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1	THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
2	OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
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4	IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FILED BY
5	SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, LP AGAINST NATIVE AMERICAN TELECOM, LLC REGARDING TC10-026 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
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8	Transcript of Proceedings <b>ORIGINAL</b> April 5, 2011
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10	BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION,
11	STEVE KOLBECK, CHAIRMAN GARY HANSON, VICE CHAIRMAN
12	CHRIS NELSON, COMMISSIONER
13	COMMISSION STAFF Rolayne Ailts Wiest
	Karen Cremer REUEIVED
14	Greg Rislov Dave Jacobson  APR 1 4 2011
15	Bob Knadle SOUTH DAKOTA PUBLIC Deb Gregg UTU ITIES COMMISSION
16	Demaris Axthelm UTILITIES COMMISSION
17	APPEARANCES
18	Tom Tobin, Sprint Communications Company
19	Scott Knudson, Sprint Communications Company Scott Swier, Native American Telecom (by telephone)
20	Darla Pollman Rogers, Interveners
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22	Reported By Cheri McComsey Wittler, RPR, CRR
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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, held in the above-entitled matter, at the South Dakota State Capitol Building, 500 East Capitol Ayenue, Room 413, Pierre, South Dakota, on the 5th day of April 2011, commencing at 9:30 a.m. 

CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: TC10-026, In the matter of the Complaint filed by Sprint Communications Company, LP against Native American Telecom, LLC, regarding telecommunications service.

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The question before us today is shall the

Commission grant Native American Telephone's Motion -
and I'm going to reverse the questions. Motion to Stay.

And shall the Commission grant Native American

Telephone's Motion to Dismiss, or how shall the

Commission proceed?

I'd like to handle the Stay first, and then we'll discuss the Dismiss.

Is it the opinion of the Commissioners to have two separate arguments, or do we want them to present the arguments both at the same time?

COMMISSIONER NELSON: Separate.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: Mr. Chairman, I'm comfortable with doing them separate. However, I don't know how challenging that will be for the parties.

Obviously, there will be some issues that they may wish to trespass upon on the two motions as they're discussing it, and I wouldn't hold them to that.

CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: I would think arguing separately would be appropriate also. I would think that arguing the Stay first would make more sense. So how

about we do it that way. All right?

So with that, Native American Telecom, you are the moving party. If you want to start, please do.

MR. SWIER: Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission. Thank you for allowing me to appear via teleconference today.

With regard to the Motion to Stay, Native

American Telecom is requesting that this Commission stay
all proceedings in this case until Sprint exhausts all

Tribal Court remedies in the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe

Tribal Court.

Both the matter in front of the Commission and the matter that's currently pending before the Crow Creek Tribal Court revolve around the same issues of law and fact.

The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine, of course, promotes tribal self-government in the authority and development of Tribal Courts. And the Doctrine states that the courts, and in this case regulatory agencies, should stay its hand until the Tribal Court has had an opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction.

Very briefly, the corporate structure of NAT is this: It is a tribally owned, limited liability company organized under the laws of the State of South Dakota.

And it provides internet access, basic telephone, and

long distance service to members on and within the exterior boundaries of the Crow Creek Reservation.

In 1997 the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe created its
Tribal Utility Authority. That deals with matters of
telecommunications on and within the exterior boundaries
of the reservation.

In September of 2008 the Utility Authority issued its Telecommunications Plan. And these documents are all part of the record.

In October of 2008 the Tribal Utility Authority granted NAT the authority to provide telecommunications services on the reservation subject to the laws of the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe. And, indeed, one year later, in September of 2009, NAT launched its tribally owned telephone system.

NAT has physical offices, its telecommunications equipment, and its telecommunication towers all on the reservation. So the offices, the equipment, the towers, and the people are all located on the reservation.

And, of course, what happened is in March of -- in March of 2010 Sprint improperly discontinued paying its terminating access charges to NAT.

What we're asking the Commission to do here today is to simply follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court in the <u>Iowa Mutual Insurance Company</u> and

National Farmers Union Insurance Company line of cases.

The Exhaustion Doctrine is very simple. It's this: It says that Sprint cannot challenge the jurisdiction of the Crow Creek Tribal Court or litigate the merits of a dispute already pending before the Tribal Court until Sprint exhausts its remedies in Tribal Court.

And, Mr. Chair and members of the Commission, this is a classic case for application of the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine.

There was a question as to although the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine is primarily a Federal Court doctrine, can the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine be applied to State Courts or in this case to a State regulatory agency?

And NAT has cited two cases. The first is the Tohono O'odham Nation case, which is a Federal Court case from Arizona in 1997. And also Bowen v. Doyle, which is a 1995 case from the Western District Federal Court in New York.

In those cases it's clear that the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine is not limited to Federal Courts, but it can also be extended to State Courts and through analogy to state regulatory agencies.

So what we're asking the Commission to do in

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this case is to simply recognize that this dispute involves, one, a tribally owned telecommunications company. Number two, the dispute involves actions that are taking place within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. Number three, this dispute involves the scope of the Tribe and the Tribal Utility Authority's regulatory authority. Number four, it also involves the scope of the Tribal Court's adjudicatory authority. Number five, it takes into consideration the Tribe's financial stability and economic development efforts on the reservation. And, finally, this dispute involves employment opportunities for the Tribe's members.

And, again, these are all supported by the voluminous documents that have already been filed in the case.

So in sum, Mr. Chair, the fundamental issue in this case is really pretty simple. It's not whether the tribal -- the Tribal Court has jurisdiction. Rather, the issue is whether the Tribal Court should be the first entity to address the jurisdictional issue.

There is no doubt that this Commission will hear this case at a later date, but under the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine, the Tribal Court should have the first crack at determining its jurisdiction.

So we're asking that the Commission accept the

recommendation of its Staff. The Staff Brief recommends granting NAT's Motion to Stay based on the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine. And we'd ask the Commission to accept its Staff recommendation here.

Mr. Chair, regarding the tribal exhaustion issue, we want to keep -- I want to keep this brief.

It's been briefed extensively. So unless the Commission has any questions at this time, that is the conclusion of my initial presentation here this morning.

CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: All right. Thank you, Mr. Swier.

Next we'll move to Sprint, Complainant.

MR. KNUDSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With me today -- I'm Scott Knudson from Briggs and Morgan, representing Sprint Communications. And with me at counsel table is Tom Tobin, my local counsel from Winner, South Dakota. I'm sorry to say Mr. Whiting also representing Sprint in this case can't appear today due to a death in the family.

Last December the Federal District Court determined that the Crow Creek Tribe's court lacked jurisdiction over NAT's complaint against Sprint based upon interstate traffic. The Federal Court construed 47 U.S.C. 207 in the Federal Communications Act to determine that a Federal Court or the FCC had exclusive

jurisdiction over interstate claims. And because the jurisdiction was exclusive there was no need to exhaust.

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The Federal District Court was interpreting the Exhaustion Doctrine as applied by the United States Supreme Court in cases decided after the cases that Mr. Swier has cited. In particular we brought these cases to the attention of the Commission. Straight v. A-1 Construction and Nevada v. Hicks, which established in the absence of a grant of jurisdiction to a Tribal Court, there's no need to exhaust because it would only result in delay.

And I just heard Mr. Swier say that ultimately the Commission will hear Sprint's Complaint. I remind the Commission that Sprint filed first in May. And we're now approaching 10 months, 11 months perhaps almost, and we have had no progress on Sprint's Complaint on the merits. What Mr. Swier is recommending to the Commission will only add further delay to defer it to a tribunal which has no jurisdiction over Sprint's Complaint.

I urge the Commission to deny the Motion to Stay for several reasons: First of all, South Dakota

Legislature has empowered this Commission to regulate intrastate telecommunications traffic.

Congress has set up a dichotomy of regulation of interstate telecommunication services -- or telecom

services overall. In 47 U.S.C. 152(b) Congress has divided regulation between the Federal Communications Commission with jurisdiction over interstate traffic and allowing the state to regulate that intrastate portion of telecommunications traffic. So Congress has ordained that this Commission through the State Legislature can regulate intrastate traffic.

The Legislature in 47-31-3 has said that this Commission has the sole authority to regulate intrastate traffic. Now that's important because what's at issue here and what's involved in Sprint's Complaint is billing for intrastate traffic. We're not talking about intra-reservation traffic but intrastate traffic. That's traffic originating somewhere in the State of South Dakota that ends up on NAT's equipment, gets billed terminating access charges to Sprint.

It asserts that it can provide intrastate traffic in its tariff that it has on file with the Tribal Utility Commission. In Section 1.1 of that tribal tariff it talks about applying to intrastate traffic. That's Exhibit F to an Affidavit that I filed with our papers.

And Sprint's been billed for that intrastate traffic, and that's found in Exhibit 9 of the Reiman Affidavit filed by NAT. Now Sprint is just one of several interexchange carriers that are involved in this

dispute. We happened to file the Complaint with the Commission, but there would be other intrastate traffic NAT would be attempting to bill for.

So first the Legislature has determined that the Commission should be regulating intrastate traffic in the first place. And, second, I'd like to take issue with the assertion the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine applies at all to the states.

First of all, let's be clear where this doctrine arises. It's not an act of Congress. It's a judge-made rule. The Federal Judiciary has said as a matter of comity -- in other words, we will extend kind of a first-chance opportunity to tribal courts to rule on these issues whether the Tribal Court would have jurisdiction.

That was created by Federal Courts. And the federal rule is not applicable to the states. If it would be applicable, it would require an act of Congress to make the federal exhaustion rule apply to State Courts or State regulatory agencies.

The two cases that Mr. Swier cited both involve Federal Courts and not a State agency determining to defer to the jurisdiction of a Tribal Court. And they're distinguishable on the facts from the situation.

NAT has cited no State Court, no State agency

adopting the exhaustion rule. And, further, because the Legislature has empowered the Commission to act first, it should exercise its jurisdiction here and rule on Sprint's Complaint.

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Now the South Dakota Supreme Court has addressed this question as well in the Cheyenne River case that we cite in our Briefs. That's an issue where there was a sale of some certain telephone exchanges that were on the Cheyenne River Reservation and whether or not the PUC and also the State Supreme Court then could regulate the terms and conditions of the sale of those telephone exchanges.

The issue came up in that case of whether or not exercising State or PUC jurisdiction over the sale of those exchanges would somehow interfere with tribal self-government, and the Supreme Court concluded it would not.

Now that's important to consider here because the basis for the federal rule is to promote tribal self-government. If the State Supreme Court has said that where the Commission has clear authority to act, they will not implicate that particular federal interest and, therefore, there should be no concern over exhaustion in these particular circumstances.

And I remind the Commission that the factual

circumstances here are similar to those that were in Cheyenne River. What Cheyenne River was talking about was a concern for people who live within the reservation who were not tribal members. We have a similar circumstance here.

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Crow Creek Reservation is an open reservation. There's a significant non-Indian population on the reservation. There are substantial amounts of fee land owned by non-Indians within that reservation. And the type of technology that they're proposing to use is WiMAX technology. That's a radio technology which radiates in all directions so it can easily go outside the boundaries of the reservation.

And I would also point out that when NAT first came to the Commission and applied for a Certificate of Authority it said that it was going to serve all individuals and businesses within the reservation.

That's Exhibit J to my Affidavit that was filed here.

And then in Exhibit W to my Affidavit there was testimony from the Federal Court litigation in October of last year where the NAT witness admitted that there was no effort to screen out non-tribal members from being eligible for service.

So the facts of our situation are similar to those of Cheyenne River. And I submit then that the

underlying concern about promoting tribal self-government doesn't rise to the level of which any type of exhaustion should apply. Instead this Commission should step forward and enforce the mandate that the Legislature has given it and act to decide on Sprint's Complaint.

Then, finally, to point out the Federal Court decision with respect to the stay, I think the Staff's Brief recommended that the Motion to Stay be granted until either the Federal Court or the Tribal Court had ruled. We have a ruling now from the Federal Court.

The Federal Court determined to enjoin NAT's Tribal Court action in full. So that action has basically stopped. It enjoined that action because it ruled or interpreted 47 U.S.C. 207 to create an exclusive federal forum for the Complaints involving the interstate traffic.

ase, which is the Price-Anderson Act Decision. The Coeur d'Alene and Alltel cases were also referenced. They involve the Federal Communications Act. The significance of which is when -- here Congress has determined where jurisdiction lies. That ties back into the interpretation of the exhaustion pool that the Supreme Court articulated in Strate and Hicks, which is very straightforward. Absent a federal grant of

jurisdiction, there is no need to exhaust because exhaustion would only delay consideration of the merits.

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Because Congress has delineated this federal/state dichotomy in 47 U.S.C. 152(b) the Commission now has the authority to move forward and regulate the intrastate traffic component of NAT services. That's what's involved in Sprint's Complaint before the PUC.

So we urge the Commission to deny the Motion to Stay and move forward on the merits.

At this point I'd like to reserve the rest of my argument on the issue of the Motion to Dismiss.

CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: All right. Thank you very much. I think next we'll hear from Crow Creek Sioux Tribe Utility Authority if they'd like to speak. They're an Intervener.

How about SDTA, Midstate, and SDN? We'll hear from those Interveners.

MS. POLLMAN ROGERS: Good morning, Mr. Chair, members of the Commission. My name is Darla Pollman Rogers, and I'm appearing today on behalf of Interveners SDTA, SDN, and Midstate.

We submitted a Brief in this Docket that was filed December 6, and in that Brief we articulated five reasons why we believe the Commission should deny the

Motion to Stay.

The previous presenter almost verbatim gave you those same arguments so I will not repeat them.

We believe that it's clear in reviewing Federal law, State law, and Administrative Rules and our own Supreme Court's analysis of the Congressional legislative intent of Federal law that the Commission has jurisdiction over this matter. The Motion to Stay should be denied, and we would urge you to submit a ruling to that effect.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: Thank you. And one more Intervener.

AT&T, would you like to comment?

No comment. Okay. How about we turn towards Staff. Ms. Cremer.

MS. CREMER: Good morning. This is Karen Cremer from Staff. As noted, the parties have briefed this matter rather extensively and thoroughly explained how they believe the case law should be applied in this matter.

For the most part the parties agree on what case law applies. Where their disagreement is is, of course, how to apply that case law to the jurisdictional issue.

As Ms. Rogers stated, Staff has also filed a Brief. I'm not going to read it to you or repeat that. I will rely on that Brief and will just basically summarize Staff's recommendations.

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Regarding the Motion to Stay, Staff believes that the Motion should be granted. Staff believes that an evidentiary hearing needs to be held so that this jurisdictional issue can be resolved so that the matter can then be heard on its merits.

The question before you then is who should hold this evidentiary hearing, as clearly what type of traffic this is needs to be determined. If it is as NAT says, confined solely within the exterior boundaries of the reservation, the Commission likely does not have jurisdiction.

If it's as Sprint says and outside the boundaries of the reservation, clearly, the Commission has jurisdiction in that regard.

I don't believe the Commission would be in error if they determined to hold the evidentiary hearing themselves. I don't think there's necessarily a right answer here or a wrong answer. The Commission clearly has an obligation to hear all matters over which they have subject matter jurisdiction.

The problem I have is that I don't believe it's

clear that the Commission has subject matter jurisdiction here and, hence, the need for an evidentiary hearing. So then it becomes a question of whether this Commission's obligation to exercise its jurisdiction is subordinated by the Congressional policies of promoting tribal self-government and self-determination.

I believe the case law encourages forums such as this Commission to permit the Tribe to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of jurisdiction, as it is their jurisdiction that's being challenged.

