] - 9:18,
37:24, 53:11	instance [2] - 55:12,	June [4] - 12:4, 61:20,	legged [1] - 28:21	20:15, 20:21, 24:22
included [10] - 10:22,	64:10	65:17, 70:22	legislation [8] - 11:22,	look [16] - 6:11, 8:18,
17:16, 18:5, 19:3,	instead [2] - 7:5,		14:2, 31:19, 31:21,	8:19, 13:16, 15:23,
19:16, 25:16, 29:2,	56:12	jurisdiction [1] - 12:14	31:24, 31:25, 32:18,	35:1, 43:22, 44:4,
31:10, 37:1, 63:24	insufficient [3] - 5:21,	justify [1] - 24:17	63:6	48:9, 53:25, 54:1,
includes [2] - 14:10,	6:16, 6:20		legislature [1] - 70:14	57:25, 65:11, 67:10,
36:6	integrated [2] - 19:13,	K	legs [1] - 28:22	73:9, 73:12
including [8] - 7:4,	30:3		LEO [38] - 15:6, 23:25,	looked [4] - 57:10,
14:10, 15:16, 22:7,	intend [1] - 22:22	Karen [1] - 1:14	26:2, 26:3, 26:10,	57:14, 64:12, 71:13
24:17, 38:1, 41:24,	intended [4] - 32:25,	keep [1] - 25:7	26:17, 26:24, 26:25,	looking [12] - 24:20,
66:5	50:1, 50:2, 52:1	kept [2] - 20:18, 47:2	27:2, 27:14, 27:18,	24:21, 34:24, 35:4,
inclusion [5] - 16:23,	intention [1] - 63:3	kind [15] - 5:1, 17:11,	28:4, 28:7, 28:9,	41:14, 43:25, 50:13,
17:24, 23:23, 29:12,	Interconnection [1] -		28:10, 28:13, 29:13,	59:7, 61:1, 62:6,
45:8	39:13	24:9, 38:17, 42:8,	30:15, 30:25, 32:9,	62:10, 62:19
inconsistent [2] -	interested [1] - 21:21	44:5, 45:19, 50:14,	35:3, 35:19, 35:20,	looming [1] - 12:22
9:11, 29:23	interesting [1] - 20:13	50:15, 52:11, 56:5,	38:17, 38:20, 39:3,	lose [4] - 7:20, 9:12,
incorporate [1] -	interim [2] - 70:21,	60:6, 61:14, 61:15,	40:2, 40:11, 45:10,	33:5, 42:8
17:10	71:6	70:15	46:1, 46:22, 49:8,	loss [1] - 49:25
incorporated [2] -	internal [2] - 30:4,	knowing [1] - 64:18	54:25, 55:6, 55:13,	low [13] - 6:3, 6:13,
31:3, 31:6	30:7	known [2] - 35:10	55:17, 55:20, 68:22	7:6, 7:8, 11:1, 11:2,
incorrect [1] - 16:15	INTO [1] - 1:5	knows [2] - 18:15,	less [5] - 17:21, 25:25,	33:18, 37:11, 40:16,
increase [1] - 15:23	investment [1] - 51:18	53:7	41:24, 55:24, 65:15	40:17, 44:23, 54:1,
incremental [19] - 5:7,	involved [1] - 16:8	Kristie [1] - 71:14	letter [3] - 39:3, 47:9	54:15
• • •		KRISTIE [1] - 1:11	letters [2] - 20:4, 47:6	lower [11] - 6:21, 7:16,
5:8, 5:13, 5:16, 6:5,	involving [1] - 19:2		level [2] - 27:11, 51:3	33:17, 34:7, 44:14,
7:3, 7:9, 7:24, 8:19,	irrelevancy [1] - 23:1	L	levelized [2] - 11:16,	44:25, 47:24, 47:25,
8:22, 10:3, 30:6,	irrelevant [1] - 33:22		69:1	48:5, 58:2, 67:22
41:5, 42:5, 59:15,	issue [43] - 11:6,	1		
66:24, 67:8, 67:15,	12:15, 14:24, 15:2,	lack [2] - 46:2, 50:22	leverage [1] - 45:15	lowers [1] - 41:9
67:16	15:13, 15:14, 19:9,	LaFave [1] - 20:9	Lewis [5] - 18:7,	
10011Frod (0) 15.4	19:10, 19:24, 22:9,	LaFrentz [2] - 3:5,	36:15, 43:8, 43:9,	M
	00.11 05.00 05.01	69:16	44:9	
21:25	22:11, 25:20, 25:21,		Lewis's [3] - 31:17,	
21:25 indeed [1] - 35:3	25:22, 29:22, 33:23,	LAFRENTZ [1] - 69:18		main [1] - 58.12
21:25 indeed [1] - 35:3 indicated [3] - 46:23,	25:22, 29:22, 33:23, 35:2, 35:19, 38:17,	Lands [8] - 18:6, 18:8,	44:14, 47:24	main [1] - 58:12
21:25 indeed [1] - 35:3 indicated [3] - 46:23, 54:25, 68:17	25:22, 29:22, 33:23, 35:2, 35:19, 38:17, 40:5, 42:9, 42:21,	Lands [8] - 18:6, 18:8, 22:12, 31:7, 31:14,	44:14, 47:24 light [5] - 23:8, 33:8,	maintaining [1] -
21:25 indeed [1] - 35:3 indicated [3] - 46:23, 54:25, 68:17 indicating [1] - 47:2	25:22, 29:22, 33:23, 35:2, 35:19, 38:17, 40:5, 42:9, 42:21, 42:24, 42:25, 43:1,	Lands [8] - 18:6, 18:8,	44:14, 47:24 light [5] - 23:8, 33:8, 33:24, 34:23, 63:2	maintaining [1] - 20:21
21:25 indeed [1] - 35:3 indicated [3] - 46:23, 54:25, 68:17 indicating [1] - 47:2	25:22, 29:22, 33:23, 35:2, 35:19, 38:17, 40:5, 42:9, 42:21,	Lands [8] - 18:6, 18:8, 22:12, 31:7, 31:14,	44:14, 47:24 light [5] - 23:8, 33:8, 33:24, 34:23, 63:2 likelihood [2] - 13:10,	maintaining [1] - 20:21 Makens [3] - 21:10,
21:25 indeed [1] - 35:3 indicated [3] - 46:23, 54:25, 68:17 indicating [1] - 47:2 indication [1] - 15:25	25:22, 29:22, 33:23, 35:2, 35:19, 38:17, 40:5, 42:9, 42:21, 42:24, 42:25, 43:1,	Lands [8] - 18:6, 18:8, 22:12, 31:7, 31:14, 32:14, 37:2, 43:2	44:14, 47:24 light [5] - 23:8, 33:8, 33:24, 34:23, 63:2 likelihood [2] - 13:10, 31:20	maintaining [1] - 20:21 Makens [3] - 21:10, 69:21, 69:22
21:25 indeed [1] - 35:3 indicated [3] - 46:23, 54:25, 68:17 indicating [1] - 47:2 indication [1] - 15:25	25:22, 29:22, 33:23, 35:2, 35:19, 38:17, 40:5, 42:9, 42:21, 42:24, 42:25, 43:1, 43:17, 44:6, 45:2,	Lands [8] - 18:6, 18:8, 22:12, 31:7, 31:14, 32:14, 37:2, 43:2 language [2] - 29:2,	44:14, 47:24 light [5] - 23:8, 33:8, 33:24, 34:23, 63:2 likelihood [2] - 13:10, 31:20 likely [3] - 43:14,	maintaining [1] - 20:21 Makens [3] - 21:10, 69:21, 69:22 MAKENS [1] - 69:21
indeed [1] - 35:3 indicated [3] - 46:23, 54:25, 68:17 indicating [1] - 47:2 indication [1] - 15:25 indifferent [2] - 7:23,	25:22, 29:22, 33:23, 35:2, 35:19, 38:17, 40:5, 42:9, 42:21, 42:24, 42:25, 43:1, 43:17, 44:6, 45:2, 46:22, 51:12, 51:13,	Lands [8] - 18:6, 18:8, 22:12, 31:7, 31:14, 32:14, 37:2, 43:2 language [2] - 29:2, 30:23	44:14, 47:24 light [5] - 23:8, 33:8, 33:24, 34:23, 63:2 likelihood [2] - 13:10, 31:20	maintaining [1] - 20:21 Makens [3] - 21:10, 69:21, 69:22

marbles [2] - 45:16,	measure [1] - 43:23	models [1] - 43:10	must [1] - 17:16	24:11, 25:20, 52:14
45:19	meet [5] - 6:14, 7:8,	modified [1] - 31:7	mute [2] - 72:6, 72:7	night [1] - 59:24
March [1] - 56:9	8:13, 34:3, 59:14	money [3] - 4:16,	mutual [1] - 28:12	nobody [2] - 18:15,
margin [1] - 65:8	meeting [3] - 3:1,	49:19, 57:13	mythological [1] -	20:20
Market [3] - 10:20,	28:12, 74:14	Montana [8] - 11:8,	8:10	none [1] - 73:25
16:5, 56:18	megawatt [5] - 4:9,	19:9, 19:11, 19:12,		nonstarter [1] - 20:17
market [57] - 5:13,	20:11, 20:22, 27:15,	23:4, 23:7, 38:13,	Ν	NOPR [2] - 61:16,
5:18, 5:22, 5:25, 6:4,	49:19	58:24		61:18
