

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION  
OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA**

In the Matter of the Petition of Sprint )  
Communications Company L.P. for ) Docket No. TC06-176  
Arbitration Pursuant to the )  
Telecommunication Act of 1996 to )  
Resolve Issues Relating to an )  
Interconnection Agreement with )  
Brookings Municipal Utilities d/b/a )  
Swiftel Communications )

**Rebuttal Testimony of RANDY G. FARRAR  
On behalf of Sprint Communications Company L.P.  
February 16, 2007**

**Public Version**



1 A. No, I missed one input change which had no impact on the analysis. I was  
2 working with Swiftel's Response to Sprint's Discovery Request No. 32,  
3 which was a list of all 1,705 (approximately) HAI Model inputs used by  
4 Swiftel. There was no indication of which inputs were HAI defaults, and  
5 which were changed by Swiftel. When manually comparing Swiftel's  
6 Response to Discovery Request No. 32 to the HAI Model Inputs Portfolio, I  
7 identified all Swiftel input changes except for one.

8

9 **Q. What one Swiftel input change did you overlook?**

10 A. I overlooked the change to "Fixed and per Line Investments – Small ICOs –  
11 Remote fixed investment – Line Size 640" (Variable 4.11.2 in the HAI Inputs  
12 Portfolio documentation, Variable 177b in Swiftel's Response to Sprint  
13 Discovery Request 32) which was increased from a default value of \$94,286  
14 to **[Begin Swiftel Confidential]** \$ **[End Swiftel Confidential]**, an  
15 increase of **[Begin Swiftel Confidential]** % **[End Swiftel**  
16 **Confidential]**.

17

18 **Q. What impact does this additional Swiftel input change have on the HAI**  
19 **output and on Swiftel's proposed reciprocal compensation rate?**

20 A. None what-so-ever. The input "Fixed and per Line Investments – Small  
21 ICOs" actually consists of 48 individual investment-related inputs. Swiftel  
22 changed only one of the 48 inputs.

23

1           However, these inputs are used by the HAI Model only when HAI Variable  
2           4.10.2 (Swiftel Input No. 177) is activated. As I discussed on page 41, line  
3           15 of my Direct Testimony, perhaps the greatest problem with the Swiftel  
4           use of the HAI Model is that Swiftel did not “Enable” this HAI input. By  
5           “Enabling” HAI Variable 4.10.2, the model will recognize Swiftel’s actual  
6           host-remote relationships. Since Swiftel did not “Enable” this input, Swiftel’s  
7           change to HAI Variable 4.11.2 has no impact what-so-ever on the final  
8           result.

9  
10       **Q. What is the result of Swiftel’s not activating HAI Variable 4.10.2?**

11       A. As I discussed on page 41, line 15 of my Direct Testimony, by not activating  
12       this input, Swiftel has significantly overstated the HAI outputs and the  
13       resulting reciprocal compensation rate.


14  
15       By Swiftel “Disabling” HAI Variable 4.10.2, the HAI Model treats each of  
16       Swiftel’s four offices as a stand-alone end office, when in reality Swiftel has  
17       only one end office serving as a host for three other remote end offices.

18       This creates at least two problems which overstate Swiftel’s costs.

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20       The first problem is that the HAI Model builds separate transmission  
21       facilities from each of the four Swiftel end offices to the RBOC network for  
22       ultimate transmission to the RBOC tandem. This overbuilding is magnified  
23       by the fact that these costs are assigned 100% to Swiftel, with no sharing of

1 this cost with the RBOC. When HAI Variable 4.10.2 is “Enabled,” the model  
2 will construct a Host-Remote transmission ring with only the host end office  
3 having transmission facilities to the RBOC network. By leaving this input  
4 “Disabled,” Swiftel has significantly overstated the necessary interoffice  
5 transmission facilities, as shown in the following diagram.

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7  
8

9 The second problem is that the HAI Model constructs the common switching  
10 components in each of the four end offices, such as the central processor  
11 and power, which in reality would reside only once in the host end office.

12

13 Swiftel proposes a reciprocal compensation rate of \$0.01310. Simply  
14 “Enabling” HAI Variable 4.10.2 (i.e. defining Swiftel’s actual host-remote  
15 relationships) and keeping all other Swiftel inputs unchanged, reduces  
16 Swiftel’s reciprocal compensation rate to \$0.00924, a reduction of 29.5%.