There was no one thing for Staff in coming to this conclusion. For me it was — it was more of a totality of the circumstances, the courts repeatedly stressing the principle that's deeply rooted in the United States Supreme Court's Indian Jurisprudence, which is Indian Courts are granted deference when determining jurisdiction as that determination should be made by the Tribe and not for the Tribe.

There are so many nuances to Indian Law and the fact that the Tribal Court would have experience in this area that the Commission lacks was one of those circumstances that I felt was important in having them go first and the Commission staying its hand and, again, the recognition of tribal sovereignty and self-government.

If it is determined that the traffic in question

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is, in fact, occurring outside the boundaries of the reservation, this Commission is not divested of jurisdiction. We will proceed as we normally do.

Again, the granting of the Motion to Stay does not determine that the Tribal Court has jurisdiction. It just merely permits the Tribal Court to address that issue first.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: Thank you, Ms. Cremer.

NAT, would you like some rebuttal?

MR. SWIER: Just very quickly.

Sprint appears to rely on the Cheyenne River case from South Dakota Supreme Court. I would note in that case that the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine was never confronted by the court in that case. It appears that the litigants in the Cheyenne River case never brought forward the tribal exhaustion issue.

So, unfortunately, that case, although relied upon heavily by Sprint, does not appear to provide any guidance when it comes to this specific tribal exhaustion issue.

Secondly, it was mentioned that in this case

Sprint filed its Complaint first and then NAT soon after

filed its Complaint in Tribal Court. I think when it

comes to the tribal exhaustion issue the issue is not who

runs to the courthouse or in this case to the regulatory agency first. I don't think that has any bearing on the tribal exhaustion analysis.

I think what you look at is exactly what NAT and the Commission Staff has indicated in this case, that you look to the fundamental tenets of the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine. And those fundamental tenets in this case would seem to dictate that the Tribal Court should have the first crack at determining its own jurisdiction.

And because of that, again, we feel that the Staff recommendation should be accepted. As the Staff Brief said, granting NAT's Motion for Stay would seem to be the most practical and most pragmatic way to move forward in this case, and we would ask the Commission to do so.

CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: Thank you.

Commissioner questions.

Commissioner Nelson.

COMMISSIONER NELSON: I have several. And I'll start with Mr. Swier.

Scott, the 47 U.S.C. 152(b) seems to me to be pretty clear that Congress intended this utility to be regulated either by Federal law or by the State. It doesn't make any mention of regulation at the Tribal level.

How would you address that?

MR. SWIER: I would say this: I think, number one, obviously we're dealing with a unique set of circumstances here. We're dealing with circumstances where the record as so far that's been put in the record is that there are some real questions here as to whether the traffic that's being generated is limited simply to the reservation.

So I think in that case -- there's no doubt that this Commission has jurisdiction over intrastate traffic. I agree with that. However, when you look at the unique circumstances here that this matter is being relegated to activities within the sovereign borders of the reservation, I think that makes a difference and makes this unique.

I think also, you know, under the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine, a Federal Court -- let me just use this analogy: When we use tribal exhaustion there's no question that a Federal Court has jurisdiction in various matters. But what the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine comes down to is whether or not in this case this Commission wants to recognize tribal exhaustion, wants to defer to the sovereignty of the Tribal Court and let the Tribal Court make that initial determination.

And I think when you look at the facts here,

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it's a discretionary decision by this Commission to invoke tribal exhaustion. But when you look at the tenets of tribal exhaustion you look at how that factors into the federal law, I just think that this is a case that clearly, clearly screams for tribal exhaustion.

So that's how I think we get to that point from the Federal Communications Act to having this Commission defer to the Tribal Court and at least initially to make this jurisdictional determination.

COMMISSIONER NELSON: I would certainly agree with your comment about it being a discretionary decision on our part whether to adopt tribal exhaustion.

Would you agree with me that our doing so as a regulatory agency would be breaking new ground?

MR. SWIER: I don't think -- well, obviously in South Dakota it would be breaking new ground. And, again, I think that's why this case is so unique in that, number one, I don't think there's any doubt that State Courts and regulatory agencies have this authority.

Number two, you may well be breaking new ground. I think that if there would have been any cases like this throughout the country, either myself or Mr. Knudson or Ms. Pollman Rogers would have found them based on the extensive briefing here.

So in a way the court would be breaking new

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ground in terms of regulatory authority. But in terms of invoking the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine, you'd be following what the great majority of cases throughout the country have found. And that's that the Tribal Court should have the first crack at this jurisdictional decision.

COMMISSIONER NELSON: You've talked a lot about -- you know, you mentioned the sovereign borders of the reservation, talked about the fact of the equipment and people and everything else is located within the borders of the reservation, that this is entirely an operation on the reservation.

And yet when NAT chose to form their business they formed it as a LLC under the laws of the State of South Dakota. Would that not in itself subject NAT to jurisdiction of this Commission?

MR. SWIER: Thank you. I don't think it would, Commissioner Nelson. I think that NAT made the decision to file with the South Dakota Secretary of State's office as an LLC. However, the activities that they're conducting are based on activities within the exterior boundaries of the reservation.

So I think simply that the fact that NAT is a South Dakota recognized LLC does not make a difference in whether tribal exhaustion should or should not be

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COMMISSIONER NELSON: Let's move a moment to the ruling of Judge Schreier on December 1. To your knowledge, since that ruling has the Crow Creek Sioux Tribal Court done anything on this case?

MR. SWIER: Well, no, it hasn't on the interstate part of it because of Judge Schreier's Decision. I think that the Tribal Court is simply waiting to see what happens with this Commission regarding this particular traffic.

But, as you know, the Crow Creek Tribal Court has a fully functioning court system. There's been a judge appointed to hear this case. And would I presume that if tribal exhaustion is invoked, we would proceed just like we would in front of this Commission or any other court.

We would obtain a scheduling order. We would get dates, and we'd start moving forward. And that process and those procedures are already in place. It's just a matter of waiting to see what this Commission does.

I don't think it's either efficient or from a money perspective it doesn't seem to make any sense to be having both this Commission and the Tribal Court moving along the same lines. I mean, then we're just

double-booking ourselves.

That's why I think this decision is so important; because if tribal exhaustion is invoked, we go to the Tribal Court and start moving.

COMMISSIONER NELSON: Okay. And the last question, I believe, and I don't know if you can answer this question, but you talked about the fact that, obviously, Crow Creek Sioux Tribe has established their judicial branch and is prepared to handle this.

Do you know under the Constitution of that Tribe whether there is separation of powers between the judicial branch and the executive and legislative branch?

MR. SWIER: I believe that the Constitution does provide for three separate branches. And, in fact, what the Crow Creek Tribe did here is they actually have appointed a judge, Judge B.J. Jones, who is a law professor up University of North Dakota. He has actually been appointed as the judge in this case. So -- and I think the reason for that is the Tribe wanted to make sure that there was not a melding between the various branches.

So a judge has been appointed in this case that has no relationships whatsoever with the Crow Creek Tribe. So I think in this case the Tribe has done

everything possible to make sure that that line of demarcation between their three branches of Government is, indeed, invoked.

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COMMISSIONER NELSON: Thank you. Appreciate the answers to those questions. I have one question for Staff, if I might.

In examining Judge Schreier's ruling, do you believe that that injunction was limited solely to interstate, or is it a blanket decision?

MS. CREMER: At first blush when I looked at it I thought it was more encompassing than it was. As I read it more thoroughly, she made a real point -- the Court made a real point of always saying interstate, interstate and leading me to believe -- and I don't know if the parties are following up or doing anything more -- that there is a division between intrastate reservation and intrastate as we think of it.

COMMISSIONER NELSON: If I could follow up on that, would you agree that Sprint requested an injunction and an all encompassing injunction?

MS. CREMER: You know, I would have to look at exactly what they asked for and how their Briefs rolled out. Sprint would probably, you know, know what they asked for and what they ultimately -- yeah. Without looking more closely, I can't say that for sure.

COMMISSIONER NELSON: Thank you. If I could redirect that question -- and this is going to be a really open-ended question, but it appears to me in reading through the Sprint Briefs that you asked for an open-ended, all encompassing injunction. In reading the final Decision, I think there is some question there as to exactly what Judge Schreier Could you address that? meant. MR. KNUDSON: We asked for a complete injunction of all proceedings in the Tribal Court. The Tribal Complaint filed by NAT, as far as sweeping, involved all of the activities, and we asked for the entire proceedings to be enjoined, and that's what the District Court said. MR. SWIER: Commissioner Nelson, if I may --COMMISSIONER NELSON: Let's let Sprint finish, and then I'd love to hear from you. CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: Pull your microphone --

CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: Pull your microphone -Mr. Swier, are you having trouble hearing Sprint?

MR. SWIER: I am a little bit. Yes,

Mr. Kolbeck.

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MR. KNUDSON: Quote on page 18 of the Court's Order, "Sprint's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Docket 20 is granted."

And so we received complete relief as requested

in our Motion. And so I believe that if this Commission allows or defers to the Tribal Court, it would -- the Tribal Court would be in violation of this injunction.

I'd also like to respond to the assertion that B.J. Jones is independent. He was appointed by the Tribal Council. I don't think the Tribal Constitution provides for the kind of separation of powers that we would expect in State Court or in Federal Court.

This Judge serves at the pleasure of the Tribal Council. And when he first came on to this case he had questions about his appointment, whether it had been duly authorized. There are other parties in play here over who can serve as a Tribal Court, and that's simply the decision by the Tribal Council.

COMMISSIONER NELSON: If I might, one more follow-up question, and I'll ask the same question that I asked of Mr. Swier.

Are you aware has the Tribal Court done anything on this issue since December 1?

MR. KNUDSON: To my knowledge, it's done nothing.

COMMISSIONER NELSON: Thank you. No further questions at this point.

CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: Commissioner Hanson. Well,
Commissioner Nelson, would you like Mr. Swier -- he tried

to jump in guick there.

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COMMISSIONER NELSON: I'm sorry. Go ahead, Mr. Swier.

MR. SWIER: Thank you. I think the Judge's opinion is very clear. It only relates to interstate traffic. In fact, the Federal Court I don't think has the jurisdiction under the Communications Act to make a ruling on any intrastate traffic.

That would be the role of this Commission. So to say that that is a broad brush order from Judge Schreier as Commissioner Nelson pointed out, I think that entails a huge question. But, again, I think that was definitely addressed to interstate traffic, and that was clear throughout the Judge's opinion that she was limiting her decision to interstate.

And I think that Judge Schreier even recognized that she likely did not even have jurisdiction over intra because that is a local decision, state or, in this case, potentially a Tribal Court decision, as opposed to traffic that traveled over multi-states making it interstate.

So when you read that Decision in its totality,

I think that she limited that to interstate traffic, and

I think that's an extremely reasonable reading of her

Decision.

COMMISSIONER NELSON: That leads me to a follow-up question for Sprint.

Did Judge Schreier have any authority over intrastate traffic so far as an injunction is concerned?

MR. KNUDSON: I would say that what the District Court had was the power to enjoin the Tribal Court proceedings based on the Complaint NAT filed in Tribal Court, which encompassed interstate traffic, and it also asserted a breach of contract action which was based on the interstate tariff and that the entire Complaint is infused with the assertion that this is a -- an interstate traffic, that the District Court would not be enjoining that intrastate action that we're bringing here before the Commission, but it would prevent the Tribal Court from going forward with anything relating to the Complaint that NAT had filed with the Tribal Court.

So I think it didn't parse out the Complaint.

It just took it this is so intertwined that it would join the entire action.

COMMISSIONER NELSON: If I might, Mr. Chairman, a follow-up question for Mr. Swier.

Is there anywhere in that 18-page Decision where Judge Schreier indicates that she feels she doesn't have the authority to enjoin the Court relating to the intrastate traffic?

MR. SWIER: Well, other than the fact that her Opinion is replete with references only to interstate and she doesn't make any reference I do not believe in her Decision to her having any jurisdiction or any effect over intra.

And she made a very obvious point. I mean, she

And she made a very obvious point. I mean, she could have just said intra and interstate traffic, or she just could have said traffic. But her Opinion throughout makes a clear dichotomy that she is dealing with interstate traffic and not intrastate traffic.

COMMISSIONER NELSON: Thank you. I appreciate that. I think now that may be all the questions I have.

CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: Thank you.

Commissioner Hanson.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Swier, I guess it's your day because I think

practically all of my questions are going to be directed to you.

Sprint argues that Federal doctrine is not binding on State Courts or State agencies. Do you agree or disagree with that?

MR. SWIER: Federal doctrine meaning the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine in this case?

COMMISSIONER HANSON: Correct.

MR. SWIER: I do not believe -- the Tribal

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Exhaustion Doctrine is never binding. It's not even binding on the Federal Courts. It is always discretionary with the Federal Court.

And through an analogy then, as I indicated before, I don't think that the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine is mandatory in this case in front of the Commission.

Just like in Federal Court this Commission has the discretion to either invoke or not invoke the Doctrine.

But as you can see from the Federal Court

Decisions, when Federal Courts have confronted this issue
they have given great, great deference, almost
unanimously in the cases, to invoking the Doctrine.

So, again, I think it's discretionary with the Commission but the federal cases that have interpreted this Doctrine, if you're going to follow those, I don't think there's any doubt that the Doctrine should be invoked.

So it's discretionary both in the Federal Court and discretionary with the State Court and, in this case, the State regulatory agency.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: You stated that when the PUC will hear this Docket and throughout your discussion. You agree that the South Dakota PUC has jurisdiction to rule on this Docket; correct?

MR. SWIER: I agree that the court -- that the

Commission obviously has jurisdiction to rule on the tribal exhaustion issue, yes. And in all the Federal Court cases that have interpreted the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine the Federal Court realizes it has jurisdiction. In all these cases the Federal Court has said, yes, we do have jurisdiction. However, we are going to recognize this Exhaustion Doctrine, and it is important enough for us to recognize the Tribal Court sovereignty and to let the Tribal Court make the initial determination on its jurisdiction.

If the Tribal Court finds that it doesn't have jurisdiction, then this case comes back to the Public Utilities Commission.

So without a doubt one way or another, this matter, I don't think there's any doubt, is going to come back to this Commission. But the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine sets out a structure that when we're dealing with these type of issues the Tribal Court should have the first crack at it.

So, again, I see it as totally analogous to how the Federal Courts handle this Exhaustion Doctrine.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: Well, I need a clarification then. Because during your last statement just a few sentences ago it sounded as if you felt that not only the Tribal Court should be the first court but

that it would possibly mean they'd be the last court.

Would there --

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MR. SWIER: How the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine works is if the court would invoke the doctrine and the Tribal Court would first hear this jurisdictional issue, the Tribal Court would then make its jurisdictional decision. If the Tribal Court finds that it has jurisdiction, then the merits of the action would be heard in Tribal Court.

After that would happen, then Sprint would have the opportunity to appeal that jurisdictional determination back to this Commission. And the Commission then could find one of two things: Number one, that the Tribal Court was correct and that it does have jurisdiction. Or, number two, the Commission could find that the Tribal Court was wrong in assuming jurisdiction and that the merits of the case should be heard in front of the PUC.

So procedurally it's a little bit cumbersome, but it's the way that this has been done since the Federal Courts first invoked the Doctrine.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: I appreciate your answer. Unfortunately, it seems like every time you answer a question it causes me to think that I need to pursue another question in regards to that. And if you would

please wait until I finish asking the question before you answer it, I would appreciate that as well.

The Interveners disagreed with Staff on the issue of tribal exhaustion. The Interveners argue that the federal rule of tribal exhaustion is a federal rule that's not binding on State Courts or State agencies. It sounds as if you agree with that position from what you've stated.