6:7, 6:12, 6:17, 6:18,	members [2] - 4:5,	month [3] - 47:6, 64:1,		normal [1] - 10:8
7:6, 7:10, 7:16, 7:25,	67:5	64:20	name [1] - 62:7	normally [1] - 28:10
8:7, 8:14, 8:20, 8:21,	mentioned [1] - 62:25	months [5] - 47:7,	National [1] - 18:14	North [1] - 14:17
8:24, 9:4, 9:6, 9:7,	mere [2] - 26:25, 35:13	56:20, 65:6, 65:21,	national [1] - 56:22	Northwest [1] - 13:13
9:23, 10:1, 16:1,	merely [1] - 27:12	65:24	natural [1] - 32:7	NORTHWESTERN [1]
30:6, 30:13, 30:20,	merits [1] - 70:17	most [5] - 7:15, 21:6,	nature [2] - 4:8, 30:8	- 1:5
32:6, 32:7, 33:9,	met [1] - 3:10	21:15, 28:23, 57:2	near [2] - 18:6, 22:23	Northwestern [90] -
33:10, 33:17, 33:18,	method [26] - 5:20,	motion [24] - 3:16,	nearly [1] - 22:20	1:17, 3:18, 3:21,
34:7, 34:9, 34:15,	29:23, 29:24, 31:3,	4:20, 9:15, 14:24,	necessarily [3] - 25:2,	3:23, 5:20, 6:6, 6:19,
34:20, 35:3, 40:19,	32:3, 32:12, 33:2,	16:21, 23:11, 23:17,	60:17, 68:22	6:20, 7:5, 8:5, 8:6,
40:23, 40:24, 40:25,	33:4, 34:10, 41:21,	23:19, 25:17, 29:19,	need [25] - 9:21,	8:11, 8:18, 8:23, 9:3,
41:4, 41:6, 41:11,	47:20, 52:19, 58:10,	32:2, 32:4, 32:8,	10:11, 10:15, 13:6,	9:14, 11:7, 11:24,
41:22, 41:24, 42:3,	58:13, 58:14, 59:1,	32:11, 32:13, 33:1,	13:9, 16:2, 17:1,	9:14, 11:7, 11:24, 15:14, 16:11, 16:22,
42:4, 42:10, 50:7,	60:6, 60:8, 60:12,	35:18, 36:5, 47:21,	17:2, 17:5, 17:18,	19:5, 19:21, 20:2,
57:11, 57:17, 59:9,	67:3, 71:18, 72:21,	66:14, 67:25, 70:7,	18:1, 22:3, 26:13,	20:20, 20:24, 21:9,
59:10, 59:19	73:1, 73:2	70:11, 70:12	26:21, 37:4, 42:2,	21:12, 21:16, 22:17,
marketplace [1] -		Motion [2] - 51:8, 62:8	42:3, 49:5, 49:19,	23:10, 23:15, 23:22,
40:17	methodology [18] -	motions [2] - 29:21,	58:21, 68:24, 69:12,	24:4, 24:14, 24:20,
markets [2] - 56:22,	5:15, 7:19, 9:10,	70:23	70:17, 71:17, 73:10	25:7, 25:9, 25:11,
67:8	9:16, 29:25, 40:14,		needed [2] - 18:4,	25:21, 26:4, 27:9,
Markey [10] - 11:14,	42:7, 42:8, 44:22,	Mountain [2] - 19:15, 19:19	47:3	29:9, 31:5, 32:21,
11:18, 11:20, 52:17,	45:1, 59:3, 59:21, 60:16, 61:2, 61:4,		needs [3] - 7:5, 9:10,	33:6, 33:8, 33:9,
52:24, 62:15, 63:1,		move [4] - 10:4, 13:2,	59:14	33:11, 33:13, 33:19,
63:14, 63:17	67:11, 67:12, 67:18	70:2, 70:4	negative [1] - 41:25	33:20, 33:23, 33:24,
mathematical [1] -	metrics [1] - 43:22	moved [1] - 57:17	negotiate [7] - 21:16,	33:25, 34:4, 34:6,
36:20	Michael [1] - 1:17	movement [1] - 57:14	21:19, 21:20, 21:24,	34:11, 34:15, 34:21,
Matt [2] - 69:21, 69:22	mid [1] - 11:2	MR [71] - 4:5, 10:13,	40:10, 45:24, 46:24	37:25, 38:10, 38:13,
MATTER [1] - 1:4	middle [2] - 11:1, 58:4	10:16, 10:19, 16:20,	negotiated [1] - 50:19	38:21, 39:13, 39:16,
	might [11] - 18:9, 22:9,	19:24, 20:24, 22:18,	negotiating [1] - 27:13	40:6, 40:15, 41:11,
matter [12] - 2:2, 31:13, 40:2, 44:5,	24:22, 49:12, 50:11,	32:22, 35:25, 37:13,	negotiation [1] - 40:9	41:19, 42:1, 46:11,
48:10, 49:10, 51:8,	51:18, 52:8, 53:5,	37:22, 46:20, 49:9,	NELSON [44] - 1:11,	46:17, 46:23, 47:1,
51:10, 52:2, 55:15,	60:25, 65:15, 74:24	49:16, 52:8, 52:15,	3:1, 3:9, 10:11,	47:8, 47:15, 48:2,
66:16, 76:10	million [3] - 23:8,	53:17, 53:22, 54:8,	10:14, 10:18, 16:19,	50:16, 51:5, 51:14,
matters [4] - 19:2,	54:10, 54:12	54:20, 55:8, 56:14,	19:23, 20:23, 22:16,	51:15, 62:2, 62:7,
	mind [1] - 25:7	58:8, 58:14, 58:17,	29:16, 32:20, 35:24,	63:5, 67:4, 67:6,
42:14, 48:11, 72:8	minds [1] - 28:12	60:13, 61:11, 61:13,	37:12, 37:20, 46:17,	67:20
maximizing [1] - 6:9	minimum [1] - 55:20	61:19, 61:23, 61:25,	48:14, 49:1, 49:3,	
MCCOMSEY [1] - 76:5	minute [1] - 37:12	62:5, 62:9, 62:10,	49:15, 52:4, 52:13,	NorthWestern's [30] -
McComsey [2] - 1:21,	minutes [18] - 3:18,	62:12, 62:14, 62:24,	53:9, 53:20, 54:7,	3:16, 4:12, 5:9, 5:17,
76:18	3:19, 3:22, 3:23,	63:20, 63:22, 63:23,	54:14, 54:24, 55:25,	6:4, 6:6, 6:14, 7:4, 7:24, 11:23, 13:14
mean [23] - 23:19,	16:19, 19:23, 20:23,	64:3, 64:5, 64:7,	61:7, 61:12, 62:4,	7:24, 11:23, 13:14, 13:16, 16:21, 23:7,
23:20, 25:2, 35:6,	22:17, 22:24, 29:17,	64:15, 64:17, 64:18,	69:8, 69:11, 69:16,	24:11, 25:8, 25:9,
38:11, 38:23, 40:18,	32:21, 32:24, 35:24,	64:25, 65:19, 66:1,	69:19, 69:22, 72:1,	
43:23, 44:1, 49:13,	46:19, 46:21, 61:9	66:13, 66:22, 66:23,	72:4, 72:23, 73:24,	26:9, 27:7, 30:2, 30:7, 30:16, 31:4,
49:24, 50:3, 57:3,	minutes' [1] - 37:21	67:2, 67:3, 67:5,	74:9, 74:13, 74:22,	
57:4, 58:23, 60:13,	mischaracterization	67:19, 68:2, 68:4,	75:1	32:8, 32:11, 34:2, 35:18, 41:6, 45:7
60:18, 60:24, 61:3,	[1] - 23:2	68:7, 68:8, 68:15,	Nelson [2] - 3:2, 52:9	35:18, 41:6, 45:7,
	mistakes [2] - 23:4,	68:16, 68:19, 69:3,	never [3] - 36:9, 40:18,	59:14 Notary [2] - 76:7,
61:5, 65:5, 65:15,			1 11EVEL 3 - 30.3, 40.10,	$1 \times 10 \times 12 = 70.7$
66:2	23:6	69:5, 69:6, 69:7,		-
66:2 means [2] - 55:16,		69:21, 70:10, 70:14	41:16	76:18
66:2 means [2] - 55:16, 66:24	23:6	69:21, 70:10, 70:14 MS [3] - 29:18, 53:14,	41:16 news [3] - 64:19,	76:18 nothing [6] - 13:19,
66:2 means [2] - 55:16,	23:6 mobile [1] - 12:18	69:21, 70:10, 70:14	41:16	76:18

notwithstanding [1] -	OF [6] - 1:2, 1:4, 2:1,	organized [1] - 67:7	peakers [1] - 34:10	28:20 , 35:17 , 36:8 , 8
65:3	76:1, 76:3	originally [1] - 70:21	peaking [4] - 5:24,	40:14, 41:4, 41:10,
November [5] - 15:17,	offer [6] - 26:11,	outcome [2] - 9:9,	7:4, 59:8, 59:11	42:1, 42:17, 47:23,
15:21, 56:17, 56:19,	27:14, 27:15, 27:18,	16:9	penalty [3] - 40:8,	48:17, 49:21, 50:5,
66:9	28:3, 39:15	outer [2] - 11:15,	50:17, 50:19	50:10, 50:15, 55:11,
number [13] - 7:13,	offered [3] - 27:6,	13:18	people [7] - 4:15,	55:19, 57:21, 60:20,
12:8, 13:23, 14:1,	27:15, 67:4	output [7] - 8:25, 20:5,	43:15, 43:21, 44:3,	64:12, 69:24, 70:3,
15:24, 18:18, 21:6,	offering [1] - 27:12	21:8, 26:11, 50:4,	52:24, 56:22, 59:24	71:7
43:22, 62:21, 63:20,	offers [1] - 47:15	50:5, 51:15	per [2] - 11:16, 14:11	pointed [1] - 72:15