17

1 **Q. Have you updated Attachment RGF-2 to show this one additional**  
2 **Swiftel input change?**

3 A. Yes. Attachment RGF-2 (Corrected) now includes HAI Input No. 177b.  
4 (Note, I also corrected a typo in Cells E29, J29, and J51, and updated the  
5 footnotes.)

6  
7 **Q. Are there other transmission issues concerning the HAI Model and**  
8 **Swiftel's network?**

9 A. Yes. An inherent fault in the HAI Model is that it treats each independent  
10 LEC as a standalone entity when designing transmission facilities, and  
11 builds unique transmission facilities for that independent LEC to the nearest  
12 RBOC network. In reality, if an RBOC is surrounded by multiple  
13 independent LECs, transmission facilities may be designed such that  
14 several independent LECs will utilize a single fiber optic transmission ring.  
15 This is more efficient than the HAI Model assumption; thus, HAI will tend to  
16 overstate costs.

17  
18 In reality, Swiftel utilizes an SDN tandem, not an RBOC tandem. This is  
19 likely more efficient than the HAI assumption.

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21 **Q. Did Mr. Rasmusson provide meaningful documentation or support for**  
22 **the 43 input changes to the HAI Model?**

1 A. No. Eight of the 43 changes were justified by **[Begin Swiftel Confidential]**  
2 “ ” **[End Swiftel Confidential]**. 26 of the changes  
3 were justified by one of the following;

4  
5 **[Begin Swiftel Confidential]**

- 6 •
- 7 •
- 8 •
- 9 •
- 10 •
- 11 •
- 12 •

13 **[End Swiftel Confidential]**

14  
15 By definition these 26 changes reflect embedded cost information of an  
16 ILEC facing little if any local competition. By definition, they are not forward-  
17 looking.

18  
19 **Q. Why is documentation of inputs important?**

20 A. Swiftel has chosen to use a model which was not designed for reciprocal  
21 compensation, and has chosen not to provide any meaningful  
22 documentation or support for its proposed inputs.

23

1 As discussed on page 34, line 10 of my Direct Testimony, the results of the  
2 HAI Model are highly sensitive to a very few number of inputs. Input  
3 changes by Swiftel in just seven areas increases Swiftel's rate for reciprocal  
4 compensation by 55%. The vast majority of Swiftel's input changes, all else  
5 equal, increase the reciprocal compensation rate.

6  
7 Without meaningful input documentation, the Swiftel inputs should be  
8 rejected.

9  
10 **Q. On page 5, line 22, Mr. Rasmusson states, "Bill and Keep is**  
11 **appropriate only when the traffic subject to reciprocal compensation**  
12 **exchanged between the Parties is balanced. Sprint has presented no**  
13 **evidence demonstrating that traffic will be balance." Please comment.**

14 **A.** Based on the FCC Rules, Mr. Rasmusson's logic is backwards. As I stated  
15 on page 26, line 10 of my Direct Testimony, 47 C.F.R. § 51.713(c) allows  
16 the Commission to presume traffic is roughly balanced, "unless a party  
17 rebuts such a presumption." Thus, the rules contemplate a presumption of  
18 balanced traffic until one party demonstrates otherwise. It is Swiftel who  
19 has not provided any evidence to rebut this presumption.

20  
21 47 C.F.R. § 51.713(c) recognizes that Bill-and-Keep is the most efficient  
22 compensation arrangement. Bill-and-Keep eliminates the necessity for both

1 carriers to establish a billing system involving the ongoing measuring of  
2 traffic and the exchange of monthly invoices and payments.

3  
4 As I discussed on page 28, line 12 of my Direct Testimony, even if traffic is  
5 somewhat out-of-balance, the expected volume of traffic between Sprint and  
6 Swiftel is unlikely to be significant enough to justify anything other than a  
7 Bill-and-Keep arrangement.

8  
9 **Q. On page 6, line 13 of his Direct Testimony, Mr. Rasmusson states, “...  
10 it can take many months or years to get to a position of balanced  
11 traffic. Some CLECs never acquire enough customers/traffic to get to  
12 a balanced position with the ILEC.” Please comment.**

13 A. This statement completely misconstrues the concept of “balanced traffic.”  
14 This statement equates “balance of traffic” with the total volumes of traffic  
15 acquired by a CLEC over “many months or a few years.” This is wrong.