During the process here no party has cited a single case in reference to the State of South Dakota adopting the Doctrine of Tribal Exhaustion.

Are you aware of any?

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MR. SWIER: No. May I answer, Mr. Commissioner?

COMMISSIONER HANSON: Yes, you may.

MR. SWIER: No. I am not aware of the South Dakota Supreme Court adopting Tribal Exhaustion, based on the fact that it's obviously never been brought before the Supreme Court before. So, unfortunately, we don't have any authority or any precedent regarding whether or not the Supreme Court would or would not adopt the Doctrine.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: You said that in your earlier answer that if this once went to the Tribal Court and then came back, that we could make one of two rulings, and one of those would be that we would -- we

could rule that the Tribe does not have jurisdiction.

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Why would we go through the process at this time of -- well, this entire process and then ask the Tribe basically if we were to stay this -- are we not in that respect implying that we believe the Tribal Court does have jurisdiction?

MR. SWIER: Mr. Commissioner, no, I don't believe that at all. I guess when, again, you look at the Exhaustion Doctrine and the principles behind it, even though this process may seem cumbersome because we're going to deal in two separate forums, that is the way the Exhaustion Doctrine is set forth.

So just because this court would invoke the Exhaustion Doctrine does not mean that -- excuse me, that this Commission would never hear the case again. just recognizing the policy reasons behind the Doctrine and recognizing the importance and the sovereignty of the Tribal Court.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: Thank you. When was this originally filed with the Tribal Court?

This was filed -- it was filed on MR. SWIER: July 7 of 2010, which would have been approximately two months after Sprint's Complaint was filed with this Commission.

> Thank you. And has any COMMISSIONER HANSON:

activity taken place since July 7 with the Tribal Court?

MR. SWIER: Yes. We have had a conference with Judge Jones, and Judge Jones' thought was that, number one, he was going to allow the Federal Court to first — to first determine the interstate issues. And, I think, again, that his thought was he was going to let this Commission see if it was going to invoke the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine.

And because this matter has been going on for several months, you know, we obviously do not have a decision from this Commission yet. But, again, it's my understanding that if exhaustion is invoked, that we do have a judge on the case, and we'd be ready to move forward just as we would before the Commission.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: And I appreciate you using the word "cumbersome." I wrote that down in my notes as I was going through this. I was going to ask a question on that.

Would the South Dakota PUC actions prohibit the Tribe from pursuing their own Docket -- from you pursuing your own Docket in Tribal Court?

And I recognize the nuances and the challenges of that, but just curious.

MR. SWIER: One of the tenets behind the Exhaustion Doctrine, of course, is so we don't have

multiple proceedings going on. For both parties I think when you look at it from a money perspective and from an efficiency perspective, it just wouldn't seem to make any sense to have both the Tribal Court and this Commission's case going on simultaneously.

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And when you look at the Exhaustion Doctrine cases, that's what the Federal Courts have said. done to make the process actually less cumbersome so we don't have multiple cases going on in different venues.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: Does it seem odd to you that a Tribal Court would go through a process on a Docket regarding a telecommunications process that involves switching and calls that are off the reservation?

MR. SWIER: I think that when you're dealing with interstate, Judge Schreier, of course, has already held that they don't have jurisdiction over that. when you look at the unique facts in this case where everything is taking place on the reservation, that I don't find it unique at all that this argument is before you that these intrastate matters should first be decided I don't find that strange or out of the by the Tribe. ordinary.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: Do you disagree with

Sprint's claim that analysis of the actual traffic

process shows that virtually all calls to NAT's exchange do not terminate to an end user on the reservation?

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MR. SWIER: I think that's a factual question that is more toward the merits of the case. I think there is a dispute there. And that's why we're not arguing the merits of the case. We're simply arguing the jurisdiction should be determined by the Tribal Court first.

So there are factual issues there that are going to have to be fleshed out. We just feel the proper venue to flesh them out is Tribal Court, at least at this point.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: One moment, please. I believe I -- I believe you've answered all of my questions for me.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Swier.

MR. SWIER: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: Excuse me. This is

Commissioner Kolbeck. Most of my questions go towards
the technical nature of it. And I agree with Mr. Swier,
though, however, that those are towards the facts of the
case. They're not necessarily whether the Tribal
Doctrine applies here.

However, Mr. Swier, could you shed some light on

where those calls are terminating? If all of this traffic is, in fact, tribal traffic, and you say that all the people -- all of the equipment and everything is on tribal land, can you give me some specifics as to what is -- do you have a DMS-100 there? Do you have a router? What do you have on tribal land?

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MR. SWIER: There is -- there are obviously hundreds of broadband internet setups. There is a conferencing bridge that allows those calls to terminate on the reservation. There is an internet library on the reservation. I don't have my list here. But there is substantial infrastructure and equipment that is on the reservation. And I don't think there's any factual dispute as to that.

There's also been employment created through NAT on the reservation. NAT -- or, excuse me, tribal members are using the equipment on the reservation for economic development matters. Things like that.

So when you look at -- and, again, I don't think it's disputed that the equipment is on the reservation, within the exterior boundaries. I can't tell you all the details of the equipment because I'm not an engineer, but I think that fact is not disputed.

CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: Okay. Now the other -- just one other thing. And, like I said, my questions --

Commissioner Nelson and Commissioner Hanson have done a great job of, and mine go towards the technicality of it so I think I will wrestle with that in my own mind.

Commissioner Nelson, more questions?

COMMISSIONER NELSON: I do have one more question for Mr. Swier. You've argued and in answering one of Commissioner Hanson's questions you talked about the importance and the sovereignty of the Tribal Court. And yet in this proceeding we've got the Crow Creek Sioux Tribal Utility Authority as an Intervener, and they're not even here today to argue the importance of that themselves.

Can you shed any light on that?

MR. SWIER: No. I know that their attorney, the Notice of Appearance was Ms. Roberts, and I think she has now taken a position with the new Congressman from North Dakota. So as far as the Tribal Utility Authority, I would rely on their previous submissions.

But, obviously, I don't represent the Utility Authority. I don't know their thoughts here. would be speculation on my part, other than what's already in the record as to either why or why they might not be there. I'm sorry I can't give you a better answer than that.

COMMISSIONER NELSON: Thank you.

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MR. KNUDSON: Excuse me. I feel there have been some factual statements that need to be responded to.

CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: Sure. Can we get you a little closer to the microphone?

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MR. KNUDSON: Yes. Sorry. First of all, I think it needs to be clearly understood that Strate v.

A-1 Construction enunciates an exception to the Exhaustion rule that falls directly into this case. And that is in the Footnote 14 that we reference. And it says, Where there is no grant of jurisdiction, exhaustion falls away because it only causes delay.

What you are hearing today is that it will not be more efficient to send this to Tribal Court and then back to the Commission because there is no grant of jurisdiction. Congress in 152(b) did not grant the Tribal Court jurisdiction. No act of this State Legislature has done so either.

I would also like to point out that there is intrastate traffic here. Sprint was billed -- and I bring you back to Reiman Exhibit 9. Usage charges, intrastate, \$181.02. Now there are other IXCs that are also being billed for intrastate traffic. What is this traffic?

It is not one reservation member calling another reservation member. It has not been disputed by NAT at

any other proceeding that 99.98 percent of the traffic originates from outside their reservation. And why is that the case? Because what is on the reservation is a piece of equipment which is conference bridge equipment. It is operated by a company -- the fee conferencing service is operated by a company called Free Conferencing Corporation out of Long Beach, California.

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Now in 2010 we have learned in the federal litigation that NAT received revenues of over \$1.1 million from this conference bridge terminating access charges that IXCs actually paid. 75 percent of that revenue went back to Free Conferencing Corporation. This is the Iowa Utilities Board Decision in Farmers.

You have what they say is a customer on the reservation, but NAT is paying that customer for the business. That's not a typical customer relationship.

These calls are coming in from all over the switched telephone network outside the reservation. Now they have the equipment on the reservation, but they were created as a South Dakota LLC. Tom Reiman was the president. He lives in Sioux Falls. He's no longer the president. Somebody associated with WiMAX -- WideVoice, excuse me, in Long Beach is now running NAT.

NAT's books and records were first kept in a bank in Sioux Falls. Now they've migrated all the

bookkeeping functions, all the financial controls, to Long Beach where NAT essentially offices within the offices of Free Conferencing Corporation.

So to talk about all the tribal connections here is to ignore that the nerve center. The principal place of business of NAT is now in Long Beach, California.

So I think it's not -- you have to have a full record before the Commission to make an informed decision.

Thirdly, if the Federal Court has enjoined the tribal proceeding and the Complaint that NAT has filed there, there really isn't pending before the Tribal Court a pure, simple Complaint over the violation of failure to pay for intrastate charges.

And so we've got the only real action going here and, we've had this pending for over 10 months. And we're entitled -- we expect the Commission to exercise the authority of the State of South Dakota to regulate intrastate traffic. It has been given that power by Congress. The Legislature has chartered this Commission to do so.

And, finally, I'd like to point out, and I wasn't at the scheduling conference with B.J. Jones but Mr. Tobin was, and I don't believe that Mr. Jones was going to go any further forward and Mr. Tobin can give

his recollection of what Mr. Jones was willing to do on that day, just to set the record straight.

MR. TOBIN: Yes. In response to Mr. Swier's position, our notes indicate -- and by "ours" I mean Mr. Whiting took the notes, and I was present in the room. It was a telephone conference, which is our only connection with the Tribal Court process to date in this case.

Judge Jones indicated he had a question regarding whether or not this whole matter had been preempted. I don't recall any reference with respect to exhaustion or anything else that Mr. Swier mentioned earlier.

But as a result of the Judge's question regarding preemption, that Judge set up a tentative briefing schedule, which is as follows: On October 20 he suggested the Tribe would intervene. We never did hear from the Tribe. On November 12 the NAT and the Tribe should file their final brief on preemption. On November 26 Sprint was going to be allowed to file a reply brief. And on December 14 if certain facts couldn't be stipulated, then we could then have a hearing sometime in December.

None of that ever took place. No one met a single deadline, and at some point in time it was agreed

that since the Federal Court had went forward, that we shouldn't do anything more until after we had heard from the Federal Court, which we did subsequently. And we still haven't heard anything from Judge Jones or from the Tribal Court.

CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: Thank you. Okay. Any other -- does that stem any questions?

All right. So no other questions from Commissioners?

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Is there any action or discussion?

I can break that egg there. This is a lot of information, and it's a very, very big decision. We don't do this very often, but I would like to take it under advisement. I'm not too keen on making a decision today, but I'd like my fellow Commissioners' opinions on that.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: Thank you for starting to make the omelet. I appreciate that.

From my standpoint, I'm prepared to make a Motion today, and I'll just state what I -- I won't make the Motion but just for conversation at this point.

I am prepared to make a Motion that the Commission not grant the Motion to Stay. I, frankly, through all of the -- and you're correct. We've had a lot of information here. And it may make good sense for

each of us to retire and have an opportunity to digest that information.

Although I think we've had a lot of information prior to this as well. I feel I would definitely defer to the Doctrine of Tribal Court Exhaustion if I believed that this was very much a -- in the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court and not in the jurisdiction of the PUC.

I don't think there's any doubt that South Dakota Public Utilities Commission has jurisdiction over this. Certainly allowing -- showing deference and allowing the Tribal Court to go through the process may be the gentlemanly thing to do.

At the same time I agree with Mr. Swier's statement that it's cumbersome and that it's unnecessary. And from the standpoint of due process, I think that we should not delay the due process here.

This is an ongoing situation that needs to be clarified, that we need to rule on, and it appears that -- well, it's extremely obvious that in a situation where all of the traffic were taking place on the reservation, that definitely the Tribal Court should go through that process.

At the same time, this is a NAT trafficking system that involves citizens across the State of South Dakota, citizens across the nation. Sprint has basically

proven because there's been no challenge from the other parties that there is a tremendous amount of financial and processing that is off the reservation. This is more of a customer relationship than a tribal authority operating a telecommunications system. And for those reasons I'm quite willing to make that Motion that I said to you earlier.

Mr. Chairman, are you -- I will defer to the Chair on the direction that you wish to take.

COMMISSIONER NELSON: Well, in that case I do have something to say. I would move that we deny NAT's Motion to Stay.

CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: All right. The Motion has been made. I know what I'm feeling and if the numbers that we had here today are true, which I believe they are, but if a substantial amount of traffic is flowing through there, we know that it's not all intra-reservation.

However, I understand that it is cumbersome. I understand that the Tribe has given thought to this. I just don't -- I'm going to have to make the call here.

COMMISSIONER NELSON: You know, I certainly agree this is an important decision. This is -- you know, jurisdictional issues are not something that I suspect this Commission deals with very frequently.

But by the same token, this has been -- this Docket's been open for 10 months, and the progress has been slow. And I do not want to see it slowed up any further by us delaying on this. I'm certainly prepared to make that decision today.

And as I look at it, looking at the federal law, 47 152(b), it's clear to me that Congress gave certain authority to the Federal Government and certain authority to State Government. No mention whatsoever of Tribal jurisdiction.

And I appreciate Mr. Swier's emphasis on the fact that our granting of Tribal Exhaustion is a discretionary option that we have. And I appreciate that. But, you know, Sprint's comments about it's discretionary but you've got to have the jurisdiction to do it, that makes sense to me. And at this point I'm not convinced under the federal law that we have the jurisdiction to do it. And for that reason I'm prepared to move ahead with this Motion at this time.

Very good arguments. And I've been leaning that way to vote yes on your Motion. I just wanted to make sure that I was giving full deference to the Tribe. And, obviously, what's going on is a big -- it's a national problem. It's something we have to deal with.

If there wasn't the volume of traffic, as Commissioner Hanson had alluded to, obviously we'd be looking that this could go back to the Tribe and think maybe it's just intra-tribe traffic. But since it's a larger volume it has to be coming from somewhere else, which is outside of the

Tribe, which is our jurisdiction. So we'll call the vote.

Commissioner Nelson.

COMMISSIONER NELSON: Aye.

CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: Commissioner Hanson.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: Aye.

CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: And Commissioner Kolbeck votes aye also.

Thank you.

We'll continue on to the Motion to Dismiss. Shall the Commission grant Native American's Motion to Dismiss?

Native American Telephone, why don't you continue on.

Thank you. Mr. Chair, members of MR. SWIER: the Commission, I think we're just going to rely on our Brief here. I think that the Staff Brief is correct in that it would be premature at this point based on the factual record to go any further with this Motion to

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Dismiss.

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I think that when you look at the record, this Motion should be deferred and a decision should not be made. Now that we are going to be apparently in front of this Commission, that I think the Motion to Dismiss as the Staff Brief said is premature and that we should move forward with discovery, and when discovery is completed NAT can move forward with its Motion to Dismiss and this Commission can have more information on which to base its decision.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: Mr. Chairman, may I make a Motion?

CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: Yes.

COMMISSIONER HANSON: Mr. Chairman, in lieu of the fact that NAT has stated that they would like to defer the Motion to Dismiss, I would simply ask -- I'm assuming that they have the right to do that and take it off the table.

Would it be appropriate to simply ask the other parties if they're opposed to that, if they want to argue that and just have the Motion?

MR. KNUDSON: For Sprint I have one question, which is really directed at Mr. Swier, which is is the issue whether the Commission has jurisdiction of the question of whether there is any intrastate traffic?

Because, otherwise, I think his challenge to the Commission's jurisdiction, and if you go to his Brief, is it says, "The Motion to Dismiss must be granted because the Commission does not have jurisdiction" -- missing word here "over NAT's activities on the reservation." That's on page 42 of its Brief.