72:17, 73:7, 73:13	old [7] - 56:12, 61:5,	outstanding [1] -	perfect [1] - 56:7	points [3] - 11:5,
numbers [13] - 43:18,	64:19, 64:21, 71:12,	61:17	perfectly [1] - 18:9	16:17, 69:25
54:15, 64:5, 64:13,	71:16	own [9] - 5:22, 6:6,	perform [2] - 51:3,	pollutants [1] - 14:5
64:22, 65:3, 65:6,	Olson [1] - 1:17	10:3, 13:14, 17:22,	51:16	portfolios [1] - 14:23
66:11, 67:21, 67:22,	once [4] - 27:23, 49:5,	22:13, 30:4, 41:6,	performance [5] -	portion [6] - 10:1,
69:2, 69:4	50:2, 51:1	53:18	50:17, 50:18, 50:23,	30:19, 32:1, 32:4,
nuts [1] - 38:23	one [34] - 7:2, 8:4,	owns [1] - 45:16	50:24, 51:22	32:13, 47:15
	9:14, 11:5, 14:14,		perhaps [1] - 17:24	portions [1] - 32:10
0	17:23, 18:25, 19:20,	Р	period [3] - 47:6,	Posey [1] - 18:11
	22:10, 34:24, 35:7,		65:23, 66:5	position [5] - 26:4,
	39:25, 40:4, 41:7,		permit [1] - 15:7	29:20, 45:3, 45:12,
OAK [1] - 1:4	41:14, 46:7, 47:23,	p.m [2] - 2:5, 75:3	perspective [1] -	72:10
Oak [53] - 1:17, 3:15,	48:23, 50:13, 50:22,	package [3] - 71:23,	73:10	possibilities [1] -
3:17, 3:22, 3:24,	53:4, 56:18, 57:6,	74:2, 74:12	Perspective [3] -	54:17
5:14, 5:19, 6:2, 7:23,	58:23, 60:13, 61:4,	page [10] - 62:11,	10:20, 16:5, 56:18	possible [6] - 24:7,
20:1, 23:11, 24:13,	61:11, 62:21, 65:22,	62:17, 62:19, 62:20,	Petition [1] - 27:17	25:13, 35:4, 51:18,
25:4, 25:17, 26:8,	66:13, 67:11, 71:21,	64:6, 64:23, 66:15,	picked [1] - 18:5	52:13, 59:19
26:9, 27:6, 27:9,	72:16, 74:4	66:19, 68:1	Pierre [2] - 2:4, 22:19	possibly [1] - 21:10
27:11, 29:19, 30:18,	Onida [1] - 76:13	paragraph [5] - 62:19,	place [7] - 8:22, 9:1,	potential [5] - 13:7,
31:9, 31:11, 31:18,	opening [1] - 62:25	62:20, 64:6, 64:22,	13:20, 40:7, 42:5,	26:5, 31:24, 32:18,
32:2, 32:4, 32:13,	operate [2] - 42:2,	66:21	45:21, 51:25	61:15
33:1, 33:5, 33:11,	49:24	paragraphs [1] - 62:23	plain [1] - 23:1	Power [4] - 9:24,
33:14, 33:16, 34:23,	operating [10] - 5:5,	parliamentary [1] -	plainly [1] - 20:17	13:13, 19:15, 19:19
36:5, 36:14, 37:21,	5:8, 6:5, 7:3, 30:7,	70:12	plan [8] - 3:17, 11:8,	POWER [1] - 1:5
38:16, 40:19, 41:1,	30:9, 34:1, 41:18,	part [9] - 4:19, 24:23,	11:12, 11:13, 11:24,	power [15] - 7:1, 7:12,
41:2, 41:3, 45:11,	59:16, 67:7	25:17, 33:1, 41:11,	17:4, 19:13, 19:14	8:7, 11:24, 21:20,
46:18, 46:25, 47:6,	operation [1] - 34:9	41:12, 44:15, 61:3,		24:21, 28:14, 33:11,
47:12, 47:14, 49:6,	opinion [8] - 36:19,	63:11	planning [6] - 19:8, 24:15, 24:16, 24:17,	33:14, 39:4, 46:12,
55:3, 62:6, 62:8,	44:1, 53:2, 55:20,	partial [2] - 3:16, 4:20	24:13, 24:10, 24:17, 24:23, 53:24	47:16, 55:21
66:14, 67:25	57:12, 58:20, 65:4,	particular [6] - 26:1,	plant [2] - 35:15,	practical [4] - 38:20,
obfuscation [1] - 23:1	65:18	46:9, 60:2, 63:6,	40:22	40:5, 51:12, 55:15
objections [1] - 7:21	opinions [5] - 36:17,	64:11	plants [14] - 7:9, 8:7,	precedential [1] -
obligation [22] -	36:18, 43:3, 43:17,	parties [6] - 25:15,	14:13, 14:16, 14:22,	19:20
12:15, 15:4, 19:25,	44:8	26:1, 28:6, 30:20,	33:21, 34:1, 34:6,	precipitously [1] -
21:2, 21:4, 21:5,	opportunity [1] -	31:13, 55:1	34:7, 34:10, 34:22,	15:25
21:7, 21:25, 25:23,	48:22	parties' [1] - 29:21	41:15, 41:18, 59:16	predominantly [1] -
26:14, 30:14, 39:24,	opposed [2] - 25:19,	party [3] - 6:25, 8:25,	play [2] - 45:17, 50:7	30:4
41:19, 42:12, 45:24,	38:15	21:11	played [1] - 59:24	prefer [2] - 63:16,
49:7, 49:11, 50:3,	opposition [1] - 67:25	passed [1] - 14:3	player [3] - 18:11,	74:12
50:5, 50:11, 51:12,	Opposition [1] - 62:8	past [2] - 34:8, 40:15	43:21, 43:22	preferred [1] - 13:3
51:25	option [1] - 27:1	pay [10] - 17:1, 17:21,		prefiled [1] - 44:15
obligations [1] - 39:25	oral [2] - 33:3, 33:7	24:5, 25:10, 28:18,	playing [2] - 7:19, 59:19	prepared [1] - 57:14
obtain [1] - 20:16	order [15] - 3:2, 16:11,	28:19, 29:5, 40:8,		preparing [1] - 57:5
obtaining [1] - 20:2	21:17, 22:1, 30:20,	47:3, 48:4	plays [1] - 42:4 plus [2] - 5:5, 36:11	presence [1] - 74:15
obviously [5] - 21:14,	30:21, 48:9, 49:18,	payers [5] - 4:13, 24:5,		present [2] - 3:3, 3:6
33:6, 33:15, 49:22,	55:1, 60:11, 69:12,	48:3, 72:17, 72:18	point [43] - 9:2, 9:14,	presentation [1] -
50:21	70:21, 71:2, 71:6,	paying [5] - 17:21,	11:21, 11:22, 13:5,	23:13
occurred [2] - 15:6,	74:16	25:2, 25:11, 55:22,	13:11, 13:21, 14:7,	presented [3] - 31:12,
22:1	orders [1] - 21:17	55:23	15:19, 16:10, 17:19, 18:3, 20:12, 21:16	31:16, 36:13
October [5] - 1:8, 2:4,	organizations [1] -	pays [1] - 25:9	18:3, 20:12, 21:16, 21:22, 21:23, 21:24,	presently [1] - 19:10
74:14, 76:11, 76:14	43:12	peaker [1] - 34:7	25:3, 25:13, 25:14,	presumably [2] - 5:25,

8:25	3:12	Q	8:20, 13:22, 18:15,	refresh [1] - 53:20
pretend [3] - 40:25,	prohibited [4] - 29:3,	×	20:3, 20:5, 21:12,	refuses [1] - 21:24
41:1, 41:4	29:4, 55:22, 55:23		40:18, 42:7, 44:4,	REFUSING [1] - 1:5
pretty [5] - 10:17,	project [12] - 4:9, 4:11,	QF [11] - 26:5, 26:6,	55:5, 59:17, 59:18	regard [3] - 67:21,
12:1, 18:2, 18:16,	20:16, 26:12, 27:2,	26:20, 26:23, 27:22,	Realtime [2] - 76:6,	68:20, 72:21
54:21	27:19, 38:16, 38:22,	27:24, 28:16, 34:19,	76:19	regarding [3] - 29:19,
previously [2] - 29:18,	49:18, 49:24, 50:10	55:14, 55:16, 55:20	reason [6] - 9:25,	30:13, 73:4
62:25	projection [3] - 31:23,	QF's [1] - 27:1	12:7, 16:25, 25:10,	
orice [25] - 17:1,	32:18, 64:2	QFs [5] - 9:19, 9:20,	63:11, 67:11	regardless [1] - 59:18
21:19, 22:8, 27:6,	projections [3] -	28:18, 29:1, 60:8	reasonable [1] - 38:8	regards [1] - 72:25
27:13, 27:15, 27:18,	30:21, 31:8, 32:6	qualifying [11] - 7:15,	reasons [2] - 29:9,	Registered [2] - 76:5,
		15:3, 17:2, 17:13,	53:4	76:19
28:7, 28:14, 28:15,	projects [1] - 51:2	17:16, 17:20, 21:8,		regulate [1] - 63:3
31:17, 31:19, 31:20,	PROMOD [1] - 9:25	23:6, 39:19, 39:21,	rebuttal [9] - 3:22,	Regulation [1] - 12:5
31:23, 32:7, 32:12,	promoting [1] - 23:6	52:1	3:23, 3:24, 25:18,	regulation [4] - 17:9,