16  
17 The concept of “balance of traffic” has nothing to do with the total volume of  
18 traffic, but rather the proportion of traffic exchanged directly between the two  
19 carriers, regardless of whether the total volume of traffic is great or small.

20 How many customers a CLEC has acquired does not directly affect the  
21 “balance of traffic” between two carriers. For example, assume Sprint has  
22 only 100 end-user customers. Also assume Sprint’s network originates  
23 100,000 minutes of traffic terminating to Swiftel’s network per month.

1 Finally, assume the Sprint network terminates 100,000 minutes originating  
2 from Swiftel's network. Traffic between Sprint and Swiftel will be "balanced"  
3 (50% / 50%). The fact that Swiftel may have 10,000 customers (100 times  
4 the Sprint number of customers) has no affect on the "balance-of-traffic"  
5 concept.

6  
7 Conversely, assume the same 100 Sprint end-user customers. If the Sprint  
8 network originates 150,000 minutes of traffic terminating to Swiftel's network  
9 per month, and the Sprint network terminates only 50,000 minutes  
10 originating from Swiftel's network, traffic between Sprint and Swiftel will be  
11 "out-of-balance" (75% / 25%, i.e. 75% Sprint originating, 25% Swiftel  
12 terminating).

### 13 14 **III. Rebuttal of W. James Adkins**

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16 **Q. On page 4, line 11 of his Direct Testimony, Mr. Adkins states that**  
17 **Swiftel does not have to provide interconnection facilities at TELRIC**  
18 **rates because that is a 251(c)(2) obligation only. Please comment.**

19 **A.** The FCC Rules do not limit the TELRIC pricing of interconnection facilities  
20 to 251(c) interconnection. As I stated on page 17, line 14 of my Direct  
21 Testimony, Paragraph 743 of the Local Competition Order and 47 C.F.R. §  
22 51.501, which establish forward-looking prices for interconnection facilities,  
23 are applicable to all interconnection facilities.

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If the Commission believes the FCC Rules do not apply in this proceeding, then the Commission appears to have three choices for pricing interconnection facilities; either access prices, forward-looking cost based rates, or create something unique. For the same reasons that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“the Act”) and the FCC require forward-looking cost based rates for interconnection under 251(c), the Commission should adopt the same cost standard in this proceeding. The purpose of the Act and the subsequent FCC Rules is to promote competition. Special access rates are set well above forward-looking costs. Requiring competitors to lease interconnection facilities at rates well above the ILEC’s forward-looking costs places the competitor at a competitive disadvantage when compared to the incumbent LEC.

**Q. Does Sprint’s current ICA with Qwest allow Sprint to lease interconnection facilities in South Dakota from Qwest at cost-based prices?**

A. Yes. In the current Interconnection Agreement between Sprint and Qwest, the Qwest price list contains the same cost-based prices for Section 7.3, “Interconnection – Direct Trunked Transport” and Section 9.6, “Unbundled Dedicated Interoffice Transport.”

1 **Q. What would the monthly cost be for this interconnection facility**  
2 **between Sprint and Swiftel?**

3 A. This interconnection facility would require a DS1 meet-point facility  
4 provisioned by both Qwest and Swiftel. Based upon a combination of  
5 Qwest TELRIC rates and Swiftel special access rates, Sprint estimates this  
6 facility would cost approximately \$370 per month. Using Qwest TELRIC  
7 rates for the entire facility, this facility would cost approximately \$149. If  
8 traffic was balanced, Swiftel's share of this facility would be only \$185 or  
9 \$75 per month, respectively.

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11 **IV. Conclusion and Summary**

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13 **Q. Please summarize your rebuttal testimony.**

14 A. The Commission should adopt a Bill-and-Keep reciprocal compensation  
15 arrangement between Sprint and Swiftel, until one party demonstrates that  
16 traffic is significantly out-of-balance and of significant volume to justify the  
17 measurement of traffic and the exchange of bills between the two carriers.

18  
19 To support its proposed reciprocal compensation rate, Swiftel chose to use  
20 a model which was not designed for reciprocal compensation, and Swiftel  
21 chose not to provide any meaningful documentation or support for their  
22 proposed inputs. The Commission should reject the HAI Model, and/or  
23 Swiftel's proposed inputs.

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2           The Commission should require Swiftel to lease Sprint interconnection  
3 facilities at prices which reflect forward-looking costs.

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5 **Q. Does this conclude your Rebuttal Testimony?**

6 A. Yes, it does.