But actually if, in fact, there is intrastate traffic, which would be calls from one South Dakota resident outside the reservation to another person, either nonmember of the reservation or someone else that's not on the reservation but because of the conferencing bridge equipment somehow those calls get connected to each other on the reservation, that's activity that I think is squarely within the Commission's jurisdiction to regulate. And I don't think there's any question that -~

COMMISSIONER HANSON: Thank you, Mr. Knudson.

The reason I ask is because generally we give deference to someone who's made a Motion if they wish to withdraw it or if they wish to defer it.

So I was just asking the Chair if that's what he wishes to do, rather than going through a hour or two replete of arguments just to give deference to the party.

MR. KNUDSON: Wouldn't intend to draw on the

action that long, Your Honor -- or Mr. Commissioner. 1 CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: How about Crow Creek Sioux 2 3 Tribe Utility Authority? They're an Intervener. Would they like to comment? 4 Hearing nothing, SDTA, Midstate, would you like to comment? AT&T? 6 7 No. Okay. Rolayne would that be a nonaction or a Motion to 8 Defer? 9 MS. AILTS WIEST: I think it might be better to 10 actually have a Motion to Defer it. 11 CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: All right. Anyone else 12 wishing to comment? 13 Mr. Swier, any further comments on it? 14 MR. SWIER: No further comments. That is what 15 we would ask. We've also in our Brief made an argument 16 under SDCL 49-13-1.1, which our argument is that it 17 prohibits Sprint from simultaneously pursuing its claim 18 19 against NAT before this Commission and the Federal Court. 20 Does the Commission want to take that particular 21 matter up, or will that not be considered today? 22 CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: I would answer no. But after 23 we've heard all of our comments, I'm going to defer to 24

Staff and then maybe Ms. Wiest.

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MR. SWIER: You bet. Otherwise, we have no 1 objection to the Commission making a Motion to simply 2 defer NAT's Motion to Dismiss. 3 CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: Okay. Thank you. 4 Would you like to comment on the Motion to Defer? 5 MS. CREMER: No. Staff does not have any 6 7 comment. Thank you. CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: All right. Well, we have a 8 Motion to Defer. I think we're all in agreement. That's probably the best course of action at this point. 10 11 I'll put it up for vote. Commissioner Nelson. 12 COMMISSIONER HANSON: I don't know that a Motion 13 was actually made. I didn't actually make a Motion. 14 CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: I thought you did. 1.5 16 sorry. COMMISSIONER HANSON: I was asking if you needed 17 one. I don't think I made a Motion. 18 CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: We'll make it clear. 19 COMMISSIONER HANSON: I move that the Commission 20 defer NAT's Motion to Dismiss. 21 CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: All right. Now we do for 22 sure have a Motion. 23 Any Commissioner discussion? 24 Hearing none, Commissioner Nelson. 25



1	COMMISSIONER NELSON: Aye.			
2	CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: Commissioner Hanson.			
3	COMMISSIONER HANSON: Aye.			
4	CHAIRMAN KOLBECK: And Commissioner Kolbeck			
5	votes aye also.			
6	(The proceeding concluded at 10:54 a.m.)			
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1	STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA )		
2	:SS CERTIFICATE		
3	COUNTY OF SULLY )		
4			
5	I, CHERI MCCOMSEY WITTLER, a Registered		
6	Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and		
7	Notary Public in and for the State of South Dakota:		
8	DO HEREBY CERTIFY that as the duly-appointed		
9	shorthand reporter, I took in shorthand the proceedings		
10	had in the above-entitled matter on the 5th day of April,		
11	2011, and that the attached is a true and correct		
12	transcription of the proceedings so taken.		
13	Dated at Onida, South Dakota this 14th day of		
14	April, 2011.		
15 .			
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17	Chris Mr Come was		
18	Cheri McComsey Wittler Notary Public and		
19	Registered Professional Reporter Certified Realtime Reporter		
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<b>\$181.02</b> [1] - <b>42</b> :21	<b>7</b> <sub>(2)</sub> - 36:22, 37:1	31:20, 35:6
+14:14=(1) 1#.21	75[1] - 43:11	agency [6] - 6:15, 11:22, 11:25, 20:2,
1		22:14, 32:20
	9	ago [1] - 33:24
1 [2] - 24:3, 28:19		agree (12) - 16:22, 21:11, 22:10, 22:13,
1.1 [2] - 10:19, 43:10	9 [2] - 10:23, 42:20	26:19, 31:20, 32:23,
10 (3) - 9:15, 44:16,	99.98[1] - 43;1	32:25, 35:7, 39:21,
49:2	9:30 [1] - 2:5	47:13, 48:23
10:54 (1) - 55:6 11 (1) - 9:15	Α	agreed [1] - 45:25
12(1) - 45:18		agreement [1] - 54:9
14 [2] - 42:9, 45:21		ahead [2] - 29:2, 49:19
14th (1) - 56:13	A-1 [2] - 9:8, 42:7	Allis (1) - 1:13
152(b (5) - 10:1, 15:4,	a.m [2] - 2:5, 55:6	AILTS [1] ~ 53:10
20:21, 42:15, 49:7	above-entitled [2] -	allow [1] - 37:4   allowed [1] - 45:20
<b>18</b> [1] - 27:22	2;2, 56:10 absence [1] - 9:9	allowing [4] - 4:5,
18-page (1) - 30:22	absent [1] - 14:25	10:4, 47:10, 47:11
1995[1] - 6:19	accept (2) - 7:25, 8:4	allows (2) - 28:2, 40:9
<b>1997</b> [2] - <b>5</b> :3, 6:18	accepted [1] - 20:11	Alite! [1] - 14:19
2	access [4] - 4:25,	alluded (1) - 50:2
	5:22, 10:18, 43:11	almost [3] - 9:15,
•	act [6] - 11:10, 11:18,	16:2, 32:11
20 [2] - 27:24, 45:16	12:2, 12:21, 14:5,	American [7] - 1:19,
2008 [2] - 5:7, 5:10	42:16	3:3, 3:6, 3:8, 4:2,
2009 (1) - 5:14	Act  5  - 8:24, 14:18, 14:20, 22:7, 29:7	4:8, 50:19 AMERICAN [1] - 1:5
<b>2010</b> [3] - 5:21, 36:22, 43:8	action[11] - 14:12,	American's [1] - 50:17
2011 [4] - 1:8, 2:4,	14:13, 30:9, 30:13,	amount (2) - 48:2,
56:11, 56:14	30:19, 34:8, 44:15,	48:16
207 [2] - 8:24, 14:14	46:10, 53:1, 54:10	amounts (1) - 13:8
26 [1] - 45:20	actions [2] - 7:3,	analogous (1) - 33:20
	37:19	analogy [3] - 6:24,
4	activities [5] - 21:13,	21:18, 32:4
	23:20, 23:21, 27:12, 52:5	analysis [3] - 16:6,   20:3, 38:25
413 [1] - 2:3	activity [2] - 37:1,	Anderson [1] - 14:18
<b>42</b> [1] - 52:6	52:14	answer [10] - 17;22,
47 [6] - 8:24, 10:1	actual j1) - 38:25	25:6, 34:22, 34:23,
14:14, 15:4, 20:21,	add [1] - 9:18	35:2, 35:13, 35:23,
49:7	address [4] - 7:20,	41:23, 53:23
47-31-3[1] - 10:8	19:6, 21:1, 27:8	answered [1] - 39:14
<b>49-13-1.1</b> [1] - 53:17	addressed [2] - 12:5, 29:13	answering [1] - 41:6
5	adjudicatory [1] - 7:8	answers [1] - 26:5 appeal [1] - 34:11
	Administrative [1] -	appear (3) - 4:5, 8:18,
5(1) - 1:8	16:5	19:19
500 [1] - 2:3	admitted [1] - 13:21	Appearance [1] -
5th [2] - 2:4, 56:10	adopt [2] - 22:12,	41:15
	35:20	APPEARANCES [1] -
6 .	adopting [3] - 12:1,	1:17
	35:11, 35:16	appearing (1) - 15:21
6[1] - 15:24	advisement [1] - 46:14	applicable [2] - 11:17, 11:18
Afit i Area	Affidavit [4] - 10:21,	application (1) - 6:9
1	10:24, 13:18, 13:19	applied (4) - 6:13, 9:4,
	40411074.4	40.45 40.00

AGAINST [1] - 1:4

13:15, 16:20

applies [3] - 11:7, 16:23, 39:24 apply (3) - 11:19, 14:3, 16.24 applying [1] - 10:20 appointed to - 24:13, 25:17, 25:19, 25:23, 28:5, 56:8 appointment(4) -28:11 appreciate (8) - 26:4, 31:11, 34:22, 35:2, 37:15, 46:18, 49:11, 49:13 approaching [1] -9:15 appropriate (2] - 3:24, 51:19 April [4] - 1:8, 2:4, 56:10, 56:14 area (1) - 18:21 argue [3] - 35:4, 41:11, 51:20 argued [1] - 41:6 argues [1] - 31:19 arguing [4] - 3:23, 3:25, 39:6 argument [4] - 15:12, 38:20, 53:16, 53:17 arguments [5] - 3:14, 3:15, 16:3, 49:21, 52:23 arises [1] - 11:10 Arizona [1] - 6:18 articulated [2] - 14:24, 15:24 asserted [1] - 30:9 assertion (3) - 11:7, 28:4, 30:11 asserts [1] - 10:17 associated [1] - 43:22 assuming [2] - 34:16, 51:17 AT&T [2] - 16:14, 53:6 attached [1] - 56:11 attempting [1] - 11:3 attention [1] - 9:7 attorney [1] - 41:14 authority [16] - 4:17, 5:11, 7:7, 7:8, 10:9, 12:21, 15:5, 22:19, 23:1, 30:3, 30:24, 35:19, 44:18, 48:4, 49:8 Authority [9] - 5:4, 5:7, 5:10, 13:16, 15:15, 41:10, 41:17, 41:20, 53:3

Authority's [1] - 7:6

authorized [1] - 28:12

Avenue (1) - 2:3 aware (8) - 28:18, 35:12, 35:15 Axthelm (1) - 1:16 aye (6) - 50:10, 50:12, 50:14, 55:1, 55:3, 55:5

# В

B.J [3] - 25;17, 28:5, 44:23 bank (1) - 43:25 base (1) - 51:9 based [8] - 8:2, 8:22, 22:23, 23:21, 30:7, 30:9, 35:17, 50:24 basic [1] - 4:25 basis [1] - 12:19 Beach (4) - 43:7. 43:23, 44:2, 44:6 bearing [1] - 20:2 becomes [1] - 18:3 BEFORE [1] - 1:10 behalf [1] - 15:21 behind [3] - 36:9, 36:16, 37:24 believes (2) - 17:5, 17:6 best[1] - 54:10 bet [1] - 54:1 better [2] - 41:23, 53:10 between [5] - 10:2, 25:11, 25:21, 26:2, 26:16 big [2] - 46:12, 49:24 bill [1] - 11:3 billed [4] - 10:15, 10:22, 42:19, 42:22 billing [1] - 10:11 binding (4) - 31:20, 32:1, 32:2, 35:6 bit [2] - 27:20, 34:19 blanket [1] - 26:9 blush [1] - 26:10 board [1] - 43:13 Bob[1] - 1:15 booking [1] - 25:1 bookkeeping [1] -44:1 books [1] - 43:24 borders [3] - 21:13, 23:8, 23:11 boundaries [9] - 5:2, 5:5, 7:4, 13:12, 17:13, 17:17, 19:1, 23:22, 40:21 Bowen [1] - 6:18

branch [3] - 25:9, 25:12, 25:13 branches (3) - 25:15, 25:22, 26:2 breach (1) - 30:9 break [1] - 46:11 breaking [4] - 22:14, 22:16, 22:20, 22:25 bridge (4) - 40:9, 43:4, 43:10, 52:12 brief [16] - 8:1, 8:6, 14:8, 15:23, 15:24, 17:2, 17:3, 20:12, 45:19, 45:21, 50:23, 51:6, 52:2, 52:6, 53:16 briefed [2] - 8:7, 16:18 briefing [2] - 22:24, 45:16 briefly [1] - 4:22 briefs [3] - 12:7, 26:22, 27:4 Briggs [1] - 8:14 bring (1) - 42:20 bringing [1] - 30:13 broad [1] - 29:10 broadband (1) - 40:8 brought [3] - 9:6, 19:16, 35:17 brush (1) - 29:10 Building (1) - 2:3 business (3) - 23:13, 43:16, 44:6 businesses [1] -13:17 BY [1] - 1:4

#### C

California (2) - 43:7, 44:6 cannot[1] - 6:3 Capitol [2] - 2:2, 2:3 carriers (1) - 10:25 case (57) - 4:9, 4:19, 6:9, 6:14, 6:17, 6:19, 7:1, 7:15, 7:17, 7:22, 8:18, 12:6, 12:13, 14:18, 16:20, 16:23, 16:24, 18:7, 19:13, 19:14, 19:15, 19:16, 19:18, 19:22, 20:1, 20:5, 20:7, 20:14, 21:9, 21:21, 22:4, 22:17, 24:5, 24:13, 25:19, 25:23, 26:25, 28:10, 29:18, 31:23, 32:6, 32:19, 33:12, 34:17, 35:10, 36:15,

37:13, 38:5, 38:18, 39:4, 39:6, 39:23, 42:8, 43:3, 45:8, 48:10 cases [17] - 6:1, 6:16, 6:21, 9:5, 9:7, 11:21, 14:17, 14:19, 22:21, 23:3, 32:12, 32:14, 33:3, 33:5, 38:7, 38:9 causes (2) - 34:24, 42:11 center [1] - 44:5 certain [4] - 12:8, 45:21, 49:7, 49:8 certainly [4] - 22:10, 47:10, 48:22, 49:4 CERTIFICATE [1] -56:2 certificate [1] - 13:15 Certified (2) - 56:6, 56:19 CERTIFY [1] - 56:8 chair [8] - 4:4, 6:8, 7:16, 8:5, 15:19, 48:9, 50:21, 52:21 CHAIRMAN (31) -1:10, 1:11, 3:1, 3:23, 8:10, 15:13, 16:12, 19:9, 20:16, 27:18, 28:24, 31:13, 39:19, 40:24, 42:3, 46:6, 48:13, 49:20, 50:11, 50:13, 51:13, 53:2, 53:12, 53:23, 54:4, 54:8, 54:15, 54:19, 54:22, 55:2, 55:4 chairman [8] - 3:17, 8:13, 30:20, 31:15, 39:16, 48:8, 51:11, 51:14 challenge [3] - 6:3, 48:1, 52:1 challenged (1) - 18:10 challenges [1] - 37:22 challenging [1] - 3:19 chance [1] - 11:13 charges [5] - 5:22, 10:16, 42:20, 43:11, 44:14 chartered [1] - 44:20 CHERI [1] - 56:5 Cheri [2] - 1:22, 56:18 Cheyenne [7] - 12:6, 12:9, 13:2, 13:25, 19:12, 19:16

chose [1] - 23:13

CHRIS (1) - 1:11

13:5

circumstance[1] -

circumstances [7] -12:24, 13:1, 18:13, 18:22, 21:4, 21:12 cite [1] - 12:7 cited [6] - 6:16, 9:6, 11:21, 11:25, 35:9 citizens [2] - 47:24, 47:25 claim [2] - 38:25, 53:18 claims [1] - 9:1 clarification [1] -33:23 clarified (1) - 47:18 classic [1] - 6:9 clear (11) - 6:21, 11:9, 12:21, 16:4, 18:1, 20:22, 29:5, 29:14, 31:9, 49:7, 54:19 clearly [6] - 17:11, 17:17, 17:22, 22:5, 42:6 ciosely (1) - 26:25 closer [1] - 42:4 Coeur[1] - 14:19 comfortable (1) - 3:18 coming [3] - 18:11, 43:17, 50:6 comity [1] - 11:12 commencing [1] - 2:4 comment [8] - 16:14, 16:15, 22:11, 53:4, 53:6, 53:13, 54:5, 54:7 comments [4] - 49:14, 53:14, 53:15, 53:24 COMMISSION (3) -1:1, 1:10, 1:12 Commission [89] -3:6, 3:8, 3:10, 4:5, 4:8, 4:12, 5:23, 6:8, 6:25, 7:21, 7:25, 8:3, 8:7, 9:7, 9:13, 9:14, 9:17, 9:20, 9:22, 10:3, 10:6, 10:9, 10:19, 11:2, 11:5, 12:2, 12:21, 12:25, 13:15, 14:3, 15:5, 15:9, 15:20, 15:25, 16:7, 17:14, 17:17, 17:19, 17:22, 18:1, 18.8, 18.21, 18:23, 19:2, 20:5, 20:14, 21:10, 21:21, 22:1, 22:7, 23:16, 24:9, 24:15, 24:20, 24:24. 28:1, 29:9, 30:14, 32:6, 32:7, 32:14, 33:1, 33:13, 33:16, 34:12, 34:13, 34:15,