32:14, 32:18, 39:10,	proper [5] - 22:7,	questions [14] - 3:12,	25:19, 37:21, 46:18	42:11, 61:15, 63:6
40:3, 40:8, 47:10,	30:11, 32:6, 37:2,	3:25, 4:2, 4:3, 48:18,	recent [3] - 12:3, 34:8,	regulations [6] -
54:11, 55:1, 55:6	60:7		57:2	12:18, 13:8, 14:3,
prices [3] - 5:13, 17:6,	properly [1] - 42:20	49:3, 56:1, 61:8,	recently [1] - 21:6	14:4, 14:7, 14:16
38:5	proposal [1] - 11:10	61:10, 68:19, 69:8,	recess [1] - 69:10	regulatory [2] - 26:7,
pricing [1] - 47:13	proposed [3] - 12:17,	71:18, 73:4, 74:20	recognize [1] - 41:3	29:4
principle [5] - 9:5,	31:19, 61:20	queue [1] - 51:17	recommends [6] -	rejecting [2] - 32:8,
16:24, 34:13, 34:17,	proposition [3] - 9:16,	quick [5] - 10:10,	32:1, 32:4, 32:8,	32:10
38:2	19:5, 19:21	16:17, 35:25, 56:3,	32:10, 32:13, 32:16	related [3] - 13:5,
privy [1] - 16:8	prospective [2] - 9:19,	58:9	reconsider [11] -	69:1, 69:3
probabilities [1] - 37:5	60:8	quickly [4] - 10:4,	30:17, 30:19, 31:4,	relative [1] - 34:23
probability [6] - 31:25,	provide [3] - 4:11,	32:23, 47:23, 65:6	31:10, 32:2, 32:5,	relatively [1] - 65:6
37:6, 37:11, 53:11,	20:7, 37:9	quite [2] - 24:14,	32:9, 32:14, 70:7,	reliable [2] - 4:12,
53:13, 54:18	provided [2] - 31:14,	47:12	70:8, 70:23	60:19
probable [1] - 24:8	31:18	quoted [1] - 66:20	reconsideration [18] -	reliance [1] - 30:10
problem [8] - 5:14,	provision [1] - 55:17		3:16, 3:17, 4:21,	relied [1] - 10:2
5:19, 6:2, 6:11, 33:8,	provisions [1] - 40:7	R	9:15, 14:24, 16:22,	
33:16, 45:21, 51:4	prudent [5] - 5:23, 6:8,		23:11, 23:12, 23:15,	relies [3] - 5:22, 29:18
proceed [3] - 4:2, 4:4,	8:9, 8:13, 38:13		23:22, 25:21, 26:9,	30:4
9:14		raise [1] - 44:21	29:11, 29:22, 35:19,	relying [3] - 57:1,
proceeding [7] -	Public [3] - 55:12,	range [5] - 10:7, 11:2,	36:6, 70:11, 70:16	59:8, 59:10
11:10, 14:22, 23:9,	76:7, 76:18	18:17, 39:7, 54:16	record [20] - 3:15,	remaining [1] - 22:5
	PUBLIC [2] - 1:1, 1:10	rate [23] - 4:12, 7:16,	10:15, 19:25, 20:1,	remarks [2] - 22:15,
31:15, 38:15, 50:21, 70:12	public [2] - 39:23,	15:3, 17:17, 19:2,	22:2, 22:12, 27:7,	62:25
	57:7	20:7, 20:11, 20:15,		remember [3] - 26:18
PROCEEDINGS [1] -	published [1] - 57:7	20:17, 24:5, 27:24,	31:12, 31:16, 35:9,	33:12, 44:16
2:1	PUC [1] - 10:5	28:3, 28:18, 30:5,	36:15, 40:10, 40:12,	remind [1] - 4:8
Proceedings [1] - 1:8	purchase [5] - 6:25,	30:22, 30:25, 48:3,	44:12, 44:13, 44:18,	renewable [1] - 17:7
-	p •	$50.22, 50.25, \pm 0.5,$	40.05 50.0 50.40	
proceedings [2] -	24:21, 26:21, 66:25,		46:25, 53:3, 53:12,	repeat [1] - 23:4
proceedings [2] - 76:9, 76:12	-	49:10, 51:10, 52:2, 72:17, 72:18	53:18	repeat [1] - 23:4
proceedings [2] - 76:9, 76:12 process [4] - 16:8,	24:21, 26:21, 66:25,	49:10, 51:10, 52:2, 72:17, 72:18	53:18 recoverable [1] -	repeat [1] - 23:4 repeatedly [1] - 26:19
proceedings [2] - 76:9, 76:12 process [4] - 16:8, 16:9, 46:13, 66:3	24:21, 26:21, 66:25, 67:1	49:10, 51:10, 52:2, 72:17, 72:18 rates [2] - 31:11, 46:3	53:18 recoverable [1] - 15:23	repeat [1] - 23:4 repeatedly [1] - 26:19
proceedings [2] - 76:9, 76:12 process [4] - 16:8, 16:9, 46:13, 66:3 procurement [4] -	24:21, 26:21, 66:25, 67:1 PURCHASE [1] - 1:5	49:10, 51:10, 52:2, 72:17, 72:18 rates [2] - 31:11, 46:3 rather [4] - 14:22,	53:18 recoverable [1] - 15:23 red [2] - 5:4, 5:18	repeat [1] - 23:4 repeatedly [1] - 26:19 replicable [3] - 58:22
proceedings [2] - 76:9, 76:12 process [4] - 16:8, 16:9, 46:13, 66:3 procurement [4] - 11:8, 11:12, 11:13,	24:21, 26:21, 66:25, 67:1 PURCHASE [1] - 1:5 purchaser [1] - 21:11	49:10, 51:10, 52:2, 72:17, 72:18 rates [2] - 31:11, 46:3 rather [4] - 14:22, 18:24, 19:18, 71:23	53:18 recoverable [1] - 15:23 red [2] - 5:4, 5:18 reduces [1] - 59:3	repeat [1] - 23:4 repeatedly [1] - 26:19 replicable [3] - 58:22, 60:6, 60:19
proceedings [2] - 76:9, 76:12 process [4] - 16:8, 16:9, 46:13, 66:3 procurement [4] - 11:8, 11:12, 11:13, 19:14	24:21, 26:21, 66:25, 67:1 PURCHASE [1] - 1:5 purchaser [1] - 21:11 purchases [2] - 34:19,	49:10, 51:10, 52:2, 72:17, 72:18 rates [2] - 31:11, 46:3 rather [4] - 14:22, 18:24, 19:18, 71:23 reached [3] - 36:19,	53:18 recoverable [1] - 15:23 red [2] - 5:4, 5:18 reduces [1] - 59:3 refer [3] - 15:11,	repeat [1] - 23:4 repeatedly [1] - 26:19 replicable [3] - 58:22, 60:6, 60:19 report [4] - 35:13, 56:7, 67:23
proceedings [2] - 76:9, 76:12 process [4] - 16:8, 16:9, 46:13, 66:3 procurement [4] - 11:8, 11:12, 11:13, 19:14 produce [2] - 34:6,	24:21, 26:21, 66:25, 67:1 PURCHASE [1] - 1:5 purchaser [1] - 21:11 purchases [2] - 34:19, 34:22	49:10, 51:10, 52:2, 72:17, 72:18 rates [2] - 31:11, 46:3 rather [4] - 14:22, 18:24, 19:18, 71:23 reached [3] - 36:19, 36:23, 37:2	53:18 recoverable [1] - 15:23 red [2] - 5:4, 5:18 reduces [1] - 59:3 refer [3] - 15:11, 23:18, 68:16	repeat [1] - 23:4 repeatedly [1] - 26:19 replicable [3] - 58:22 60:6, 60:19 report [4] - 35:13, 56:7, 67:23 Reported [1] - 1:21
proceedings [2] - 76:9, 76:12 process [4] - 16:8, 16:9, 46:13, 66:3 procurement [4] - 11:8, 11:12, 11:13, 19:14	24:21, 26:21, 66:25, 67:1 PURCHASE [1] - 1:5 purchaser [1] - 21:11 purchases [2] - 34:19, 34:22 purchasing [2] -	49:10, 51:10, 52:2, 72:17, 72:18 rates [2] - 31:11, 46:3 rather [4] - 14:22, 18:24, 19:18, 71:23 reached [3] - 36:19, 36:23, 37:2 read [4] - 11:11,	53:18 recoverable [1] - 15:23 red [2] - 5:4, 5:18 reduces [1] - 59:3 refer [3] - 15:11, 23:18, 68:16 reference [5] - 13:24,	repeat [1] - 23:4 repeatedly [1] - 26:19 replicable [3] - 58:22 60:6, 60:19 report [4] - 35:13, 56:7, 67:23 Reported [1] - 1:21 reporter [2] - 36:1,
