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**From:** Evan Vokes  
**Sent:** Wednesday, February 28, 2007 10:15 PM  
**To:** David Taylor; Bob Hudson; Fred Kubke  
**Cc:** Curtis Parker; Michael Moschopedis; Da-Ming Duan  
**Subject:** RE: Production welding on Ft. McKay NPS 30 - Thickwood section

As requested, a survey of all welds was performed on Saturday February 24, 2007 with assistance of the Midwest pipelines technology assistant; Sean

The issue arose out of a visual inspection of a weld that was just after the second welding shack. The weld bead looked wrong and was only fused to one side of the groove. Barry went to look at the welding machine records and assuming that the welder was running HP was very concerned that the welder had run F1 instead of the HP. I had estimated that this would have been MLT 835 as UT had not assigned a MLT number yet but the location was the last weld of the particular section.

This is when we felt we had a problem as we were near 100% repairs and the morning of February 24, 2007, Barry was sure that at least one weld was affected based on his analysis of the data. A copy of a page from my personal logbook was emailed to Dave by Dianne on my behalf.

The morning of, February 24, 2007, I drove down the pipe and recorded all of the weld numbers, the Midwest Weld number, the MLT number and the approximate area of the defects and completed my list of welders assigned to each joint. A spread sheet of all of the weld sequences was built for MLT numbers 800 through 845. The suspected weld was actually numbered as MLT 836.

The analysis was complicated by the fact that the welders must advance the incremental count for the MW data logs and write the corresponding number on the pipe. Often this was not done on these two sections of pipe fabricated on February 23, 2007. The time logs had to be deciphered based on the welder pass record written on the pipe and the timestamp on the individual weld files.

It was determined that the weld pass sequence was in fact maintained for the entire day of February 23, 2007 for all welds including the suspected weld MLT #836. The net result of this analysis was trending that proved that the high rejection rate of the pipe was not due to a pass sequence errors. The incident investigation has not cost any production delays to Midwest. As discussed in David Taylor's notice of rejection email entitled "Production welding on Ft. McKay NPS 30 - Thickwood section" dated Friday Feb 23, 2007; we will accept the Fridays production based on the original AUT scans, which evaluated to the original ECA criteria for the project.

If you require any further information, please contact me  
Thank you  
Evan Vokes

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**From:** David Taylor  
**Sent:** Friday, February 23, 2007 5:13 PM  
**To:** Bob Hudson; Fred Kubke  
**Cc:** Evan Vokes; Curtis Parker; Michael Moschopedis; Da-Ming Duan  
**Subject:** Production welding on Ft. McKay NPS 30 - Thickwood section

Bob,

It has been brought to my attention through Evan and Ron that the welders have used the incorrect pass sequence on at least one weld. I believe it was weld # 835 – this should be confirmed as this weld was not numbered when the non-compliance was noted.

This is a major issue that Midwest needs to address immediately. The Engineering Critical Acceptance criteria, is based on the welding procedure qualified being maintained within the Annex K, essential variables, the use of an incorrect pass sequence places the weld outside of the procedure. The use of the wrong pass sequence voids the acceptance criteria.

Therefore TransCanada will not accept any of the production welding for Friday, Feb. 23, 2007.

Midwest shall provide to TransCanada an assessment of the welding data to determine the extent of the problem and identify the welds involved. TransCanada will review the Midwest submission and determine if the welds can be assessed to the project ECA, CSA workmanship (Clause 7) or have the welds cut-out.

If there are any questions please call.

Thank you!