36:15, 36:24, 37:7, 37:11, 37:14, 42:14, 44:8, 44:17, 44:20, 46:23, 47:9, 48:25, 50:17, 50:22, 51:5, 51:9, 51:24, 52:4, 53:19, 53:21, 54:2, 54:20 Commission's (4) -18:3, 38:4, 52:2, 52:14 COMMISSIONER (46) - 1:11, 3:16, 3:17, 20:19, 22:10, 23:7, 24:2, 25:5, 26:4, 26:18, 27:1, 27:16, 28:15, 28:22, 29:2, 30:1, 30:20, 31:11, 31:15, 31:24, 32:21, 33:22, 34:22, 35:14, 35:22, 36:19, 36:25, 37:15, 38:10, 38:24, 39:13, 41:5, 41:25, 46:17, 48:10, 48:22, 50:10, 50:12, 51:11, 51:14, 52:17, 54:13, 54:17, 54:20, 55:1, 55:3 Commissioner [25] -20:17, 20:18, 23:18, 27:15, 28:24, 28:25, 29:11, 31:14, 35:13, 36:7, 39:20, 41:1, 41:4, 41:7, 50:2. 50:9, 50:11, 50:13, 53:1, 54:12, 54:24, 54:25, 55:2, 55:4 Commissioners [2] -3:13, 46:9 Commissioners' [1] -46:15 COMMUNICATIONS [1] - 1:4Communications [9] -1:18, 1:18, 3:2, 8:15, 8:24, 10:2, 14:20, 22:7, 29:7 company [5] - 3:2, 4:23, 7:3, 43:5, 43:6 COMPANY (1) - 1:4 Company [4] - 1:18, 1:18, 5:25, 6:1 Complainant[1] -8:12 Complaint [19] - 3:2. 9:13, 9:16, 9:19, 10:11, 11:1, 12:4, 14:5, 15:7, 19:23, 19:24, 27:11, 30:7, 30:10, 30:16, 30:17,

36:23, 44:11, 44:13 complaint [1] - 8:22 COMPLAINT [1] - 1:4 Complaints [1] -14:15 complete [2] - 27:9, 27:25 completed (1) - 51:7 component [1] - 15:6 concern (3) - 12:23, 13:3, 14:1 concerned [1] - 30:4 concluded [2] - 12:16, 55:6 conclusion [2] - 8:8, 18:12 conditions (1) - 12:11 conducting [1] - 23:21 conference [5] - 37:2, 43:4, 43:10, 44:23, 45:6 Conferencing (1) -43:12 conferencina (5) -40:9, 43:5, 43:6, 44:3, 52:12 confined [1] - 17:13 confronted [2] -19:15, 32:10 Congress [11] - 9:24, 10:1, 10:5, 11:10, 11:18, 14:21, 15:3, 20:22, 42:15, 44:20, 49:7 Congressional (2) ~ 16:6, 18:5 Congressman [1] -41:16 connected [1] - 52:13 connection [1] - 45:7 connections [1] - 44:4 consider [1] - 12:18 consideration [2] -7:9, 15:2 considered (1) - 53:22 Constitution (3) -25:10, 25:14, 28:6 construction [1] - 9:8 Construction [1] -42:7 construed [1] - 8:23 continue (2) - 50:16, 50:20 contract (1) - 30:9 controls [1] - 44:1 conversation [1] ~ 46:21 convinced [1] - 49:17 corporate [1] - 4:22 corporation [2] - 43:7.

44:3 Corporation [1] -43:12 correct [6] - 31:24, 32:24, 34:14, 46:24, 50:23, 56:11 council [3] - 28:6, 28:10, 28:14 counsel [2] - 8:16 country (2) - 22:22, 23:4 COUNTY [1] - 56:3 course (6) - 4:16, 5:20, 16:24, 37:25, 38:16, 54:10 court [14] - 4:10, 4:11, 8:21, 19:15, 22:25, 24:12, 24:16, 26:13, 30:24, 32:25, 33:25, 34:1, 34:4, 36:13 Court [113] - 4:14, 4:20, 5:25, 6:4, 6:6, 6:7, 6:12, 6:17, 6:19, 7:18, 7:19, 7:23, 8:20, 8:23, 8:25, 9:3, 9:5, 9:10, 11:14, 11:23, 11:25, 12:5, 12:10, 12:16, 12:20, 13:20, 14:6, 14:9, 14:10, 14:11, 14:12, 14:24, 18:20, 19:5, 19:6, 19:13, 19:24, 20:8, 21:17, 21:19, 21:23, 21:24, 22:8, 23:4, 24:5, 24:8, 24:11, 24:24, 25:4, 27:10, 27:14, 28:2, 28:3, 28:8, 28:13, 28:18, 29:6, 29:19, 30:6, 30:8, 30:12, 30:15, 30:16, 32:3, 32:7, 32:9, 32:18, 32:19, 33:3, 33:4, 33:5, 33:8, 33:9, 33:11, 33:18, 33:25, 34:5, 34:6, 34:7, 34:9, 34:14, 34:16, 35:16, 35:18, 35:20, *35:23, 36:5, 36:18,* 36:20, 37:1, 37:4, 37:21, 38:4, 38:11, 39:7, 39:11, 41:8, 42:13, 42:16, 44:10, 44:12, 45:7, 46:1, 46:3, 46:5, 47:5, 47:7, 47:11, 47:21, 53:20 Court's [2] - 16:6, 18:15 court's [2] - 7:8, 27:22 courthouse (1) - 20:1 courts [7] - 4:18, 4:19, 11:13, 18:13, 18:16, 22:19, 32:2 Courts [12] - 6:14, 6:22, 6:23, 11:16, 11:19, 11:22, 31:20, 32:10, 33:21, 34:21, 35:6, 38:7 crack [4] - 7:24, 20:9, 23:5, 33:19 create [1] - 14:14 created [4] - 5:3, 11:16, 40:15, 43:20 Creek [16] - 4:10, 4:13, 5:2, 5:3, 5:13, 6:4, 8:21, 13;6, 15:14, 24:4, 24:11, 25:8, 25:16, 25:24, 41:9, 53:2 Cremer [4] - 1:13, 16:16, 16:17, 19:9 CREMER [4] - 16:17, 26:10, 26:21, 54:6 Crow [16] - 4:10, 4:13, 5:2, 5:3, 5:13, 6:4, 8:21, 13:6, 15:14, 24:4, 24:11, 25:8, 25:16, 25:24, 41:9, 53:2 CRR[1] - 1:22 cumbersome (6) -34:19, 36:10, 37:16, 38:8, 47:14, 48:19 curlous [1] - 37:23 customer (4] - 43:14, 43:15, 43:16, 48:4

D

d'Alene [1] - 14:19 DAKOTA [2] - 1:2, 56:1 Dakota [25] - 2:2, 2:4, 4:24, 8:17, 9:21, 10:15, 12:5, 19:13, 22:16, 23:15, 23:19, 23:24, 25:18, 32:23, 35:10, 35:16, 37:19, 41:17, 43:20, 44:18, 47:9, 47:25, 52:8, 56:7, 56:13 Darla (2) - 1:19, 15:20 date [2] - 7:22, 45:7 Dated [1] - 56:13 dates [1] - 24:18 Dave [1] - 1:14 deadline [1] - 45:25 deal (2) - 36:11, 49:25

20:9

development [3] -

dealing [5] - 21:3, 21:4, 31:9, 33:17, 38:15 deals [2] - 5:4, 48:25 death [1] - 8:19 Deb [1] - 1:15 December [6] - 8:20 15:24, 24:3, 28:19, 45:21, 45:23 decide[1] - 14:5 decided [2] - 9:5, 38:21 decision [28] - 14:7, 14:18, 22:1, 22:11, 23:6, 23:18, 24:8. 25;2, 26;9, 27;6, 28:14, 29:15, 29:18, 29:19, 29:22, 29:25, 30:22, 31:4, 34:7, 37:11, 43:13, 44:9, 46:12, 46:14, 48:23, 49:5, 51:3, 51:10 decisions [1] - 32:10 deeply [1] - 18:14 defer [15] - 9:18, 11:23, 21:22, 22:8, 47:4, 48:8, 51:16, 52:20, 53:9, 53:11, 53:24, 54:3, 54:5, 54:9, 54:21 deference [6] - 18:16, 32:11, 47:10, 49:23, 52:18, 52:23 deferred (1) - 51:3 defers [1] - 28:2 definitely [3] - 29:13, 47:4, 47:21 delay [5] - 9:11, 9:18, 15:2, 42:11, 47:16 delaying (1) - 49:4 delineated [1] - 15:3 demarcation [1] - 26:2 Demaris (1) - 1:16 denied (1) - 16:9 deny [4] - 9:20, 15:9, 15:25, 48:11 detalls [1] - 40:22 determination (6) -18:6, 18:17, 21:24, 22:9, 33:9, 34:12 determine [4] - 4:21, 8:25, 19:5, 37:5 determined (8) - 8:21. 11:4, 14:11, 14:22, 17:12, 17:20, 18:25, 39:7 determining [4] -7:24, 11:22, 18:16,

23:24 different [1] - 38:9 digest [1] - 47:1 directed [2] - 31:17. 51:23 direction [1] - 48:9 directions [1] - 13:12 directly [1] - 42:8 disagree (2) - 31:21, 38:24 disagreed (1) - 35:3 disagreement[1] -16:23 discontinued [1] -5:21 discovery [2] - 51:7 discretion [1] - 32:8 discretionary (8) -22:1, 22:11, 32:3. 32:13, 32:18, 32:19, 49:13, 49:15 discuss [1] - 3:12 discussing (1) - 3:21 discussion [3] -32:22, 46:10, 54:24 Dismiss [11] - 3:9, 15:12, 50:16, 50:18, 51:1, 51:5, 51:8, 51:16, 52:3, 54:3, 54.21 dismiss [1] - 3:12 dispute [8] - 6:5, 7:1, 7:3, 7:5, 7:11, 11:1, 39:5, 40:14 disputed (3) ~ 40:20. 40:23, 42:25 distance [1] - 5:1 distinguishable [1] -11:24 district [1] - 6:19 District [5] - 8:20, 9:3, 27:13, 30:5, 30:12 divested (1) - 19:2 divided [1] - 10:2 division [1] - 26:16 DMS-100(1) - 40:5 DO (1) - 56:8 Docket [7] - 15:23, 27:24, 32:22, 32:24, 37:20, 37:21, 38:12 Docket's (1) - 49:2 Doctrine [29] - 4:16, 6:2, 6:10, 6:12, 6:13, 6:22, 7:23, 8;3, 9:4, 11:7, 19:14, 20:7,

4:18, 7:10, 40:18

dichotomy [3] - 9:24.

difference [2] - 21:14,

15:4, 31:9

dictate [1] - 20:8

21:17, 21:20, 23:2, 31:23, 32:1, 32:5, 33:4, 33:7, 33:17, 33:21, 34:3, 36:9, 36:12, 36:14, 37:8, 37:25, 38:6 doctrine [16] - 4:18, 6:13, 11:9, 31:19, 31:22, 32:8, 32:12, 32:15, 32:16, 34:4, 34:21, 35:11, 35:21, 36:16, 39:24, 47:5 documents (2) - 5:8, 7:14 done [8] - 24:5, 25:25, 28:18, 28:20, 34:20, 38:8, 41:1, 42:17 double [1] - 25:1 double-booking (1) -25:1 doubt [7] - 7:21, 21:9, 22:18, 32:16, 33:14, 33:15, 47:8 down [2] - 21:21, 37:16 Doyle [1] - 6:18 draw [1] - 52:25 due [3] - 8:18, 47:15, 47:16 duly [2] - 28:11, 56:8 duly-appointed [1] -56:8 during [2] - 33:23, 35:9

Ε

easily (1] - 13:12 East [1] - 2:3 economic [2] - 7:10, 40:17 effect [2] - 16:10, 31:4 efficiency [1] - 38:3 efficient [2] - 24:22, 42:13 effort[1] - 13:22 efforts [1] - 7:10 egg j1) - 46:11 either [8] - 14:9, 20:23, 22:22, 24:22, 32:8, 41:22, 42:17, 52:10 El (1) - 14:17 eligible [1] - 13:23 emphasis [1] - 49:11 employment (2) -7:12, 40:15 empowered [2] - 9:22, 12:2

encompassed (1) -30:8 encompassing [3] -26:11, 26:20, 27:5 encourages [1] - 18:7 end [1] - 39:2 ended [2] - 27:3, 27:5 ends [1] - 10:15 enforce [1] - 14:4 engineer[1] - 40:22 enjoin [3] - 14:11, 30:6, 30:24 eniolned [3] - 14:13, 27:13, 44:10 enjoining [1] - 30:13 entalis [1] - 29:12 entire [4] - 27:12, 30:10, 30:19, 36:3 entirely [1] - 23:11 entitled [3] - 2:2, 44:17, 56:10 entity [1] - 7:20 enunciates [1] - 42:7 equipment (13) - 5:17, 5:18, 10:15, 23:9, 40:3, 40:12, 40:17, 40:20, 40:22, 43:4, 43:19, 52:12 error [1] - 17:19 essentially [1] - 44:2 established [2] - 9:8, 25:8 evidentiary (5) - 17:7, 17:11, 17:20, 18:2, 18:9 exactly (3) - 20:4, 26:22, 27:7 examining [1] - 26:7 exception [1] - 42:7 exchange [1] - 39:1 exchanges [3] - 12:8, 12:12, 12:15 exclusive [3] - 8:25. 9:2, 14:14 excuse [5] - 36:14, 39:19, 40:16, 42:1, 43:23 executive (1) - 25:12 exercise (3) - 12.3, 18:4, 44:17 exercising [1] - 12:14 exhaust [3] - 9:2, 9:10, 15:1 exhaustion [31] - 8:5, 11:19, 12:1, 12:24, 14:2, 14:23, 15:2, 19:17, 19:20, 19:25, 20:3, 21:18, 21:22, 22:2, 22:3, 22:5, 22:12, 23:25, 24:14,