proceedings [2] - 76:9, 76:12 process [4] - 16:8, 16:9, 46:13, 66:3 procurement [4] - 11:8, 11:12, 11:13, 19:14 produce [2] - 34:6, 44:25	24:21, 26:21, 66:25, 67:1 PURCHASE [1] - 1:5 purchaser [1] - 21:11 purchases [2] - 34:19, 34:22 purchasing [2] - 17:15, 33:11 purees [1] - 45:18	49:10, 51:10, 52:2, 72:17, 72:18 rates [2] - 31:11, 46:3 rather [4] - 14:22, 18:24, 19:18, 71:23 reached [3] - 36:19, 36:23, 37:2 read [4] - 11:11, 42:11, 61:21, 63:25	53:18 recoverable [1] - 15:23 red [2] - 5:4, 5:18 reduces [1] - 59:3 refer [3] - 15:11, 23:18, 68:16 reference [5] - 13:24, 14:7, 37:14, 37:17	repeat [1] - 23:4 repeatedly [1] - 26:19 replicable [3] - 58:22, 60:6, 60:19 report [4] - 35:13, 56:7, 67:23 Reported [1] - 1:21 reporter [2] - 36:1, 76:9
proceedings [2] - 76:9, 76:12 process [4] - 16:8, 16:9, 46:13, 66:3 procurement [4] - 11:8, 11:12, 11:13, 19:14 produce [2] - 34:6, 44:25	24:21, 26:21, 66:25, 67:1 PURCHASE [1] - 1:5 purchaser [1] - 21:11 purchases [2] - 34:19, 34:22 purchasing [2] - 17:15, 33:11 purees [1] - 45:18 PURPA [10] - 28:17,	49:10, 51:10, 52:2, 72:17, 72:18 rates [2] - 31:11, 46:3 rather [4] - 14:22, 18:24, 19:18, 71:23 reached [3] - 36:19, 36:23, 37:2 read [4] - 11:11, 42:11, 61:21, 63:25 reading [2] - 64:1,	53:18 recoverable [1] - 15:23 red [2] - 5:4, 5:18 reduces [1] - 59:3 refer [3] - 15:11, 23:18, 68:16 reference [5] - 13:24,	repeat [1] - 23:4 repeatedly [1] - 26:19 replicable [3] - 58:22, 60:6, 60:19 report [4] - 35:13, 56:7, 67:23 Reported [1] - 1:21 reporter [2] - 36:1, 76:9 Reporter [4] - 76:6,
proceedings [2] - 76:9, 76:12 process [4] - 16:8, 16:9, 46:13, 66:3 procurement [4] - 11:8, 11:12, 11:13, 19:14 produce [2] - 34:6, 44:25 produces [2] - 60:16, 60:18	24:21, 26:21, 66:25, 67:1 PURCHASE [1] - 1:5 purchaser [1] - 21:11 purchases [2] - 34:19, 34:22 purchasing [2] - 17:15, 33:11 purees [1] - 45:18 PURPA [10] - 28:17, 29:1, 29:2, 29:23,	49:10, 51:10, 52:2, 72:17, 72:18 rates [2] - 31:11, 46:3 rather [4] - 14:22, 18:24, 19:18, 71:23 reached [3] - 36:19, 36:23, 37:2 read [4] - 11:11, 42:11, 61:21, 63:25 reading [2] - 64:1, 66:23	53:18 recoverable [1] - 15:23 red [2] - 5:4, 5:18 reduces [1] - 59:3 refer [3] - 15:11, 23:18, 68:16 reference [5] - 13:24, 14:7, 37:14, 37:17	repeat [1] - 23:4 repeatedly [1] - 26:19 replicable [3] - 58:22, 60:6, 60:19 report [4] - 35:13, 56:7, 67:23 Reported [1] - 1:21 reporter [2] - 36:1, 76:9 Reporter [4] - 76:6, 76:19, 76:19
proceedings [2] - 76:9, 76:12 process [4] - 16:8, 16:9, 46:13, 66:3 procurement [4] - 11:8, 11:12, 11:13, 19:14 produce [2] - 34:6, 44:25 produces [2] - 60:16, 60:18 product [1] - 57:3	24:21, 26:21, 66:25, 67:1 PURCHASE [1] - 1:5 purchaser [1] - 21:11 purchases [2] - 34:19, 34:22 purchasing [2] - 17:15, 33:11 purees [1] - 45:18 PURPA [10] - 28:17, 29:1, 29:2, 29:23, 30:12, 35:5, 39:18,	49:10, 51:10, 52:2, 72:17, 72:18 rates [2] - 31:11, 46:3 rather [4] - 14:22, 18:24, 19:18, 71:23 reached [3] - 36:19, 36:23, 37:2 read [4] - 11:11, 42:11, 61:21, 63:25 reading [2] - 64:1, 66:23 ready [2] - 70:2, 70:3	53:18 recoverable [1] - 15:23 red [2] - 5:4, 5:18 reduces [1] - 59:3 refer [3] - 15:11, 23:18, 68:16 reference [5] - 13:24, 14:7, 37:14, 37:17 referenced [1] - 70:21	repeat [1] - 23:4 repeatedly [1] - 26:19 replicable [3] - 58:22 60:6, 60:19 report [4] - 35:13, 56:7, 67:23 Reported [1] - 1:21 reporter [2] - 36:1, 76:9 Reporter [4] - 76:6, 76:19, 76:19 represent [3] - 4:25,
proceedings [2] - 76:9, 76:12 process [4] - 16:8, 16:9, 46:13, 66:3 procurement [4] - 11:8, 11:12, 11:13, 19:14 produce [2] - 34:6, 44:25 produces [2] - 60:16, 60:18 product [1] - 57:3 production [1] - 39:5	24:21, 26:21, 66:25, 67:1 PURCHASE [1] - 1:5 purchaser [1] - 21:11 purchases [2] - 34:19, 34:22 purchasing [2] - 17:15, 33:11 purees [1] - 45:18 PURPA [10] - 28:17, 29:1, 29:2, 29:23, 30:12, 35:5, 39:18, 45:8, 66:20	49:10, 51:10, 52:2, 72:17, 72:18 rates [2] - 31:11, 46:3 rather [4] - 14:22, 18:24, 19:18, 71:23 reached [3] - 36:19, 36:23, 37:2 read [4] - 11:11, 42:11, 61:21, 63:25 reading [2] - 64:1, 66:23 ready [2] - 70:2, 70:3 real [5] - 4:25, 8:10,	53:18 recoverable [1] - 15:23 red [2] - 5:4, 5:18 reduces [1] - 59:3 refer [3] - 15:11, 23:18, 68:16 reference [5] - 13:24, 14:7, 37:14, 37:17 referenced [1] - 70:21 referred [3] - 13:9,	repeat [1] - 23:4 repeatedly [1] - 26:19 replicable [3] - 58:22, 60:6, 60:19 report [4] - 35:13, 56:7, 67:23 Reported [1] - 1:21 reporter [2] - 36:1, 76:9 Reporter [4] - 76:6, 76:19, 76:19 represent [3] - 4:25, 8:14, 33:19
proceedings [2] - 76:9, 76:12 process [4] - 16:8, 16:9, 46:13, 66:3 procurement [4] - 11:8, 11:12, 11:13, 19:14 produce [2] - 34:6, 44:25 produces [2] - 60:16, 60:18 product [1] - 57:3 product [1] - 39:5 Professional [2] -	24:21, 26:21, 66:25, 67:1 PURCHASE [1] - 1:5 purchaser [1] - 21:11 purchases [2] - 34:19, 34:22 purchasing [2] - 17:15, 33:11 purees [1] - 45:18 PURPA [10] - 28:17, 29:1, 29:2, 29:23, 30:12, 35:5, 39:18, 45:8, 66:20 purposes [2] - 5:11,	49:10, 51:10, 52:2, 72:17, 72:18 rates [2] - 31:11, 46:3 rather [4] - 14:22, 18:24, 19:18, 71:23 reached [3] - 36:19, 36:23, 37:2 read [4] - 11:11, 42:11, 61:21, 63:25 reading [2] - 64:1, 66:23 ready [2] - 70:2, 70:3 read [5] - 4:25, 8:10, 10:9, 26:21, 62:7	53:18 recoverable [1] - 15:23 red [2] - 5:4, 5:18 reduces [1] - 59:3 refer [3] - 15:11, 23:18, 68:16 reference [5] - 13:24, 14:7, 37:14, 37:17 referenced [1] - 70:21 referred [3] - 13:9, 37:15, 48:12	repeat [1] - 23:4 repeatedly [1] - 26:19 replicable [3] - 58:22, 60:6, 60:19 report [4] - 35:13, 56:7, 67:23 Reported [1] - 1:21 reporter [2] - 36:1, 76:9 Reporter [4] - 76:6, 76:19, 76:19 represent [3] - 4:25, 8:14, 33:19 representatives [1] -
