From: Evan Vokes
Sent: Tuesday, October 25, 2011 10:07 AM
To: Grant Kowpak
Subject: Bison
Attachments: RE: NDT Meeting; RE: old RMS designs; RE: Counter-bore and taper versus back-bevel

Thought you might like to see Bison background emails before I drop the incomplete binder off.

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What you need to understand from my POV is that Shane is fully aware of what was happening on Bison and made decisions based on this knowledge

Shane was the person pushed to have RTD hired, Shane had Kevin Theisen of Universal Ensco setup the AUT, witness the qualification and approve the setups on behalf of TransCanada. We were able to have some input into the design but that is where it stopped. Although I was sent AUT calibration scan when I was in Mexico, I had never worked with or was trained on the user interface. You cannot tell correctly what is going on without physically being there for the setup before construction starts and that option to witness was never extended to core TC personal.

There was no review of the RTD procedure as Shane assured us would happen, the recommendations on checking the velocity as per the specification was ignored and last communication was to address the issue of wide caps which thankfully they did listen too as they needed this detail. This was the single technical query that ever came out of Bison which was resolved. The point of all of this is the AUT system was setup and approved outside the TC specification without our knowledgeable staff being involved.

The email from Claude shows that he is on the side of quality and was so until Shane quit and Claude left on stress leave. The string shows that Ken Lee of PHMSA initiated it to support the PHMSA advisory on counter bores.. .

There was very little contact with Bison till I got off the plane to be greeted by Claude and Ralf Hoffman and tasked with firing RTD. I had no experience on the new RTD user interface when this started so I was of limited use for the first while but it is hard to fault RTD for a setup that the Bison project approved and never acted upon to correct. What RTD was pretty technically bad, but not to the level of engineering skill demonstrated by the project team. The only thing that didn't happen is we never fired RTD much to the chagrin of some one in the project team as Shaw was lined up before I even got there.

The question now becomes one of what happened to Dan Kelly's reports and why did the project not act upon this. There were a lot of underlying unrecorded incidents that happened as only witnessed by personal that quit or got fired. My point I was making is that when I visited PG Spread 4, I was shown technical queries on NDE by the chief inspector that I told the chief inspector still needed to be sent to the project because that is the correct channel but the answers were technical in nature and should answered in Calgary. I never did see these question but the results were clearly answered in policy that appeared on the pipeline while I was there. I got RTD on the path to improving the quality although it was a pretty rough road and we proved that the welding quality was poor and the oversight was limited when we first came to site. Things were much better on week three.

How could I control a technical process when I have no meaningful input?
How is this different that the current Keystone philosophies?