25:3, 33:2, 35:4, 35:5, 35:11, 35:16, 37:12, 42:8, 42:10, 45:12, 47:5, 49:12 Exhaustion [29] -4:16, 6:2, 6:10, 6:12, 6:13, 6:22, 7:23, 8:3, 9:4, 11:7, 19:14, 20:6, 21:17, 21:20, 23:2, 31:23, 32:1, 32:5, 33:3, 33:7, 33:16, 33:21, 34:3, 36:9, 36:12, 36:14, 37:8, 37:25, 38:6 exhausts [2] - 4:9, 6:6 Exhibit [4] - 10:21. 10:23, 13:18, 42:20 exhibit [1] - 13:19 expect [2] - 28:8, 44:17 experience (1) - 18:20 explained [1] - 16:19 extend [1] - 11:12 extended [1] - 6:23 extensive [1] - 22:24 extensively [2] - 8:7, 16:19 exterior (6) - 5:2, 5:5, 7:4, 17:13, 23:21, 40:21 extremely [2] - 29:24, 47:19

#### F

fact [15] - 4:15, 18:20, 19:1, 23:9, 23:23, 25;7, 25:15, 29:6, 31:1, 35:17, 40:2. 40:23, 49:12, 51:15, 52:7 factors (1) - 22:3 facts [6] - 11:24, 13:24, 21:25, 38:18, 39;22, 45:21 factual [6] - 12:25, 39:3, 39:9, 40:13, 42:2, 50:25 failure [1] - 44:13 falls [2] - 42:8, 42:11 Falls [2] - 43:21, 43:25 family (1) - 8:19 far [4] - 21:5, 27:11, 30:4, 41:17 farmers [1] - 43:13 Farmers [1] - 6:1 FCC [1] - 8:25 Federal (39) - 6:12, 6:17, 6:19, 6:22,

8:20, 8:23, 8:25, 9:3, 10:2, 11:11, 11:16, 11:22, 13:20, 14:6, 14:9, 14:10, 14:11, 21:17, 21:19, 22:7, 28:8, 29:6, 32:3, 32:7, 32:9, 32:10, 32:18, 33:2, 33:4, 33:5, 33:21, 34:21, 37:4, 38:7, 44:10, 46:1, 46:3, 49:8, 53:19 federal [21] - 8:24, 11:17, 11:19, 12:19, 12:22, 14:15, 14:20, 14:25, 16:4, 16:7, 20:23, 22:4, 31:19, 31:22, 32:2, 32:14, 35:5, 43:8, 49:6, 49:17 federal/state [1] - 15:4 fee [2] - 13:8, 43:5 fellow (1) - 46:15 feit [2] - 18:22, 33:24 few [1] - 33:24 file [5] - 10:18, 11:1, 23:19, 45:19, 45:20 filed [18] - 3:2, 7:14, 9:14, 10:21, 10:24, 13:18, 15:24, 17:1, 19:23, 19:24, 27:11, 30:7, 30:16, 36:20, 36:21, 36:23, 44:11 FILED [1] - 1:4 final [2] - 27:6, 45:19 finally [3] - 7:11, 14:6, 44:22

financial [3] - 7:10, 44:1, 48:2 finish [2] - 27:16, 35:1 first [31] - 3:11, 3:25, 6:16, 7:19, 7:24, 9:14, 9:21, 11:4, 11:6, 11:9, 11:13, 12:2, 13:14, 18:23, 19:7, 19:23, 20:2, 20:9, 23:5, 26:10, 28:10, 33:19, 33:25, 34:5, 34:21, 37:4, 37:5, 38:21, 39:8, 42:5, 43:24 first-chance[1] -11:13 five [2] - 7:9, 15:24 flesh [1] - 39:11 fleshed [1] - 39:10

flowing [1] - 48:16

26:18, 28:16, 30:2,

follow [6] - 5:24,

30:21, 32:15

following [2] - 23:3, 26:15 follows [1] - 45:16 footnote [1] - 42:9 form [1] - 23:13 formed [1] - 23:14 forth [1] - 36:12 forum [1] - 14:15 forums (2) - 18:7, 36:11 forward [12] - 14:4, 15:5, 15:10, 19:17, 20:14, 24:18, 30:15, 37:14, 44:25, 46:1, 51:7, 51:8 four[1] - 7:7 frankly (1) - 46:23 free [2] - 43:6, 44:3 Free [1] - 43:12 frequently [1] - 48:25 front [5] - 4:12, 24:15, 32:6, 34:18, 51:4 full [3] - 14:12, 44:7, 49:23 fully (1) - 24:12 functioning [1] -24:12 functions (1) - 44:1 fundamental [3] -

follow-up [3] - 28:16,

30:2, 30:21

# G

7:16, 20:6, 20:7

GARY [1] ~ 1:11 generally [1] - 52:18 generated (1) - 21:7 gentlemanly [1] -47.12 given (4) - 14:5, 32:11, 44:19, 48:20 government [6] - 4:17, 12:16, 12:20, 14:1, 18:6, 18:24 Government [3] -26:2, 49:8, 49:9 grant [9] - 3:6, 3:8, 9:9, 14:25, 42:10, 42:14, 42:15, 46:23, 50:17 granted (6) - 5:11, 14:8, 17:6, 18:16, 27:24, 52:3 granting [4] - 8:2, 19:4, 20:12, 49:12 great (4) - 23:3, 32:11, 41:2 Greg [1] - 1:14

Gregg (1) - 1:15 ground [4] - 22:14, 22:16, 22:20, 23:1 guess [2] - 31:16, 36:8 guidance [1] - 19:20

#### Н

hand [2] - 4:20, 18:23 handle [3] - 3:11, 25:9, 33:21 Hanson [6] - 28:24, 31:14, 41:1, 50:2, 50:11, 55:2 HANSON [24] - 1:11, 3:17, 31:15, 31:24, 32:21, 33:22, 34:22, 35:14, 35:22, 36:19, 36:25, 37:15, 38:10, 38:24, 39:13, 46:17, 50:12, 51:11, 51:14, 52:17, 54:13, 54:17, 54:20, 55:3 Hanson's [1] - 41:7 hear[11] - 7:21, 9:13, 15:14, 15:17, 17:23, 24:13, 27:17, 32:22, 34:5, 36:15, 45:17 heard [7] - 9:12, 17:9, 34:9, 34:18, 46:2, 46:4, 53:24 hearing [10] - 17:7, 17:11, 17:20, 18:2, 18:9, 27:19, 42:12, 45:22, 53:5, 54:25 heavily (1) - 19:19 held [3] - 2:1, 17:7, 38:17 hence [1] - 18:2 HEREBY [1] - 56:8 Hicks (2) - 9:8, 14:24 hold [4] - 3:22, 17:10, 17:20, 18:8 Honor [1] - 53:1 hour [1] - 52:22 huge [1] - 29:12 hundreds (1) - 40:8

## - 1

ignore [1] - 44:5 implicate [1] - 12:22 implying [1] - 36:5 importance [3] -36:17, 41:8, 41:11 important [6] - 10:10, 12:18, 18:22, 25:3, 33:7, 48:23 improperly [1] - 5:21 IN [1] - 1:4 Indeed (2) - 5:13, 26:3 Independent [1] - 28:5 Indian [4] - 13:7, 18:15, 18:16, 18:19 Indians [1] - 13:9 Indicate [1] - 45:4 indicated [3] - 20:5, 32:4, 45:9 indicates [1] - 30:23 individuals [1] - 13:17 information (5) -46:12, 46:25, 47:2, 47:3, 51:9 Informed [1] - 44:8 infrastructure [1] -40:12 infused [1] - 30:11 initial (3) - 8:9, 21:24, 33:9 injunction [8] - 26:8, 26:19, 26:20, 27:5, 27:9, 27:23, 28:3, 30:4 Instead [1] - 14:3 Insurance [2] - 5:25, 6.1 intend [1] - 52.25 intended [1] - 20:22 intent (1) - 16:7 interest [1] - 12:22 Interexchange [1] -10:25 interfere (1) - 12:15 Internet [3] - 4:25, 40:8, 40:10 interpretation [1] -14:23 interpreted [4] -14:14, 14:17, 32:14, 33:3 interpreting [1] - 9:3 interstate [22] - 8:23, 9:1, 9:25, 10:3, 14:15, 24:7, 26:9, 26:13, 26:14, 29:5, 29:13, 29:15, 29:21, 29;23, 30:8, 30:10, 30:12, 31:2, 31:7, 31;10, 37:5, 38:16 Intertwined [1] - 30:18 intervene (1) - 45:17 Intervener [1] - 15:16 Intervener [3] - 16:13, 41:10, 53:3 Interveners [5] - 1:19, 15:18, 15:21, 35:3, 35:4 intra [6] - 10:13, 29:17, 31:5, 31:7,

48:18, 50:4 intra-reservation [2] -10:13, 48:18 Intra-tribe [1] - 50:4 Intrastate [28] - 9:23, 10.4, 10:7, 10:9, 10:12, 10:13, 10:17, 10:20, 10:22, 11:2, 11:5, 15:6, 21:10, 26:16, 26:17, 29:8, 30:4, 30:13, 30:25, 31:10, 38:21, 42:19, 42:21, 42:22, 44:14, 44:19, 51:25, 52:7 invoke [6] - 22:2, 32:8, 34:4, 36:13, 37:7 invoked [7] - 24:1, 24:14, 25:3, 26:3, 32:17, 34:21, 37:12 invoking [2] - 23:2, 32:12 involve [2] - 11:21, 14:20 involved [4] - 10:11, 10:25, 15:7, 27:11 involves [7] - 7:2, 7:3, 7:5, 7:7, 7:11, 38:13, 47:24 involving [1] - 14:15. lowa [2] - 5;25, 43:13 issue [23] - 7:16, 7:19, 7:20, 8:6, 10:10, 11:6, 12:7, 12:13, 15:12, 16:25, 17:8, 18:9, 19:7, 19:17, 19:21, 19:25, 28:19, 32:10, 33:2, 34:5, 35:4, 51:24 issued (1) - 5:8 issues [7] - 3:20, 4:14, 11:14, 33:18, 37:5, 39:9, 48:24 ltself (1) - 23:15 IXCs [2] - 42:21, 43:11

J

29:14, 45:14 judge-made [1] -11:10 iudicial [2] - 25:9, 25:12 Judiciary [1] - 11:11 July [2] - 36:22, 37:1 jump (1) - 29:1 jurisdiction [61] -4:21, 6:4, 7:18, 7:24, 8:22, 9:1, 9:2, 9:9, 9:19, 10;3, 11:15, 11:23, 12:3, 12:14, 14:22, 15:1, 16:8, 17:15, 17:18, 17:24, 18:1, 18:4, 18:9, 18:10, 18:17, 19:3, 19:5, 20:9, 21:10, 21:19, 23:16, 29:7, 29:17, 31:4, 32:23, 33:1, 33:4, 33:6, 33:10, 33:12, 34:8, 34:15, 34:17, 36:1, 36:6, 38:17, 39:7, 42:10, 42:15, 42:16, 47:6, 47:7, 47:9, 49:10, 49:15, 49:18, 50:7, 51:24, 52:2, 52:4, 52:15 jurisdictional (9) -7:20, 16:24, 17:8, 22:9, 23:5, 34:5, 34:6, 34:11, 48:24 jurisprudence [1] -18:15

Judge [13] - 24:3,

45;9, 46:4

judge's [3] - 29:4,

24:7, 26:7, 27:7,

29:11, 29:16, 30:3,

30:23, 37:3, 38:16,

Κ

Karen [2] - 1:13, 16:17 keen [1] - 46:14 keep [2] - 8:6 kept [1] - 43:24 kind [2] - 11:12, 28:7 Knadle [1] - 1:15 knowledge [2] - 24:4, 28:20 KNUDSON [9] - 8:13, 27:9, 27:22, 28:20, 30:5, 42:1, 42:5, 51:22, 52:25 Knudson [4] - 1:18, 8:14, 22:22, 52:17 KOLBECK [30] - 1:10, 3:1, 3:23, 8:10, 15:13, 16:12, 19:9, 20:16, 27:18, 28:24, 31:13, 39:19, 40:24, 42:3, 46:6, 48:13, 49:20, 50:11, 50:13, 51:13, 53:2, 53:12, 53:23, 54:4, 54:8, 54:15, 54:19, 54:22, 55:2, 55:4 Kolbeck (4) - 27:21, 39:20, 50:13, 55:4

L

lacked (1) - 8:21

lacks [1] - 18:21

land [3] - 13:8, 40:4, 40:6 (arger (1) - 50:5) last [5] - 8:20, 13:21, 25:5, 33:23, 34:1 launched [1] - 5;14 law [14] - 4:14, 16:5, 16:7, 16:20, 16:23, 16:24, 18:7, 18:19, 20:23, 22:4, 25:17, 49:6, 49:17 laws [3] - 4:24, 5:12, 23:14 lead (1) - 5:24 leading [1] - 26:14 leads [1] - 30:1 leaning [1] - 49:21 learned [1] - 43:8 least [2] - 22:8, 39:11 legislative (2) - 16:6, 25:12 Legislature (1) - 9:22 legislature [7] - 10:6, 10:8, 11:4, 12:2, 14:4, 42:17, 44:20 less [1] - 38:8 level [2] - 14:2, 20:25 liability (1) - 4:23 library [1] - 40:10 lies [1] - 14:22 Ileu [1] - 51:14 light [2] - 39:25, 41:13 likely [2] - 17:14, 29:17 ilmited (5) - 4:23, 6:22, 21:7, 26:8, 29:23 limiting [1] - 29:15 line [2] - 6:1, 26:1 lines [1] - 24:25 list (1) - 40:11 litigants [1] - 19:16

litigate (1) - 6:4 litigation [2] - 13:20, 43:9 live (1] - 13:3 ilves [1] - 43:21 LLC [6] - 1:5, 3:3, 23:14, 23:20, 23:24, 43:20 local [2] - 8:16, 29:18 located (2) - 5:19, 23:10 look j14j - 20:4, 20:6, 21:11, 21:25, 22:2, 22:3, 26:21, 36:8, 38:2, 38:6, 38:18, 40:19, 49:6, 51:2 looked [1] - 26:10 looking [3] - 26:25, 49:6, 50:3 love [1] - 27:17 LP [2] - 1:4, 3:2

M

majority [1] - 23:3 mandate [1] - 14:4 mandatory (1) - 32:6 March [2] - 5:20, 5;21 matter[18] - 2:2, 3:1, 4:12, 4:13, 11:11, 16:8, 16:19, 16:21, 17:8, 17:24, 18:1, 21:12, 24:20, 33:15, 37:9, 45:10, 53:22, 56:10 MATTER [1] - 1:4 matters [5] - 5:4, 17:23, 21:20, 38:21, 40:18 McComsey [2] - 1:22, 56:18 MCCOMSEY (1) - 56:5 mean [5] - 24:25, 31:6, 34:1, 36:14, 45:4 meaning [1] - 31:22 meant[1] - 27:8 melding [1] - 25:21 member [2] - 42:24, 42:25 members [9] - 4:4. 5:1, 6:8, 7:12, 13:4, 13:22, 15:20, 40:16, 50:21 mention [2] - 20:24, 49:9 mentioned [3] - 19:22, 23:8, 45:12 merely [1] - 19:6 merits [9] - 6:5, 9:17,