proceedings [2] - 76:9, 76:12 process [4] - 16:8, 16:9, 46:13, 66:3 procurement [4] - 11:8, 11:12, 11:13, 19:14 produce [2] - 34:6, 44:25 produces [2] - 60:16, 60:18 product [1] - 57:3 production [1] - 39:5 Professional [2] - 76:6, 76:19	24:21, 26:21, 66:25, 67:1 PURCHASE [1] - 1:5 purchaser [1] - 21:11 purchases [2] - 34:19, 34:22 purchasing [2] - 17:15, 33:11 purees [1] - 45:18 PURPA [10] - 28:17, 29:1, 29:2, 29:23, 30:12, 35:5, 39:18, 45:8, 66:20 purposes [2] - 5:11, 5:18	$\begin{array}{c} 49:10,51:10,52:2,\\ 72:17,72:18\\ \textbf{rates}[2]-31:11,46:3\\ \textbf{rather}[4]-14:22,\\ 18:24,19:18,71:23\\ \textbf{reached}[3]-36:19,\\ 36:23,37:2\\ \textbf{read}[4]-11:11,\\ 42:11,61:21,63:25\\ \textbf{reading}[2]-64:1,\\ 66:23\\ \textbf{ready}[2]-70:2,70:3\\ \textbf{real}[5]-4:25,8:10,\\ 10:9,26:21,62:7\\ \textbf{reality}[3]-8:15,\\ \end{array}$	53:18 recoverable [1] - 15:23 red [2] - 5:4, 5:18 reduces [1] - 59:3 refer [3] - 15:11, 23:18, 68:16 reference [5] - 13:24, 14:7, 37:14, 37:17 referenced [1] - 70:21 referred [3] - 13:9, 37:15, 48:12 referring [3] - 64:4, 67:24, 70:24	$\begin{tabular}{lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$
proceedings [2] - 76:9, 76:12 process [4] - 16:8, 16:9, 46:13, 66:3 procurement [4] - 11:8, 11:12, 11:13, 19:14 produce [2] - 34:6, 44:25 produces [2] - 60:16, 60:18 product [1] - 57:3 product [1] - 57:3 professional [2] - 76:6, 76:19 professional [1] -	24:21, 26:21, 66:25, 67:1 PURCHASE [1] - 1:5 purchaser [1] - 21:11 purchases [2] - 34:19, 34:22 purchasing [2] - 17:15, 33:11 purees [1] - 45:18 PURPA [10] - 28:17, 29:1, 29:2, 29:23, 30:12, 35:5, 39:18, 45:8, 66:20 purposes [2] - 5:11, 5:18 push [2] - 21:13,	49:10, 51:10, 52:2, 72:17, 72:18 rates [2] - 31:11, 46:3 rather [4] - 14:22, 18:24, 19:18, 71:23 reached [3] - 36:19, 36:23, 37:2 read [4] - 11:11, 42:11, 61:21, 63:25 reading [2] - 64:1, 66:23 ready [2] - 70:2, 70:3 real [5] - 4:25, 8:10, 10:9, 26:21, 62:7 reality [3] - 8:15, 59:12, 59:17	53:18 recoverable [1] - 15:23 red [2] - 5:4, 5:18 reduces [1] - 59:3 refer [3] - 15:11, 23:18, 68:16 reference [5] - 13:24, 14:7, 37:14, 37:17 referenced [1] - 70:21 referred [3] - 13:9, 37:15, 48:12 referring [3] - 64:4, 67:24, 70:24 reflect [2] - 30:8, 65:3	$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c c c } \hline repeat [1] - 23:4 \\ \hline repeatedly [1] - 26:19 \\ \hline replicable [3] - 58:22, \\ 60:6, 60:19 \\ \hline report [4] - 35:13, \\ 56:7, 67:23 \\ \hline Reported [1] - 1:21 \\ \hline reporter [2] - 36:1, \\ 76:9 \\ \hline Reporter [4] - 76:6, \\ 76:19, 76:19 \\ \hline represent [3] - 4:25, \\ 8:14, 33:19 \\ \hline representatives [1] - \\ 20:2 \\ \hline represented [1] - 5:21 \\ \hline extremation of the second second$
proceedings [2] - 76:9, 76:12 process [4] - 16:8, 16:9, 46:13, 66:3 procurement [4] - 11:8, 11:12, 11:13, 19:14 produce [2] - 34:6, 44:25 produces [2] - 60:16, 60:18 product [1] - 57:3 production [1] - 39:5 Professional [2] - 76:6, 76:19 professional [1] - 18:18	24:21, 26:21, 66:25, 67:1 PURCHASE [1] - 1:5 purchaser [1] - 21:11 purchases [2] - 34:19, 34:22 purchasing [2] - 17:15, 33:11 purees [1] - 45:18 PURPA [10] - 28:17, 29:1, 29:2, 29:23, 30:12, 35:5, 39:18, 45:8, 66:20 purposes [2] - 5:11, 5:18 push [2] - 21:13, 21:14	49:10, 51:10, 52:2, 72:17, 72:18 rates [2] - 31:11, 46:3 rather [4] - 14:22, 18:24, 19:18, 71:23 reached [3] - 36:19, 36:23, 37:2 read [4] - 11:11, 42:11, 61:21, 63:25 reading [2] - 64:1, 66:23 ready [2] - 70:2, 70:3 real [5] - 4:25, 8:10, 10:9, 26:21, 62:7 reality [3] - 8:15, 59:12, 59:17 realize [1] - 68:21	53:18 recoverable [1] - 15:23 red [2] - 5:4, 5:18 reduces [1] - 59:3 refer [3] - 15:11, 23:18, 68:16 reference [5] - 13:24, 14:7, 37:14, 37:17 referenced [1] - 70:21 referred [3] - 13:9, 37:15, 48:12 referring [3] - 64:4, 67:24, 70:24 reflect [2] - 30:8, 65:3 reflected [3] - 35:12,	$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c c c } \hline repeat [1] - 23:4 \\ \hline repeatedly [1] - 26:19 \\ \hline replicable [3] - 58:22, \\ 60:6, 60:19 \\ \hline report [4] - 35:13, \\ 56:7, 67:23 \\ \hline Reported [1] - 1:21 \\ \hline reporter [2] - 36:1, \\ 76:9 \\ \hline Reporter [4] - 76:6, \\ 76:19, 76:19 \\ \hline represent [3] - 4:25, \\ 8:14, 33:19 \\ \hline representatives [1] - \\ 20:2 \\ \hline represents [4] - 5:21 \\ \hline represents [4] - 5:6, \\ \hline \end{tabular}$
proceedings [2] - 76:9, 76:12 process [4] - 16:8, 16:9, 46:13, 66:3 procurement [4] - 11:8, 11:12, 11:13, 19:14 produce [2] - 34:6, 44:25 produces [2] - 60:16, 60:18 product [1] - 57:3 production [1] - 39:5 Professional [2] - 76:6, 76:19 professional [1] -	24:21, 26:21, 66:25, 67:1 PURCHASE [1] - 1:5 purchaser [1] - 21:11 purchases [2] - 34:19, 34:22 purchasing [2] - 17:15, 33:11 purees [1] - 45:18 PURPA [10] - 28:17, 29:1, 29:2, 29:23, 30:12, 35:5, 39:18, 45:8, 66:20 purposes [2] - 5:11, 5:18 push [2] - 21:13,	49:10, 51:10, 52:2, 72:17, 72:18 rates [2] - 31:11, 46:3 rather [4] - 14:22, 18:24, 19:18, 71:23 reached [3] - 36:19, 36:23, 37:2 read [4] - 11:11, 42:11, 61:21, 63:25 reading [2] - 64:1, 66:23 ready [2] - 70:2, 70:3 real [5] - 4:25, 8:10, 10:9, 26:21, 62:7 reality [3] - 8:15, 59:12, 59:17	53:18 recoverable [1] - 15:23 red [2] - 5:4, 5:18 reduces [1] - 59:3 refer [3] - 15:11, 23:18, 68:16 reference [5] - 13:24, 14:7, 37:14, 37:17 referenced [1] - 70:21 referred [3] - 13:9, 37:15, 48:12 referring [3] - 64:4, 67:24, 70:24 reflect [2] - 30:8, 65:3	$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c c } \hline repeat [1] - 23:4 \\ \hline repeatedly [1] - 26:19 \\ \hline replicable [3] - 58:22, \\ 60:6, 60:19 \\ \hline report [4] - 35:13, \\ 56:7, 67:23 \\ \hline Reported [1] - 1:21 \\ \hline reporter [2] - 36:1, \\ 76:9 \\ \hline Reporter [4] - 76:6, \\ 76:19, 76:19 \\ \hline represent [3] - 4:25, \\ 8:14, 33:19 \\ \hline representatives [1] - \\ 20:2 \\ \hline represented [1] - 5:21 \\ \hline extremation of the second s$

23:19, 23:21, 30:17,	revised [1] - 64:5	21:8, 21:12, 26:6,	similar [1] - 70:11	56:8, 57:5, 67:23, 10
30:19, 31:4, 31:9	rights [1] - 39:17	26:11, 27:6, 27:12,	simple [3] - 7:13, 18:2,	68:13, 68:17
requested [1] - 71:2	risk [4] - 17:5, 17:9,	27:14, 27:16, 28:3,	47:13	SS [1] - 76:2
requests [1] - 29:10	18:1, 54:13	28:14, 39:15, 39:16,	simplest [2] - 41:21,	stack [1] - 41:10
require [3] - 28:13,	Rislov [7] - 1:14, 62:4,	47:16, 50:4, 50:6,	60:5	Staff [26] - 3:19, 4:6,
35:14	62:12, 64:3, 67:5,	50:7, 50:8	simply [2] - 10:7, 55:3	13:5, 15:12, 29:17,
required [2] - 29:2,	68:4, 68:8	selling [9] - 8:7, 8:14,	situation [8] - 7:25,	29:18, 29:23, 30:14,
31:6	RISLOV [17] - 62:5,	8:24, 33:10, 34:15,	45:14, 45:15, 46:3,	30:16, 30:18, 31:2,
requirements [1] -	62:10, 62:14, 63:20,	34:20, 40:17, 40:18,	52:10, 54:9, 55:10,	31:9, 31:21, 32:1,
30:12	63:23, 64:5, 64:15,	46:10	59:6	32:3, 32:8, 32:9,
requires [2] - 28:17,	64:18, 65:19, 66:13,	sells [2] - 6:7, 33:8	situations [2] - 45:25,	32:12, 32:16, 36:15,
30:24	66:23, 67:3, 67:19,	sense [7] - 16:24,	73:17	37:4, 42:10, 42:25,
requiring [2] - 29:4,	68:15, 68:19, 69:5,	16:25, 17:11, 21:11,	six [9] - 47:7, 56:19,	43:1, 46:15, 61:7
30:20	69:7	38:7, 45:9, 60:18	64:1, 64:20, 65:5,	STAFF [1] - 1:13
	road [1] - 25:12	sent [2] - 20:25, 39:3		Staff's [2] - 29:20,
reselling [1] - 40:23		separate [1] - 51:24	65:21, 65:24, 73:25	66:14
reserves [1] - 15:23	Rocky [2] - 19:15,		six-month [2] - 64:1,	
resolved [1] - 3:13	19:19	serve [2] - 5:22, 6:3	64:20	stale [1] - 65:6
resorting [1] - 7:6	rollcall [1] - 69:12	service [1] - 39:23	sixth [1] - 11:24	stalled [1] - 11:21
resource [16] - 9:2,	Room [1] - 2:3	set [3] - 18:12, 27:10,	slide [9] - 4:22, 5:2,	stand [1] - 22:13
9:4, 9:21, 17:4,	room [3] - 3:3, 3:7,	40:3	5:7, 5:12, 10:9,	standing [1] - 14:18
17:22, 19:7, 19:13,	10:12	sets [5] - 27:23, 44:22,	10:23, 36:2, 36:6,	standpoint [2] - 72:12,
24:16, 24:23, 27:21,	rounds [1] - 53:15	49:6, 51:10, 52:3	68:18	72:19
39:6, 41:10, 42:2,	Rounds [1] - 1:15	setting [3] - 23:5,	slip [1] - 23:18	start [5] - 25:2, 29:1,
51:17, 53:24	ROUNDS [4] - 53:17,	60:16, 70:15	smarter [1] - 58:18	36:1, 49:2, 68:15
resources [32] - 5:10,	53:22, 54:8, 54:20	settled [1] - 26:25	SMITH [5] - 61:11,	started [2] - 20:4,
5:17, 5:24, 6:6, 6:10,	RPR [1] - 1:21	several [3] - 3:11,	61:13, 61:23, 70:10,	71:11
6:14, 6:17, 6:25, 7:4,	rule [2] - 55:13, 70:11	47:6, 52:5	70:14	state [3] - 5:5, 39:23,
7:5, 7:24, 8:13, 10:3,	rules [5] - 23:17,	several-month [1] -	Smith [2] - 1:13, 61:25	55:12
17:6, 17:7, 24:20,	61:19, 61:21, 62:1,	47:6	solely [1] - 10:2	STATE [2] - 1:2, 76:1
24:22, 30:7, 34:3,	70:16	shareholders [1] -	solution [1] - 51:20	State [3] - 2:2, 39:25,
34:14, 34:16, 34:18,	run [3] - 14:11, 54:15,	28:22	someone [1] - 53:7	76:7
34:19, 39:14, 40:1,	65:11	shed [1] - 23:8	sometime [1] - 65:4	statement [1] - 37:14
41:6, 42:3, 43:13,	running [1] - 34:7	Sherry [2] - 4:23, 10:9	sometimes [4] -	statements [1] - 68:10
59:8, 59:11, 67:9	Ryan [1] - 18:11	shop [1] - 27:19	28:25, 43:18, 43:24,	states [2] - 12:8
respect [10] - 23:5,		shopping [1] - 27:24	45:14	States [1] - 12:13
23:23, 23:24, 25:14,	S	short [5] - 20:10,	somewhere [1] - 58:3	stationary [1] - 12:18
27:21, 37:14, 45:2,	-	20:14, 20:17, 40:16,	sophisticated [1] -	status [3] - 30:2,
45:7, 46:22, 47:22		69:10	43:10	61:13, 61:16
respectfully [1] - 29:9	safety [1] - 12:11	short-term [3] - 20:10,	sorry [2] - 48:8, 72:21	steady [1] - 5:5
respond [2] - 33:1,	scenario [2] - 9:12,	20:14, 20:17	sort [5] - 4:7, 35:15,	step [1] - 26:13
36:9	61:15	shorthand [2] - 76:9	58:20, 59:11, 59:20	still [6] - 46:10, 54:17,
response [7] - 8:3,	scenarios [8] - 10:21,	shorthandedly [1] -	sorts [1] - 66:18	57:11, 58:25, 64:20,
9:15, 20:5, 25:18,	10:22, 13:24, 14:10,	13:9	sources [2] - 12:18,	71:18
26:8, 62:22, 68:9	14:12, 54:4, 54:15,	show [2] - 25:11,	12:19	Stone [1] - 14:18
responsible [1] - 4:18	65:11	55:14	South [11] - 2:2, 2:4,	
Responsible [1] - 12:5	scheduled [1] - 70:22	showed [1] - 15:22	4:10, 4:13, 14:17,	stool [2] - 28:21, 28:22
restrict [1] - 23:14	scientific [1] - 44:5	shown [2] - 64:22,		
result [5] - 33:5,	screen [1] - 36:3	64:24	23:4, 30:3, 30:8,	stop [1] - 44:1
44:25, 54:9, 60:17,	second [10] - 5:12,		39:6, 76:7, 76:13	straightforward [2] -
60:18	8:16, 9:22, 10:9,	shows [3] - 19:25,	SOUTH [2] - 1:2, 76:1	7:14, 17:17
results [2] - 54:4, 61:6	17:19, 25:20, 45:2,	20:1, 27:8	speaks [1] - 53:12	strict [1] - 30:10
retirement [1] - 14:15	45:10, 57:10	side [5] - 5:21, 6:18,	special [1] - 39:22	strike [1] - 47:14
retiring [1] - 14:22	secondly [1] - 36:14	8:1, 14:12	specific [2] - 24:19,	struggled [1] - 58:23
• • •	see [15] - 5:2, 5:4, 5:7,	sides [2] - 48:15, 73:6	63:21	study [2] - 43:16,
retrofitting [1] - 14:13	5:15, 10:23, 10:25,	signal [1] - 60:7	specifically [2] - 6:13,	65:23
return [1] - 9:3	27:2, 44:13, 54:11,	signed [1] - 39:2	62:10	subject [1] - 40:9
reverse [2] - 29:11,	57:22, 61:8, 62:12,	significance [1] - 23:9	speculative [2] - 25:5,	subjective [1] - 54:22
29:12	65:10, 66:19, 70:2	significant [2] - 67:22,	29:8	submission [1] - 71:3
review [1] - 62:3	seem [1] - 72:22	72:17	spend [1] - 18:15	submissions [1] -
reviewed [3] - 12:20,	sell [21] - 8:23, 20:5,	significantly [2] -	spent [1] - 58:10	48:15
61:20, 61:21	Jen [21] - 0.20, 20.0,	62:19, 64:14	spring [8] - 16:6, 16:7,	submit [1] - 45:8
	1	1		1

submitted [1] - 47:14	technically-	61:14, 63:16	10:16, 10:19, 16:20,	29:3, 29:5, 45:24, 11
subsequent [6] - 64:1,	recoverable [1] -	TRANSCRIPT [1] - 2:1	19:24, 20:24, 37:22,	53:23, 55:22, 67:8
66:5, 66:6, 67:22,	15:23	Transcript [1] - 1:8	49:9, 49:16, 52:8,	Utilities [1] - 55:12
70:19, 71:5	telephone [3] - 1:12,	transcription [1] -	52:15, 56:14, 58:8,	utility [29] - 6:9, 6:24,
subsequently [1] -	69:13, 74:15	76:12	58:14, 58:17, 60:13,	7:7, 17:5, 17:21,
65:23	tempting [1] - 49:9	transferred [1] - 9:3	61:19, 62:9, 62:12,	20:18, 21:23, 24:18,