15:2, 15:10, 17:9. 34:8, 34:17, 39:4, met[1] - 45:24 microphone [2] -27:18, 42:4 midstate [1] - 15;17 Midstate [2] - 15;22, 53:5 might [5] - 26:6, 28:15, 30:20, 41:22, 53:10 migrated [1] - 43;25 million [1] - 43:10 mind [1] - 41:3 mine [1] - 41:2 missing [1] - 52:4 moment [2] - 24:2, 39:13 money (2) - 24:23, 38:2 months [6] - 9:15, 36:23, 37:10, 44:16, Morgan (1) - 8:14 morning (3) - 8:9, 15:19, 16:17 most (4) - 16:22. 20:13, 39:20 Motion [48] - 3:6, 3:7, 3:9, 4:7, 8:2, 9:20, 14:8, 15:9, 15:12, 16:1, 16:8, 17:5, 17:6, 19:4, 20:12, 27:23, 28:1, 46:20, 46:21, 46:22, 46:23, 48:6, 48:12, 48:13, 49:19, 49:22, 50:16, 50:17, 50:25, 51:3, 51:5, 51:8, 51:12, 51:16, 51:21, 52:3, 52:19, 53:8, 53:11, 54:2, 54:3, 54:5, 54:9, 54:13, 54:14, 54:18, 54:21, 54:23 motions [1] - 3:21 move [11] - 8:12, 15:5, 15:10, 20:13, 24:2, 37:13, 48:11, 49:19, 51:6, 51:8, 54:20 moving [4] - 4:3, 24:18, 24:24, 25:4 MR [39] - 4;4, 8:13, 19:11, 21:2, 22:15, 23:17, 24:6, 25:14, 27:9, 27:15, 27:20, 27:22, 28:20, 29:4, 30:5, 31:1, 31:22, 31:25, 32:25, 34:3, 35:13, 35:15, 36:7,

36:21, 37:2, 37:24, 38:15, 39:3, 39:18, 40:7, 41:14, 42:1, 42:5, 45:3, 50:21, 51:22, 52:25, 53:15, 54:1 MS (6) - 15:19, 16:17, 26:10, 26:21, 53:10, 54:6 multi (1) - 29:20 multi-states [1] -29:20 multiple [2] - 38:1, 38:9 must [1] - 52:3 Mutual [1] - 5:25

# N

name (1) - 15:20 NAT [37] - 4:22, 5:11, 5:14, 5:16, 5:22, 6:16, 10:24, 11:3, 11:25, 13:14, 13:21, 15:6, 17:12, 19:10, 19:23, 20:4, 23:13, 23:15, 23:18, 23:23, 27:11, 30:7, 30:16, 40:15, 40:16, 42:25, 43:9, 43:15, 43:23, 44:2, 44:6, 44:11, 45:18, 47:23, 51:8, 51:15, 53:19 NAT's [11] - 8:2, 8:22, 10:15, 14:11, 20:12, 39:1, 43:24, 48:11, 52:5, 54:3, 54:21 nation [2] - 6:17, 47:25 national [1] - 49:24 National (11 - 6:1) Native [8] - 1:19, 3:3, 3:6, 3:8, 4:2, 4:7, 50:17, 50:19 NATIVE [1] - 1:5 nature [1] - 39:21 necessarily (2) -17:21, 39:23 need (8) - 9:2, 9:10, 15:1, 18:2, 33:22, 34:24, 42:2, 47:18 needed [1] - 54:17 needs (4) - 17:7, 17:12, 42:6, 47:17 NELSON (23) - 1:11, 3:16, 20:19, 22:10, 23:7, 24:2, 25:5, 26:4, 26:18, 27:1, 27:16, 28:15, 28:22,

29:11, 41:1, 41:4, 50:9, 54:12, 54:25 nerve [1] - 44:5 network [1] - 43:18 Nevada (11 - 9:8) never [6] ~ 19:14, 19:16, 32:1, 35:17, 36:15, 45:17 new [5] - 22:14, 22:16, 22:20, 22:25, 41:16 New [1] - 6:20 next [2] - 8:12, 15:14 non [3] - 13:7, 13:9, 13:22 non-Indian [1] - 13:7 non-Indians (1) - 13:9 non-tribal [1] - 13:22 nonaction [1] - 53:8 none [2] - 45:24, 54:25 nonmember[1] -52:10 normally [1] - 19:3 North [2] - 25:18, 41:17 Notary [2] - 56:7, 56:18 note (1) - 19:13 noted (1) - 16:18 notes [3] - 37:16, 45:4, 45:5 nothing (2) - 28:21, 53:5 Notice [1] - 41:15 November [2] - 45:18, 45:20 nuances [2] - 18:19, 37:22

29:2, 30:1, 30:20,

Nelson [10] - 20:18,

55:1

31:11, 41:5, 41:25,

48:10, 48:22, 50:10,

23:18, 27:15, 28:25,

# numbers [1] - 48:14

number [10] - 7:3, 7:5,

7:7, 7:9, 21:2, 22:18,

22:20, 34:13, 34:15,

37:3

O'odham [1] - 6:17 objection [1] - 54:2 obligation [2] - 17:23, -18:4 obtain [1] - 24:17 obvious [2] - 31:6, -47:19

40:7, 41:19, 49:24, 50:2 occurring (1) - 19:1 October [3] - 5:10, 13:20, 45:16 odd [1] - 38:10 OF [6] - 1:2, 1:4, 2:1, 56:1, 56:3 office [1] - 23:19 offices [4] - 5:16, 5:18, 44:2, 44:3 often [1] - 46:13 omelet [1] - 46:18 once (1] - 35:23 one [26] - 5:13, 7:2, 10:24, 16:12, 18:11, 18:21, 21:3, 22:18, 26:5, 28:15, 33:14, 34:13, 34:14, 35:24, 35:25, 37:4, 37:24, 39:13, 40:25, 41:5, 41:7, 42:24, 45:24, 51:22, 52:8, 54:18 ongoing (1) - 47:17 Onida [1] - 56:13 open [4] - 13:6, 27:3, 27:5, 49:2 open-ended (2) - 27:3, 27:5 operated [2] - 43:5, operating [1] ~ 48:5 operation [1] - 23:12 opinion [5] - 3:13, 29:5, 29:14, 31:2, 31:8 opinions [1] - 46:15 opportunities [1] -7:12 opportunity [4] - 4:21, 11:13, 34:11, 47:1 opposed (2) - 29:19. 51:20 option [1] - 49:13 ordained [1] - 10:5 order [3] - 24:17, 27:23, 29:10 ordinary (1) - 38:23 organized [1] - 4:24 originally [1] - 36:20 originates [1] - 43;2 originating [t] - 10:14 otherwise [2] - 52:1, 54:1 ourselves [1] - 25:1

outside [7] - 13:12,

17:16, 19:1, 43:2,

obviously [11] - 3:20,

21:3, 22:15, 25:8,

33:1, 35:17, 37:10,

43:18, 50:6, 52:9 overall [1] - 10:1 own [6] - 4:21, 18:5, 20:9, 37:20, 37:21, 41:3 owned [4] - 4:23, 5:14, 7:2, 13:9

#### P

page [2] - 27:22, 52:6 paid [1] - 43:11 papers [1] - 10:21 parse [1] - 30:17 part [5] - 5:9, 16:22, 22:12, 24:7, 41:21 particular [5] - 9:6, 12:22, 12:24, 24:10, 53:21 parties [8] - 3:19, 16:18, 16:22, 26:15, 28:12, 38:1, 48:2, 51:20 party [3] - 4:3, 35:9, 52:24 Paso (1) - 14:17 pay [1] - 44:14 paying (2) - 5:21, 43:15 pending [4] - 4:13, 6:5, 44:12, 44:16 people [4] - 5:19, 13:3, 23:10, 40:3 percent [2] - 43:1, 43:11 perhaps (1) - 9:15 permit (1) - 18:8 permits [1] - 19:6 person [1] - 52:9 perspective (3) -24:23, 38:2, 38:3 physical [1] - 5:16 piece (1) - 43:4 Pierre [1] - 2:3 place [8] - 7:4, 11:6, 24:19, 37:1, 38:19, 44:5, 45:24, 47:20 plan [1] - 5:8 play [1] - 28:12 pleasure [1] - 28:9 point (16) - 13:14, 14:6, 15:11, 22:6, 26:12, 26:13, 28:23, 31:6, 39:12, 42:18, 44:22, 45:25, 46:21, 49:16, 50:24, 54:10 pointed (1) - 29:11 policies (1) - 18:5 policy [1] - 36;16

POLLMAN(t) - 15:19 Poliman [3] - 1:19, 15:20, 22:23 pool [1] - 14:23 population (1) - 13:7 portion [1] - 10:4 position [3] - 35:7, 41:16, 45:4 possible (1) - 26:1 Dossibly (1) - 34:1 potentially [1] - 29:19 power [2] - 30:6, 44:19 powers [2] - 25:11, 28:7 practica([1] - 20:13 practically [1] - 31:17 pragmatic [1] - 20:13 precedent [1] - 35:19 preempted [1] - 45:11 preemption [2] -45:15, 45:19 preliminary [1] - 27:23 premature [2] - 50:24, 51:6 prepared [5] - 25:9, 46:19, 46:22, 49:4, 49:18 present [2] - 3:14, 45:5 presentation [1] - 8:9 presenter [1] - 16:2 president [2] - 43:21, 43:22 presume [1] - 24:13 pretty (2) - 7:17, 20:22 prevent [1] - 30:14 previous [2] - 16:2, 41:18 Price [1] - 14:18 Price-Anderson (1) -14:18 primarily (1) - 6:12 principal [1] - 44:5 principle [1] - 18:14 principles [1] - 36:9 problem [2] - 17:25, 49:25 procedurally [1] -34:19 procedures [1] - 24:19 proceed [3] - 3:10, 19:3, 24:14 proceeding [4] - 41:9, 43:1, 44:11, 55:6 Proceedings [1] - 1:7 proceedings [7] - 4:9, 27:10, 27:13, 30:7, 38:1, 56:9, 56:12

PROCEEDINGS [1] -2:1 process [14] - 24:19, 35:9, 36:2, 36:3, 36:10, 38:8, 38:11, 38:12, 39:1, 45:7, 47:11, 47:15, 47:16, 47:22 processing [1] - 48:3 Professional [2] -56:6, 56:19 professor (1) - 25:18 progress (2) - 9:16, prohibit [1] - 37:19 prohibits [1] - 53:18 promote [1] = 12:19 promotes [1] - 4:17 promoting (2) - 14:1, 18:5 proper [1] - 39:10 proposing (1) - 13:10 proven [1] - 48:1 provide (4) - 5:11, 10:17, 19:19, 25:15 provides [2] - 4:25, 28.7 PUBLIC [2] - 1:1, 1:10 Public [4] - 33:12, 47:9, 56:7, 56:18 PUC (8) - 12:9, 12:14, 15:8, 32:22, 32:23, 34.18, 37:19, 47.7 pull [1] - 27:18 pure [1] - 44:13 pursue [1] - 34:24 pursuing [3] - 37:20, 53:18 put [2] - 21:5, 54:11

# Q

questions [16] - 3:7, 8:8, 20:17, 21:6, 26:5, 28:11, 28:23, 31:12, 31:17, 39:15, 39:20, 40:25, 41:4, 41:7, 46:7, 46:8 quick [1] - 29:1 quickly [1] - 19:11 quite [1] - 48:6 guote [1] - 27:22

# R

radiates [1] - 13:11 radio [1] - 13:11 rather [3] - 7:18,

16:19, 52:22 read [3] - 17:2, 26:12, 29:22 reading [3] - 27:4, 27:6, 29:24 ready [1] - 37:13 reaf [4] - 21:6, 26:12, 26:13, 44:15 realizes [1] - 33:4 really [4] - 7:17, 27:3, 44:12, 51:23 Realtime (2) - 56:6, 56:19 reason [3] ~ 25:20, 49:18, 52:18 reasonable [1] - 29:24 reasons [4] - 9:21, 15:25, 36:16, 48:6 rebuttal (1) - 19:10 received [2] - 27:25, 43:9 recognition [1] -18:24 recognize [5] - 7:1, 21:22, 33:6, 33:8, 37:22 recognized [2] -23:24, 29:16 recognizing [2] -36:16, 36:17 recollection (1) - 45:1 recommendation [3] -8:1, 8:4, 20:11 recommendations [1] - 17:4 recommended [1] -14:8 recommending (1) -9:17 recommends (1) - 8:1 record [8] - 5:9, 21:5, 41:22, 44:8, 45:2, 50:25, 51:2 records (1) - 43:24 redirect [1] - 27:2 reference [4] - 31:3, 35:10, 42:9, 45:11 referenced [1] - 14:19 references [1] - 31:2 regard [2] - 4:7, 17:18 REGARDING [1] - 1:5 regarding [8] - 3:3, 8:5, 17:5, 24:10, 35:19, 38:12, 45:10, 45:15 regards [1] - 34:25 Registered [2] - 56:5, 56:19

regulate [8] - 9:22,

10:4, 10:7, 10:9,

12:10, 15:6, 44:18, 52:15 regulated [1] - 20:23 regulating [1] - 11:5 regulation [3] - 9:24, 10:2, 20:24 regulatory [10] - 4:19, 6:14, 6:24, 7:7, 11:20, 20:1, 22:14, 22:19, 23:1, 32:20 Relman [3] - 10:23, 42:20, 43:20 relates [1] - 29:5 relating (2) - 30:15, 30:24 relationship (2) -43:16, 48:4 relationships (1) -25:24 relegated [1] - 21:12 relied [1] - 19:18 rellef [1] - 27:25 rely [4] - 17:3, 19:12, 41:18, 50:22 remedies [2] - 4:10, 6:6 remind [2] - 9:13, 12:25 repeat [2] - 16:3, 17:2 repeatedly [1] - 18:13 replete (2) - 31:2, 52:23 reply [1] - 45:21 Reported [1] - 1:22 Reporter [4] - 56:6, 56:19, 56:19 reporter [1] - 56:9 represent[1] - 41:19 representing [2] -8:15, **8**:18 requested (2) - 26:19, 27:25 requesting (1) - 4:8 require [1] - 11:18 Reservation (3) - 5:2, 12:9, 13:6 reservation [47] - 5:6, 5:12, 5:18, 5:19, 7:5, 7:11, 10:13, 13:3; 13:6, 13:8, 13:9, 13:13, 13:17, 17:14, 17:17, 19:2, 21:8, 21:14, 23:9, 23:11, 23:12, 23:22, 26:16, 38:14, 38:19, 39:2, 40:10, 40:11, 40:13, 40:16, 40:17, 40:20, 42;24, 42:25, 43:2, 43:3, 43:15, 43:18, 43:19, 47:21, 48:3,

48:18, 52:5, 52:9, 52:10, 52:11, 52:13 reserve [1] - 15:11 resident[1] - 52:9 resolved (1) - 17:8 respect [3] - 14:7, 36:5, 45:11 respond [1] - 28:4 responded (1) - 42:2 response [1] - 45:31 rest [1] ~ 15:11 result [2] - 9:11, 45:14 retire (1) - 47:1 revenue [1] - 43:12 revenues [1] - 43:9 reverse [1] - 3:7 reviewing [1] - 16:4 revolve [1] - 4:14 rise [1] - 14:2 Rislov [1] - 1:14 River [7] - 12:6, 12:9. 13:2, 13:25, 19:12, 19:16 Roberts [1] - 41:15 ROGERS [1] - 15:19 Rogers (4) - 1:19, 15:21, 17:1, 22:23 Rolayne [2] - 1:13, 53:8 role [1] - 29:9 rolfed [1] - 26:22 Room [1] - 2:3 room [1] - 45:6 rooted [1] - 18:14 router [1] - 40:5 RPR [1] - 1:22 rule [14] - 11:11, 11:13, 11:17, 11:19, 12:1, 12:3, 12:19, 32:24, 33:1, 35:5, 36:1, 42:8, 47:18 ruled [2] - 14:10, 14:14 Rules [1] - 16:5 ruling [6] - 14:10, 16:9, 24:3, 24:4, 26:7, 29:8 rulings (1) - 35:25 running [1] - 43:23 runs [1] - 20:1

sale (3) - 12:8, 12:11, 12:14 schedule [1] - 45:16 scheduling [2] -24:17, 44:23 Schreier [7] - 24:3,