substantial [2] -	tendered [1] - 50:16	transmission [1] -	62:24, 63:22, 64:3,	24:19, 26:18, 26:20,
18:22, 35:14	term [11] - 9:18, 20:10,	56:23	64:7, 64:17, 64:25,	26:22, 27:4, 27:14,
substantially [3] -	20:14, 20:15, 20:17,	transpired [1] - 56:16	66:1, 66:22, 67:2,	27:20, 28:2, 28:21,
53:1, 63:8, 65:18	20:21, 21:18, 24:22,	TREE [1] - 1:4	67:5, 68:2, 68:7	28:22, 30:3, 38:14,
suddenly [1] - 47:8	47:13, 52:1	Tree [36] - 1:17, 3:18,	Uda [18] - 1:17, 4:4,	39:18, 39:23, 45:16,
sue [1] - 47:10	terminology [1] -	3:22, 5:14, 5:19, 6:2,	23:12, 24:7, 33:3,	50:4, 50:6, 59:7,
sued [1] - 12:9	23:16	7:23, 24:13, 25:4,	34:13, 37:7, 37:15,	60:8, 66:24, 66:25
sufficient [11] - 6:3,	terms [7] - 20:25,	26:9, 27:6, 27:9,	46:23, 47:5, 47:11,	utility's [5] - 10:3,
6:13, 6:21, 7:7, 8:8,	21:1, 21:4, 21:20,	27:11, 31:9, 31:18,	47:23, 48:7, 48:11,	28:15, 28:23, 28:24,
8:12, 15:19, 22:13,	28:12, 39:11, 44:7	33:6, 33:11, 33:14,	49:4, 68:5, 68:20,	51:1
31:14, 34:3, 59:13	testimony [10] - 15:18,	33:16, 34:23, 36:14,	70:25	utilize [1] - 30:20
suggest [4] - 22:9,	20:9, 21:9, 37:9,	37:21, 38:16, 40:20,	Uda's [1] - 68:9	
	38:4, 44:16, 53:19,	41:1, 41:2, 41:3,	uncertain [2] - 38:2,	V
33:9, 37:8, 37:10		45:11, 47:1, 47:6,	38:4	V
suggested [1] - 37:4	54:18, 54:20, 72:15	47:12, 47:14, 49:6,	uncomfortable [2] -	
suggestion [1] - 53:23	Texas [1] - 55:12	47:12, 47:14, 49:6, 55:3, 62:6, 67:25	73:14, 73:15	vacuum [1] - 67:7
suggests [1] - 37:7	THE [5] - 1:1, 1:2, 1:4,	Tree's [17] - 3:15,	unconditional [4] -	valuable [1] - 39:6
SULLY [1] - 76:3	1:10	3:24, 20:1, 23:11,	26:5, 39:15, 45:24,	value [5] - 6:9, 7:8,
summarize [1] - 29:20	themselves [1] - 21:4		49:23	9:2, 25:16, 41:17
summary [2] - 28:20,	therefore [3] - 21:1,	25:17, 26:8, 29:19, 30:18, 31:11, 32:2,	undead [2] - 63:2,	vanishing [1] - 52:15
32:1	22:22, 31:3	32:4, 32:13, 33:1,	63:19	vantage [1] - 9:2
summer [1] - 16:7	they've [1] - 11:12		under [5] - 12:11,	variabilities [1] -
support [8] - 18:22,	thinks [1] - 37:1	36:5, 46:18, 62:8, 66:14	16:10, 29:25, 39:17,	41:23
23:14, 30:16, 30:18,	third [2] - 6:25, 8:25		70:16	variable [1] - 33:25
31:4, 31:15, 31:17,	thoughts [2] - 70:5,	tried [1] - 21:10	understood [1] - 68:8	variables [1] - 54:4
73:3	72:2	true [7] - 14:6, 27:23,	undisputed [2] - 24:3,	various [6] - 10:21,
supported [3] - 22:2,	threat [2] - 12:11,	29:5, 29:7, 30:8,	40:10	14:10, 57:14, 57:25,
36:16, 43:2	12:23	33:22, 76:11		65:10, 71:2
supports [1] - 31:9	three [2] - 28:21,	try [9] - 23:13, 23:14,	unenforceable [1] -	Veatch [19] - 10:19,
suppose [5] - 49:16,	44:21	23:17, 25:1, 32:23,	26:11	10:25, 11:19, 13:13,
49:17, 49:20, 51:16	three-legged [1] -	37:9, 43:10, 46:21,	unfortunately [1] -	14:21, 16:5, 18:17,
supposed [2] - 39:1,	28:21	56:11	27:4	35:12, 36:11, 36:12,
45:11	timelines [1] - 3:10	trying [12] - 17:1,	unhappy [1] - 50:21	56:18, 57:2, 57:9,
Supreme [3] - 12:13,	Timothy [1] - 1:17	18:10, 20:18, 24:10,	unintentional [1] -	64:2, 65:11, 65:16,
52:18, 63:13	TO [1] - 1:5	33:13, 37:9, 38:7,	15:2	67:24, 68:13, 69:4
surprising [1] - 25:24	today [25] - 3:13, 4:2,	46:9, 49:13, 52:9,	unit [1] - 9:1	Veatch's [4] - 7:12,
surprisingly [1] - 12:9	18:25, 21:14, 21:20,	56:3, 58:11	United [1] - 12:13	58:3, 64:13, 65:4
suspect [1] - 52:24	22:20, 23:10, 24:3,	Tuesday [5] - 71:24,	unknown [1] - 60:14	vehemently [1] - 73:6
system [1] - 30:9	24:9, 24:21, 28:24,	74:8, 74:12, 74:14,	unless [2] - 74:3,	verbalization [1] -
System [1] - 18:14	36:4, 38:10, 39:4,	74:18	74:21	10:15
systems [1] - 30:8	39:6, 42:22, 46:10,	turn [7] - 4:20, 9:13,	untrue [1] - 46:24	versus [2] - 12:5,
	48:16, 52:6, 52:25,	22:17, 25:20, 29:16,	up [17] - 18:6, 18:16,	18:11
Т	57:12, 71:10, 71:23,	48:17, 67:19	35:20, 36:11, 36:18,	
•	73:18, 74:1	turns [1] - 60:15	43:6, 45:14, 45:25,	vertically [1] - 30:3
	together [3] - 5:10,	two [11] - 5:2, 6:21,	46:2, 47:3, 55:4,	vertically-integrated
tackle [2] - 74:7	56:11, 56:20	8:4, 9:15, 16:17,	58:22, 59:1, 59:20,	[1] - 30:3
tails [4] - 7:20, 9:12,	ton [2] - 11:16, 14:11	54:4, 62:23, 63:20,	60:3, 60:6, 74:21	viable [3] - 11:22,
33:5, 42:8	took [3] - 19:19,	64:25, 70:1, 74:4	updated [2] - 59:2,	28:16, 28:18
tax [2] - 39:5, 61:14	45:21, 76:9	typically [2] - 7:16,	69:3	VICE [1] - 1:11
		53:23	upheld [1] - 55:17	view [1] - 63:10
technical [8] - 19:2,	top [5] - 62:11, 62:17,			
technical [8] - 19:2, 22:6, 22:11, 44:6,	62:20, 64:6, 64:22		Utah [2] - 19:15, 19:17	views [1] - 35:8
technical [8] - 19:2,	-	U	Utah [2] - 19:15, 19:17 UTILITIES [2] - 1:1,	violate [2] - 16:23,
technical [8] - 19:2, 22:6, 22:11, 44:6,	62:20, 64:6, 64:22 totally [1] - 33:22	U		violate [2] - 16:23, 45:8
technical [8] - 19:2, 22:6, 22:11, 44:6, 48:11, 53:5, 57:19,	62:20, 64:6, 64:22	U UDA [32] - 4:5, 10:13,	UTILITIES [2] - 1:1,	violate [2] - 16:23,

Virginia [3] - 9:22, 9:23, 9:24	Z
visit [1] - 70:1	
	zero [5] - 34:24, 41:16
vote [1] - 71:22	41:24, 41:25
W	
wait [1] - 74:1	
walk [1] - 28:1	
wants [1] - 28:5	
Waxman [10] - 11:14,	
11:18, 11:20, 52:17,	
52:24, 62:15, 63:1,	
63:14, 63:17	
Waxman-Markey [10]	
- 11:14, 11:18,	
11:20, 52:17, 52:24,	
62:15, 63:1, 63:14,	
63:17	
ways [2] - 36:18, 46:6	
Whitehall [1] - 19:11	
whole [6] - 11:6,	
32:23, 56:24, 58:8,	
71:23, 74:12	
willing [1] - 45:17	
win [4] - 7:19, 9:12,	
33:5, 42:8	
wind [1] - 17:7	
Wind [2] - 19:11, 21:7 WITTLER [1] - 76:5	
Wittler [2] - 1:21,	
76:18	
words [1] - 42:22	
workable [3] - 58:13,	
58:15, 60:12	
works [1] - 18:15	
world [2] - 8:10, 8:11	
worlds [1] - 8:1	
worst [1] - 8:1	
worth [3] - 43:24,	
59:23, 60:2	
writing [1] - 20:4	
written [1] - 48:15	
	-
T	-
year [4] - 13:16, 25:25,	
71:12, 71:16	
years [8] - 11:15,	
13:18, 13:19, 23:5,	
24:9, 24:11, 48:4,	
52:14	
yourself [2] - 39:1, 43:25	
Yvette [2] - 3:5, 69:16	