27:7, 29:11, 29:16, 30:3, 30:23, 38:16 Schreier's [2] - 24:7, 26:7 scope (2) - 7:6, 7:8 Scott [4] - 1:18, 1:19, 8:14, 20:21 screams [1] - 22:5 screen [1] - 13:22 SDCL[1] - 53:17 SDN [2] - 15:17, 15:22 SDTA [3] - 15:17, 15:22, 53:5 second [1] - 11:6 secondly [1] - 19:22 Secretary [1] - 23:19 Section [1].- 10:19 see [6] - 24:9, 24:20, 32:9, 33:20, 37:7, 49:3 seem [6] - 20:8, 20:12, 24:23, 36:10, 38:3, 38:10 self[7] - 4:17, 12:16, 12:20, 14:1, 18:6, 18:24 self-determination (1) - 18:6 self-government [6] -4:17, 12:16, 12:20, 14:1, 18:6, 18:24 send [1] - 42:13 sense [5] - 3:25, 24:23, 38:4, 46:25, 49:16 sentences [1] - 33:24 separate [5] - 3:14, 3:16, 3:18, 25:15, 36:11 separately (1) - 3:24 separation [2] - 25:11, 28:7 September [2] - 5:7, 5:14 serve [2] - 13:16, 28:13 serves [1] - 28:9 service (4) - 3:4, 5:1, 13:23, 43:6 **SERVICES** [1] - 1:5 **\$ervices** [4] - 5:12, 9:25, 10:1, 15:7 set [5] - 9:24, 21:3, 36:12, 45:2, 45:15 sets [1] - 33:17 setups (1) - 40:8 several [4] - 9:21, 10:25, 20:19, 37:10 shall (4) - 3:5, 3:8, 3:9, 50:17

shed (2) - 39:25, 41:13 shorthand [2] - 56:9 showing [1] - 47:10 shows (1) - 39:1 significance [1] -14:21 significant [1] - 13:7 similar [3] - 13:1, 13:4, 13:24 simple [3] - 6:2, 7:17, 44:13 simply [10] - 5:24, 7:1, 21:7, 23:23, 24:8, 28:13, 39:6, 51:16, 51:19, 54:2 simultaneously (2) -38:5, 53:18 single [2] - 35:10, 45:25 Sloux (10] - 4:10, 5:3, 5:13, 15:14, 24:4, 25:8, 41:9, 43:21, 43:25, 53:2 situation [4] - 11:24, 13:24, 47:17, 47:19 slow [1] - 49:3 slowed [1] - 49:3 sole [1] - 10:9 solely (2) - 17:13, 26:8 someone (2) - 52:10, 52:19 sometime [1] - 45:23 somewhere [2] -10:14, 50:6 soon [1] - 19:23 sorry [5] - 8:17, 29:2, 41:23, 42:5, 54:16 sounded [1] - 33:24 sounds [1] - 35:7 SOUTH (2) - 1:2, 56:1 South [23] - 2:2, 2:4, 4:24, 8:17, 9:21, 10:14, 12:5, 19:13, 22:16, 23:15, 23:19, 23:24, 32:23, 35:10, 35:16, 37:19, 43:20, 44:18, 47:9, 47:24, 52:8, 56:7, 56:13 sovereign [2] - 21:13, 23:8 sovereignty [5] -18:24, 21:23, 33:8, 36:17, 41:8 specific [1] - 19:20 specifics (1) - 40:4 speculation [1] ~ 41:21 SPRINT [1] - 1:4

Sprint [31] - 1:18,

1:18, 3:2, 4:9, 5:21,

6:3, 6:6, 8:12, 8:15, 8:18, 8:22, 9:14, 10:16, 10:24, 17:16, 19:12, 19:19, 19:23, 26:19, 26:23, 27:4, 27:16, 27:19, 30:2, 31:19, 34:10, 42:19, 45:20, 47:25, 51:22, 53:18 Sprint's [12] - 9:13, 9:16, 9:19, 10:11, 10:22, 12:4, 14:5, 15:7, 27:23, 36:23. 38:25, 49:14 squarely [1] - 52:14 SS [1] - 56:2 stability (1) - 7:10 Staff [19] - 8:1, 8:4, 16:16, 16:18, 17:1, 17:5, 17:6, 18:11, 20:5, 20:11, 26:6, 35:3, 50:23, 51:6, 53;25, 54:4, 54:6 STAFF [1] - 1:12 Staff's [2] - 14:7, 17:4 standpoint [2] - 46:19, 47:15 start [4] - 4:3, 20:20, 24:18, 25:4 starting [1] - 46:17 State [24] - 2:2, 4:24, 6:14, 6:23, 10:14, 11:19, 11:25, 12:10, 12:14, 12:20, 20:23, 22:18, 23:14, 28:8, 31:20, 32:19, 35:6, 35:10, 42:16, 44:18, 47:24, 49:9, 56:7 state [12] - 6:24, 10:4, 10:6, 11:20, 11:22, 11:25, 16:5, 29:18, 31:20, 32:20, 35:6, 46:20 STATE [2] - 1:2, 56:1 State's [1] - 23:19 statement [2] - 33:23, 47:14 statements (1) - 42:2 states [4] - 4:18, 11:8, 11:17, 29:20 States [3] - 5:24, 9:4, 18:15 stay (8) - 3:7, 3:11, 3:25, 4:8, 4:20, 14:7, 20:12, 36:4 Stay (11) - 4:7, 8:2, 9:20, 14:8, 15:10, 16:1, 16:8, 17:5,

19:4, 46:23, 48:12

staying [1] - 18:23

STEVE[1] - 1:10 still (1) - 46:4 stipulated (1) - 45:22 stopped (1) - 14:13 straight [2] - 9:7, 45:2 straightforward [1] -14:25 strange [1] - 38:22 Strate [2] - 14:24, 42:6 stressing (1) - 18:14 structure [2] - 4:22, 33:17 subject [4] - 5:12, 17:24, 18:1, 23:15 submissions [1] -41:18 submit (2) - 13:25, 16:9 submitted [1] - 15:23 subordinated [1] -18:4 subsequently (1) -46:3 substantial [3] - 13:8, 40:12, 48:16 suggested [1] - 45:17 SULLY [1] - 56:3 sum [1] - 7:16 summarize (1) - 17:4 supported [1] - 7:13 Supreme [13] - 5:25, 9:5, 12:5, 12:10, 12:16, 12:20, 14:24, 16.6, 18:15, 19:13, 35:16, 35:18, 35:20 suspect [1] - 48:25 sweeping [1] - 27:11 SWIER [29] - 4:4, 19:11, 21:2, 22:15, 23:17, 24:6, 25:14, 27:15, 27:20, 29:4, 31:1, 31:22, 31:25, 32:25, 34:3, 35:13, 35:15, 36:7, 36:21, 37:2, 37:24, 38:15, 39;3, 39:18, 40:7, 41:14, 50:21, 53:15, 54.1 Swier [20] - 1:19, 8:11, 9:6, 9:12, 9:17. 11:21, 20:20, 27:19, 28:17, 28:25, 29:3, 30:21, 31:16, 39:17, 39:21, 39:25, 41:6, 45:12, 51:23, 53:14 Swier's [3] - 45:3, 47:13, 49:11 switched [1] - 43:18

stem (1) - 46:7

step [1] - 14:3

switching [1] - 38:13 { system (4] - 5:15, 24:12, 47:24, 48:5

### Т

table [2] - 8:16, 51:18 talks [1] - 10:20 tariff [3] - 10:18. 10:19, 30:10 TC10-026 (2) - 1:5, 3:1 technical [1] - 39:21 technicality (1) - 41:2 technology [3] -13:10, 13:11 TELECOM [1] - 1:5 Telecom [4] - 1:19, 3:3, 4:2, 4:8 telecom [1] - 9:25 telecommunication [2] - 5:17, 9:25 TELECOMMUNICATI ONS [1] - 1:5 telecommunications [10] - 3:4, 5:5, 5:8, 5:11, 5:16, 7:2, 9:23, 10:5, 38:12, 48:5 teleconference [1] -4:6 telephone [8] - 1:19, 4:25, 5:15, 12:8, 12:11, 43:18, 45:6, 50:19 telephone's [2] - 3:6, 3:9 tenets (4) - 20:6, 20:7, 22:3, 37:24 tentative [1] - 45:15 terminate [2] - 39:2, terminating [4] - 5:22, 10:16, 40:1, 43:10 terms [3] - 12:11, 23:1 testimony [1] - 13:20 THE 间 - 1:1, 1:2, 1:4, 1:10 themselves [2] -17:21, 41:12 therefore [1] - 12:23 they've (1) - 43:25 thirdly [1] - 44:10 thoroughly [2] -16:19, 26:12 thoughts [1] - 41:20 three [3] - 7:5, 25:15, 26:2 throughout [5] -22:22, 23:3, 29:14, 31.8, 32.22

ties [1] - 14:22 Tobin [4] - 1:18, 8:16, 44:24, 44:25 TOBIN [1] - 45:3 today [13] - 3:5, 4:6, 5:24, 8:14, 8:18, 15:21, 41:11, 42:12, 46:15, 46:20, 48:15, 49:5, 53:22 Tohono | 13 - 6:17 token [1] - 49:1 Tom (3) - 1:18, 8:16, 43:20 took [4] - 30:18, 45:5, 45:24, 56:9 totality [2] - 18:13, 29:22 totally [1] - 33:20 toward (11 - 39:4) towards [4] - 16;15. 39:20, 39:22, 41:2 towers [2] - 5:17, 5:18 traffic [49] - 8:23, 9:23, 10:3, 10:5, 10:7, 10:10, 10:12, 10:13, 10:14, 10:18, 10:20, 10:23, 11:2, 11:5, 14:16, 15:6, 17:11, 18:25, 21:7, 21:10, 24:10, 29:6, 29:8, 29:13, 29:20, 29:23, 30:4, 30:8, 30:12, 30:25, 31:7, 31:8, 31:10, 38:25, 40:2, 42:19, 42:22, 42:23, 43:1, 44:19, 47:20, 48:16, 50:1, 50:4, 51:25, 52:8 trafficking [1] - 47:23 TRANSCRIPT [1] - 2:1 Transcript[1] - 1:7 transcription [1] -56:12 traveled (1) - 29:20 tremendous (1) - 48:2 trespass [1] - 3:21 tribal [51] - 4:10, 4:11, 4:17, 4:18, 7:8, 7:18, 8:5, 10:19, 11:13, 12:15, 12:19, 13:4, 13:22, 14:1, 18:5, 18:24, 19:17, 19:20, 19:25, 20:3, 20:24, 21:18, 21:22, 22:2, 22:3, 22:5, 22:12, 23:25, 24:14, 25:3, 27:10, 28:6, 28:9, 28:14, 33:2, 35:4, 35:5, 35:11, 35:16, 39:23, 40:2, 40:4,

40:6, 40:16, 41:17, 44:4, 44:11, 48:4, 49:9, 49:12 Tribal [93] - 4:14, 4:16, 4:20, 5:4, 5:10, 6:4. 6:6, 6:7, 6:9, 6:11, 6:13, 6:21, 7:6, 7:18, 7:19, 7:22, 7:23, 8:2, 9:9, 10:18, 11:7, 11:14, 11:23, 14:9, 14:12, 18:20, 19:5, 19:6, 19:14, 19:24, 20:6, 20:8, 21:16, 21:20, 21:23, 22:8, 23:2, 23:4, 24:5, 24:8, 24:11, 24:24, 25:4, 27:10, 28:2, 28:3, 28:13, 28:18, 29:19, 30:6, 30:7, 30:14, 30:16, 31:22, 31:25, 32:5, 33:3, 33:8, 33:9, 33:11, 33:16, 33:18, 33:25, 34:3, 34:5, 34:6, 34:7, 34:9, 34:14, 34:16, 35:23, 36:5, 36:18, 36:20, 37:1, 37:7, 37:21, 38:4, 38:11, 39:7, 39:11, 41:8, 41:10, 42:13, 42:16, 44:12, 45:7, 46:5, 47:5, 47:7, 47:11, 47:21 tribally [3] - 4:23, 5:14, 7:2 tribe [19] - 7:6, 18:8, 18:18, 25:11, 25:20, 25:25, 36:1, 36:3, 37:20, 38:22, 45:17, 45:18, 48:20, 49:23, 50:3, 50:4, 50:7 Tribe [8] - 4:10, 5:3, 5:13, 15:15, 25:8, 25:16, 25:25, 53:3 Tribe's [1] - 8:21 tribe's [2] - 7:9, 7:12 tribunal (1) - 9:18 tried [1] - 28:25 trouble [1] - 27:19 true [2] - 48:15, 56:11 turn [1] - 16:15 two [12] - 3:14, 3:21, 6:16, 7:3, 11:21. 22:20, 34:13, 34:15, 35:24, 36:11, 36:22, 52:22 type [4] - 13:10, 14:2, 17:11, 33:18

typical [1] - 43:16

U

U.S.C [5] - 8:24, 10:1, 14:14, 15:4, 20:21 ultimately [2] - 9:12, 26:24 unanimously [1] -32:12 under[9] - 4:24, 7:22, 21:16, 23:14, 25:10, 29:7, 46:14, 49:17, 53:17 underlying [1] - 14:1 understood [1] - 42:6 unfortunately [3] -19:18, 34:23, 35:18 Union [1] - 6:1 unique [6] - 21:3, 21:11, 21:15, 22:17, 38:18, 38:20 United [3] - 5:24, 9:4, 18:15 University (1) - 25:18 unless (1) - 8:7 unnecessary [1] -47:14 up [13] - 9:24, 10:15, 12:13, 25:18, 26:15, 26:18, 28:16, 30:2, 30:21, 45:15, 49:3, 53:22, 54:11 urge (3) - 9:20, 15:9, 16:9 usage (1) - 42:20 user[1] - 39:2 utilities [1] - 43:13 UTILITIES [2] - 1:1, 1:10 Utilities [2] - 33:13, 47:9 utility [2] - 20:22, 41:17 Utility [9] - 5:4, 5:7, 5:10, 7:6, 10:19, 15:15, 41:10, 41:19, 53:3

٧

various (2) - 21:19, 25:21 venus (1) - 39:10 venues (1) - 38:9 verbatim (1) - 16:2 via (1) - 4:5 VICE (1) - 1:11 violation (2) - 28:3, 44:13 virtually [1] - 39:1 volume [2] - 50:1, 50:5 voluminous [1] - 7:14 vote [3] - 49:22, 50:8, 54:11 votes [2] - 50:14, 55:5

W

wait [1] - 35:1 waiting [2] - 24:9, 24:20 wants [2] - 21:22 western [1] - 6:19 whatsoever [2] -25:24, 49:9 Whiting (2) - 8:17, 45:5 whole [1] - 45:10 widevoice [1] - 43:22 Wiest [2] - 1:13, 53:25 WIEST [1] - 53:10 willing [2] - 45:1, 48:6 WiMAX [2] - 13:10. 43:22 Winner [1] - 8:16 wish [4] - 3:20, 48:9, 52:19, 52:20 wishes [1] - 52:22 wishing [1] - 53:13 withdraw (1) - 52:19 witness [1] - 13:21 Wittler[2] - 1:22, 56:18 WITTLER [1] - 56:5 word [2] ~ 37:16, 52:5 words [1] - 11:12 works [1] - 34:4 wrestle [1] - 41:3 wrote [1] - 37:16

Y

year [2] - 5:13, 13:21 York [1] - 6:20